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Abstract
The fight against corruption emerged as one of the most significant issues
during the 2004 enlargement and gained even more importance with the
accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. This thesis examines the European
Union (EU) policy against corruption in the context of the accession of the
Central and Eastern European countries in 2004. Its prime objective is to
illustrate the differences between EU policy towards existing Member States and
the candidate countries in this area. The thesis outlines the legal bases and
historical development of the EU anti-corruption framework, and goes on to
show that the enlargement process has profoundly transformed this policy
framework. It analyses how the fight against corruption became one of the EU
membership criteria and explains that accession policy forced the EU to create
new institutions and mechanisms to address the problem of corruption within the
candidate countries. The thesis also argues that the experience gained by the
EU in the 2004 enlargement led to a more robust anti-corruption stance during
the accession of Bulgaria and Romania and will have implications for any future
enlargements of the EU. However, the thesis further points at the limited nature
of the anti-corruption framework that applies to existing Member States and
argues that it does not respond to the urgent need to enhance anti-corruption
standards within the EU. The thesis suggests that the EU should use the
experience gained within the pre-accession process to develop a more coherent
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Introduction
Since the end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, corruption has emerged as
a major political issue and a serious impediment to efforts for social and economic
development in the region. As a result of the biggest enlargement process in the
European Union (EU) history, eight post-communist countries (the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) joined the EU in
2004.
The pre-accession process coincided with the collapse of communism and the
EU was in a unique position to guide the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries
in their democratic and economic transitions. Combating corruption gained
unprecedented importance during this process. It was recognised as a central element of
democratic governance and the rule of law and became an explicit condition for EU
membership. Throughout the pre-accession period, the EU attempted to tackle the issue
of corruption in the CEE countries. The EU influenced the national anti-corruption
policies and demanded reforms from the candidate countries in a way that had never
occurred within the EU Member States.
This thesis does not offer a systematic treatment of the causes of the
phenomenon of corruption or its principal characteristics. Therefore, there is also no
significant analysis of the capacity of legal regulation to penetrate this phenomenon and
bring about effective change. Instead, the thesis focuses on the EU anti-corruption policy
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in the specific context of the 2004 enlargement. In particular, it answers three important
questions: what is the policy of the EU against corruption within the CEE countries after
accession? Is this policy enough to address the problem of corruption across the Member
States? And, if not, should the EU develop a more comprehensive framework?
The thesis builds upon six crucial findings:
• The EU does not have a clear competence under either the EC or the EU
Treaty to prevent and combat corruption within the Member States.
• The extent of corruption within the CEE candidate countries forced the
EU to develop a new anti-corruption policy for the purpose of the
enlargement process.
• Accession represented a challenge but also a great opportunity to
influence reforms in the post-communist countries. The enormous
leverage within the accession process allowed the EU to influence the
anti-corruption policies of the candidate countries to an unprecedented
degree.
• The candidate countries had to comply with broad anti-corruption
standards and their national policies were under rigorous scrutiny by the
EU. The focus was on formal compliance with the EU and international
instruments against corruption, rather than implementation of
fundamental anti-corruption reforms. The EU did not fully take
advantage of the potential offered by the accession process and its efforts
were hamstrung by the lack of a framework against corruption within the
Member States.
• As a result of the 2004 enlargement, the EU acquired experience in
setting the anti-corruption standards and evaluating progress in meeting
them across the countries. The EU used this experience in its policy
towards Romania and Bulgaria to develop a more robust system of post-
accession monitoring.
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• Corruption in the new Member States is an ongoing challenge and should
continue to be a priority. The lack of coherent anti-corruption framework
within the EU and the disappointing results of the accession process may
discredit plans for further enlargement of the EU.
I will argue that the EU should develop a more coherent anti-corruption policy
for three main reasons. First, the existing anti-corruption framework does not respond to
the urgent need to enhance the anti-corruption standards across the Member States and
to provide adequate monitoring of those standards. Second, the EU policy does not
safeguard the achievements of the pre-accession process, and as a result, the anti-
corruption standards are diminished once a country joins the EU. Third, it is appropriate
for the EU to act strongly against corruption, as it has the necessary tools and the
political capacity to develop an adequate strategy to tackle this problem.
The argument is presented in the legal and political context as of 30 November
2007, except where otherwise indicated. It is set out in seven chapters. Chapter One
discusses why corruption emerged as an international policy issue in the 1990s and
surveys the major international initiatives in this area. The chapter also introduces the
EU's definition of corruption and points at strengths and weaknesses of this definition.
Finally, the chapter analyses the causes of corruption in the CEE countries and explains
the importance of the fight against corruption for the success of democratic transitions of
these countries.
Chapter Two introduces a legal and historical context for the development of the
EU policy. The chapter analyses the EU legal powers in the area of anti-corruption under
the EC and EU Treaties. The chapter argues that while the EU powers under the EC
Treaty are limited by legal factors, the action against corruption under the EU Treaty is
constrained by the lack of the political will of the Member States to give up this national
field of competence. Next, the chapter moves on to explain that the EU approached
corruption in its own unique way through policies aiming at ensuring the proper
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functioning of the internal market and protection of the European Communities' (EC)
financial interests.
Chapter Three presents an overview of the EU anti-corruption framework. The
chapter underlines the limited nature of the EU anti-corruption framework in comparison
to the relevant international initiatives. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the EU
system for monitoring the implementation of the anti-corruption instruments is
fragmented and ineffective.
Chapter Four explains how the fight against corruption became one of the central
conditions for EU membership. The chapter argues that the EU was in a unique position
to affect the domestic policy making in the CEE countries. The chapter also examines
when in the pre-accession process the EU potential to influence the content of
anti-corruption reforms was the greatest.
Chapter Five analyses how the EU evaluated the extent of corruption within the
CEE candidate countries. The chapter discusses the new mechanisms and institutions in
this area developed by the EU for the purposes of the pre-accession policy. Finally, the
chapter points at weaknesses and the limited nature of the EU evaluation.
Chapter Six focuses on the EU strategy against corruption within the candidate
countries. The chapter begins with discussion of anti-corruption standards set by the EU,
making a clear distinction between requirements of the acquis and informal standards
developed by the EU specifically for the CEE countries. Finally, using the example of
Poland, the chapter assesses the impact of the EU accession on the anti-corruption
policies of the candidate countries and points at its limits.
Chapter Seven evaluates the impact of the 2004 enlargement on the EU policy
against corruption. The chapter shows the reinforcement of the EU anti-corruption
strategy towards Romania and Bulgaria and argues that verification mechanisms
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developed by the EU are ineffective. Furthermore, the chapter examines the possible
developments of the EU policy against corruption.
Finally, the conclusion will present the specific policy recommendations. The
case will be made that the EU should develop its own soft law anti-corruption
framework in the form ofmutually agreed non-legally binding policy recommendations.
5
1
Corruption: concept, importance and
international response
Corruption is not a new phenomenon. However, it was only in the 1990s that it first
emerged as a global policy problem that could no longer be addressed purely through
domestic means. In the era of globalisation, a truly international response involving
major international policy players is vital to the success of anti-corruption initiatives.
The goal of this chapter is to introduce the central concept of corruption and give
an overview of the major international instruments in this area. To this end, the chapter
starts with a discussion of the definition of corruption adopted by the EU.1 It points out
the strengths and weaknesses of this definition and contrasts it with definitions adopted
by other international organisations. Following this discussion, the chapter moves on to
analyse the prevalence, causes and consequences of corruption in the CEE candidate
countries.
1 The term EU is normally used throughout the thesis, even when it is in some cases only the first pillar of
the EU. The term Community is referred to when it is necessary for clarity of competences under the first
pillar.
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EU policy within the accession process was based on the perception that
corruption in the CEE candidate countries was more widespread than in the Member
States. This chapter examines this claim by presenting evidence of corruption within the
CEE countries before the accession. In addition, the chapter discusses why the heritage
of communism and the nature of political and economic transitions made the CEE
countries particularly vulnerable to corruption.
Beyond this, the chapter goes on to look at the emergence of international
cooperation against corruption in the 1990s and explains why corruption became an
international policy problem. Furthermore, the chapter also surveys the major
multilateral initiatives against cormption, shows the evolution of international
cooperation and discusses how international organisations can help in preventing and
combating cormption across countries. Finally, the chapter examines the monitoring
mechanisms relevant to the fight against cormption and emphasises the importance of an
effective evaluation system for a success of the anti-cormption initiatives.
1. The EU's definition of corruption
When researching cormption, it is apparent from the outset that there is no single and
agreed definition as to what constitutes cormption. The concept of cormption is subject
to an ongoing debate among political scientists, lawyers, economists and social
scientists, who all focus on different aspects of cormption. As has been pointed out, 'no
precise definition of corruption can be found which applies to all forms, types and
degrees of cormption, or which would be accepted universally as covering all acts,
which are considered in every jurisdiction as constituting cormption.'2
2 Council of Europe, 'Programme ofAction Against Corruption, Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption'
(1996), GMC (96) 95, at 14.
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While the classical definitions of corruption referred to destruction of public
morality and 'a decline ...of the virtues ...of a state or a ruler'3, modern definitions
focus on the actions of individuals and their '...discretionary freedom or power in the
decision making process.'4 According to one of the most cited definitions in the
literature introduced by Klitgaard, corruption is likely to occur in conditions where an
official has monopoly power and a degree of discretion over certain goods or services,
and where the system of accountability is weak.5
The European Parliament (EP) provided its first definition of corruption in 1995
as ' ...the behaviour of persons with public or private responsibilities who fail to fulfil
their duties because a financial or other advantage has been granted or directly or
indirectly offered to them in return for actions or omissions in the course of their
duties.'6 In its first Communication on EU policy against corruption in 1997, the
Commission clarified this concept by stating that corruption refers to '...any abuse of
power or impropriety in the decision making process brought about by some undue
inducement or benefit.'7 In 1998 this definition was endorsed by the European Court of
Auditors.8
The Commission subsequently refined the concept of corruption at the EU level
in 2003 as an 'abuse of power for private gain'9 explicitly stating that this definition
embraces both the public and private sectors. It is important to emphasise that, as far as
the definition of corruption is concerned, the EU was in the avant-garde. In contrast to
3
U. von Alemann, 'The unknown depths of political theory: The case for a multidimensional concept of
corruption' (2004) Crime, Law & Social Change 42, 25-34, at 26.
4 P. C. van Duyne, 'Will "Caligula" go transparent?' (2001) Forum on Crime and Society, Vol. 1 No. 2,
73-98, at 74.
5 R. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988), at 75.
6
European Parliament, 'Resolution on combating corruption in Europe' (1995), A4-0314/1995, OJ C
017/443,22.01.1996.
7 Commission (EC), 'Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
on a Union policy against corruption', COM(97) 192 final, 21.05.1997, at. 1.
8 Court of Auditors, 'Special Report No 8/98', OJ C 230, 22.7.1998, para 6.1.
9 Commission (EC), 'Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and
the European Economic and Social Committee on a comprehensive EU policy against corruption',
COM(2003) 317 final, 28.5.2003, at 6.
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definitions employed by other international agencies, which placed the public sector at
the centre, the EU's definition of corruption, since its first formulation in 1995, included
both public and private sectors. The Commission emphasised that it did not wish to
adopt traditional definitions followed by the World Bank and the leading non¬
governmental organisation in this area, Transparency International, which viewed
corruption as 'the use of one's public position for illegitimate private gains.'10 Over
time, Transparency International also adopted a broader definition of corruption as 'the
misuse of entrusted power for private gain'11 to include the private sector. The World
Bank's definition, however, remains deliberately confined to the public sector, as the
World Bank lends primarily to governments and supports government policies,
programs, and projects.12
At the outset only public sector corruption (corruption carried out by and against
public officials) was subject to studies and legal regulation at national and international
levels. Regulation of private sector corruption (corruption within business activities) is
more recent. This late response can be attributed to the perception that the owners of
companies would take the necessary measures to prevent employees from acting in ways
that are likely to harm the organization and that there are fewer incentives for corruption
in the private sector, as in economies with effective competition inefficient behaviour is
penalised by the market.13 Over time, however, an agreement emerged that private sector
corruption constituted a serious problem and had to be met with an international
response. There were three main reasons for this. First, the private sector corruption also
had international ramifications. Second, it has been pointed out that 'the private sector is
larger than the public sector in many countries, and the line between the two sectors is
10 Ibid.
11
Transparency International, 'Frequently asked questions about corruption', see:
<http://www.transparency.Org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq#faqcorrl> accessed 9 December 2007.
12 World Bank, 'Helping Countries combat corruption: The role of the World Bank' (1997), at 9
<http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf> accessed 9 December 2007.
13
A. Argandona, 'Private-to-private Corruption' (2003) Journal of Business Ethics 47, 253-267, at 253.
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blurred by privatisation, outsourcing and other developments.'14 Third, as Webb has
noted, the huge economic influence of multinational corporations and the leverage they
had in relation to states, meant that they also had to be a target of an international anti-
corruption strategy.15
When defining corruption for the purposes of EU policy, the Commission drew a
distinction between a narrow criminal law definition and a broader concept of corruption
as an 'abuse of power for private gain' used for purposes of prevention policy. A similar
distinction is also reflected in the policies of other leading international organisations in
the area of anti-corruption, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe.
For the purposes of prevention, the UN accepts the same definition of corruption as the
EU.16 Meanwhile, the Council of Europe adopts a slightly narrower approach by
accepting that the definition of corruption cannot be unduly broad and cover a number of
general offences committed by people in the course of their employment, such as fraud,
embezzlement, theft and other acts which prejudice the employer and explains that
' ...corruption is not about putting one's fingers in the till but more about the abuse of
power or improbability in the decision-making process.'17
The EU restricts its criminal law definition to 'passive' and 'active' bribery. In
short, 'passive' bribery refers to taking bribes and 'active' bribery refers to giving bribes
by a person who induces corruption. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter
Three, the definition of bribery adopted in EU instruments does not differ in any
substantial way from bribery as defined in other international instruments. However, it is
important to emphasise that bribery is only one of the types of corruption, and there are
14
Transparency International Press Release, 'UN Convention must criminalise private sector corruption'
(2003)
<http://www.transparencv.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2003/2003_03_ll_un_convention>
accessed 9 December 2007.
15 P. Webb, 'The United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Global Achievement or Missed
Opportunity?' (2005) Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8 No. 1, 191-229, at 213.
16 United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 'Global Dynamics of Corruption, The
role of the United Nations Helping Member States Build Integrity to Curb Corruption' (2002), at 3
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp3.pdf> accessed 9 December 2007.
17 Council of Europe (n 2), at 15.
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many other common forms, such as favouritism, nepotism, embezzlement, trading in
influence, buying votes or illegal political party financing.18
In contrast to the EU, the UN and the Council of Europe adopt broader
approaches and criminalise other types of corruption as well. The UN Convention
Against Corruption (UNCAC) adopted in 2003 focuses on the criminalisation of specific
types of corrupt conduct, such as bribery, embezzlement, trading in influence and abuse
of functions.19 The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on corruption
prescribes criminalisation of bribery offences and trading in influence.20 It is also worthy
of note that the Council of Europe introduced the definition of corruption, for the
purposes of civil law, as 'requesting, offering, giving or accepting directly or indirectly a
bribe or any other undue advantage or the prospect thereof, which distorts the proper
performance of any duty or behaviour required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue
advantage or the prospect thereof.'21
The distinction between the criminal-law definition and the broader concept of
corruption adopted for the purposes of prevention is very important. Criminal law
definitions constitute a basis for prosecuting offenders and therefore must be clear-cut
and precise. Clarity of definition is a safeguard against the discretionary power of public
authorities. As a result, the criminal law usually does not define corruption in a broader
18 For discussion see: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 'The Global Programme Against
Corruption. UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit' (3rd edn, Vienna 2004)
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publications_toolkit_sep04.pdf> accessed 9 December 2007.
19 Articles 15-19 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, Resolution 58/4 (adopted 31
October 2003, entered into force 14 December 2005) (the UNCAC)
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention_cormption/signing/Convention-e.pdf> accessed 9
December 2007.
20 Articles 2-12 Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Cormption, ETS No.: 173 (adopted 27
January 1999, entered into force 1 July 2002) (the Criminal Law Convention)
<http://conventions.coe.intArreatv/Commun/OueVoulezVous.asp?NT=173&CM=l&DF=7/l 1/2007&CL=
ENG> accessed 9 December 2007.
21 Council of Europe, 'Civil Law Convention on Cormption: Explanatory Report' ETS No.: 174
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treatv/EN/Reports/Html/174.htm> accessed 9 December 2007.
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sense, but is restricted only to certain types of corrupt conduct, which can be more
precisely defined, such as taking or giving bribes.22
The concept of corruption for the purposes of prevention must be more inclusive.
As the Council of Europe has been noted:
...no comprehensive and all-embracing strategy in the fight against corruption can ever
be formulated, if one were to limit such measures to criminal corruption alone. ...a
corrupt practice or system might not as yet be considered by law an offence, but such an
omission would not render it less corrupt in its character.23
The concept used for purposes of prevention should embrace the criminal law definition,
but it cannot be limited to it. Apart from criminalisation, a comprehensive anti-
corruption strategy must focus on enhancing integrity and accountability. Criminal law
regulations are not flexible enough to embrace all types of corrupt conduct. The concept
of corruption employed for the purposes of prevention should target not only the
conduct, which is illegal at a given time, but also activity that is unethical. Adoption of a
broader concept also ensures that no corrupt conduct will be excluded from policy in the
future.
The EU's definition of corruption as the 'abuse of power for private gain' is
broad enough to include most forms of corruption. Its scope, however, is not entirely
clear. Questions arise how to define vague concepts like 'abuse of power' or 'private
gain'. As Alemann has noted, this '...definition starts from the assumption that a
concrete, formal and informal system of laws and norms exists which is accepted by all
sides' and that is not the case.24 Often the rules may not be exactly defined as to what is
allowed and what is not. For example, it is hard to state in a clear way how big the
private gain should be in order to fall under this definition. Some authors have agued
22 United Nations (n 16).
23 Council of Europe (n 2), at 16.
24Alemann (n 3), at 29.
12
that there ought to be a threshold value in order to exclude minor benefits, such as in the
extreme example where a civil servant takes a pencil belonging to his employers.25
At the same time, however, there is a strong argument for the adoption of a
vague and imprecise definition, especially by international organisations such as the EU.
The concept of corruption adopted for the purposes of international policy should be
more inclusive than the one adopted at the national level, where the agreement as to
what constitutes corruption is easier to reach. For an international organisation, that is
trying to assist in formulating national anti-corruption strategies, this policy concept
must '...take into account as many voices and perspectives as possible.'26 Definitions
and perceptions of corruption vary across countries depending on different historical,
cultural and social traditions. As Csonka has pointed out, corruption is primarily a moral
issue.27 What constitutes corruption in one society may be acceptable as a customary
practice in another. Therefore, at the international level the aim should be to adopt a
concept that could embrace various definitions of corruption across societies.
2. Case study: Corruption in the Central and Eastern European countries
2.1. The prevalence of corruption in the post-communist countries
As will be discussed in Chapter Four, the fight against corruption became a membership
condition for the first time within the accession process of the CEE countries. The EU
created new institutions and developed anti-corruption standards to guide and assist
these countries with their anti-corruption reforms. This policy developed as a result of
the perception that corruption in the CEE candidate countries constituted a more serious
problem than in the old Member States.
25 Ibid.
26 United Nations (n 16), at 4.
27 P. Csonka, 'Corruption: The Council of Europe's Approach' in B. A.K.Rider (ed), Corruption: The
Enemy Within (Kluwer Law International, 1997), 343-353, at 346.
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Before presenting evidence on the prevalence of corruption in the CEE countries,
it is important to understand that measuring corruption across countries faces at least
three formidable challenges. First, the measurement of corruption is hampered by the
lack of an agreed definition of corruption across countries. Thus the question arises as to
what exactly one should measure. Second, even if definitions can be agreed, there is a
risk that limiting measurement to well-defined types of corruption does not reflect the
real extent of the phenomenon in a society. For example, as Tanzi has noted, measuring
bribes paid only would ignore a whole range of corrupt acts that are not accompanied by
the payment of bribes.28 Third, corruption will likely be undercounted because it is a
crime that does not have an obvious victim who could report it and the parties involved
have a mutual interest in hiding their activity.
Generally, the incidence of corruption can be measured in three basic ways: by
number of prosecutions, perception or experience. Each way has its shortcomings. As far
as prosecutions are concerned, it has been pointed out that a serious analysis cannot rely
on the number of prosecutions only and ' ...would not deduce from a larger number of
bribery convictions that corruption is more widespread.'29 Counting the number of
prosecutions provides an indication of the effectiveness or intensity of law enforcement
efforts, rather than actual levels of corruption.
Another source of evidence is provided by international surveys on the
perception of corruption, which at present constitute the prevailing source of
information. The most widely recognised index measuring the perception of corruption
across a great number of countries is the Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index (CPI).30 The weakness of this form of measurement lies in the fact that
28 V. Tanzi, 'Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures' (1998) IMF
Working Paper WP/98/63, at 20.
29
Open Society Institute, 'Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy',
2002, at 25 (OSI Report) <http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/corruption> accessed 6 December 2007.
30 On the methodology of the Transparency International CPI 2007, see:
<http://www.transparencv.org/policv research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007/methodology> accessed 9
December 2007.
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it also does not measure the actual extent of corruption, but merely how people perceive
the problem. This is especially problematic if the perception of corruption is inflated not
because it really is more prevalent than elsewhere, but instead due to greater media
independence in a given country that gives greater exposure to corruption cases and
raises public awareness.
Finally, surveys of the actual experience of corruption also do not provide fully
reliable data. Their reliability may be impaired by the fact that respondents prefer not to
disclose the information, especially if they participated in a corrupt act. For example, the
high levels of refusal constituted a problem in the 1999 Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank.31 Nevertheless, surveys of real
experience do represent the most advanced way of collecting information on the actual
extent of corruption in a given country.
Although corruption exists to varying degrees in all political systems, it is
perceived to be endemic in post-communist countries. As will be discussed in Chapter
Four, this perception led the EU to recognise the fight against corruption as one of the
membership conditions in 1997. Indeed, there is considerable survey evidence available
from that time suggesting that corruption in the candidate countries was perceived to be
a more serious problem than in the old Member States.
The first analysis of corruption in the CEE countries took place only after the end
of communism. The World Bank's study on patterns and trends of corruption in 2000
was one of the first comprehensive analyses of corruption faced by the business
community in the CEE countries.32 It identified and measured two key types of
31 See: 1999 BEEPS survey 'Key Findings from the Business Environment Survey of Private Sector Firms
in the CEE and CIS countries', at 82 <http://www.ebrd.com/countrv/sector/econo/survevs/beepsr99.pdf>
accessed 9 December 2007.
32 World Bank, 'Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate' (2000)
<http://www.worldbank.orp/wbi/governance/pdf/contribution.pdf> accessed 9 December 2007.
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corruption in the transition countries: state capture, including bribes paid to influence
laws and regulations33 (for example, illegal contributions by private actors to political
parties or the sale of court decisions to private interests) and administrative corruption,
including, bribes paid for regular administrative dealings34 (for example, bribes to gain
licenses or win public procurement contracts). The World Bank concluded that
'corruption has become pervasive in many transition countries' and that the roots of this
problem '...reach deep into historical legacies, economic structures, and transition
paths.'35 The findings of the World Bank were later confirmed by the Open Society
Institute (OSI) report in 2002, which found that state capture, in the form of uncontrolled
lobbying and corruption in the financing of political parties, constituted a serious
problem in many candidate countries.36
In addition, the World Bank presented a comparison of twelve of the most
widely known international corruption indices. (See Figure 1.1)
33 'State capture refers to the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the public and private sectors
to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and other government policies to their own
advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials.'
emphasis in original). See: Ibid, at xv-xvi.
4 '... administrative corruption refers to the intentional imposition of distortions in the prescribed
implementation of existing laws, rules, and regulations to provide advantages to either state or non-state
actors as a result of the illicit and non transparent provision of private gains to public officials.' (emphasis
in original). See: Ibid, at xvii.
35
Ibid, at 81.
36 OSI Report (n 29), at 66-67.
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Source: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton, 'Aggregating
Governance Indicators' (1999) World Bank: Policy Research Paper No. 2195 quoted in World
Bank, 'Anti-Corruption in Transition: A Contribution to A Policy Debate' (2000), at xiv
<htto://www.worldbank. ora/wbi/aovernance/Ddf/contribution.Ddf> accessed 9 December 2007.
The above data confirmed that corruption in the CEE countries was perceived to be
considerably higher than in the OECD countries, which comprised all of the old EU
Member States.37
Higher levels of corruption in the CEE countries were also indicated by the
Transparency International CPI, which drew upon numerous distinct surveys of expert
and general public views of the extent of corruption in countries around the world. The
Transparency International CPI score measures perceptions of the degree of corruption
as seen by business people and country analysts. For the purposes of the CPI, corruption
is understood as 'misuse ofpublic power for private benefit.'38 (emphasis added) They
range between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). For the first time, the CPI
included all the eight CEE candidate countries in 1999. (See Table 1.1)
37 The accuracy of this comparison is, however, impaired by the fact that the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovak Republic are also members of the OECD.
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Czech Republic 4.6 39
Poland 4.2 44
Lithuania 3.8 50
Slovak Republic 3.7 53
Latvia 3.4 58
Source: The 1999 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 99 Countries
were included into the survey
<http://www.transparencv.ora/policv research/surveys indices/cpi/previous cpi 1/1999>
accessed 9 December 2007.
The above survey clearly shows that the problems of corruption appeared to be more
acute in the candidate countries (in bold) than in the old Member States. This trend was
maintained in the yearly Transparency International CPI throughout the whole pre-
accession process.39 It was also evident that the best candidate countries were less
corrupt than the worst EU Member States. In Belgium, corruption was perceived to be a
bigger problem than in Estonia and Slovenia, while Italy and Greece were ranked lower
than Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia. This survey highlights significant problem of
39
Transparency International CPI's <http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi>
accessed 9 December 2007.
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double standards within the accession process, which will be discussed in Chapters Four
and Six. While the anti-corruption efforts of the candidate countries were under the close
scrutiny of the EU, there was no similar policy towards old Member States, even though
some of them scored poorly in the international rankings.
The above international findings were later confirmed by public opinion polls in
the CEE countries. In a survey in 2003/2004, 92% in Poland, 64% in the Czech
Republic, 83% in Slovakia, 72% in Hungary, 88% in Slovenia, 86% in Lithuania and
59% in Estonia answered that they lived in a 'corrupt state.'40
It should be reiterated that these indicators discussed above refer to the
perception of corruption only. As far as the actual extent of corruption is concerned, the
OSI report in 2002 concluded that 'there is still little comparative research available to
provide clear evidence of the extent of corruption in candidate States, and no detailed
comprehensive study of corruption in EU member and CEE States that would yield
sufficient data to make serious comparisons.'41
2.2. Causes of corruption
There are two important factors that make the CEE countries particularly vulnerable to
corruption: their communist heritage and the political and economic transformation that
they are still going through. Corruption was an intrinsic part of the communist system.
Paying bribes and depending on personal contacts was not only common, but sometimes
the only way to arrange administrative dealings or gain access to basic goods and
services. As Tanzi has observed, the centrally-planned economies '...experienced a
great deal of corrupt practices', the vast majority of which were either ignored or not
widely reported at the time.42
40 GfK Institute for Market Research Praha, (2003/2004) 'Corruption climate' including all CEE countries
except for Latvia <http://www.gfk.hr/press_en/corrupti.htm> accessed 9 December 2007.
41 OSI Report (n 29), at 58.
42 Tanzi (n 28), at 5.
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The political reforms in the CEE countries uncovered corruption that existed
under the communist regime. According to the OSI report, the communist systems left
behind the following patterns:
traditions of both high-level grand corruption and low-level petty corruption; entrenched
mistrust of the State; a feeling of legitimacy among the population in circumventing the
State ("beating the system"); widespread clientelism and forms of exchange that run
against both formal political and bureaucratic norms and corruption in the private sector
as a substitute for fair competition.43
As Sajo has observed, corruption in Central and Eastern Europe was structural in the
sense that it was part of the region's clientelistic social structures, which were
characteristic of communist regimes.44 Sajo defined clientelism as 'a network of social
relations where personal loyalty to the patron prevails against the modem alternatives of
market relations, democratic decision making, and professionalism in public
bureaucracies.'45 Such a clientelistic system of exchange emerged in the absence of
effective markets.46 An example of corruption based on such a clientelistic system would
be when a public official abuses his office to reward his clients, perhaps by providing
jobs to the clients of particular political groups in order to build his position in a political
party.
After the demise of communism, the transition to democracy and a market
economy brought about new types of corruption. In the World Bank's assessment, 'the
simultaneous transition processes of building new political and economic institutions in
the midst of a massive redistribution of state assets have created fertile ground for state
capture and administrative corruption.'47 Market liberalisation of the economy, which
43 OSI Report (n 29), at 43.
44 A. Sajo, 'Corruption, Clientelism, and the Future of the Constitutional State in Eastern Europe' (1998)
East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 7 No. 2
<http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol7num2/special/special.html> accessed 9 December 2007.
45 Ibid.
46 OSI Report (n 29), at 43.
47 World Bank (n 32), at xix.
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used to be under exclusive control of the state, created new opportunities for corruption
that did not exist under the previous economic system. One example is corruption
related to the privatisation process. Officials who played a direct role in privatisation
deals often took advantage of their position, sometimes by selling public assets at a low
price in return for a bribe.48 Among other factors facilitating corruption during the
transition period were the underdeveloped civil society and the lack of accountability
standards in public administration and the judiciary,
The CEE countries were undergoing simultaneous economic, legal, ideological
and social transitions. They had to define new rules and new institutions to govern their
economies and societies. As Holmes has pointed out, the scope of attempted change was
'one significant reason why most post-communist states have suffered a severe
legislative lag in the past decade' (emphasis in original), which meant that laws have
often been non-existent or vague and contradictory.49 All that constituted a fertile ground
for corruption. Moreover, the transition to democracy has been accompanied not only by
the collapse of political and economic communist system, but also by a loss of belief in
the old communist value system.50 Some authors point out that such 'general
deterioration of values' and the resulting 'moral wasteland' in post-communist countries
was a prime cause of increased corruption among officials.51
Adding to the problem, the international context in which post-communism was
bom also contributed to the prevalence of corruption in the CEE countries.52 The
48 See more: D. Kaufmann and P. Siegelbaum, 'Privatization and Corruption in the transition economies'
(1997) Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 50 Issue 2, 419-458.
9
L. Holmes, 'Corruption. Weak States and Economic Rationalism in Central and Eastern Europe' 9th
International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) (South Africa , Durban, 1999)
50 W. L. Miller, S. White and P. Heywood, Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe,
(London: Macmillan, 1998) Chapter 4 quoted in W. L. Miller, A.B. Grpdeland and T. Y. Koshechkina,
'Bribery and Other Ways of Coping With Officialdom in Post-Communist Eastern Europe' in A.J.
Heidenheimer and M. Johnston (eds), Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts (3rd edn Transaction
Publishers New Brunswick 2005), 559-580, at 561.
51 T. Verheijen and A. Dimitrova, 'Private interests and public administration: the Central and East
European experience' (1996) International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 62 No. 2,197-218, at
212, quoted in W. L. Miller, Ase B. Grpdeland and T. Y. Koshechkina (n 50).
52 More on this point, see: Holmes (n 49).
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revolutions of 1989-91 in Central and Eastern Europe coincided with a recession in the
West and with the rise of neo-liberal ideology, which can encourage corruption due to
greater job insecurity for public officials and privatization.53 As Holmes has explained,
to the extent that some post-communist countries were influenced by this ideology,
economic rationalism has been a factor encouraging official corruption.54
2.3. The importance of combating corruption
Up until the 1990s, the damaging effects of corruption were not widely acknowledged.
Quite to the contrary, some economists suggested that corruption actually raised
economic growth. The central argument was that bribery could be '... an efficient way of
getting around burdensome regulations and ineffective legal systems.'55 It was claimed
that corruption effectively allocates goods according to the willingness and ability to
pay, therefore putting goods in the hands of people who value them the most and use
them most efficiently.56 Among other claims, one could find arguments saying that
corruption is efficiency-enhancing because it removes government-imposed rigidities
which impede investment; in other words it 'oils the mechanism' or 'greases the
process.'57 It was also argued that public officials work harder with the prospect of
bribes, which in turn allows government to keep budget expenditure at lower levels.58 At
the time when these arguments were commonplace, it comes as no surprise that
corruption was considered a legitimate part of business and in some countries it was
even tax deductible.59
53 L. Holmes, 'Crime, Corruption, and Politics: Transnational Factors' in J. Zielonka and A. Pravda (eds),
Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe Volume 2: International and Transnational Factors, (OUP,
Oxford 2001), 192-230, at 207-208.
54 Ibid.
55 D. Kaufmann, 'Corruption: The Facts' (1997) Foreign Policy, No. 107,114-131, at 115-116.
56
Klitgaard (n 5), at 31
57 Tanzi (n 28), at 25.
58
T. G. Grosse, 'Dzialania anty-korupcyjne w panstwach czlonkowskich OECD' (2000), at 9
<http://www.batory.org.pl/ftp/program/przeciw-korupcji/pk0001.pdf> accessed 10 December 2007.
59
For example: France, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, see: Ibid, at 5.
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Intensified research on corruption in the 1990s increased the awareness of its
costs for economic, political and social development. The damaging consequences of
corruption were finally widely acknowledged by economists. It was recognised that
corruption lowers investment and economic growth60 and might cause loss of tax
revenue and diminish the quality of infrastructure and public services.61 Corruption was
found to raise transaction costs and uncertainty in the economy and lead to inefficient
economic outcomes.62 In 1997 the World Bank argued that:
There is increasing evidence that corruption undermines development. It also hampers
the effectiveness with which domestic savings and external aid are used in many
developing countries, and this in turn threatens to undermine grassroots support for
foreign assistance. Corruption is of growing concern to donors, nongovernmental
organizations, and governments and citizens in developing and industrial countries
alike.63
Furthermore, corruption has a destructive impact on the democratic systems, as it
distorts the democratic decision-making process and undermines the legitimacy and the
credibility of governments. As Heywood has observed, corruption attacks 'some of the
basic principles on which democracy rests - notably, the equality of citizens before
institutions... and the openness of decision making...'64 Corruption replaces just and
predictable legal systems and other critical social structures that lie between individuals
and the state with less formal and less predictable rules that may well change from case
to case.65
In the post-communist countries, which were much more fragile than long-
established democracies, the social and political costs of corruption were potentially
60
P. Mauro, 'Corruption and growth' (1995) The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110 No. 3,681-
712, at 683.
61
P. Mauro, 'Why worry about corruption' (1997) Economic Issues 6, International Monetary Fund, at 7
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues6/issue6.pdf> accessed 10 December 2007.
52 Ch. W. Gray and D. Kaufmann, 'Corruption and Development' (1998) Finance & Development, 7-10,
at 8.
63 World Bank (n 12), at 1.
64
P. Heywood, 'Political Corruption: Problems and Perspectives' (1997) Political Studies, XLV, 417-435,
at 421.
65 United Nations (n 16), at 5.
23
more destructive.66 Corruption could still undermine the success of the post-communist
transitions. It destroys support for democracy, therefore undermines the driving force
behind reforms. Corrupt governments lose the legitimacy they need to conduct vital
reforms. As Heymann has pointed out, a critical relationship between corruption and
democracy is that corruption can deeply undermine support for democracy in any fragile
democracy and 'where democracy is younger and more fragile, corruption seems a
reason to abandon democracy completely in favor of some form of other government
that, it is hoped, will be free of that vice.'68
This partly explains the rise of the populist parties in the CEE countries, where
the credibility of governments has begun to depend '...on the intensity of their
commitments to fight corruption.'69 In 1998 Krastev pointed out that '...an anti-
corruption campaign is a very useful platform for attacking reformist policies and
reform-minded governments' and '...anti-corruption rhetoric... may abet the rise of
populist and anti-reformist alternatives.'70 Examples of populist parties that came to
power in the CEE countries promising to end corruption include the Self Defence party
in Poland and Vladimir Meciar's party in Slovakia.71 At the same time, however, these
parties resisted more radical economic reforms and liberalisation of markets, which
shows no recognition that in order to minimise corruption, the role of the state in the
economy and related opportunities for self-enrichment among officials must be
reduced.72
66
L. Holmes, 'Corruption and the crisis of the post-communist state' (1997) Crime, Law & Social Change
27: 1997, 275-297, at. 276.
67 World Bank (n 32), at xiv.
68 P.B. Heymann, 'Democracy and Corruption' (1996-1997) 20 Fordham Int'l L. J., 323- 346, at 327-328.
69
I. Krastev, 'Dancing with Anticorruption' (1998) East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 7 No 3
<http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol7num3/special/corruption.html> accessed 10 December 2007
70 Ibid.
71
'Populist watch' The Economist 1 April 2004.
72 M.L. Tupy, 'The Rise of Populist Parties in Central Europe. Big Government, Corruption, and the
Threat to Liberalism' (2006) CATO Institute, Centre for Global Liberty & Prosperity Development Policy
Analysis, No. 1, at 12 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/dpa/dpal.pdf> accessed 6 December 2007.
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In summary, corruption could endanger the achievements of political and
economic transitions in the CEE countries as officials could influence newly established
policies and laws to secure their own interests. It could compromise the efficiency of
economic activity and distort public perceptions of how a proper market economy
works, making the transition to free market democracy far more difficult.73 As Chapter
Four will discuss, the EU acknowledged the dangers that corruption poses for the
ongoing transformation in the CEE countries, and as a result, democratic and anti-
corruption reforms were to a great degree interrelated in the accession process.
3. Corruption as an international policy problem
3.1. The context
Initially, corruption was considered to be a problem for domestic policies, which did not
require a response at the international level. However, in the 1990s it attracted
considerable attention and turned into a truly global political issue. This can be
explained by four key factors: the end of the Cold War, globalisation, the rising
influence of NGOs, and a wave of bribery scandals worldwide.
First, the collapse of the Cold War political system ended a tendency to overlook
obvious cases of corruption as long as particular countries were in the right political
camp.74 With the end of the bipolar struggle that dominated global politics, there was
'...a marked decrease in the willingness of the public to tolerate corrupt practices by
their political leaders and economic elites.'75 Democracy spread to new places, bringing
greater independence for the media and prosecution services. These in turn exposed the
extent of corruption, which could no longer be tolerated.
73 P. Glynn, S. J. Kobrin and M. Nairn, 'The Globalization of Corruption' in K. A. Elliott (ed) Corruption
and the Global Econom (Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 1997), 7-27, at 10.
74 Tanzi (n 28), at 4.
75
Glynn, Kobrin and Nairn (n 73), at 8.
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The second important factor was globalisation, which opened up new frontiers
not only for trade and business, but also for corrupt practices. As Tanzi has noted,
globalisation has brought individuals from countries with little corruption into frequent
contact with those from countries where corruption is endemic and these contacts have
increased the international attention paid to corruption.76 Globalisation not only
increased the opportunities for corrupt practices, but also made their detection more
difficult due to the proliferation of electronic commerce and offshore financial centres.77
This made international cooperation to act against corruption more urgent than ever
before.
Third, the 1990s also witnessed the dissemination of the anti-corruption
standards by the international agencies. In this context, it is important to emphasise the
role of Transparency International, set up in 1993, which is a non-govemmental agency
independent of both national governments and international organizations. It is
comprised of a global network of more than 90 locally established national chapters.78
Over the years, Transparency International has played an important role in publicising
the damaging effects of corruption and encouraging governments to implement more
robust anti-corruption standards.
Fourth, a wave of bribery scandals across the world changed the rich world's
perception of corruption. This revealed that the problem of corruption was not confined
to the developing countries, but affected the well-established democracies as well. In
Western Europe, during the 1980s and the start of the 1990s, '...corruption no longer
appeared to be a marginal or exceptional but was seen as an endemic problem.'79
76 Tanzi (n 28), at 5.
77 J. W. Williams and M. E. Beare, 'The business of bribery: Globalization, economic liberalization, and
the "problem" of corruption' (1999) Crime, Law & Social Change 32,115-146 at 119.
78 See: <http://www.transparencv.org/about_us> last accessed 26 October 2007.
79 D. Delia Porta and Y. Meny, 'Introdcution' in D. Delia Porta and Y. Meny (ed.), Democracy and
Corruption in Europe (Pinter 1997), 1-6, at 4.
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Greater attention to the problem of corruption may also be driven by the fact that
the extent of corruption increased in the 1990s. Such an argument was discussed by
Tanzi, who distinguished three main factors that may have contributed to the rise of
corruption over that decade: the increased role of the government in the economy, the
growth of international trade and business and the economic changes in transition
countries.80 However, others argue that there is no credible evidence that corruption
actually increased during the 1990s.81
3.2. Evolution of international cooperation
International organisations engaged actively in the fight against corruption when its
damaging consequences on political and economic systems were recognised in the
1990s. In 1998, Brademas and Heimann wrote that 'after years of being tolerated with a
mixture of apathy, cynicism, and denial, corruption is becoming a target of serious
international action.'82 In reality, though, international efforts against corruption evolved
through several stages over time.
The first efforts at international cooperation in the fight against corruption
focused on developing a legal approximation of the offence of corruption. One of the
reasons for that was the need to ensure effective cooperation among countries in
investigating and prosecuting cases of corruption, which traditionally is governed by the
principle of 'double criminality', a rule where acting on a request for assistance under
extradition or mutual assistance agreements from another country depends on whether
an act constitutes a criminal offence in both the requesting and the requested state.
However, as Pieth has pointed out, behind the initiatives in this area, in addition to a
80 Tanzi (n 28), at 6-8.
81 Williams and Beare (n 77), at 126.
82 J. Brademas and F. Heimann, 'Tackling International Corruption. No longer Taboo' (1998) 77 Foreign
Affairs 1998,17- 22, at 17.
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search for legal harmony, there was also a mixture of economic interests and moral
climate.83
At the beginning, initiatives focused on bribery in the context of international
trade. The first measure in this area was the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA), adopted in 1977, which was a national measure prohibiting the bribery of
foreign officials by American companies. However, as Carver has pointed out, the
adoption of the FCPA did not come from any high moral principle, but rather from
concerns that unacceptable share price volatility resulted from the reliance of companies
on major contracts that were often induced by bribes.84
At the instigation of the United States, the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development Convention (OECD) took one of the first multilateral
initiatives against corruption.85 In 1996 the OECD adopted a Recommendation on the
tax deductibility of bribes to foreign public officials.86 This Recommendation called on
member countries to deny such deductibility. The reasons behind the adoption of this
measure were purely economic. Tax deductibility of bribes distorted fair competition, as
the countries which allowed it gained an unfair advantage over countries where such
deductibility was not allowed.
Following this, in 1997 the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Transactions (the OECD Convention) was adopted.87 The
OECD Convention was signed as a result of pressure by the Unites States to introduce
rules disallowing companies to bribe foreign public officials in order to obtain or retain
83 M. Pieth, 'The Harmonization of Law Against Economic Crime' (1999) European Journal of Law
Reform, Vol. 1 No. 4, 527-551, at 535.
84 J. P. Carver, 'Combating Corruption: the Emergence of New International Law' (2003), International
Law FORUM du droit international 5,119-123, see footnote 1 at 119.
85
Glynn, Kobrin and Nairn (n 72), at 19-20.
86
OECD, 'Recommendation of the Council on the tax deductibility of bribes to foreign public officials'
(1996) <http://www.oecd.Org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf> accessed 10 December 2007.
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OECD, 'Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Transactions'
(adopted 21 November 1997, entered into force 15 February 1999) (the OECD Convention)
<http://www.oecd.Org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf> accessed 10 December 2007.
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international contracts. It entered into force in 1999 and has been ratified by 37
countries.88 The OECD Convention focuses on the supply-side of corruption and is
limited to the criminalisation of active corruption of foreign public officials.89 The state
parties are required to introduce the liability of legal persons, although here, depending
on national arrangements, criminal responsibility is not required.90
An important goal of the OECD Convention is to ensure that the countries
cooperate with each other for the purposes of investigating and prosecuting bribery and,
in particular, they are not allowed to refuse to cooperate on grounds of bank secrecy.91
The parties are also obliged to make bribery of foreign officials an extraditable offence
and prosecute in cases where national laws make it not possible to extradite a country's
nationals.92
The OECD Convention addresses corruption in the very narrow context of
international trade and treats corruption as an obstacle to international investment. This
approach reflects the limited mandate of the OECD. The OECD Convention does not
require state parties to criminalise acts of bribery of national officials or acts involving a
bribe paid for purposes unrelated to international business.93 The objective was to
include all major trade competitors into a common anti-corruption agreement and ensure
a fair playing field for international business.
88 See chart of ratifications, as of 19 June 2007 at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/1898632.pdf>
accessed 10 December 2007.
89 Article 1(1) of the OECD Convention.
90 Article 2 and 3(2) of the OECD Convention.
91 Article 9of the OECD Convention.
92 Article 10 of the OECD Convention.
93 Heidenheimer and Moroff observed that 'bribery as defined by the OECD convention relates only to
payments made in order to retain and obtain business, which therefore excludes bribes paid to avoid taxes,
customs duties, judicial or other regulatory obligations.' See A.J. Heidenheimer and H. Moroff,
'Controlling Business Payoffs to Foreign Officials: The 1998 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention' in A.J.
Heidenheimer and M. Johnston (eds), Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts (3rd edn Transaction
Publishers New Brunswick 2005), 943-959, at 953.
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The OECD Convention addressed corruption only to the extent where the corrupt
officials constituted an impediment to market access94 and in this sense it resembles a
trade treaty. As Brademas and Heimann have pointed out, 'the OECD is the ideal forum
for tackling the supply side of international corruption because its member states are the
home bases of nearly all important international companies.'95 This is confirmed in
Article 15 of the OECD Convention, which provides that this convention enters into
force when it is ratified by five of the ten countries which have the ten largest export
shares and which represent by themselves at least sixty per cent of the combined total
exports of those ten countries.
Despite the success in ratification of the OECD Convention, ten years after its
adoption, Transparency International argued that as a result of the lack of political will
on the part of the states parties, the impact of the OECD Convention remained limited.
In more than half of the signatory countries, there was little or no enforcement of the
prohibition against foreign bribery.96 Despite a great number of investigations, only a
few of them have led to convictions.97 However, as Pieth has noted, the criminal side of
the OECD Convention should not be emphasised too much, because the actual goal was
to mobilize companies to develop preventive concepts.98 The focus on prevention is
visible in Article 8 of the OECD Convention, which obliges the state parties to establish
accounting and auditing standards for companies to prevent off-the-books accounts. In
addition, the OECD adopted a number of non-binding recommendations which aim at
94 Pieth (n 83), at 536.
95 Brademas and Heimann (n 82), at 19.
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For a detailed account of the enforcement of the OECD Convention, see: Transparency International
'Progress Report 2007: Enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions', at 6
<http://www.transparencv.org/news_room/in_focus/2007/oecd> accessed 10 December 2007.
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enhancing integrity and transparency in the private and public sectors, including 1997
Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions and
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises."
The enforcement of the OECD Convention was seriously undermined in 2006 by
a dangerous precedent set by the United Kingdom. In the so called 'Al-Yamamah
investigation', the arms company BAE allegedly paid a bribe to a member of the Saudi
Arabia ruling clan in order to obtain a contract.100 The anti-corruption investigation was,
however, discontinued by the British government in 2006 for national security
reasons.101 Such a stance by the United Kingdom threatens the effectiveness of the
OECD Convention and '...creates an open-ended loophole that other countries could
readily use.'102
The OECD Convention has had a 'knock-on effect' on the development of
further international instruments against corruption.103 International cooperation against
corruption was subsequently taken a step further with the adoption of the Council of
Europe anti-corruption instruments. Since the very beginning, the Council of Europe has
addressed corruption as a serious threat to democracy, the rule of law and human
rights.104 At the pan-European level, it remains the most active organization addressing
the problem of corruption across countries. Council of Europe initiatives aim to cover all
aspects of the international fight against corruption and try to set Europe-wide anti-
corruption standards by way of treaties, recommendations and resolutions.
99
OECD, 'Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business
Transactions'(1997) <http://www.oecd.Org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf>: 'The OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises'(Revised in 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf>: 'The
1998 Recommendation on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service' (1998)
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/13/1899138.pdf>: 'Recommendation on Guidelines for Managing
Conflict of Interest in the Public Service' (2003) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/56/36587292.pdf>
accessed 10 December 2007.
100 'BAE accused of secretly paying £lbn to Saudi prince' The Guardian (7 June 2007).
101 B.W. Heinemann and F. Heimann, 'Arrested Development: The fight against international corporate
bribery' (2007) The National Interest, Nov. /Dec., 80- 87, at 80.
102 Transparency International (n 96), at 35.
103 Holmes (n 53), at 224.
104 Council of Europe, 'Threat to Europe from economic crime' (1997), Doc. 7971
<hrtp://www.coe.int/t/dgl/greco/documents/otherbasictexts_en.asp> accessed 10 December 2007.
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The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Criminal Law
Convention)105 was adopted in 1999 and has a much broader scope than the OECD
Convention, as it focuses on criminalisation of active and passive bribery of public
officials, including national and foreign officials, officials of international organisations,
and members of national and foreign public assemblies.106 Next to bribery, it also covers
trading in influence, a form of corruption whereby an undue advantage is given to
anyone who asserts influence over a public official.107 In addition, the Criminal Law
Convention provides protection of informants cooperating with investigating and
prosecuting authorities108 and obliges the state parties to ensure the independence of
anti-corruption bodies.109 Similarly to the OECD Convention, this convention aims to
improve international cooperation in mutual legal assistance and extradition in cases of
corruption.110
The Council of Europe also adopted the first international instrument that defines
common rules for civil litigation in cases of corruption. The Civil Law Convention on
Corruption (Civil Law Convention)111 was adopted in 1999 and obliges the state parties
to provide effective remedies for persons who have suffered damage as a result of
corruption, including full compensation for such damage.112 The damage can be
compensated for if the defendant has committed or authorised the act of corruption, or
failed to take reasonable steps to prevent corruption.113 Both the public and private
sectors are covered. The Civil Law Convention also addresses the prevention of
corruption and obliges the state parties to ensure protection of employees who report
105 Council of Europe (n 20).
106 Article 2 -11 of the Criminal Law Convention.
107 Article 12 of the Criminal Law Convention.
108 Article 22 of the Criminal Law Convention.
109 Article 20 of the Criminal Law Convention.
110 Chapter IV of the Criminal Law Convention.
111 Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No.: 174 (adopted 4 November 1999,
entered into force 1 November 2003) (the Civil Law Convention)
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treatv/Commun/OueVoulezVous.asp?NT=174&CM=l&DF=7/ll/20Q7&CL=
ENG> accessed 6 December 2007.
112 Article 2 and 3 of the Civil Law Convention.
113 Article 4 of the Civil Law Convention.
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corruption in good faith to authorities and introduce national laws on auditing and
accounting for companies.114
Apart from the above legal developments, during the 1990s international
agreement emerged on some key anti-corruption principles that should underpin national
anti-corruption strategies. At the pan-European level, the Council of Europe's Twenty
Guiding Principles for the Fight Against Corruption (Twenty Guiding Principles)115
constitute the most comprehensive document in this area. They encompass not only the
criminalisation of corruption but also preventive measures, such as raising public
awareness and ethical behaviour, independence of the judiciary and prosecution,
limitation of immunity for public officials, specialisation of persons and bodies in charge
of fighting corruption, transparent and efficient public administration, codes of conduct
for public official, appropriate auditing procedures, regulation of political party
financing and freedom of the media (See Appendix 1). The Twenty Guiding Principles
are not binding, but the national authorities are called to take them into account when
constructing their national policies against corruption. They are formulated in a general
way and thus can be adapted to the specific needs and priorities in every country. The
Twenty Guiding Principles are complemented by two recommendations of the Council
of Europe, which define common rules against corruption in the funding of political
parties and electoral campaigns116 and a model code of conduct for public officials.117
At the global level, corruption was initially addressed indirectly in the UN
Convention Against Transnational Crime (UNCATOC)118 adopted in 2000. This
114 Article 9 of the Civil Law Convention.
115 The Council of Europe, .Resolution (97) 24 on the Twenty Guiding Principles For the Fight Against
Corruption'(1997) <http://www.coe.int/t/dgl/greco/documents/Resolution(97)24_EN.pdf> accessed 10
December 2007.
116 Council of Europe, 'Recommendation (2003)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on
common rules against funding of political parties and electoral campaigns' (2003)
<http://www.coe.int/t/dgl/greco/general/Rec(2003)4_EN.pdf> accessed 10 December 2007.
117 Council of Europe, 'Recommendation (2000) 10 on codes of conduct for public officials' (2000)
<http://www.coe.int/t/dgl/greco/documents/Rec(2000)10_EN.pdf> accessed 10 December 2007.
'18 United Nations, 'United Nations Convention Against Transactional Organised Crime' Resolution 55/25
(adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 29 September 2003) (the UNCATOC)
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convention included several provisions relating to preventing and combating public
sector corruption. In particular, it foresaw the criminalisation of corruption of public
officials119 and liability of legal persons involved in corrupting public officials.120 Apart
from criminalisation, the UNCATOC also put stress on the prevention of corruption by
obliging the state parties to promote the concept of 'integrity' among public officials and
recommending that they ensure the independence of anti-corruption bodies.121
A more recent international agreement in bringing together the elements of a
strategy against corruption was developed in 2003 with the adoption of UNCAC, which
entered into force in 2005. The UNCAC is the first global agreement and the most
comprehensive international instrument against corruption. The preamble to the
UNCAC recognised that corruption constitutes a threat 'to the stability and security of
societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and
justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law' and that
'corruption is no longer a local matter but a transnational phenomenon that affects all
societies and economies, making international cooperation to prevent and control it
essential.'122
The scope of criminalisation foreseen by the UNCAC is broader than in any
previous international instrument in this area. In addition to domestic and cross-border
bribery, the state parties are required to criminalise embezzlement, trading in influence
and abuse of functions.123 Similar to the OECD and the Council of Europe instruments,
the UNCAC lays down the rules for mutual legal assistance and extradition in case of
offences prescribed by it.124 Furthermore, it is the first instrument which provides for
<http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_eng.pdf>
accessed 10 December 2007.
119 Article 8 of the UNCATOC.
120 Article 10 of the UNCATOC.
121 Article 9 of the UNCATOC.
122 United Nations (n 19).
123 Articles 15-19 of the UNCAC.
124 Chapter IV of the UNCAC.
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cooperation in the return of illicit funds deposited by corrupt officials in foreign banks to
the countries of origin.125
Most importantly, however, the UNCAC includes a wide range of preventive
measures against corruption in the public and private sectors. As far as the public sector
is concerned, the provisions relate to the establishment of preventive anti-corruption
bodies, the promotion of integrity in public administration, the adoption of codes of
conduct, ensuring transparency in public procurement and the management of public
finances and enhancing the independence of the judiciary and prosecution.126 In the
private sector, the state parties are asked to take a wide range of actions, which include
promoting high auditing and accounting standards, recommending adoption of codes of
conduct and the use of good commercial practices.127 The UNCAC also calls on state
parties to promote participation of civil society in the fight against corruption.128
The UNCAC constitutes a blueprint for devising national and international
initiatives in this area. However, a closer look at its provisions reveals that some of them
do not have a binding character. For example, the state parties are only asked to
'consider' criminalisation of bribery and embezzlement in the private sector.129 In
addition, most of the preventive measures are non-mandatory. For example, the state
parties are only required to 'consider' taking appropriate measures to enhance
transparency in the funding of political parties.130
Apart from the above anti-corruption instruments, the international community
also approached corruption indirectly through anti-money laundering legislation. During
the 1990s, the international anti-money laundering regime was gradually extended to
embrace the proceeds of corruption. When the regime was first established, corruption
125 Chapter V of the UNCAC.
126 Articles 7, 8, 9,11 of the UNCAC.
127 Article 12 of the UNCAC.
128 Article 13 of the UNCAC.
129 Article 22 of the UNCAC.
130 Article 7(3) of the UNCAC.
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was excluded from the anti-money laundering legislation. The first international measure
in this area that imposed an obligation to criminalise acts of money laundering, the UN
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
adopted in 1988, was limited to drug offences.131 Soon after, however, the Council of
Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds
from Crime was adopted in 1990 and extended criminalisation to any criminal offence as
a result of which proceeds were generated, thereby including corruption.132
The most comprehensive anti-money laundering framework was developed by
the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), an inter-governmental
body established by the G7-Summit in 1989. In 1990 FATF first drafted a series of non-
binding Forty Recommendations133, which were then revised in 1996 and 2003, to
ensure that they remain up to date and relevant to the evolving threat of money
laundering. The Forty Recommendations have been reflected in laws at both national
and international levels, including, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the EU
measures. Since 1996, the Forty Recommendations have suggested that countries should
apply the crime ofmoney laundering to all serious offences.134
At the same time, it has been recognised that any comprehensive strategy against
corruption must include measures aimed at preventing and controlling the laundering of
funds stemming from corruption. The link between corruption and money laundering is
131 Article 3(l)(b) United Nations, 'Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances' (adopted 19 December 1988, entered into force 11 November 1990)
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf> accessed 10 December 2007.
132 Article 1(e) Council of Europe, ETS No.: 141 (adopted 8 November 1990, entered into force 1
September 1993)
<http://conventions.coe.int/treatv/en/Treaties/Html/141.htm> accessed 10 December 2007. This
Convention is now replaced by the 2005 Council of Europe 'Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism' ETS No.: 198 (adopted
16 May 2005, not yet in force) <http://conventions.coe.int/Treatv/EN/Treaties/Html/198.htm> accessed 10
December 2007.
133 FATF, 'The Forty Recommendations' (revised 2003) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/28/0.3343.en_32250379_32236930_33658140_l_l_l_1.00.html#40recs> accessed 10
December 2007.
134 Ibid, see: Recommendation 1.
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now explicit in the international anti-corruption instruments. In particular, the OECD
Convention, the Criminal Law Convention and the UNCAC all contain provisions on
criminalisation of laundering of proceeds from corruption offences.135 Chapter Three
will demonstrate that this principle is also reflected at the ELF level.
The offences of corruption and money laundering are strongly correlated. Money
laundering can be defined as a process whereby proceeds from a crime are manipulated
in a way that conceals their illicit source.136 The anti-money laundering measures
contribute to the fight against corruption in two important ways: by reducing incentives
and by using their extraterritorial reach to expose corruption where it may not otherwise
be uncovered.
First, anti-money laundering measures reduce the incentive to engage in
corruption by taking away the economic gain derived form corruption. Corruption is
committed for profit, and criminals will often try to disguise the illegal origin of their
wealth. Corrupt individuals often rely on money laundering techniques to hide the illegal
origin of their wealth. Anti-money laundering measures aim at tracing the origin of
money and preventing the criminals from reintegrating their illegitimate gains back into
the legitimate economy. As Shams has pointed out, 'creating corruption as a predicate
offence for money laundering helps prevent the corrupt from maintaining their fagade of
legitimacy and expose their corruption.'137
Second, the international anti-money laundering measures have an extraterritorial
reach, which helps to uncover cases of corruption taking place in third countries. For
example, the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
135 Article 7 of the OECD Convention, Article 13 of the Criminal Law Convention and Article 14 and 23
of the UNCAC.
136 For an overview, see: W. C. Gilmore, DirtyMoney: The evolution of international measures to
counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism (3rd edn, Council of Europe Publishing, 2004), at
29-46.
137 H. Shams, 'Using Money Laundering Control to Fight Corruption: An Extraterritorial Instrument'
(2000) Essays in International Financial & Economic Law, No. 27, at 43.
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Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism establishes
that 'it shall not matter whether the predicate offence was subject to the criminal
jurisdiction of the Party.'138 This means that it is still an offence to launder the proceeds
from corrupt acts, even if these acts occurred outside the country where the laundering
takes place. The laundering of proceeds abroad has been a practice of many corrupt
officials across the world. For example, in 1999 the Economist noted that African
leaders had $20 billion on deposit in Swiss banks alone.139
3.3. The importance of international cooperation
Why can anti-corruption strategy not be confined only to national measures? Why
should the fight against corruption not be treated purely as an internal problem of
countries? During the 1990s, an agreement was reached that corruption needs to be
addressed at both national and international levels. It was recognised that the
international cooperation can boost the will and capacity to fight corruption in several
important ways.
First, international cooperation becomes indispensable as soon as criminals move
across the borders. There is a need for cooperation in the investigation and prosecution
of cross-border cases of corruption and a degree of approximation for the purposes of
effective mutual legal assistance and extradition. As Chapter Three will discuss, the
need for cooperation against cross-border crime became particularly visible and is best
illustrated in the context of the EU.
Second, international cooperation makes it possible to agree on criminalisation of
some forms of corruption. The best example here is the criminalisation of bribery of
foreign officials, which had to be initiated at the international level because individual
countries were reluctant to prosecute their own companies who obtained profitable
138 Article 9(2)(a) Council of Europe (n 131).
139 'A global war against bribery' The Economist (14 January 1999).
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contracts abroad, even if it occurred as a consequence of bribery. In addition, countries
did not want to put their own companies at an economic disadvantage in comparison to
companies from other countries, where such bribery was sometimes allowed.
Third, the involvement of the international community may be necessary when
countries are not able to deal with the problem of corruption alone. In extreme cases,
international pressure can be the only driver behind reforms. International institutions
can finance or assist in drafting specific reforms projects, such as public administration
reform and public finances management.140 Also, external pressure can generate the
political will inside countries and put pressure on national governments to step up the
fight against corruption. This pressure can be particularly effective if countries rely on
external financial assistance. For example, in the 1990s the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund have introduced reforms to their lending practices, making
the provision of funds conditional upon the successful implementation of anti-corruption
reforms. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the EU used similar conditionality
to affect political and economic reforms in the candidate countries. The World Bank, in
particular, focuses not only on preventing corruption in the projects it finances, but also
helps countries that request assistance in combating corruption.141
Finally, international cooperation helps to disseminate best practices in
preventing and combating corruption. Countries are able to share experiences and learn
about successful anti-corruption policies in other countries. International agencies with a
cross-country expertise can also assist in drafting more effective anti-corruption
strategies.
140 S. Rose-Ackerman, Korupcja i rzqdy (Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego i Wydawnictwo Sic! 2001), at
334-338.
141World Bank (n 12), at 3.
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3.4. Monitoring mechanisms
The adoption of international anti-corruption instruments was an important
accomplishment, but it was not an end in itself. The challenge was to ensure that
national governments would actively enforce these instruments. To this end the
international organisations set up various monitoring mechanisms to oversee their
correct and timely implementation. Monitoring refers to an international review process
to assess whether national governments have taken adequate action to implement
provisions of a relevant international instrument.142 Effective monitoring mechanisms
are crucial for the success of anti-corruption instruments. As Brademas and Heimann
have pointed out, monitoring of compliance with high standards prevent regulation from
falling to the lowest common denominator.143 The importance of such a system has been
recently highlighted in the context of the UNCAC, but it applies to all international
instruments. As has been pointed out:
If UNCAC is properly implemented it will result in major reductions in corruption,
producing great benefits in terms of better democratic governance, accelerated
international development, more efficient government procurement, stronger
competition, and alleviation of poverty around the world. An effective follow-up process
ensures that such implementation will take place and that the goals of UNCAC can be
achieved. Without follow-up there is a high risk that UNCAC will become another
example of the futility of high aspirations.14
A good example demonstrating the need for an appropriate monitoring mechanism is the
Organisation of American States (OAS) Convention Against Corruption145 adopted in
1996. Until four years after its entry into force, there was no monitoring of the OAS
142
F. Heimann and G. Dell, 'Report on the Follow-up Process for UN Convention Against Corruption'
(Transparency International, 2006), at 1
<http://www.transparencv.org/global_priorities/international_conventions/proiects conventions/uncac/unc
ac monitoring_report> accessed 10 December 2007.
14 Brademas and Heimann (n 82), at 19.
144 Heimann and Dell (n 142), at 6.
145
Organisation of American States, 'Inter-American Convention Against Corruption' (adopted 29 March
1996, entered into force 6 March 1997) <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html>
accessed 10 December 2007.
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Convention and the governments took little action against corruption. However,
governments' efforts were finally stimulated in 2001 when monitoring began.146
In Europe, there are two monitoring mechanisms in the area of anti-corruption
developed by the OECD and the Council of Europe. They are based on a system of peer
review, which can be defined as the 'systematic examination and assessment of the
performance of a State by other States with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed
State improve its policy making, adopt best practices, and comply with established
standards and principles.'147 These mechanisms do not entail legal sanctions but rely on
peer pressure, a form of mutual persuasion to comply with the relevant standards.
The OECD monitoring system is run by the Working Group on Bribery (OECD
WG) composed of government experts from participating countries. It evaluates
compliance with the OECD Convention and a non- binding 1997 Recommendation on
Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions.148 The purpose is to evaluate
in a systematic way whether the national government is implementing laws that meet the
standards set by the OECD instruments. The OECD WG meets five times a year to
monitor compliance with the OECD instruments. The monitoring process is divided into
two main phases. The first phase involves a paper analysis of law and an assessment of
the conformity of the national laws with the OECD instruments.149 In the second phase a
questionnaire is sent out and intensive meetings take place in the examined country with
government, law enforcement authorities, business, trade unions and NGOs.150 The
reports are prepared after nine months of intense discussion and include
Heimann and Dell (n 142), at 5.
147 F. Pagani, 'Peer Review: A Tool for Co-Operation and Change. An Analysis of an OECD Working
Method' (2002) SG /LEG(2002) 1, OECD, at 4-5 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/16/1955285.pdf>
accessed 10 December 2007.
148 For information concerning the OECD WG mandate see:
<http://www.oecd.Org/document/5/0.3343.en_2649_34855_35430021_l l_l_1.00.html#Mandate>
accessed 10 December 2007.
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recommendations for improvement.151 The OECD reports are public and constitute a
valuable source of information about the general anti-corruption policies in the
examined countries. They are very detailed and very often examine individual cases of
corruption.
Even though the scope of the OECD instruments is narrow, the OECD WG
reports go even further and make a general assessment of a government's initiatives and
the anti-corruption development in the evaluated country. The OECD WG has no power
to discipline or exclude members for breaching the OECD instruments, but instead relies
on peer pressure to persuade governments to comply with the relevant standards. It has
been argued that the OECD WG should increase the effectiveness of its action by
issuing annual reports that compare and contrast national enforcement in order to hold
governments fully accountable and increase the peer pressure.152
The Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) was
established in 1999 to monitor the observance of the Twenty Guiding Principles and the
implementation of the Criminal Law Convention, the Civil Law Convention on
corruption, and two recommendations on codes of conduct for public officials and the
funding of political parties. The aim of GRECO is to '...improve the capacity of its
members to fight corruption by following up, through a dynamic process of mutual
evaluation and peer pressure, compliance with their undertakings in this field'153, rather
than to ascertain compliance with the Council of Europe instruments.154 Similarly to
151 OECD WG Reports
<http://www.oecd.Org/document/24/0.2340.en_2649 37447_1933144_l_l_l_37447.00.html> accessed
10 December 2007.
152 Heinemann and Heimann (n 101), at 85.
153 Article 1 of the Statute of GRECO, Council of Europe, Appendix to Resolution (99) 6
<http://www.coe.int/t/dgl/greco/documents/statute_en.asp> accessed 10 December 2007.
154
J. Polakiewicz, 'Alternatives to Treaty-Making and Law-Making by Treaty and Expert Bodies in the
Council of Europe' in R. Wolfram and V. Roben (eds) Developments ofInternational Law in Treaty
Making (Springer 2005), 245-290, at 286.
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OECD WG, GRECO monitors through mutual evaluation and peer pressure.155 The
evaluation is conducted in rounds.156 It involves the collection of information through
questionnaires and on-site country visits, as well as drafting of the evaluation reports.157
These reports are open to the public and contain recommendations for the evaluated
countries in order to improve their level of compliance with the provisions under
consideration. The major strength of GRECO monitoring is that the implementation of
recommendations is under scrutiny after the adoption of the evaluation report.158 Non¬
compliance with recommendations may trigger a special procedure aimed at reinforcing
peer pressure to force a member country to comply with recommendations and may lead
to issuing a public statement by the Statutory Committee of GRECO.159
GRECO constitutes the most comprehensive evaluation process at the pan-
European level. According to the OSI, ' ...the GRECO reports remain the nearest thing
in existence to analysis based on consistent standards, producing evaluations that can be
used on a comparative basis, at least in the area of anti-corruption policy.'160 It has also
been observed that GRECO activities have raised awareness of the problems faced by
the authorities in the fight against corruption and 'national governments have been
forced to reconsider their legislation and improve their administrative practices.'161
155 Rule 22(2) of GRECO Rules of Procedure, Council of Europe, GRECO(2005) 6E
<http://www.coe.int/t/dgl/greco/documents/2005/Greco(2005)6_EN.pdf> last accessed 25 November
2007.
156 Rule 23 of GRECO Rules of Procedure. GRECO's first evaluation round (2000-2002) dealt with the
independence, specialisation and means of national bodies engaged in the prevention and fight against
corruption. It also dealt with the extent and scope of immunities of public officials from arrest,
prosecution, etc. The second evaluation round (2003-2006) focused on the identification, seizure and
confiscation of corruption proceeds, the prevention and detection of corruption in public administration
and the prevention of legal persons (corporations, etc) from being used as shields for corruption. The third
evaluation round (launched in January 2007) addressed (a) the incriminations provided for in the Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption and (b) the transparency of party funding
<rhttp://www.coe.int/t/dgl/greco/evaluations/index_en.asp> accessed 10 December 2007.
157 Rule 24- 29 of GRECO Rules of Procedure.
158 Rule 30 of GRECO Rules of Procedure.
159 Article 32 and 33 of GRECO Rules of Procedure.
160 OSI Report (n 29), at 65.
161 Polakiewicz (n 154), at 285.
43
At the global level, recently an evaluation mechanism has been established to
monitor the implementation of the UNCAC. The Working Group on the Review of
Implementation (UN WG) met for the first time in August 2007162, and the
methodological options of review were still under discussion. In order to test the
available methods of evaluation, the UN WG distributed to state parties a questionnaire
on the implementation of the UNCAC. The text will be analysed by a group of experts,
who may also conduct country visits to validate the findings of their analysis.163 A final
report on the findings of the pilot project will be presented to the Conference of State
Parties in 2008.
In addition, it is important to mention two monitoring mechanisms in the area of
money-laundering conducted by FATF and the MONEYVAL within the Council of
Europe. The FATF evaluation is also based on peer review.164 In the first stage, every
member country provides information on the status of its implementation of the Forty
Recommendations and Nine Special Recommendations165 by responding each year to a
standard questionnaire.166 On the basis of this information, the FATF assesses the extent
to which the Recommendations have been implemented by both individual countries and
the group as a whole. In the second stage, a team of experts from other member
governments visit the member country and meets with government officials and the
private sector over a two week period.167 The purpose of such mutual evaluation is to
draw up a report assessing the extent to which the evaluated country has effectively
162 United Nations, 'Conference of State Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption'
(2007) CAC/COSP/WG.1/2007/1
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention corruption/cosp/WGs/WGl/V0784020-e.pdf> accessed 10
December 2007.
163 United Nations, 'Conference of State Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption'
(2007) CAC/COSP/WG. 1/2007/2, at 8
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention_corruption/cosp/WGs/WGl/V0785985e.pdf> accessed 10
December 2007.
164 FATF, 'Monitoring the Implementation of the Forty Recommendations' <http://www.fatf-
ggfi.Org/document/60/0.2340.en_32250379_32236920_34039228_l_l_l_l.00.html> accessed 10
December 2007.
165 FATF, 'Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing' (updated 2004)
<http://www.fatf-gafi.Org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf> accessed 10 December 2007.
166 FATF (n 164).
167 Ibid.
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implemented a system against money laundering and to highlight areas in which further
progress may still be required. These reports are available to the public.168
The strength of the FATF evaluation lies in its policy of reinforcing peer pressure
on a member that does not comply with the anti-money laundering recommendations.
Such a member country is first asked to deliver a progress report at a FATF plenary
meeting. Subsequent measures include a letter from the FATF President or the dispatch
of a high-level mission to the non-complying member country. Finally, the FATF may
issue a statement calling on financial institutions to give special attention to business
relations and transactions with persons, companies and financial institutions domiciled
in the non-complying country or suspend the FATF membership of the country in
question. The FATF Recommendations are not legally binding instruments and have a
soft law nature. However, as Gilmore pointed out, 'in governmental circles in the major
economies, the FATF experience with mutual evaluation has been widely perceived as a
success.'169
Given the limited membership of FATF, there was a need to include the non-
members of FATF, in particular the CEE countries, into a separate monitoring system
within the Council of Europe. The evaluation body, MONEYVAL, was established in
1997 and is based on the FATF model. Considering the scope of evaluations carried out
by MONEYVAL, it can be concluded that it is a more ambitious body. In addition to the
FATF Recommendations, the evaluation includes the UN, the Council of Europe and the
EU anti-money laundering instruments. The MONEYVAL evaluation reports are also
available to the public.170 In 2007, the activities of MONEYVAL were positively
assessed by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe Terry Davis, who argued
168 FATF Reports <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/32/0.3343.en_32250379_32236982_35128416_l_l_l_1.00.html> accessed 10
December 2007.
169 Gilmore (n 136), at 139.
170 MONEYVAL Reports <http://www.coe.int/t/c/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/combating_economic_crime/5_money_Iaundering/General_information/Evaluations%20%20
MONEYVAL.asp#TopOfPage: accessed 10 December 2007.
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that as a result of the evaluations ' ...conventions are being ratified; laws and procedures
which match international standards are being put into place; financial intelligence units
are being created where none existed to analyse suspicious activity reports from banks
and other relevant institutions.'171
The above monitoring mechanisms have brought results.172 It is important to
notice that although the OECD recommendations and the Twenty Guiding Principles are
non-binding or 'soft law' instruments, the monitoring systems ensure compliance by
national governments. The advantage of peer review is the fact that during the process,
countries exchange not only information but also have an opportunity to learn from each
other and exchange best practices. On-site visits may also stimulate a government's
action.173 It has been pointed out that the 'soft law' nature of peer review is often better
suited to encourage and enhance compliance than a traditional enforcement mechanism,
as it can take into account a country's policy objectives and look at its performance in a
historical and political context.174 An additional advantage is that the outcomes of
reviews are available to the public. In this way, civic organisations and the press may
scrutinise actions of national governments and increase the pressure to step up efforts
against corruption. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, similar mechanisms based on
mutual evaluation and peer review were introduced by the EU in certain areas of the
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and also within the pre-accession
policy.
Conclusion
There are two distinct definitions of corruption at the EU level. While the criminal law
definition is limited to outlawing bribery, for the purposes of prevention, the EU accepts
171 T. Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Speech 'MONEYVAL 10th Anniversary plenary
meeting' (Strasbourg, 3 December 2007)
<http://www.coe.int/t/dc/press/news/20071203_disc_sg_EN.asp?> accessed 10 December 2007.
172 Heimann and Dell (n 141), at 24-26.
173 Gilmore (n 136), at 137.
174 Pagani (n 147), at 12.
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a very broad and inclusive definition of corruption as an 'abuse of power for private
gain', which puts it in the mainstream of international organisations. Ideally, the EU
should base its policy against corruption within Member States on this concept of
corruption, as it allows a focus not only on criminal law repression, but also on the
prevention of corrupt conduct. In practice, however, as will be seen in Chapters Two and
Three, to a large extent the EU limits its strategy to the criminalisation of bribery.
The evidence presented in this chapter confirms that corruption in the CEE
countries was widely perceived to constitute a serious problem. The damaging
consequences of corruption in these countries were exacerbated by the scale of political
and economic changes undertaken after the collapse of communism. Corruption has
made the transition to democracy and a free market economy more difficult and has
demanded an emergency response. The extent and complexity of the problem of
corruption in the post-communist countries posed a particularly difficult challenge for
the EU, which, as it will be illustrated in the next chapters, decided to assist and guide
these countries in their anti-corruption efforts.
International organisations have each responded to corruption in accordance with
their specific goals and mandate. Initially, a narrow approach was taken, and corruption
was approached as an impediment to international trade and market access. Over time,
however, international cooperation addressed corruption in a broader sense as a serious
threat to economic growth and political stability.
From the outset, international agencies saw the need to focus not only on
repression of corruption by means of criminal law, but also on prevention. The OECD,
the Council of Europe and the UN have all included preventive measures in their anti-
corruption strategies. These measures usually take the form of non-binding
recommendations or non-obligatory provisions in the treaties. They all aim at enhancing
transparency and integrity in both the public and private sectors.
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International experience also demonstrates the utmost importance of having
appropriate monitoring mechanisms to evaluate the implementation of anti-corruption
instruments at the national level. In some countries, these mechanisms have substantially
increased the effectiveness of otherwise non-binding recommendations. Following this
success, these recommendations served as a model for the national anti-corruption
strategies.
This chapter has provided a useful background for consideration of the EU
strategy against corruption. In particular, the initiatives of the Council of Europe and the
UNCAC will serve as a yardstick for an assessment of EU action in this area. The next
chapter opens a discussion about the EU anti-corruption strategy by analysing to what




The scope of EU legal powers and development
of the policy in the area of anti-corruption
Similar to other international organisations, the EU responded to the problem of
corruption in the second half of the 1990s. It addressed corruption in its own
characteristic way corresponding with its goals, its structure and, most importantly, its
competences. This chapter provides a legal and historical context for the development of
the EU policy, setting a useful background for a detailed discussion of the legislative and
institutional framework against corruption in the next chapter.
The chapter first outlines what the EU can possibly do to prevent and fight
corruption within the Member States and what are the legal and political constraints of
EU action. The anti-corruption acquis is complex from a legal point of view. The
competences in the area of anti-corruption are divided between Member States and the
EU. In addition combating corruption is a cross-pillar area matter, regulated under both
European Community (EC) and EU Treaties.1
1 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union (EU Treaty) and of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (EC Treaty), OJ C 321 E/l, 29.12.2006.
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The chapter starts with an analysis of the available legal bases under the EC
Treaty (also known as the 'first pillar') and explains that the Community has very
limited legal powers with regard to preventing and combating corruption within the
Member States. Next, the chapter discusses the competences under Title VI of the EU
Treaty regulating the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (also known as
the 'third pillar') and argues that the action of the EU is restrained by political, rather
than legal factors. The legislative and institutional framework under both Treaties would
be substantially amended if the Treaty of Lisbon2 entered into force. In October 2007 the
European Council agreed the final text of the Treaty of Lisbon, which draws upon the
earlier Constitutional Treaty3 rejected in the French and Dutch referendums in 2005. The
Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007 by the Heads of State or Government
of 27 Member States, but still needs to be ratified by all Member States in accordance
with their constitutional requirements. This chapter elaborates on the added value of the
amendments introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in the area of anti-corruption.
Furthermore, the chapter examines the three phases in the development of EU
policy against corruption within the Member States. The focus here is on the policy, as
opposed to the actual legal instruments and obligations of the Member States in this
area. These instruments and obligations are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.
1. The legal bases in the area of anti-corruption policy
Competence is a technical term meaning 'the legal power to act.'4 In the area of anti-
corruption it denotes the power to decide on a broad range of policies, which touch upon
many highly sensitive areas, for example:
2
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European
Community, CIG 14/07,3.12.2007.
3 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 169, 18.7.2003.
4 J. Shaw, Lecture (University of Edinburgh, School of Law, October 2006).
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• criminal law
• limiting immunity of public officials and elected representatives
• introducing transparency rules in public administration
• regulating system for recruitment of civil servants
• organisation of anti-corruption bodies
• rules on financing of political parties
• ensuring freedom of media
• guaranteeing independence of the judiciary and prosecution.
National governments are generally very reluctant to give up to the EU control
over these policy areas. Power to regulate some of these matters may bring them
political benefits at the national level when used against political opponents. Moreover,
sometimes Member States may tolerate corruption if it serves their economic interests.
For instance, a Member State may even tolerate administrative weakness in customs
enforcement if it contributes to greater trade going through its ports.5 For these reasons,
there is a tension between the interests of Member States to preserve traditional
sovereign powers and those of the EU to acquire the necessary means to tackle
corruption at the European level.
This section analyses how far the EU competences in the area of anti-corruption
reach. It starts by drawing attention to several important aspects of the EU legal order.
Firstly, the EU does not have a general competence to regulate this policy area. Unlike a
sovereign state, it only has competence within the limited areas in which it has been
given power.6 In other words, every EU action requires a legal basis in the EC or EU
Treaty. In the absence of such legal basis, the action will be declared void by the Court
of Justice in accordance with mles laid down in Article 230 EC.
5 C.M. Warner, 'Creating a Common Market for Fraud and Corruption in the European Union: An
Institutional Accident, or a Deliberate Strategy' (2002) EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 2002/31, at 20-21.
6 Article 5 EC. For more, see: P. Craig and G. de Burca, EULaw. Text, Cases, and Materials (3rd edn
OUP, 2003), at 132.
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A legal basis is a provision of the Treaty that allocates competences between the
EU and Member States and prescribes which legal instrument and legislative process
should be used. The choice of legal basis is an important factor in the success of a
proposal. There is a key difference between adopting the legal measures on the basis of
the EC or the EU Treaty. Adoption of legal instruments under the EC Treaty entails
many advantages, such as increased efficiency and transparency of the legislative
process, co-decision power of the EP, guaranteeing a 'European dimension' of the
legislative proposal through the right of initiative of the Commission, favouring high
standard achievements through qualified majority voting and monitoring of
implementation by the Member States.7
Secondly, EU action under first and third pillars is limited by the principle of
subsidiarity and proportionality as formulated in Article 5 EC, whereby the EU can take
an action in a certain area only if the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by Member States in the framework of their national legal systems
and can, therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community or Union. In addition, the principle of proportionality
requires that EU action must not go beyond what is strictly necessary to achieve the
objectives of the EC and EU Treaties. According to the guidance given by the Protocol
on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality8, EU action is
justified where:
• the issue under consideration has transnational aspects
• actions by Member States alone or lack of EU action would conflict with
the requirements of the Treaty
• action at EU level would produce clear benefits by reason of its scale or
effects compared with action at the level of the Member States.
7 Commission (EC), 'Implementing The Hague Programme: the way forward' COM(2006) 331 final,
28.6.2006, at 14.
8 Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality added by the Treaty of
Amsterdam, OJ C 340/105,10.11.1997.
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The principle of subsidiarity is important from the point of view of initiating legislation
by the Commission. When making legislative proposal, the Commission should consult
widely and clearly state reasons for concluding that the EU objective can better achieved
by the action at the EU level.9
The principle of subsidiarity can be seen from three perspectives: constitutional,
legal and political. In the first view, subsidiarity plays an important part in the
constitutional structure of the EU, as ' ...it is a declaration of the vision of Europe shared
by the authors of the Treaty and enshrined in that document.'10 Its goal is to ensure that
decisions are taken closer to the people and in this way the principle serves democracy
and protects Member States from centralization of power by the EU.
From a second perspective, subsidiarity is also a legal principle. Its goal is to
regulate whether the competence of the Community or Union is properly exercised. The
Court of Justice has jurisdiction in actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of
subsidiarity by a legislative act.11 To date, however, the Court of Justice has not struck
down a measure on the basis of breach of subsidiarity.12 According to Barber there are
two main explanations for this failure to develop subsidiarity as a legal constraint on
Community action.13 Firstly, subsidiarity is not suited to judicial enforcement, because it
requires deciding over difficult technical and political issues, including assessment of
social and economic effects of the act and the balance of regional and central power.14
9
Ibid, paras 4 and 9.
10 N. W. Barber, 'The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity' (2005) European Law Journal, Vol. 11 No. 3,
308-325, at 308.
11 Articles 230 EC and Article 35 (6) EU.
12 For discussion on the justiciability of the principle of subsidiarity, see: Ch. Ritzer, M. Ruttloff and K.
Linhart, 'How to Sharpen a Dull Sword- The Principle of Subsidiarity and its Control' (2006) German law
Review, Vol. 07 No. 09, 733-760; G. de Burca, 'The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as
an Institutional Actor' (1998) Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 36 No. 2, 217-235; F. Sander,
'Subsidiarity infringements before the European Court of Justice: futile interference with politics or a
substantial step towards EU federalism?' (2006) Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol. 12,517-571.





Secondly, the principle of subsidiarity '...runs against the spirit' of the Court of
Justice.15 There is an ethos of the Court of Justice as an engine of integration, often
adjudicating in favour of Community action over action at the Member States level and
therefore, it is hard to imagine that the Court of Justice finds it easy to be impartial
between the Community and Member States levels.16
In a third and final view, subsidiarity can be viewed as a political principle, as its
enforcement essentially must be in the hands of political institutions and the role of the
courts in enforcing it is limited.17 As will be discussed below, the political character of
the principle of subsidiary has been reinforced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which enables
the political scrutiny of the principle by the national parliaments. National parliaments
are well placed to resolve difficult political issues that subsidiarity touches upon, but
also have a strong interest in making sure that subsidiarity is applied.
1.1. The EC Treaty
The fight against corruption is not mentioned as one of the objectives of the Community
in Articles 2 and 3 EC. There are, however, legal bases available under the EC Treaty
which can be used for the adoption of anti-corruption measures. Firstly, corruption is
addressed in the framework of protection of the Community financial interest and the
fight against fraud. The most important provision in this area is Article 280 EC
(ex Article 209a EC, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht), which concerns
exclusively the protection of the financial interests of the European Communities (EC).
Also, the Treaty of Amsterdam amended Article 280(4) EC to provide a legal basis for
adoption of legislation using the co-decision procedure and qualified majority voting in
the Council with a view to affording effective and equivalent protection of the EC
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 J. Peters, 'National Parliaments and Subsidiarity: Think Twice' (2005) European Constitutional Law
Review 1, 68-72, at 70.
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financial interests in the Member States.18 The competence of the Community to adopt
the administrative measures on the basis of Article 280 EC is not subject to dispute.19
It has been in continuous dispute, however, whether the Community can
prescribe criminal sanctions for behaviour violating Community law.20 In the context of
protection of financial interests, the subject of debate is Article 280(4) EC, which
specifies that measures taken on the basis of Article 280 EC 'shall not concern the
application of national criminal law or the national administration of justice'. Some
authors claim that this provision precludes any Community competence in the area of
criminal law for the protection of the financial interests.21 However, it has also been
argued that this exception precludes Community measures only as regards criminal
procedure and law enforcement, not substantive criminal law.22 The latter view has been
supported by the Commission and endorsed by the EP, which recognised the
competence of the Community to adopt all the provisions that do not relate to procedural
criminal law or judicial cooperation.23
18 Before amendments introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the legal measures aimed at protection of
the financial interests were adopted on the basis of Article 308 EC (ex Article 235 EC).
19 W. van Gerven, 'Constitutional Conditions for a Public Prosecutor's Office at the European level'
(2000) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 8/3, 296-318, at 307.
0 For example: M. Wasmeier and N. Thwaites, 'The "battle of the pillars": does the European Community
have the power to approximate national criminal laws?' (2004) European Law Review 29, 613-634; G.
Dona, 'Towards a European Judicial Area? A Corpus Juris Introducing Penal Provisions for the Purpose
of the Protection of the Financial Interests of the European Union' (1998) European Journal of Crime,
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 6/3, 282-297; P. A. Albrecht and S. Braum, 'Deficiencies in the
Development of European Criminal Law' (1999) European Law Journal, Vol. 5 No. 3, 293-310; K. Ligeti,
'European Community Criminal Law' (1998) Acta Juridica Hungarica, 39, Nos 1-2, 55-91; H. Hugger,
'The European Community's Competence to Prescribe National Criminal Sanctions' (1995) European
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 3, 241-271; M. Delmas-Marty, 'The European
Union and Penal law' (1998) European Law Journal, Vol. 4 No. 1, 87-115.
21
For example: G.J.M. Corstens, 'Criminal law in the First Pillar?' (2003) European Journal of Crime,
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 11/1, 2003,131-144, at 142-143; W. van Gerven (n 19), at 306-
307; J. Spencer, 'Legal bases for the implementation' in M. Delmas-Marty and J.A.E. Vervaele (eds), The
implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member States (Vol. 1 Intersentia, Antwerp-Groningen-Oxford
2000), 380-382, at 380.
22 For example: S. Peers, EUJustice andHomeAffairs Law (2nd edn OUP, 2006), at 397; K. Tiedemann,
'Legal bases for the implementation' in M. Delmas-Marty and J.A.E. Vervaele (n 21), 385-387, at 385.
23 Commission (EC), 'Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
criminal-law protection of the Community's financial interests' (the Draft Directive) COM(2001)272
final, 23.5.2001, at 6-7; European Parliament, 'Report on the proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the criminal-law protection of the Communities' financial interests
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There is an agreement across the EU institutions that Article 280 EC needs to be
instrumentalised with the use of criminal law. To this end the Council advocates
adoption of legal instruments under the third pillar and the Commission considers the
use of the first pillar instruments as the most appropriate. These conflicting views
became visible when in 2001 the Commission proposed a Directive on the criminal law
protection of the EC financial interests (Draft Directive)24 based on Article 280(4) EC.
The proposal was a response to the lack of ratifications of the relevant instruments in
this area adopted under the third pillar, in particular the Convention on the protection of
the EC financial interests (PIF Convention)25 together with the First Protocol26 and the
Second Protocol27 to the PIF Convention. The Draft Directive did not bring anything
new with regard to content; it only encompassed the main aspects of the third pillar
instruments and aimed at approximation of national criminal law in relation to the
protection of the EU financial interests. According to the proposal, the Member States
would be required to make the acts of fraud, corruption and money laundering
punishable criminal offences.28 The Draft Directive was not accepted by the Council. In
fact, 14 delegations did not support the adoption of the proposal, stating that they did not
favour the adoption of criminal law measures on the basis of Article 280(4) of the EC
Treaty.29
(COM(2001)272-C5-0225/2001-2001/0115(COD))' A5-0390/2001, 8.11.2001, at 41; European
Parliament, 'Report on criminal proceedings relating to the protection of the Union's financial interests'
A4-0082/98, 3.3.1998, at 11-12.
24 Commission (n 23).
25 Convention drawn up on the basis ofArticle K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection of
the European Communities' financial interests, (adopted 26 July 1995, entered into force 17 October 2002
among the 15 old Member States) (the PIF Convention) OJ C 316/57, 27.11.1995.
26 Protocol drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union to the Convention on the
protection of the European Communities' financial interests, (adopted 27 September 1996, entered into
force 17 October 2002 among the 15 old Member States) (the First Protocol) OJ C 313/10, 23/10/1996.
27 Second Protocol drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to the
Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests (adopted 19 June 1997, not
entered into force) (the Second Protocol) OJ C 221/22,19.07.1997.
28 Article 7 of the Draft Directive.
29 Council of the European Union, 'Draft Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
criminal-law protection of the Community's financial interests'10596/03, 18.6.2003.
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In 2003, the Court of Justice was asked to resolve the dispute between the
Community and the Union over the competence in the area of criminal law.
The Commission brought a legal challenge to annul the Framework Decision on the
protection of the environment through criminal law arguing that it was within the
Community's powers to adopt environmental legislation.30 In Case C-176/03, the Court
of Justice upheld the Commission's arguments and annulled the framework decision.31
The judgment confirmed the general rule that 'neither criminal law nor the rules of
criminal procedure fall within the Community's competence'32, but recognised that this
rule 'does not prevent the Community legislature, when the application of effective,
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national authorities is
an essential measure for combating serious environmental offences, from taking
measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member States which it considers
necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it lays down on environmental
protection are fully effective.'33
The above judgement of the Court of Justice cast a significant new light, but also
a continuing uncertainty. Case C-176/03 involved protection of the environment, which
according to the Court of Justice constituted 'one of the essential objectives of the
Community.'34 (emphasis added) In the Communication on the implications of this
judgement, the Commission expressed the view that criminal law measures could be
adopted on a Community basis only at the sectoral level and only on condition that there
was a clear need to 'combat serious shortcomings in the implementation of the
Community's objectives and to provide for criminal law measures to ensure the full
effectiveness of a Community policy or the proper functioning of a freedom.'35 It
remained unclear, however, whether the judgement of the Court of Justice extended to
30 OJ C 135/21, 7.6.2003.
31 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR1-7879.
32 Ibid, para 47.
33 Ibid, para 48.
34 Ibid, para 41.
35 Commission (EC), 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on the implications of the Court's judgement of 13 September 2005 (Case 176/03 Commission v Council)'
COM(2005)583 final/2, 24.11.2005, para 7.
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areas other than protection of the environment and, in particular, whether the
Community competence extended to the achievement of any Community objective.36
This issue was further elaborated by the Court of Justice in the Case C-440/05
concerning a challenge by the Commission to the Council's framework decision aimed
at harmonising criminal sanctions in relation to ship source pollution.37 In the judgment
to the Case C-440/05 the Court of Justice annulled the contested framework decision and
confirmed that the main findings from the Case C-176/03 apply also in the area of
transport policy (Article 80(2) EC).38 Most importantly, however, the Court of Justice
found that the determination of the type and level of the criminal penalties to be applied
does not fall within the Community's sphere of competence.39
What is the significance of these judgements for the area of anti-corruption?
Considering the willingness of the Court of Justice to give the Community a competence
to legislate in the area of criminal law, one can predict that the implications of the
judgment extend to other Community policy areas. One can therefore argue that the
Community has the competence to adopt criminal-law measures to ensure that the
protection of the financial interests as prescribed by Article 280 EC is fully effective. If
the above judgement applies to the area of the protection of the financial interests, then it
needs to be recognised that Article 280 EC is a specific legal basis which, by virtue of
Articles 29 and 47 EU Treaty, takes precedence when adopting measures regarding the
protection of the EC financial interests. It should follow that the Commission's analysis
claiming that the above mentioned Draft Directive on the criminal-law protection of the
EC financial interests should be adopted on the basis of Article 280(4) EC is correct.40 It
must be emphasised, however, that the PIF Convention and its Protocols would not be
entirely invalid, as apart from establishing criminal offences, they also regulate judicial
36 For discussion, see: V. Mitsilegas, 'Constitutional Principles of the European Community and European
Criminal Law' (2006) European Journal of Law Reform, Vol. VIII, no. 2/3, 301-323, at 302-309 and Peers
(n 22), at 394-397.
'7 Case C-440/05 Commission v. Council [2007] (ECJ 23 October 2007).
38 Ibid, para 66.
39
Ibid, para 70.
40 Commission (n 35), at 8.
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cooperation among Member States, which does not fall under the Community
competence.
The added value of the judgement would be the enhanced monitoring of
implementation of these instruments by Member States. As Chapter Three will discuss
in more detail, adoption of the legal instruments under the first pillar entails greater
monitoring powers for the Commission, in particular infringement procedure under
Article 226 EC. There is no similar enforcement action under the third pillar, and the EU
Treaty provides for very limited monitoring mechanisms in the area of police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Lack of effective monitoring results and delays
in ratification and implementation is one of the most serious weaknesses of the anti-
corruption instruments adopted under the third pillar. In particular, as of 12 December
2007, the PIF Convention and the First Protocol have not yet been ratified by Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Romania, and the Second Protocol still
needs to be ratified by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania
and Italy.41
Member States, however, do not appear to support a wider interpretation of the
Community competence. It is worth adding that in the Case C-176/03 the Council was
supported by 11 out of 15 Member States and in the Case 440/05 by 19 out of 25
Member States. As a result, in 2006 the Member States agreed on a procedure to be
followed within the Council when a Commission proposal involves measures relating to
the criminal law, which ensures scrutiny of a proposal by the preparatory bodies within
the Council at an early stage of negotiation.42
Under the Treaty of Lisbon the first and third pillars are merged into a single
legal framework, which foresees the same legal instruments for both pillars, including
41
For charts of ratifications, see: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu> accessed 12 December 2007.
42 Council of the European Union, 'Procedure for future handling of legislative files containing proposals
relevant to the development of criminal law policy' 7876/06, 28.3.2006.
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regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions.43 The abolition of the
EU pillar structure should remove the controversies over the appropriate legal basis. It is
confirmed by the removal from Article 280(4) of the contested paragraph on the impact
of Community measures on the application of national criminal law or the national
administration of justice.
It should be emphasised, however, that the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the
criminal law competence differs from the procedure resulting from the above
judgements of the Court of Justice in two important ways. First, while the judgements of
the Court of Justice entail monopoly of initiative by the Commission, the Treaty of
Lisbon foresees that the measures in the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters,
including the approximation of the laws of the Member States, are to be adopted within
the Council using qualified majority voting and on the initiative of the Commission or a
quarter of the Member States.44 According to Monar, this seems to be 'a good
compromise between, on the one hand, the preservation of a right of initiative of the
member states... and, on the other, the need to prevent a proliferation of initiatives from
individual member states which are all too often inspired by purely national interests.'45
Second, under the Treaty of Lisbon there is a possibility to use a special procedure,
known as the 'emergency brake', when a Member State considers that a draft legislative
act 'would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system' it can request the
draft to be referred to the European Council and the legislative procedure will be
temporarily suspended.46 In case of disagreement, the Treaty of Lisbon gives a
possibility for at least nine Member States to establish enhanced cooperation on the basis
of the initial draft proposal.47 As has been pointed out, this provision raises serious
concerns, as it:
43 Article 249(1) of the Treaty of Lisbon.
44 Article 611 of the Treaty of Lisbon.
45 J. Monar, 'Justice and Home Affairs in the EU Constitutional Treaty. What Added Value for the 'Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice'?'(2005) European Constitutional Law Review 1, 226-246, at 242.
46 Article 69B (3) of the Treaty of Lisbon.
47 Ibid.
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enables any of the member states simply to interrupt a legislative procedure through a
referral to the European Council. This not only undermines the idea of a regular
legislative process, but also gives to the European Council a de facto legislative role,
which, according to the institutional system of the Union, it should not have.48
It is important to emphasise that, even if the Community gains competence to
protect the financial interests by means of criminal law as a result of the Court of Justice
judgments, this would not have much impact on its general competence to prevent and
fight corruption within the Member States, which would remain very limited. Again, the
scope of measures adopted under Article 280 EC is confined to protection of the
Community financial interests. This competence does not extend to the fight against
corruption with no impact on the Community budget. The question is which legal bases
allow the Community to address the problem of corruption beyond the protection of the
EC financial interests. In this context, two residual provisions of the EC Treaty -
Articles 95 and 308 EC - are discussed.
Article 95 EC Treaty confers on the Community the power to approximate
national laws of Member States with the purpose of establishing and ensuring the proper
functioning of the internal market. Corruption distorts fair competition and adversely
affects the proper functioning of the internal market. Moreover, widespread corruption
within the Member States is capable of undermining the effective implementation of the
acquis. Under Article 95 EC corruption has been addressed through legislation
concerning money laundering, terrorist financing, public procurement and the
application of international accounting and auditing standards. The importance of these
measures for preventing and combating corruption is discussed in more detail in Chapter
Three. Here it is important to point out that the fight against corruption was not the
primary objective of these measures, but they all aimed at ensuring the proper
functioning of the internal market.
48 Monar (n 45), at 241.
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Could Article 95 EC, however, be used for the adoption of measures aimed at
preventing and combating corruption within the Member States? On the basis of the
case-law of the Court of Justice it is possible to elaborate on criteria which an anti-
corruption measure would have to fulfil to be legitimately based on Article 95 EC. The
Court of Justice established limits to the use of this Article. It recognised that the
measures adopted under Article 95 EC must 'genuinely have as its object the
improvement of the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal
market.'49 Therefore, for example, the adoption of the Directives against money
laundering50 and two Regulations against terrorist financing51 on the basis of Article 95
EC was justified because the introduction of the proceeds of illegal activities into the
financial system and their further investment could damage the stability and reputation
of the financial sector and thus threaten the internal market.52 The Court of Justice
further ruled that a mere finding of disparities between national rules and of the abstract
risk of obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition
liable to result is not sufficient to justify the choice of Article 95 as a legal basis.53 The
measures adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC must have a primary objective of
safeguarding the proper functioning of the single market, which is not merely incidental
to other objectives.54
Considering the above, it would be difficult to use Article 95 EC as a basis for
adoption of measures which primarily aim at prevention and the fight against domestic
49 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR1-8419, para 84.
50 Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the
purpose of money laundering, OJ L 166, 28.06.1991 amended by OJ L 344/76, 28.12.2001 and Directive
2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the
use of the financial system for the purpose ofmoney laundering and terrorist financing, OJ L 309/15,
25.11.2005.
51
Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on
controls of cash entering or leaving the Community, OJ L 309/9, 25.11.2005 and Regulation (EC) No
1781/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 on information on the
payer accompanying transfers of funds, OJ L345, 8.12.2006.
52 For example: Regulation No 1889/2005, paras 2 and 3 and Directive 2005/60/EC, para 2.
53 Case C-376/98 (n 49).
54 Case C-317/04 Parliament v. Council [2005] ECR 1-2457, Opinion of Advocate General Leger, paras
149 and 150.
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corruption within Member States. The Commission, in its legislative proposal, would
have to justify that the fight against corruption is only incidental to the primary objective
of ensuring the proper functioning of the internal market. An example of an anti-
corruption measure which could be based on Article 95, providing that the Community
gains broader competence in criminal law, is the Framework Decision on combating
corruption in the private sector.55 The adoption of this Framework Decision was justified
by the fact that corruption in the private sector distorts the proper functioning of the
single market. It has been pointed out that, with the increase in cross-border trade in
goods and services, corruption in the private sector is not just a domestic problem as it
distorts competition in relation to the purchase of goods or commercial services and
impedes sound economic development.56 Moreover, one can argue that if the
Community gains competence to prescribe the offences, criminalisation of cross-border
corruption in the public sector could also be regulated under Article 95 EC. Bribery of
public officials by private entities also distorts the proper functioning of the internal
market and fair competition. As observed in Chapter One, the perception of cross-border
corruption in the public sector as an impediment to trade was the reason behind adoption
of the OECD Convention.
It would be more difficult, however, to fulfil the Court of Justice criteria in the
case of a measure which would regulate purely domestic cormption without the cross-
border dimension, such as corruption in the financing of political parties within the
Member States. Although this measure would generally contribute to eliminating
corruption across the EU and thus better functioning of the internal market, in the light
of the case-law of the Court of Justice it would be hard to justify its adoption on the
basis of Article 95 EC. In particular, the objective of combating corruption would be
primary and the mere fact that corruption in the financing of political parties may affect
the establishment or functioning of the internal market would not be sufficient to justify
using that provision as the basis for the act.
55 Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private
sector, (the Framework Decision), OJ L 192/54, 31.7.2003.
56
Ibid, paras 1 and 9.
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Yet another possibility is the use of the residual Article 308 EC. This legal basis
can be used if action by the Community is necessary to attain, in the course of the
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community, if the EC
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers. This Article, however, does not constitute
a suitable legal basis for adoption of anti-corruption measures because the fight against
corruption within the Member States is not a Community objective. However,
combating corruption is an important element of maintaining and developing an area of
freedom, security and justice which was recognised by the Treaty of Amsterdam as one
the objectives of the Union.57 It is, therefore, argued that appropriate legal bases for
adoption of measures against corruption within the Member States lie under the EU
Treaty rather than EC Treaty.
1.2. The EU Treaty
Under the provisions of the third pillar, which deals with police and judicial cooperation
in criminal matters, corruption is addressed as part of the general policy against
organised and cross-border crime. The EU gained a competence to act in the area of
anti-corruption with the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht58 in 1993. Since
then, the fight against corruption at the EU level has been taken beyond the protection of
the EC financial interests.
Although the Treaty of Maastricht did not mention corruption expressly,
combating fraud on an international scale was recognised to be a matter of 'common
interest' (Article K.1 (5)) in which Member States agreed to cooperate. To that end the
Council could unanimously adopt joint positions, joint actions and conventions.59 The
legal effect of joint actions and joint positions has been subject to debate60, as the EU
57 Article 2 EU in conjunction with Article 29 EU.
58 OJ C 191, 29.7.1992.
59 Article K.4 (3) and K.3 (2) of the Treaty of Maastricht.
60 Peers (n 22), at 16-17.
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Treaty was silent on that. For some joint positions, the legal effect was determined by
their text, which, for example, could provide that joint position bound only the
executive, not legislative or judicial authorities of Member States.61 Meanwhile, joint
actions required Member States 'to present proposals to their national parliaments, rather
than impose an obligation upon the entire State to ensure that the national law was
amended.'62
Conventions, on the other hand, are established instruments of public
international law. They are binding on Member States once ratified and their legal
effects are determined by national law. The Council, however, could merely recommend
to the Member States the ratification of conventions in accordance with their respective
constitutional requirements, and therefore the EU was dependent on the political will of
the Member States to progress towards implementation.
The lack of effectiveness of the instruments introduced by the Treaty of
Maastricht is particularly visible in the field of anti-corruption. The Joint Action on
corruption in the private sector (the Joint Action)63 adopted in 1998 was not
implemented by all Member States and eventually had to be replaced by a new type of
instrument, a framework decision, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The
conventions did not constitute appropriate instruments for addressing the problem of
corruption at the EU level either. The two main reasons were the lack of ratifications and
minimal regulation. In 1999 Transparency International emphasised that the lack of
ratification and implementation of the instruments was the major weakness of the EU
anti-corruption policy.64 Despite repeated calls for ratification from the Council, the EP
61 Council Joint Position 96/196/JHA of 4 March 1996 defined by the Council on the basis of Article K.3
of the Treaty on European Union on the harmonized application of the definition of the term 'refugee' in
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugees, OJ L 63,13.3.1996.
62 Peers (n 22), at 382-383.
63 Council Joint Action 98/742/JHA of 22 December 1998 on corruption in the private sector, OJ L 358/2,
31.12.1998.
64
Transparency International, 'Fighting Corruption: What remains to be done at the EU level' (1999)
Working Paper.
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and the Commission65, the anti-corruption instruments in the form of conventions and
protocols were not promptly ratified by all Member States.66 For example, the PIF
Convention adopted in 1995 and the First Protocol adopted in 1996 came into force only
on 17 October 2002 and the Second Protocol adopted in 1997 has not yet entered into
force. Similarly, the Convention against bribery of Member States' and Community
officials (the Anti-Corruption Convention)67, adopted in 1997, entered into force only
eight years later on 28 September 2005.68 Such delays show how ineffective the third
pillar instruments are and seriously undermine the political credibility of Member States
with regard to any future anti-corruption initiatives.
The conventions represent yet another serious weakness. Since they are adopted
under the rules of unanimity, they are an outcome of a political compromise. Thus, they
often do not regulate the matter in a comprehensive manner but rather tend to impose
only minimum standards, resulting in the lowest common denominator that is acceptable
to all Member States. The scope of these instruments is very narrow, and therefore the
Member States are usually allowed to adopt internal provisions imposing more stringent
obligations.69 As Kuijper pointed out, 'a Member State proposal frequently was the
product of a particular national orientation... and the only way to arrive at agreement
65
For example: Commission (EC), 'Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee on a Comprehensive EU Policy Against
Corruption' COM(2003) 317 final, 28.5.2003, at 8; Amsterdam European Council, Presidency
Conclusions (16 June 1997); European Parliament, 'Report on the Communication from the Commission
to the Council and the European Parliament on a Union policy against corruption', A4-0285/98, PE
226.841/fin., 24.7.1998, at 9-10.
66 Commission (EC), 'Report from the Commission. Implementation by Member States of the Convention
on the Protection of the European Communities' financial interests and its protocols' COM(2004) 709
final, 25.10.2004.
57 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) of the Treaty on European Union on the fight
against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials ofMember States of the
European Union, (the Anti-Corruption Convention), OJ C 195, 25.06.1997.
68As of 13 December 2007, it has not been ratified by Czech Republic and Malta
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu> last accessed 13 December 2007.
69 Article 11 of the Anti-Corruption Convention and joint reading of Article 7 of the First Protocol and
Article 9 of the PIF Convention.
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among all the Member States was to strip it down to a minimal product acceptable to
all.'70
The effectiveness of the fight against corruption has been enhanced since the
entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, in which the fight against corruption was
expressly recognised as one of the objectives of the Union.71 Article 29 EU recognised
preventing and combating corruption as an important element in the area of freedom,
security and justice. In order to fight corruption, Member States agreed for closer police
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and approximation of national criminal
laws.
The highly ineffective instruments in this field were replaced by legal
instruments introduced by Article 34(2) of the Treaty of Amsterdam, including common
positions, framework decisions and decisions. Common positions define the approach of
the EU to a particular matter, such as the Council's Common Position on the UNCAC72
adopted on the basis of Article 34(2)(a) EU. Meanwhile, there are two substantial
differences between framework decisions and decisions. First, framework decisions are
binding as to the result to be achieved and leave to the national authorities the choice of
form and methods, while decisions are binding in their entirety.73 Second, while
framework decisions can be adopted for the purpose of approximation of the laws and
regulations of the Member States, decisions can be adopted for any other purpose
consistent with the objective of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,
excluding, however, approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.74
Neither decisions nor framework decisions entail direct effect.
70 P.J. Kuijper, 'The Evolution of the third pillar from Maastricht to the European Constitution:
Institutional Aspects' (2004) Common Market Law Review 41 Issue 2, 609-626, at 611.
71 Article 2 EU read in conjunction with Article 29 EU.
72 Council of the European Union, 8897/4/02, 30 October 2003.
73 Article 34 (2) (b) and (c) EU.
74 Ibid.
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Although the EU Treaty upholds the possibility to adopt conventions75, since the
entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam the Council has not used the convention and
has instead relied 'exclusively on framework decisions and decisions to regulate what
traditionally could be regulated only by means of a "convention".'76 The possibility to
adopt framework decisions by the Council substantially increased the influence of the
EU on the criminal laws of Member States. There are two important aspects of
framework decisions, which make them more effective than conventions: the deadline
for implementation and the monitoring mechanism. Unlike conventions, which become
binding upon ratification by Member States, framework decisions do not need to be
approved or ratified at the national level, although they require implementation and
introduce changes into national law. The Member States must implement them within
a prescribed period of time, which in case of the Framework Decision on corruption in
the private sector was within two years after adoption.77
The second important aspect of framework decisions is that the Council and the
Commission have powers to monitor their effective implementation into national laws.
Article 9(2) of the Framework Decision on combating corruption in the private sector
obliges the Member States to transmit to the Council and the Commission the text of the
provisions transposing into their national law the obligations imposed on them under this
Framework Decision. Following that, the Council assesses the extent to which Member
States have complied with the provisions of this Framework Decision. Moreover, the
Court of Justice in the Pupino case78 has confirmed that although EU framework
decisions do not have a direct effect, i.e. they cannot be directly invoked by individuals
in national courts, they have an indirect effect. This means that national courts must
75
Treaty of Amsterdam simplified the procedure for the entry into force of conventions, i.e. according to
Article 34(d) EU 'unless they provide otherwise, conventions shall, once adopted by at least half of the
Member States, enter into force for those Member States'. This represents an improvement compared to
the Treaty of Maastricht, which contained no such provision, but still, there is no obligation to adopt
conventions within a set period of time.
76 G. Vermeulen, 'Where do we currently stand with harmonisation in Europe?' in A. Klip and H. van der
Wilt (eds) Harmonisation andHarmonising Measures in Criminal Law (Royal Netherlands Academy of
Arts and Science, Amsterdam 2002), 65-76, at 70.
77 Article 9 of the Framework Decision.
78 Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR1-5285.
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interpret national law in the light of framework decisions. The Court of Justice also
confirmed that, similarly to Directives in the first pillar, unimplemented framework
decisions cannot impose criminal liability upon individuals or aggravate such liability.7
Similar to framework decisions, decisions also do not need to be approved or
ratified at the national level, even though they require implementation and may
introduce changes into national law. One of the examples in the area of anti-corruption is
the proposal for a Council Decision on the setting anti-corruption network80, which will
be discussed in a more detail in Chapter Seven.
The Treaty gives the EU the legal powers to address cross-border corruption and
approximate criminal provisions of the national anti-corruption laws. The approximation
is however limited to agreeing on minimum common rules relating to the constituent
elements of criminal acts and penalties, leaving Member States free to adopt more
stringent measures.81 This corresponds to the general Community approach to
approximation of national laws within the internal market82, and it enables Member
States to maintain more stringent standards, provided that these are compatible with the
Treaty.
Approximation in the area of anti-corruption was not a new concept introduced
by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Efforts to approximate criminal law in this area began after
the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. Although the provisions of the
Treaty did not explicitly grant the Council a competence to harmonise the substantive
criminal laws of Member States, Peers has pointed out that Article K.1 (5) referred to
combating fraud on an international scale in so far as this was not covered by judicial,
customs and police cooperation in criminal matters, 'thus implying that there was
79 Ibid, paras 44 and 45.
80 Council of the European Union, 'Initiative of the Republic of Germany with a view to the adoption of a
Council Decision on a contact-point network against corruption' 11202/07, 25.6.2007.
81 Article 31(e) EU.
82
Craig and de Burca (n 6), at 1195.
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competence to harmonize substantive criminal law in these areas independently of
judicial cooperation.'83 All the anti-corruption instruments adopted after the entry into
force of the Treaty of Maastricht, including the First Protocol, the Anti-Corruption
Convention and the Joint Action on corruption in the private sector aimed at
harmonising the definition of corruption and the approximation of sanctions.
The political will to approximate with regard to the offence of corruption, was
reiterated by the Vienna Action Plan84, the Tampere European Council85 and the EU
Strategy for the Beginning of the New Millennium.86 As a result, as already mentioned
above, in 2003 the Council adopted a Framework Decision aimed at approximating the
offence of corruption in the private sector, which replaced the earlier ineffective Joint
Action. The need for a more effective instrument in this area had become particularly
urgent due to adoption the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant in
200287, which included corruption in the list of offences in respect of which prior
verification of double criminality is not required. Given the substantial differences in the
laws of the Member States, there was a need to harmonise the essential aspects of the
offence and the penalties in the area of private sector corruption.88
Corruption is also one of the areas where approximation of laws is specifically
mentioned by the Treaty of Lisbon.89 The approximation of substantive criminal laws is
foreseen in cases of corruption with 'a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature
or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis.'90
83 Peers (n 22), at 382.
84 Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty
of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice, OJ C 19/1,23.1.1999, para 18.
85
Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, (16 October 1999), para 48.
86 Council of the European Union, 'The Prevention and Control of Organised Crime: A European Union
Strategy for the Beginning of the New Millennium' 6611/00, 3.3.2000, recommendation 7.
87 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the
surrender procedures between Member States, OJ L190,18.7.2002.
88
European Parliament, 'Report on the initiative of the Kingdom of Denmark with a view to the adoption
of a Council framework decision on combating corruption in the private sector ((10689/2002 -
C5-0376/2002 - 2002/0817(CNS))' A5-0382/2002, 7.11.2002, at 15.
89 Article 69B (1) of the Treaty of Lisbon.
90 Ibid.
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It is also restricted to the establishment of minimum rules concerning the definition of
criminal offences and sanctions in this area.91 One can therefore conclude that the Treaty
of Lisbon does not bring any substantial changes in this area.
Criminal law, however, is only one of the elements of the comprehensive anti-
corruption strategy. Thus, the question arises whether the EU can do more than
approximate the offence of corruption. The answer is yes. The EU has the political
capacity and legal tools under the EU Treaty to develop a more comprehensive policy
against corruption within the Member States. The EU competence in this area is not
clear and does not directly stem from provisions of the EU Treaty. Nonetheless, it exists
and depends on the political will of the Member States and, in particular, on how they
interpret the need to fight cross-border corruption and organised crime.
In accordance with Article 29 EU an objective of the Union is to provide citizens
with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by preventing
and combating crime. This article gives the EU a clear competence to fight cross-border
corruption and organised crime. The amendments introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon do
not change that. It is up to Member States to decide on the extent of necessary measures
to fight these two forms of crimes. First, the focus on combating cross-border corruption
cannot be separated from broader policy of fighting corruption within the countries. An
important point has been made by Johnston, who has argued that 'efforts to control
cross-border corruption will meet with little success unless they are supported by, and
co-ordinated with, effective action against domestic abuses.'92 As in the case of
domestic corruption, 'weak and poorly run institutions increase vulnerability to cross-
border corruption', therefore a country with high levels of internal corruption is likely to
have problems with cross-border corruption.93
91 Ibid.
92 M. Johnston, 'Cross-Border Corruption: Points of Vulnerability and Challenges for Reform' (1997)
UNDP-PACT and OECD Development Centre Workshop on Corruption, at 14
http://www.undp.org/governance/contactcdrom-




Second, as far as the fight against organised crime is concerned, Member States
are free to recognise that coordination of national anti-corruption policies is an important
element of that fight. Corruption has already been addressed by the EU in the context of
organised crime, and some positive policy developments in this area were initiated in
2004 by a five-year programme for EU action in the area of JHA, the so-called Hague
Programme94, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven.
In both cases the EU Treaty provides the necessary legal tools to set common
anti-corruption standards among its Member States. The EU could use decisions, a legal
instrument introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. In fact, as mentioned above, the
Member States made a proposal for a Decision on setting anti-corruption network, which
will be discussed in a more detail in Chapter Seven. Here, it suffices to say that it is up
to the Member States to decide on how far-reaching and effective this proposal
eventually goes and they can decide to establish a network that would be responsible for
monitoring national policies in this area. There is also a possibility to use 'soft law'
measures, such as the Council's Resolutions, Recommendations and Conclusions to
discipline the Member States with regard to their anti-corruption efforts. With such
options available, it is clear that EU action under the third pillar is limited more by
political than legal factors.
It is also important to point out that the Treaty of Lisbon provides some
provisions which may enhance the Union competence in the area of anti-corruption.
That particularly applies to a provision that provides that the Union may support the
efforts of Member States to improve their administrative capacity to implement acquis?5
In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon provides that the Union may establish measures to
promote and support the action of Member States in the field of crime prevention.96
94 Council of the European Union, 'The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in
the European Union' 16054/04, 13.12.2004.
95 Article 176D of the Treaty of Lisbon.
96 Article 69C of the Treaty of Lisbon.
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The intergovernmental nature of cooperation under the EU Treaty makes any
progress in the area of combating corruption dependent on the political will of the
Member States. The Commission has a right of legislative initiative under the third
pillar, but every such initiative must comply with the principle of subsidiarity in
accordance with Article 2 EU. In the area of anti-corruption, the action of the EU is
justified in cases of cross-border corruption falling outside the single jurisdiction of a
Member State. However, if the EU was to address the problem of domestic corruption
within the Member States, the question would arise as to whether the EU is the most
appropriate level to deal with this field of national policy. It would be hard to justify
action in areas without clear cross-border impact. For example, it would be hard to
justify why the laws on the financing of political parties within Member States should be
adopted at the EU level, considering differences in legal systems and traditions among
Member States in this area. In the third pillar, however, the principle of subsidiarity is
politically monitored by Member States. Due to unanimous decision making, any
Member State can simply dismiss the proposal if it appears to violate the principle of
subsidiarity.
If the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the subsidiarity may be more intensely
scrutinized and invoked before the Court of Justice. Due to the qualified decision
making in the Council, which was provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon, the Member
States may be more likely to challenge a measure on the grounds that it breaches the
principle of subsidiarity, especially when they are outvoted in the adoption of a measure.
In addition, the Protocol on the application of principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality97 attached to the Treaty of Lisbon introduces the possibility for a national
parliament to challenge a perceived infringement of the principle of subsidiarity in the
Court of Justice.98 This means that the national parliaments will have a right to disagree
with their Member State's government and object to a legislative act.
97
Treaty of Lisbon (n 2).
98 Article 8 of the Protocol.
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The most serious drawback of the EU legal framework is the democratic deficit
in the decision-making process within the third pillar, leading to questions about the
suitability of the legal instruments available under the EU Treaty to decide on the
content of national anti-corruption policies. The decision making within the third pillar
is characterised by a lack of sufficient democratic legitimacy particularly in regard to
parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of the adopted decision. Judicial and parliamentary
control of measures in the area of judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters is
particularly important, because it entails many potential implications for the rights of
individuals. However, the EP is not sufficiently involved in the decision-making
processes and has a merely consultative role in the legislative procedure." The opinions
of the EP are not binding and in practice the Council often does not accept its
amendments because the requirement of unanimity in decision making means that
delegations are unlikely to change anything due to an EP proposal.100
The Court of Justice's competences in the third pillar also remain much more
restricted than in the first pillar. The Treaty of Amsterdam increased the role of the
Court of Justice by introducing the preliminary ruling procedure in Article 35 EU on the
validity and interpretation of framework decisions and decisions, as well as on the
interpretation of conventions and on the validity and interpretation of the measures
implementing them. Moreover, in Case C-354/04 the Court of Justice confirmed that a
national court may ask the Court to give a preliminary ruling concerning the validity or
interpretation of a common position, when it has serious doubt whether that common
position is really intended to produce legal effects in relation to third parties.101
However, the employment of preliminary rulings under the third pillar is not compulsory
and depends on the declaration of the Member States.102 The Court of Justice also has
99 Article 39 EU.
100 H. Nilsson, 'Decision- Making in EU Justice and Home Affairs: Current Shortcomings and Reform
Possibilities' (2002) SEI Working Paper No. 57, at 6.
101 Case C-354/04 Gestoras Pro Amnistia and others v Council [2007] ECR1-01657, para 54.
102 Article 35 (2) EU.
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jurisdiction to review the legality of framework decisions and decisions in actions
brought by a Member State or the Commission.103 Unlike in the case of legal measures
adopted under the EC Treaty, natural or legal persons are not able to challenge the
legality of measures adopted under the third pillar.104
The decision making under the third pillar gives too much power to the
executive. The decisions within the Council are adopted by ministers without the
involvement of national parliaments, yet as pointed out above, the Treaty of Amsterdam
substantially increased the influence of the EU on national criminal laws. Framework
decisions and decisions are binding on the Member States, including national
parliaments, yet they are considered to be established in a largely undemocratic and non-
transparent way.105 This goes against the principle of legality, according to which the
legislative body gives democratic legitimacy to criminal law.106
It remains open for the Member States to decide on the degree of national
parliamentary scrutiny or control of the executive, and different national parliamentary
procedures have resulted in delays in decision making under the third pillar.107 As Kiiver
pointed out, the first impression is that:
...national executives play European legislators under complex and secretive bargaining
rules, and their parliaments at home have to accept, possibly implement into national
law, binding Union legislation; they are too slow, too uninformed, and often too bored to
enforce government accountability for European affairs; parliaments are ignorant of
what their governments intend to do in the Council beforehand, and merely watch as the
governments scapegoat 'Brussels' for unpopular decisions afterwards.108
103 Article 35 (6) EU. In addition, in Case C-354/04 (n 102), para 55, the Court of Justice ruled that it
would be possible to review legality of common positions if they are intended to produce legal effects in
relation to third parties.
104 Article 35(6) EU, compare with Article 230 EC.
105 Vermeulen (n 76), at 66
106 A. Weyembergh, 'Approximation of criminal laws, the constitutional treaty and the Hague programme'
(2005) Common Market Law Review 42: 1567-1597, at 1594.
107 Peers (n 22), at 52 and Nilsson (n 100), at 6-7.
108 P. Kiiver, 'The Composite Case for National Parliaments in the European Union: Who Profits from
Enhanced Involvement?' (2006) European Constitutional Law Review, 2, 227-252, at 229. The author
admits that this is a very simplistic and often not entirely correct first impression.
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One of the most important objectives of the EU institutional reform was to
enhance the democratic legitimacy within the EU decision-making process. The
Constitutional Treaty introduced several far-reaching changes to the functioning of the
third pillar, which were upheld by the Treaty of Lisbon. As already discussed above, the
Treaty of Lisbon abolishes the pillar structure of the EU. Crucially, however, the Treaty
of Lisbon foresees full jurisdiction of the Court of Justice over measures in the area of
judicial and police cooperation. The standard legislative procedure will be a co-decision
procedure involving qualified majority voting in the Council. Thus, the EP becomes a
co-legislator in the further development of the area of freedom, security and justice.
The Treaty of Lisbon also facilitates greater participation of national parliaments
in the EU decision-making process. The involvement of national parliaments is not new.
The national parliaments have a right to receive information on European issues from
their government and set up committees to scrutinise European documents and
decisions.109 The national parliament can also bind the government to a specific
negotiation position.110 However, the scrutiny procedures differ across Member States111
and the Treaty of Lisbon aims to ensure more systematic and enhanced involvement of
national parliaments in decision making under the third pillar. Under the Protocol on the
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, attached to the Treaty of
Lisbon, the Commission is obliged to forward all legislative proposals to national
parliaments at the same time as it forwards them to the Council and the EP.112 They then
have eight weeks to examine draft legislative texts and to give a reasoned opinion on
subsidiarity.113 If national parliaments contest a draft legislative act, the Commission
must re-examine the draft and may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw it.114 The
109 K. Auel, 'Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of
Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs' (2007) European Law Journal, Vol. 13 No. 4, 487-504, at 488-489.
110 Ibid, at 498-503.
111 Nilsson (n 100), at 6-7.
112 Article 4 of the Protocol.
113 Article 6 of the Protocol.
114 Article 7(2) of the Protocol.
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Treaty of Lisbon provides a procedure in case the Commission chooses to maintain the
draft, which may lead, depending on the EP and Council's opinion, to the withdrawal of
the Commission's proposal.115
In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon specifically mentions the role of national
parliaments in ensuring compliance of legislative initiatives in the areas of police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters in accordance with arrangements provided for
by the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.116
Monar observed that 'although this controlling role of national parliaments applies in
principle to all legislative initiatives, the specific mentioning of it in respect of the
justice and home affairs area could increase the justification pressure for new measures,
especially on the European Commission.'117 Further adding to their role, national
parliaments will also take part in the evaluation mechanisms for the implementation of
the Union policies in the area of freedom, security and justice and will be involved in the
evaluation of the activities of Europol and Eurojust.118
There is a disagreement over how effective the Treaty of Lisbon would be in
enhancing the democratic legitimacy within the EU decision-making process. Thym
suggested that the enhanced role of national parliaments compliments the role of the EP
and both levels of parliamentary accountability mutually reinforce democratic
legitimacy at the EU level119, while Carrera and Geyer argue that the Treaty of Lisbon
will respond to the democratic shortcomings that have so far characterised cooperation
in the area of justice and home affairs.120 However, Weyembergh suggests that an
115 Article 7(3) of the Protocol.
116 Article 61B of the Treaty of Lisbon.
117 J. Monar (n 45), at 232.
118 Article 8C (c) of the Treaty of Lisbon.
119 D. Thym, 'The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe' (2004) WHI Paper 12/04, at 8 <http://www.rewi.hu-
hprlin.de/WHI/papers/whipapers404/paper0404.pdf > accessed 14 December 2007.
120 S. Carrera and F. Geyer, 'The Reform Treaty and Justice and Home Affairs. Implications for the




enhanced role for national parliaments does not necessarily lead to true democratisation,
pointing out that high abstention rates in European elections may be interpreted as
meaning that European citizens are disinterested with regard to EU matters, leading to a
lack of interest by most national parliaments in the building of the EU criminal area.121
As Kiiver has pointed out, national parliaments could play a greater role even without
large-scale constitutional reforms, if they only allocated more will, time and resources to
European affairs.122
2. The development of the EU policy against corruption
Combating corruption was not always high on the EU agenda. The EU, as well as others
in the international community, started to address corruption in the second half of the
1990s. Attention focused on the EU policy against corruption within the Member States
as well as the policy against internal corruption. It is, however, of utmost importance for
the EU to have a genuine and coherent strategy against internal corruption, as
widespread corruption within the EU institutions puts at risk the credibility of all EU
policies and destroys citizens' confidence in the process of European integration.
Moreover, the EU cannot legitimately demand high standards from candidate countries
or the Member States if it does not hold its own administration to the same standards. As
suggested by the EP, 'the Commission would be well advised to be seen to be putting its
own house in order before giving lessons to others.'123
As explicitly admitted by the Commission, it was the crisis triggered by the
Santer Commission's resignation in March 1999 under allegations of fraud, corruption
and nepotism that revealed the necessity to set up more effective measures for the
protection of the integrity of the European Pubic Administration.124 Two reports of the
Committee of Independent Experts, convened in 1999 under auspices of the EP and the
121 Weyembergh (n 106), at 1596.
122 Kiiver (n 108), at 241.
123 European Parliament (n 65), at 28.
124 Commission (n 65), at 13.
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Commission, exposed the inadequacy of the legal and institutional framework for the
fight against corruption within the EU institutions.125 In fact, the creation of a
Committee of Independent Experts in itself meant that control authorities within the EU
lacked both appropriate expertise and independence.126
The late response to the problem of internal corruption is surprising, as this is the
area where the Community competence is not subject to dispute. With regard to its
administration, the Community has an exclusive competence to develop preventive anti-
corruption policies, establish an anti-corruption body, implement Staff Regulation,
promote transparency in decision making and avoidance of conflict of interests, and
develop codes of conduct.127 The fight against corruption within the institutions is
regulated by the Community, particularly through administrative law provisions. The
Commission can regulate this area with the use of internal decisions or on the basis of
Article 280 EC under which, as discussed above, the Community has legal power to take
action in order to protect the EC financial interests.
The only exceptions are the criminal law instruments addressing fraud and
corruption of officials of the Community adopted under the EU Treaty. As a result, in
addition to the criminal liability for corruption, an official may also face administrative
liability and disciplinary sanctions under the Staff Regulation128, which focuses on the
preventive aspect of the strategy against corruption and defines ethical standards for
officials of the Community. These standards include the duty to act impartially129, the
125 Committee of Independent Experts Reports, 'Second Report on Reform of the Commission: Analysis
of current practice and proposals for tackling mismanagement, irregularities and fraud' (Vol. 1 10
September 1999)
<http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/reports/sages_en.html> accessed 14 December 2007.
120 Ch. Lequesne and P. Rivaud, 'The Committees of Independent Experts: expertise in the service of
democracy?' (2003) Journal of European Public Policy 10:5, 695-709, at 701.
127 Commission (EC), 'Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European
Community, of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption' COM(2006) 82 final, 2.3.2006,
Annex II.
128 Staff Regulations ofOfficials of the European Communities, 1.5.2004.
<http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/toclOO_en.pdf accessed 14 december 2007> accessed 14
December 2007.
129 Article 11 (96) of the Staff Regulation.
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prohibition of acceptance of any honour, decoration, favour, gift or payment of any kind
from any source outside the institution to which an official belongs130, and prohibition of
an official performing his duties when any personal interest may impair his
independence.131
The central body with the specific task to detect and combat corruption
damaging the EC financial interests is the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)132,
established in 1999 in the wake of the resignation of the Santer Commission.133 OLAF is
an independent administrative body entrusted with powers to investigate cases of
corruption, fraud and other illegal activity affecting the Community budget. It is
competent to conduct two categories of investigations: internal and external.134 Internal
investigations are conducted by OLAF within the Community institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies.135 For example, at the end of 2004, OLAF opened 68 internal anti-
corruption investigations and 25 cases were under assessment within the EU
institutions.136 External investigations involve OLAF's intervention in the Member
States and are governed by formal Community legislation.137 OLAF has a right to
initiate inquiries as well as the right to decide, in cases where it has been responsible for
an investigation, when files should be submitted to the judicial authorities for further
investigation involving police powers and possible prosecution.138
130 Ibid.
131 Article 11a (96) of the Staff Regulation.
132 OLAF is a French acronym for 'Office Europeen de la Lutte Anti-Fraude'.
133 Commission Decision of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), OJ L
13620,31.5.1999.
134 Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999
concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), OJ L 136/1, 31.5. 1999
and Council Regulation (Euroatom) No 1074/1999 of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted
by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), OJ L136/8, 31.5. 1999.
135 Interinstitutional Agreement of 25 May 1999 between the European Parliament, the Council of the
European Union and the Commission of the European Communities concerning internal investigations by
the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), OJ L136/1, 31.5.1999.
136 OLAF, 'Report of the European Anti-Fraud Office' (2004), at 15.
137 Council Regulation 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities'
Financial Interests, OJ L 312/1,23.12.1995; Council Regulation No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996
concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the
European Communities' financial interests against fraud and other irregularities, OJ L 292/2, 15.11.96
138 Articles 5 and 10 of the Regulation 1073/1999.
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The highest standards of good administration and transparency at the European
level are promoted in the activity of the European Court of Auditors and the European
Ombudsman. The ECA is an independent external audit institution. In planning its audit
programmes, the ECA takes account, inter alia, of the particular susceptibility to fraud
and corruption which exists in many sectors. The European Ombudsman also plays a
significant role in enhancing openness and transparency in the EU decision making. One
of the European Ombudsman's most important initiatives in this field is the drafting of
the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour139, which intends to explain the
right to good administration, as guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
EU.140
The European Ombudsman is also competent to investigate possible cases of
maladministration in the activities of the Community institutions and bodies in
accordance with Article 195 EC, which provides that any citizen of the EU or any
natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State has the
right to refer to the Ombudsman cases concerning instances of maladministration in the
activities of the Community institutions and bodies, with the exception of the Court of
Justice and the Court of First Instance acting in their judicial role. Maladministration is
defined as occurring 'when a public body fails to act in accordance with a rule or
principle which is binding upon if141 and thus covers cases of corruption.
The resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 was a turning point in the
development of the administrative reform at the EU level. In 2000, the White Paper set
out an overall strategy for the reform of the Commission based on principles of
139 The European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour (2002)
<http://ombudsman.europa.eu/code/pdf/en/code2002_en.pdf> accessed 14 December 2007.
140 Article 41 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, OJ C 364/1, 18.12.2000.
141 The European Ombudsman, 'Annual Report For 1997' (1998), at 23
<http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/report97/pdf/en/rap97_cn.pdf> accessed 14 December 2007.
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independence, responsibility, accountability, efficiency and transparency.142 The reforms
included: (1) the creation of a new internal audit service, (2) improving public access to
documents of the EP, the Council and the Commission, (3) revision of a career system
and (4) 'fraud-proofing' of legislation.143 The Commission also took a number of
important initiatives to foster transparency and accountability at the EU level. It adopted
a series of measures aimed at enhancing integrity among its staff, which included the
adoption of codes of conduct for Commissioners144 and Commission Staff145 and a
decision setting rules for the Commission staff on how to report serious wrongdoings.146
The Commission also recognises that transparency is an important element of the
prevention of fraud and corruption. The European Transparency Initiative launched in
2005 aims at identifying and stimulating a discussion on areas where transparency at the
EU level needs to be improved.147 Examples of areas where a need for a further action
was identified include: (1) publication of data about beneficiaries of EU funds, (2)
regulation of lobbying, (3) strengthening the ethics in the European institutions and (4)
revising the regulation of access to documents at the EU level.148
In its anti-corruption policy, the EU also relies on the work carried out by
international agencies. The most important example from recent years is the process of
the Community's accession to the UNCAC, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter
Three. If the Community becomes a party to the UNCAC, it will be bound to apply high
anti-corruption standards in its own strategy against internal corruption. This is evidence
that the fight against corruption has become a relatively high priority for the EU, and
there seems to be a political commitment to fight corruption within the EU
142 Commission (EC), 'Reforming the Commission: a White Paper', Part I COM(2000) 200 final/2,
5.4.2000.
Ibid.
444 Code of conduct for Commissioners, SEC(2004) 1487/2, 23.11.2004.
145 Commission Decision, of 17 October 2000 amending its Rules of Procedure, OJ L 267/63, 20.10.2000.
146 Commission (EC), C/2002/845 of 2April 2002.
147 Commission (EC), 'Green Paper. European Transparency Initiative', COM(2006) 194 final, 3.5.2006.
148 por more, see: Transparency Initiative
;upp://ec.euroDa.cu/commission_barroso/kallas/transparencv_en.htm#4> accessed 14 December 2007.
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institutions.149 As concluded by Transparency International, '...sufficient safeguards,
controls, audit and anti-fraud mechanisms have now been put in place.'150
As far as the policy against corruption within the Member States is concerned,
one can distinguish three phases in its historical development. In the first phase,
attention was focused on the protection of the EC financial interests and this turned out
to be a platform for the further development of anti-corruption policy. To show how this
platform developed, this section discusses the policy against fraud affecting the EC
financial interests, but only to the extent that helps better to understand the
developments in the area of anti-corruption. During the second phase, the EU began to
approach the offence of corruption directly and adopted legal instruments that
specifically addressed the offence of corruption both in the public and private sectors.
Finally, the third phase started in 1997 with the agreement across the EU institutions on
the need for a broad anti-corruption policy at the EU level. That year the Commission
adopted the First Communication on the EU policy against corruption, which was the
first EU policy document to focus on the subject. Together with the Second
Communication adopted in 2003, both documents provide an outline of what can be
seen as a comprehensive EU policy against corruption.
2.1. Phase One: The fight against corruption in the context of the
protection of the Communities' financial interests
The first anti-corruption instrument at the EU level was adopted in the context of the
policy against fraud affecting the EC financial interests. Despite the great importance of
anti-fraud policy for the legitimacy and credibility of the European integration project, it
took the EU quite a long time to develop an adequate anti-fraud policy. As White has
149 S. Kallas, 'The European Union: An Elodorado of Corruption?' (Speyer, Germany, 27 October 2006).
150 Transparency International, 'Comments on the European Commission Communication on "A
Comprehensive EU Policy Against Corruption'" (2003), at 3
http://www.transparencv.org/content/download/2017/T2199/file/tibrussels_on_eu_commission.pdf>
accessed 14 December 2007.
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pointed out, the approach to fraud control until the 1990s can be described as 'atomistic'
or 'fragmentary'.151 There was no general anti-fraud framework, only sector specific
regulations mostly in respect of the Common Agriculture Policy, which consumed a
large part of the Community budget.152
Initially, the protection of the EC financial interests was not a priority for the EU.
Nikodem observed that the lack of political will to develop effective means to combat
fraud can be explained by the fact that, in the early stages of integration, the Community
budget was dependent on Member States' contributions, and thus the Member States
'...carried the burden of negative financial consequences of fraud.'153 The situation
changed when the Community developed its own resource system in the 1970s.154
In 1976 the Commission submitted a proposal for an amendment to the Treaty,
which provided for the adoption of common rules for the criminal-law protection of
financial interests and an equivalent protection for the financial interests of EC and
Member States in accordance with the principle of assimilation.155 This proposal was
not, however, adopted by the Member States. Nonetheless, the principle of assimilation
was introduced to the Community legal order in the 1980s by the Court of Justice. A
principle whereby infringements affecting the Community budget had to be penalized
under the same conditions as infringements affecting the national budget was articulated
for the first time in the 'Greek maize '156 case and later codified in Article 209a EC of the
Treaty of Maastricht. After amendments by the Treaty ofAmsterdam, it is Article 280(2)
EC: 'Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the EC
lsl S. White, Protection of the Financial Interests of the European Communities: The FightAgainst Fraud
and Corruption (Kluwer Law International, 1998), at 17.
152 Ibid, 7-12.
153 A. Nikodem, 'The Evolution of Anti-Fraud Policy in the European Community from a Constitutional
Law Perspective' (2002) Managerial Law, Vol. 44 No. 4, 59-76, at 65.
154 Ibid.
155 J.A.E Vervaele, Fraud against the Community. The Need for European Fraud Legislation (Kluwer
Law and Taxation Publishers, 1992), at 85-89.
156 Case 68/88 Commission v. Greece [1989] ECR 2965.
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financial interests as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial interests'.
As a result, national law was used to protect the Community budget.
In practice the principle of assimilation had a limited value. The degree of
protection varied from one state to another. There was no common definition of what
constituted fraud, and it was up to national laws of Member States to define the offence
and sanctions. In the 1990s, the cooperation against Community fraud was further
enhanced, and Member States decided to re-examine the Commission's proposal from
1976.157 In 1994, the Council recognised the need for greater compatibility as to the
definition of fraud and applicable sanctions.158
In the second half of the 1990s, the Treaty of Maastricht gave the EU
competence to adopt legal instruments in the area of police and judicial cooperation in
criminal law, and it became possible to strengthen the protection of financial interests.
The legal instrument designed to improve the fight against fraud was the PIF Convention
adopted in 1995. It introduced a common definition of fraud affecting the Community
budget, which was accepted by all Member States. The PIF Convention introduced two
separate but matching definitions of fraud, one applying to expenditure, the other to
revenue. For the purposes of the Convention, fraud affecting the Community's budget
was defined as:
a) in respect of expenditure, any intentional act or omission relating to:
- the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or documents,
which has as its effect the misappropriation or wrongful retention of funds from the
general budget of the European Communities or budgets managed by, or on behalf of,
the European Communities,
- non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, with the same effect,
- the misapplication of such funds for purposes other than those for which they were
originally granted;
(b) in respect of revenue, any intentional act or omission relating to:
157 Council Resolution of 13 November 1991 concerning the protection of the financial interests of the
Communities', OJ C328/1,17.12.1991.
158 Council Resolution of 6 December 1994 on the legal protection of the financial interests of the
Communities, OJ C 355,14.12.1994, para 2.
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- the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or documents,
which has as its effect the illegal diminution of the resources of the general budget of the
European Communities or budgets managed by, or on behalf of, the European
Communities,
- non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, with the same effect,
- misapplication of a legally obtained benefit, with the same effect.159
In this context, it is important to draw a distinction between the concepts of
'fraud' and 'corruption'. Both concepts has been defined and distinguished at the EU
level and the EU addresses the problem of corruption in a separate policy documents.
The distinction between these two concepts is also recognised in the literature.
According to Huberts:
...public functionaries are corrupt when they act (or do not act) as a result of the
personal rewards offered to them by interested outside private actors' and 'public fraud
is private gain at public expense, damaging the group or organization to which the
functionary belongs, without the involvement of external beneficiaries.160 (emphasis in
original).
In addition, Van Duyne pointed out that: 'corruption is an "exchange relationship"
between a decision maker and an interested person offering or promising an advantage
in exchange for a desired decision outcome, whereas fraud can in principle be
committed as a solitary act.'161 Corruption may lie behind fraud and other irregularities.
For instance, a public official in return for a bribe may accept false or incomplete
documents, and in result an economic operator is exempted from paying customs duties.
Therefore, many aspects of the fight against fraud and irregularity, especially its
prevention and investigation, can contribute to revealing cases of corruption.
By virtue of the PIF Convention, the Member States agreed to make 'fraud' a
criminal offence under their national laws and to provide for effective, proportionate and
159 Article 1 of the PIF Convention.
160 L.W. J.C. Huberts, 'What can be done against public corruption and fraud: Expert views on strategies
to protect public integrity' (1998) Crime, Law and Social Change 29, 209-224, at 211.
161 P.C. van Duyne, 'Will "Caligula" go transparent?' (2001) Forum on Crime and Society, Vol. 1 No. 2,
73-98, at 74.
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dissuasive criminal penalties including deprivation of liberty which can give rise to
extradition.162 The PIF Convention also obliged Member States to introduce liability of
heads of businesses or any person having power to take decisions or exercise control
within a business in cases of fraud committed by a person under their authority acting on
behalf of the business.163
The importance of the PIF Convention also stems from the fact that it introduced
the rules on judicial cooperation in cases of cross-border fraud. To that end, Articles 4
and 5 laid down common rules on the jurisdiction, extradition and prosecution, designed
to ensure that national laws of Member States do not provide for loopholes to avoid
prosecution for fraud. One of the requirements of the PIF Convention is a duty of each
Member State to establish jurisdiction over fraud when committed by its own nationals
outside its territory, if under its law it does not extradite its own nationals.164 Article 6
goes on to provide for a closer cooperation between Member States in investigation and
prosecution in order to facilitate the detection and punishment of fraud in cases
involving more than one country. This could be achieved by means, for example, of
mutual legal assistance, extradition, transfer of proceedings or enforcement of sentences
passed in another Member State. In cases of conflicts of jurisdiction, Member States are
also obliged to cooperate in deciding which Member State shall prosecute with a view to
centralizing the prosecution in a single Member State. Furthermore, Article 7 contains
the 'ne bis in idem' principle which means that a person whose trial has been finally
disposed of in one Member State could not be prosecuted in another Member State in
respect of the same facts, save in the exceptional circumstances listed in the Convention.
At the same time, the EU also took initiatives under the EC Treaty to harmonise
systems of administrative sanctions. In 1995 the Council adopted the Regulation on the
protection of the EC financial interests (PIF Regulation).165 It defined the administrative
162 Article 2 of the PIF Convention.
163 Article 3 of the PIF Convention.
164 Article 5 (1) of the PIF Convention.
165 Council Regulation 2988/95 (n 137).
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concept of irregularity against the budget of the Community.166 The PIF Regulation
provided the Commission with authority to carry out administrative checks and apply
administrative sanctions in the protection of the EC financial interests. It was the first a
'horizontal'167 instrument, which meant that it provided a framework for the general
anti-fraud activities carried out across all sectors of the Community budget.
Shortly after, in 1996 the Council supplemented the PIF Regulation with a
Regulation on basis of which the Commission, in practice OLAF, was empowered to
carry out on-the-spot administrative checks and inspections at central, regional or local
level on any economic operator directly or indirectly receiving a financial benefit from
the Community budget, for detection of frauds and irregularities detrimental to the
financial interests of the EC.168 Pursuant to Article 2 of this Regulation OLAF can carry
out inspections in cases of serious or complex transnational cases of fraud and
irregularities, or at the request of the Member State concerned. Without hindering the
powers of the Member States, in Article 4 the Regulation permits the Commission to
carry out checks at its own initiative, after informing the relevant national authorities.
On the basis of Articles 7 and 8, OLAF has access to all relevant documents under the
same conditions as national inspectors, and its reports have the same evidential value in
administrative and judicial proceedings.
Adoption of the above measures signalled an important change of policy and
enhanced the protection of Community financial interests. In 1994, the Council
recognised that Member States should take effective measures to punish bribery
involving Community officials in relation to the financial interests of the EC.169 The first
EU instrument against corruption was adopted in the context of a general realization that
there was a need to reinforce the protection of the Community budget. It was not
introduced because of a recognition that corruption posed a general threat for the rule of
166 Article 1(2) of the PIF Regulation.
167 S. White, 'Proposed Measures Against Corruption of Officials in the European Union' (1996)
European Law Review 21 465-476, at 466.
168 Council Regulation 2185/96 (n 137).
169 Council (n 158).
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law, economic development and good governance, which had driven the first anti-
corruption initiatives of the Council of Europe. As demonstrated throughout this thesis,
the assumption that anti-corruption policy at the EU level should serve other objectives
of European integration, such as protection of financial interests or proper functioning of
the internal market, instead of being an objective in itself, is a premise of the EU policy
against corruption.
2.1.1. First Protocol
In 1995 Transparency International in its memorandum to the EU institutions pointed
out that 'the EU was not aware of the role it was able to play in countering international
corruption, leaving this matter rather to Member States or to larger international
agencies, in particular the OECD.'170 There are two main factors explaining why the first
EU anti-corruption initiatives did not take place before the mid 1990s. First, as already
discussed in Chapter One, corruption became an important issue of international
cooperation only in the second half of the 1990s. Therefore, the EU initiatives were not
late in comparison to other international bodies. In fact, the EU anti-corruption
instrument adopted in 1996 focused on the criminalization of transnational bribery for
the first time in Europe.171 Secondly, the EU gained a competence in the area of criminal
law only in 1993 when the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force and the first anti-
corruption instrument was adopted on the basis of the EU Treaty.
The motivation behind the adoption of the first EU anti-corruption instrument
was very similar to the reasons that led to the adoption of the PIF Convention. Cross-
border corruption very often exploits the legal and technical possibilities offered by
global markets. This is especially the case within the EU, where criminals are able to
take advantage of the lack of internal frontiers. Just as in the case of fraud, there was a
need to ensure greater convergence among the criminal laws of Member States. Similar
170 Transparency International (n 64).
171 M. Pieth, 'The Harmonization of Law Against Economic Crime' (1999) European Journal of Law
Reform, Vol. 1 No. 4, 527-551, at 538.
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to the anti-fraud policy area a major problem in the 1990s was the lack of a commonly
agreed definition across the Member States of what constituted corruption.172 Hence,
some practices which were considered as corrupt under criminal laws of one Member
State were not offences in other Member States. At the same time, it was recognized that
while the definitions of corruption offences varied across Member States, they had
common elements that made it possible to arrive at a single definition.173
A principal weakness in the fight against transnational corruption was that the
criminal laws of Member States were very often limited to nationals and did not apply to
Community officials or officials of other Member States.174 For instance, the criminal
laws of a Member State did not extend to situations where its nationals instigated
corruption of officials of another Member States on its own territory. Moreover, as
already mentioned in Chapter One, in some Member States such bribes were tax
deductible as a customary business practice.
Combined with these problems, a growing number of Community officials
involved in the distribution of Community funds created opportunities of corruption.
There was thus a pressing need for European action to complement what was done at the
national level. Just as in the case within the internal market acquis under the first pillar,
there was a need for regulation at least at a minimum level; as otherwise the offenders
would concentrate on a country with the weakest commitment to fight corruption and
commit a crime in a system that offered them impunity. This could lead to a 'race to the
bottom' in which the standards in the Member States with the weakest anti-corruption
regime would prevail across the EU. As Weyembergh pointed out, even the criminals
who are not aware of the legal diversity or do not take advantage of it, benefit at least
indirectly from the lack of unity, as '...the practitioners of criminal justice systems have
172 Commission (EC), 'Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
on a Union Policy Against Corruption', COM(97) 192 final, 21.5.1997, at. 2.
173 Explanatory Report on the Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities'
financial interests OJ C 11,15.1.1998.
174 Ibid.
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to face the heterogeneity of substantive and procedural criminal laws, which increases
the complexity of the fight against cross-border crime'175
What specific circumstances led to the first EU anti-corruption instrument in
1996? Already in 1995 the EP had adopted a resolution on combating corruption in
Europe, where it recognised that the EU 'must equip itself with its own policy of
combating corruption that would enable it to establish both the requisite preventive and
repressive measures.'176 Most importantly, the EP called to take fight against corruption
beyond the protection of the EC financial interests and address it in a more general way.
It further called on the Member States to take action against corruption in a number of
policy areas, such as tax legislation and other legal provisions that indirectly encouraged
corruption, including the funding of political parties and the rules on declaration of
interests. These recommendations of the EP had no legal force and Member States were
not bound to take any action, but they did have an important political significance. As
discussed later in the Chapter, the EP on many occasions presented a much broader
vision of EU anti-corruption policy than the Commission. It has been a strong advocate
of developing all-encompassing policy that addresses corruption as a general threat to
the rule of law and democracy within the Member States.
The legislative response to the EP resolution was modest. The first anti-
corruption instrument was the First Protocol177 adopted in 1996. It was adopted to
reinforce the protection of the Community budget and only corruption actually or
potentially damaging the EC financial interests was regulated by the EU legislator.
While the specific provisions of the First Protocol are discussed in more detail in
Chapter Three, here it suffices to say that it introduced common definition of corruption
and established the basis for judicial cooperation among Member States, adapting the
relevant rules of the PIF Convention. To that end, Article 7 of the First Protocol
175
Weyembergh (n 106), at 1579.
176
European Parliament, 'Resolution on combating corruption in Europe' (1995) A4-0314/1995, OJ C 17,
22.1.1996.
177 See (n 26).
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stipulates that provisions of the PIF Convention with regard to the criminal liability of
the heads of business, extradition, cooperation and ne bis in idem apply also to the First
Protocol.
The First Protocol also lists a number of situations in which Member States are
to establish their jurisdiction. It is obligatory for a Member State to establish jurisdiction
when the offence is committed in whole or in part within its territory.178 According to
Article 6, jurisdiction can also be established in three more cases. First, where the
offender is one of its nationals or one of its officials, a Member State may establish its
jurisdiction for offences committed abroad, within or outside the EU.179 Note, however,
that Member States that do not extradite their own nationals must establish jurisdiction
in cases when the offence is committed by their nationals outside its territory.180 Second,
a Member State can prosecute where the offence is committed against a national of that
Member State. And, third, a Member States may establish its jurisdiction where the
offender is a Community official working for a Community institution with its
headquarters in the Member State concerned. Such regulation leads to a situation where
many Member States may claim jurisdiction to prosecute the same offence. This, in turn,
may lead to conflicts about which Member State should take action. To alleviate this
difficulty, the First Protocol introduced the obligation for Member States to cooperate in
deciding which should prosecute.181
The scope of the offence of corruption was subsequently extended when the
Second Protocol182 to the PIF Convention was signed in 1997. The Second Protocol
introduced (1) the legal liability of legal persons for active corruption183, (2)
criminalisation of laundering of the proceeds of corruption184 and (3) the duty to take the
necessary measures to enable the seizure, confiscation or removal of the instruments and
178 Article 6(a) of the First Protocol.
179 Explanatory Report (n 173).
is" Article 7 of the First Protocol and Article 5 of the PIF Convention.
18J Article 7 of the First Protocol and Article 6 of the PIF Convention.
182 See (n 27).
183 Article 3 of the Second Protocol.
184 Article 2 of the Second Protocol.
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proceeds of active and passive corruption.185 The scope of the Second Protocol was also
limited to protection of the Community financial interests.
The legal framework created by the First and Second Protocols filled in the
necessary gaps in the criminal laws of Member States and improved the prosecution and
judicial cooperation in cases of cross-border corruption. It is evident that the main goal
of the EU legislator, in this phase of policy development, was not to address the problem
of corruption in general, but to reinforce the protection of the Community financial
interests. The clear indication of this is the requirement of damage to the financial
interests of the EC and the fact that neither of the instruments addresses the problem of
corruption of third-country officials.
2.2. Phase Two: Beyond the protection of the Communities' financial
interests
In the next phase of policy development the EU legislator started to address corruption
not only as a danger to the Community budget, but rather as a serious crime that poses a
threat to the rule of law. Since 1997, the EU has begun developing a common approach
against corruption in the context of organised crime. As was acknowledged by the EP:
...there are numerous connections between corruption and organised crime, which can
entail special dangers for the democratic rule of law and the market economy,
particularly if organised crime succeeds with the help of corruption in penetrating public
administration or the legal system, because in so doing they gain access to important
information and thus can increase their opportunity for exploiting legal structures for
illegal purposes...186
As observed in Chapter One, the danger of the links between corruption and organised
crime was also recognised by international initiatives. At the EU level, also the Council
recognised that a comprehensive policy against corruption should be an integral part of
185 Article 5 of the Second Protocol.
186 European Parliament (n 65), at 6.
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the EU strategy against organised crime.187 The importance of the fight against
corruption was subsequently confirmed by the Council Resolution in 1998 on the
prevention of organised crime188 and the EU strategy on the prevention and control of
organised crime in 2000.189
As already mentioned above, in 1997 Member States adopted the Anti-
Corruption Convention190 specifically to take combating corruption beyond the
protection of the Community financial interests. Since the goal was still to improve
judicial cooperation in criminal matters among Member States, thus the content of this
Convention is structured in a comparable way to the First Protocol, and many provisions
derive from the PIF Convention and the First Protocol. However, there is one crucial
difference: the Anti-Corruption Convention is not restricted to the protection of the
Community budget and therefore has a wider scope than the First Protocol. It provides
for criminalisation of all bribery conduct involving a Community's or Member States'
officials and not just that linked to protection of the Community financial interests.191
The independence of the anti-corruption measures from the protection of the EC
financial interests was confirmed in 1998 with the adoption of the Joint Action on
corruption in the private sector.192 It was the first EU measure addressing purely
domestic cases of corruption within Member States and focusing on the impact of
corruption on the internal market. The preamble to the Joint Action explicitly stated that:
'...corruption distorts fair competition and undermines the principles of openness and
freedom of markets, and in particular the smooth functioning of the internal market, and
also militates against transparency and openness in international trade...' The
Framework Decision on combating corruption in the private sector, which replaced the
187 Council Action Plan to combat organized crime, OJ C 251,15.08.1997, recommendation 6.
188 Council Resolution of 21 December 1998 on the prevention of organised crime with reference to the
establishment of a comprehensive strategy for combating it, OJ C 408, 29.12.1998, paras 12,13 and 14.
189 Council (n 86).
I9" See (n 67).
191 Articles 2 and 3 of the Anti-Corruption Convention.
192 See (n 63).
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Joint Action in 2003, put the fight against corruption at the EU level into even broader
context, as it referred to corruption as a threat to a 'law-abiding society', and 'impeding
sound economic development.'193
2.3. Phase Three: A comprehensive policy against corruption
In 1997 the Council expressed the political will to develop a comprehensive anti-
corruption policy at the EU level.194 In response, the Commission presented a
Communication on a Union Policy against Corruption (the First Communication)195,
where it argued for the adoption of an anti-corruption strategy both within and outside
EU borders. The Commission expressed the view that such a policy should encompass
international trade and competition, Community expenditure abroad, Community own
resources, development co-operation policies and the pre-accession strategy.196
According to the Commission 'ideally the criminal law within the Union should address
the bribery of EC officials, the bribery of officials of other Member States, the bribery of
officials from states outside the Union and private sector corruption.'197 In 1998 the EP
in its report on the First Communication, advocated the policy at the EU level, because
'... although each of the EU Member States has anti-corruption measures of its own, they
diverge markedly in their legal impact, range and practical application, resulting in a
disparate and patchy anti-corruption system for the EU as a whole.'198
One question that emerged concerned what aspects of this policy would deal
with corruption within the Member States. From the very beginning the Commission
made it clear that it did not advocate complete harmonisation of Member States' laws
and policies on corruption, but only a common approach in certain key areas.199 This
193 See (n 55), para 9.
194 Council (n 187).
195 Commission (n 172).
196 Ibid, at 1.
197 Ibid, at 4.
198 European Parliament (n 65), at 6.
199 Commission (n 172), at 3.
95
view of the Commission is not surprising, as harmonisation of anti-corruption policies is
politically inconceivable. Moreover, the harmonisation of national policies in this area
should never be a goal of the EU legislator. The Council of Europe's Twenty Guiding
Principles against corruption (See Appendix 1), the most comprehensive policy
guidelines in this area, do not harmonise the national laws, but their importance lies in
the fact that the countries are constructing national anti-corruption laws in line with the
goals indicated by these principles.
The Commission's intention to prevent and combat corruption was confirmed in
2003 with the adoption of the Communication on a Comprehensive EU Policy against
Corruption (the Second Communication).200 The Commission proposed a very ambitious
scope for this policy. In the Commission's view, 'comprehensive' policy means
reducing corruption 'at all levels in a coherent way within the EU institutions, in EU
Member States and outside the EU.'201 According to the Commission, the EU is an
appropriate actor to take initiatives to reduce corruption within the Member States,
including political corruption, corrupt activities committed by and collusively with
organised crime groups, private-to-private corruption and so-called petty corruption.202
The Commission also pointed out the necessity of political commitment from EU
governments to combat and prevent corruption and to accept their responsibility to
promote and live up to the anti-corruption standards.203 In the assessment of the
Transparency International, the Second Communication reflected 'real change' that has
occurred during the last few years, including heightened awareness of the disastrous
consequences of corruption and concrete steps taken against it at EU level.204
200 Commission (n 65).
201 Ibid, at 5.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid, at 7.
204 Transparency International (n 150), at 2.
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The texts of the First and the Second Communication, together with the reports
of the EP prepared in response to them, included a number of more specific policy
recommendations for Member States.205 Examples include:
• to conduct legislative simplification and debureaucratisation of their public
sectors;
• to tackle corruption in the political sphere by guaranteeing the transparency of
funding of political parties;
• to introduce common standards for the collection of evidence, special
investigative techniques, protection for whistleblowers, victims and witnesses of
corruption and the confiscation of the proceeds of corruption;
• to ensure that appropriate remedies are available for victims of corruption and
introduce clear rules for the protection of whistleblowers in public
administration;
• to establish bodies specialised in the fight against corruption and guarantee the
independence of specialised anti-corruption authorities and Member States'
officials fighting against corruption and related economic crimes such as fraud,
money laundering, and tax and accounting offences;
• to introduce rules and codes of conduct aimed at preventing conflicts of interest
for public authorities whose activities are susceptible to private-sector interests;
• to ensure freedom of media and freedom of information.
All the above guidelines for domestic policies were set out by both the Commission and
the EP. They were not presented in any systematic or coherent way. They have no legal
force, and Member States are not bound to take them into account. In practice, ' ...the
205 European Parliament, 'Report on the communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee-On a Comprehensive EU Policy
Against Corruption (COM(2003) 317-2003/2154(INI)), A5-0367/2003, PE 329.915, 4.11.2003; European
Parliament (n 65); Commission (n 65) and (n 172).
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Commission with the legal competence to raise the issue of corruption in a particular
Member State with the government responsible or with the Council.'206
The most comprehensive set of principles for improving the fight against
corruption at the EU level was presented by the Commission in the Annex to the Second
Communication in 2003 (See Appendix 2). While their content will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter Six, here it is important to note that they were addressed only to
acceding, candidate and other third countries. This is not only proof of the double
standards applied towards the candidate countries, but it also shows the weak position of
the Commission in relation to Member States in the area of anti-corruption. In response
to the Second Communication, the EP called upon the Commission to require the
candidate countries and the Member States make equivalent efforts in the fight against
corruption and draw up a set of principles with a view to stepping up the fight against
corruption, both in the accession countries and in the Member States, based on the
Council of Europe's Twenty Guiding Principle, and to submit a report every two years
to the Council, the EP and the national parliaments.207 However, during discussions with
the Council, the Commission deplored that 'the Member States are not willing to express
their support to the Ten Principles for Improving the Fight against Corruption in
Acceding, Candidate and other Third Countries, set out in the Annex to its
Communication, but merely "notes" these principles in the draft Council Resolution.'208
The Second Communication, however, has also set clear limits for EU action in
the area anti-corruption. The Commission is aware of the role played by the other
international agencies in this area, in particular the UN, the OECD and the Council of
Europe, and wants to take advantage of their initiatives. Therefore, it only recommends
that' ...mainly those measures should be strengthened and supported at EU level, which
206 F. Frattini, Parliamentary questions E-3601/04, (1 April 2005)
207 European Parliament (n 205), at 9.
208 Council of the European Union, 'Draft Council Resolution concerning a comprehensive EU policy
against corruption. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the
Eur°pean Economic and Social Committee on a Comprehensive EU Policy against Corruption', 6150/05,
! 1.2.2005.
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are not already substantially covered, or not with the same degree of mandatory
character as EU instruments, by international organisations.'209 This position deserves
only partial support. It is in the EU's vital interest to support international initiatives and
especially to encourage Member States' participation in international anti-corruption
efforts. Such support, however, should not lead to complete reliance on these initiatives
and, in consequence, the neglect of the problem of corruption within Member States.
Conclusion
The area of anti-corruption policy is dominated by Member States' competences and EU
initiatives affect only some aspects of national anti-corruption strategies. There are both
legal and political constraints limiting the EU's influence. Under the first pillar, the
Community has almost no legal power. It can only regulate corruption affecting the EC
financial interests and adopt measures within its internal market legal framework, having
merely incidental impact on the national policies in this area. Under the third pillar, the
EU competences are broader but still limited by the intergovernmental nature of judicial
and police cooperation in criminal matters. Nor does Title VI of the EU Treaty clearly
give the EU competence to institute Member States to come to common standards. As a
result, the EU created a framework that forces the Member States to comply only with
certain minimum standards, focusing on cross-border corruption.
Nevertheless, there are legal tools available under the EU Treaty which could be
used to establish a more coherent framework for preventing and combating corruption
within the Member States. Any progress in this area depends, however, on the political
will of the Member States. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon would enhance
the quality and effectiveness of EU decision making in the area of anti-corruption. The
introduction of qualified majority voting would help to overcome the problem of cutting
the decisions down to the lowest possible standards acceptable to all Member States.
The quality of the anti-corruption measures would also be increased by greater
209 Communication (65), at 5
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parliamentary and judicial scrutiny over the legal instruments and improved monitoring
of the implementation of EU measures by the Member States.
The main objective of the EU, since its inception, was to create the internal
market. Therefore, the EU initiatives in the field of anti-corruption have served in
achieving this objective. This is a critical difference between the EU and the Council of
Europe, the leading organisation in the field of anti-corruption at the pan-European
level. The Council of Europe's mandate is to promote democracy and the rule of law,
and in both domains the fight against corruption plays a crucial role. The EU,
meanwhile, responded to the problem of corruption in its own unique way. Initially, the
focus was on corruption affecting the Community's financial interests. Over time the
policy developed to address corruption in a more general way. The Commission
declared that prevention and the fight against corruption constituted an important
element of EU policy. The Commission and the EP both formulated many, often far-
reaching, recommendations for the Member States on how they should construct their
national anti-corruption policies. These recommendations are, however, incoherent,
spread across various policy documents and, most importantly, not binding for the
Member States, which do not have to take them into account. This Chapter gave an
overview of the broad anti-corruption policy framework. The next Chapter moves on to
discuss the actual legislative measures taken by the EU to address the problem of




The EU strategy against corruption within the
Member States
It is in the EU's vital interest to ensure that all the Member States have in place effective
policies for preventing and combating corruption. The premise of the EU legal system is
that acquis is correctly implemented and enforced by public administration and courts in
the Member States. However, widespread corruption within Member States constitutes a
threat to the correct application of EU policies and effective implementation of the
acquis. It carries particular dangers in the area of freedom, security and justice, where
policy increasingly relies on mutual recognition and trust among Member States. The
evidence of corruption in the police or in the courts has a destructive effect on that trust
among Member States.
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Corrupt practices undermine the legitimacy of judgements and arrest warrants
issued by judicial authorities across Member States. In addition, criminal organisations
and terrorists may use corruption to penetrate the structures of Member States and
pursue their illicit goals. Above all, however, corruption undermines the principles of
democracy and the rule of law, which as prescribed in Article 6 EU Treaty are
fundamental to the functioning of the EU and common to all Member States. To prove
its commitment to these principles, the EU must have a genuine policy addressing the
problem of corruption within its Member States.
One other important reason for developing a more comprehensive policy against
corruption across Member States is that corruption poses a danger for the regular
distribution of EU funds. In particular, around 80% of EU funds are under shared
management by the Commission and the Member States.1 It is mainly the responsibility
of Member States to ensure an effective system of control for these funds. The
prevalence of corruption connected with the distribution of EU funds within Member
States is confirmed in the reports of GRECO. For example, the 2001 GRECO evaluation
reports on Greece observed that one of the most common forms of corruption is the
bribery of public officials in return for their assistance in obtaining subsidies or aid from
EU funds.2
1 Commission (EC), 'Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Protection
of the financial interests of the Communities - Fight Against Fraud - Annual report 2006'
COM(2007)390, 6.7.2007, at 5.
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The need for such policy is also evident in the fact that corruption is seen as a
serious issue by EU citizens.
Figure 3.1: Corruption as a major problem in 25 Member States
O Agree
0C4.1 Corruption is » raajor pioblsrn in (OUR COUNTRY)
■ Disagree DDSC
«SS
Source: Special Eurobarometer, 'Opinions on organised, cross-border crime and corruption'
(2006) <httD://ec.europa.eu/Dublic opinion/archives/ebs/ebs 245 en.odf> accessed 15
December 2007.
As can be seen from Figure 3.1, almost three-fourths of EU citizens agreed with the
statement that corruption is a major problem in their country. In ten of the EU's 25
Member States over 85% of survey respondents agreed with the statement. Meanwhile,
only three countries (Denmark, Finland and Austria) did not have a clear majority that
agreed with the statement.
There is also evidence from the Transparency International Global Corruption
Barometer 2007 that in over half of the European countries surveyed, a majority of
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citizens think that their government's efforts to fight corruption are ineffective. In six
old Member States (Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom), over 50% of citizens believe this is the case. In Germany, a shocking 77%
believe the German government's efforts to tackle corruption are ineffective. (See
Figure 3.2)
Figure 3.2: The government's efforts to fight corruption
Country Territory
Percentage of respondents who think







EU+ 28% 12% 60%
Austria 30% 24% 46%
Bulgaria 14% 15% 72%
Czech Republic 14% 22% 64%
Denmatk 34% 42% 25%
Finland 31% 26% 42%
France 37% 25% 38%
Germany 20% 3% 77%
Greece 26% 15% 59%
Iceland 18% 37% 45%
Ireland 46% 3% 52%
Italy 21% 8% 70%
Lithuania 9% 14% 77%
Luxembourg 26% 37% 37%
Netherlands 39% 11% 51%
Norway 15% 47% 38%
Poland 22% 30% 48%
Portugal 23% 13% 64%
Romania 26% 19% 55%
Spain 42% 6% 51%
Sweden 24% 33% 44%
Switzerland 35% 32% 33%
United Kingdom 34% 2% 64%
Source: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2007
<http://www.transparencv.org/policv research/surveys indices/acb> accessed 14 December
2007.
As observed in Chapter Two, the need for a comprehensive policy against
corruption was recognised across the EU institutions in the second half of the 1990s. It
was also acknowledged that preventing and combating corruption within the Member
104
States should be one of the goals of this policy. This chapter analyses how the actual
measures taken by the EU correspond with the policy framework and examines whether
the EU addresses corruption within the Member States in a coherent and adequate way.
To this end the chapter begins with a discussion of a legislative and institutional
anti-corruption framework developed by the EU under both the first and third pillars.
First, it analyses the preventive character of the Community acquis in the area of the
single market and then moves on to elaborate on the approximation of the offence of
corruption by the EU instruments adopted under the EU Treaty. It points out the very
limited scope of these instruments using the relevant initiatives of the Council of Europe
and the UN as a point of reference. The chapter further outlines how corruption is one of
the thirty two generic offences which are subject to an intensified cooperation at the EU
level on the basis of mutual recognition. Next, the chapter examines the anti-corruption
dimension of the EU anti-money laundering legislation and notes that in this area the EU
regularly updates its standards in accordance with the latest international initiatives. The
chapter also discusses the monitoring of EU anti-corruption measures and argues that it
is a fragmented and ineffective process. Finally, the chapter examines the ways in which
the EU cooperates and takes advantage of other international initiatives in the area of
anti-corruption.
1. EU legislative and institutional framework
1.1. The first pillar measures
The anti-corruption standards are developed by the Community in the framework of the
single market legislation adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC. The legal measures
adopted in this area have a non-criminal, administrative character, and their goal is to
ensure fair competition and the proper functioning of the internal market. Although
combating corruption is not their primary objective, they contribute usefully towards the
prevention of corruption.
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One of the areas of the Community acquis, where such anti-corruption standards
are developed is public procurement, which is the process used by governments,
regional and local public authorities to obtain goods, works and services. The primary
purpose of public procurement legislation is to ensure transparency in selection
procedures and equal access for those seeking to gain public contracts.
Public procurement is particularly vulnerable to corrupt practices and
favouritism. Companies participating in a tender may be tempted to use bribes to obtain
contracts. As a result, corrupt public officials purchase goods or services from a
company that gives the highest bribe, rather than from the best bidder. Fair and
transparent procedures for the awarding of contracts and appropriate judicial appeal
procedures limit the danger of corruption. The Commission recognises that 'whilst
transparent procedures are not sufficient in themselves to eradicate fraud and corruption,
an effective and dissuasive system of monitoring, procedural checks and proportional
penalties helps to protect against breaches of public trust.'3 In a study on the prevention
of corruption in the Member States conducted in 1998 for the EP, one of the highest
priorities identified was the need for transparency in regard to award procedures for
public contracts.4 In 1997 and 2000 the Council called on the Member States and the
Commission to ensure that the applicable legislation provides for the 'possibility that an
applicant in a public tender procedure who has committed offences connected with
organised crime can be excluded from the participation in tender procedures conducted
by Member States and the Community.'5
3 Commission (EC), 'Green Paper. Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the Way
Forward' 27.11.1996, at 4 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/green-
papers/com-96-583/com-96-583_en.pdf > accessed 15 December 2007.
4
European Parliament, 'Measures to prevent corruption in EU Member States' (1998) Working Paper
JURI101 EN, at 2 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/iuri/pdf/101_en.pdf> accessed 14
December 2007.
5 Council of the European Union, 'The Prevention and Control of Organised Crime: A European Union
Strategy for the Beginning of the New Millennium' 6611/00, 3.3.2000, recommendation 2; Council
Action Plan to combat organized crime, OJ C 251,15.08.1997, recommendation 7.
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Two Public Procurement Directives6 adopted in 2004 govern the opening of
public procurement in Member State to the EU wide competition. They apply only to
public contracts above certain thresholds, which are revised by the Commission every
two years.7 The Directives provide for the mandatory exclusion of candidates for
participation in a criminal organisation, corruption, fraud or money laundering.8 The
offence of corruption is defined by reference to Article 3 of the Anti-Corruption
Convention and Article 3(1) of the Joint Action on combating corruption in the private
sector. This exclusion is limited to economic operators convicted by the final judgment
of the court. In addition, the economic operator may be excluded from participating in a
contract if he or she has been convicted by a final judgment of any offence concerning
his professional conduct or has been guilty of grave professional misconduct proven by
any means which the contracting authorities can demonstrate.9 The court proceedings
can take a long time, and there might be convincing evidence of corruption even where
there is no final conviction. The Directives cover such situations as well, as corruption
constitutes a grave professional misconduct and convincing evidence would be sufficient
to blacklist the candidate.10
The exclusion of persons or companies who engage in corrupt practices from
public contracts for a specified period of time, so called blacklisting, is one of the most
effective means of preventing corruption. For companies it means loss of contracts and a
damaged reputation. Holding a company accountable for corruption among their
employees increases the potential costs of corruption and therefore should encourage
companies to devise their own internal anti-corruption policies. Blacklisting has been
used at both international and national levels. One of the examples includes the system
6 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public
service contracts, OJ L 134/114, 30.4.2004; Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water,
energy, transport and postal services sectors, OJ L 134/1, 30.4.2004.
7 Article 69 of the Directive 2004/17/EC
8 Article 45 (1) (b) of the Directive 2004/18/EC; Article 53(3) of the Directive 2004/17/EC
9 Article 45(2) (c) and (d) of the Directive 2004/18/EC
10
Transparency International, 'Fighting Corruption at EU level. Progress Report 1995-2004' (2004)
Working Paper, point 11.
107
run by the World Bank whereby publicly listed firms and individuals who, as a result of
an administrative process, were found to have violated the World Bank anti-corruption
provisions, are ineligible to be awarded a World Bank-financed contract for certain
periods.11
In theory, the Public Procurement Directives introduce a framework whereby a
person or a company convicted for corruption may be excluded from public procurement
across the EU. In practice, the effectiveness of such a framework is not guaranteed, as
too much depends on the contracting authority taking action, in case of doubt or of being
unaware of such a conviction. The contracting authority must be aware of conviction by
final judgement before it can exclude an economic operator. Only in cases of suspicion
should the contracting authority contact the relevant national authorities, including
authorities of other Member States, which otherwise do not have a duty to inform about
convictions of their national companies willing to participate in a public tender in other
Member States.12 In fact, the Member States may be unwilling to inform about such
convictions if as a result the national companies would be excluded from contracts in
other Member States. The contracting authority can also ask the economic operators to
supply the relevant documents, such as an extract from the judicial record or of an
equivalent document issued by a competent judicial or administrative authority, to
confirm whether they have been convicted for corruption or not, but it would do so only
in cases of suspicion.13
This policy could be improved. A public register of companies' criminal
convictions run centrally by the EU and open to all national contracting authorities
would offer a better solution. It would guarantee that companies convicted for corruption
were excluded in all Member States. Another option would be a system whereby
11 World Bank Listing of Ineligible Firms:
<http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?contentMDK=64069844&menuPK=116730&pagePK=6
4148989&piPK=64148984&querycontentMDK=64069700&theSitePK=84266#excerpts > accessed 15
December 2007.
12 Article 45(1) of the Directive 2004/18/EC.
13 Article 45(3) Directive 2004/18/EC.
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companies receive positive checks before they can take part in a tender. The systematic
requirement for companies to provide proof that they have not engaged in corrupt
practices would prevent corruption in a more effective way than the current regulation.14
However, the Public Procurement Directives do not foresee such a system, and the
introduction of any such rules at the national level would be regarded as an infringement
of Community law. This was confirmed by the Commission's decision in 2007 to take
legal action against Greece concerning legislation that stated that in order to avoid
disqualification, all tenderers must make an official declaration that they have not been
convicted of any charge of corruption.15
The Community law also provides review procedures for decisions taken by
contracting authorities and compensation of persons harmed by infringements of public
procurement rules.16 Member States must ensure that review procedures are available at
least to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular public
contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement.17 In June
2006 the Commission presented a proposal for a Directive strengthening national rules
on remedies.18 The objective of the proposal is to ensure better prevention of the signing
of public contracts which have been concluded illegally. It provides for a 'standstill
period' before the contract can actually be signed to give bidders time to examine the
14 White proposed an EU-wide 'white list', where tenderers would provide proof that they meet EU-agreed
criteria and agree to checks being carried out by the national authorities, see: S. White, (ed) 'Procurement
and Organised Crime: An EU-wide study' (Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, 2000) quoted in K.
Drew, 'Cracking down on Corrupt Companies. A Critical Analysis of the EC's Public Procurement
Proposals' (2001) PSIRU <http://www.againstcorruption.org/reports/2001-09-Corr-EUproc.doc> accessed
15 December 2007.
15 'Public procurement: The Commission reacts to Greek legislation excluding certain companies from
public procurement' Press Release IP/07/353 (21 March 2007)
16 Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply
and public works contracts, OJ L 395, 30.12.1989 and Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992
coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community
rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and
telecommunications sectors, OJ L076, 23.3.1992.
17 Article 1(3) of the Directive 89/665/EEC and Directive 92/13/EEC.
18 Commission (EC), 'Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review
procedures concerning the award of public contracts' COM(2006) 195 final/2, 14.6.2006.
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decision and to assess whether it is appropriate to initiate a review procedure.19 This
would give the contracting authorities additional time to leam about the existence of
corrupt practices. The proposed Directive would allow national courts to render the
illegally awarded public contracts ineffective20, as under the current system these
contracts cannot be opened again and operators, whose rights have been infringed, may
only seek review for damages.21
The Public Procurement Directives do not govern the public contracts financed
from the EU budget, which are regulated by the Financial Regulation.22 Corruption,
subject to a final judgement and grave professional misconduct proven by any means
which the contracting authority can justify, constitutes grounds for exclusion from
public contracts involving EU funds.23 When subcontracting is envisaged, there is also a
duty to certify that the subcontractor is not in one of the above situations.24 A contract
shall also not be awarded to candidates or tenderers, when conflict of interests prevents
him from giving priority to the interests of the contracting authority.25
Most importantly, the Commission set up and operates a central database with
details of candidates and tenderers who should be excluded from public contracts on the
basis of the above criteria.26 The authorities of Member States have access to the
information contained in the database and may take it into account when awarding
contracts associated with the implementation of the EU budget. Transparency
International, in its assessment of the blacklisting system at the EU level, argued that a
19 'Public procurement: Commission welcomes European Parliament agreement on Directive improving
rights of rejected bidders' Press Release IP/07/861 (21 June 2007).
20 Commission (n 18), at 20.
21
Ibid, at 2.
22 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1995/2006 of 13 December 2006 amending Regulation (EC,
Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European
Communities, OJ L 390, 30.12.2006.
23 Article 93 (c) and (e) of the Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial
Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, OJ L 248,16.9.2002.
24 Article 93 of the Regulation No 1995/2006.
25 Article 94 (a) of the Regulation No 1995/2006.
26 Article 95 of the Regulation No 1995/2006.
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similar central registry should be established under the Public Procurement Directives
for contracts with no EU funds at stake.27
The Community acquis also contains measures on accounting and auditing that
greatly contribute to prevention and detection of corruption cases. The inclusion of
accounting and auditing standards in the anti-corruption strategy is not a new theme and,
as observed in Chapter One, has been reflected in other international initiatives, such as
the OECD Convention and the UNCAC. Under Community law, publicly traded
companies, including banks and insurance companies, are required to prepare their
consolidated accounts in accordance with globally accepted International Accounting
Standards28 from 2005 onwards.29 The EU has also been promoting the use of high
quality auditing standards across the EU by harmonisation of statutory audit
requirements in accordance with the International Standards on Auditing.30 As a result of
the Community initiatives in this area, companies must comply with high uniform
standards that ensure transparency of accounts across the EU.
1.2. The third pillar measures
The provisions of Title VI of the EU Treaty on police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters give the EU competence to fight corruption through approximations of
criminal laws of Member States and by establishing close cooperation between judicial
and police authorities. This section starts by examining the scope of approximation at
the EU level in the area of both public and private sector corruption. Next, the section
27
Transparency International, 'Recommendations for the Development and Implementation of an
effective Debarment System in the EU' (2006)
<http://www.eib.org/cms/htm/en/eib.org/attachments/strategies/TI_EU_debarment_recommendations.pdf
> accessed 15 December 2007.
28
For text of the International Accounting Standards, see: Annex to Commission Regulation (EC) No
1725/2003 of 29 September 2003 adopting certain international accounting standards in accordance with
Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 261/1,13.10.2003.
29
Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the
application of international accounting standards, OJ L243,11.9.2002.
3 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on statutory
audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, OJ L 157, 9.6.2006.
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moves on to discuss how corruption has found its place in the general framework of
police and judicial cooperation within the EU and recently became a subject of an
intensified judicial cooperation on the basis of mutual recognition.
1.2.1. Approximation of criminal laws
1.2.1.1. Public sector
In the First Communication on the EU policy against corruption in 1997, the
Commission identified a number of shortcomings in the anti-corruption laws of Member
States with regard to the scope of regulation and liability of legal persons.31 This section
discusses how the EU legislator has responded to these loopholes since then and what
changes have been introduced to the national criminal laws of the Member States. As
discussed in Chapter Two, two EU instruments adopted in the mid 1990s, the First
Protocol32 adopted in 1996 and the Anti-Corruption Convention33 adopted in 1997,
address corruption in the public sector, defined as corruption involving public officials.
Both instruments contain the same definitions of active and passive corruption
with the exception that the First Protocol is limited to corruption affecting EC financial
interests. On the basis of these two instruments, Member States are required to
criminalise the offence of passive and active corruption. The Anti-Corruption
Convention defines 'passive corruption' as:
31 Commission (EC), 'Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
on a Union Policy Against Corruption', COM(97) 192 final, 21.5.1997, at 3.
32 Protocol drawn up on the basis ofArticle K.3 of the Treaty on European Union to the Convention on the
protection of the European Communities' financial interests, (adopted 27 September 1996, entered into
force 17 October 2002 among the 15 old Member States) (the First Protocol) OJ C 313/10, 23/10/1996.
33 Convention drawn up on the basis ofArticle K.3 (2) of the Treaty on European Union on the fight
against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the
European Union, (the Anti-Corruption Convention), OJ C 195, 25.06.1997.
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...the deliberate action of an official, who, directly or through an intermediary, requests
or receives advantages of any kind whatsoever, for himself or for a third party, or
accepts a promise of such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in accordance with
his duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of his official duties...34;
and 'active corruption', as:
...the deliberate action of whosoever promises or gives, directly or through an
intermediary, an advantage of any kind whatsoever to an official for himself or for a
third party for him to act or refrain from acting in accordance with his duty or in the
exercise of his functions in breach of his official duties...35
The definition of bribery embraced by the EU instruments is quite broad. Both direct and
indirect (through intermediary) means of bribery are covered. In the case of passive
corruption, the request in itself is the core of the offence, and it is immaterial whether
such a request is acted upon.36 The offence is also complete if an official accepts or
receives a bribe, even though he later waives the performance of the agreement or
returns whatever it is he received.37 Cases in which an official requests a gift or another
advantage not for himself but for a third party, such as a spouse or a political party, are
also covered by the definition.38 The concept of 'advantage of any kind whatsoever' is
deliberately broad to include not only material objects, such as money, but also anything
that might represent an indirect interest, for instance settlement of the corrupted person's
debts or work on property belonging to him.39 The request or acceptance must predate
the official's act or omission. In addition, the situations where the official, contrary to
his official duty to act impartially, receives the advantage in return for acting in
accordance with his function (e.g. by accelerating the processing of case) are also
covered by the EU legislator.40
34 Article 2 of the Anti-Corruption Convention
35 Article 3 of the Anti-Corruption Convention
36
Explanatory Report on the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the






The Member States are required to ensure that passive and active corruption,
and participating and instigating of it, is criminalised under their national laws and
punished by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties involving
deprivation of liberty which can give rise to extradition.41 The term 'dissuasive' can be
viewed as vague, however, '...multilateral agreements cannot influence domestic
legislation too deeply thus allowing them to fix the sanctions themselves, according to
the principle of sovereignty.'42 The same language is used in other international
instruments, including in the Council of Europe and the UN conventions.43
The EU's definitions of bribery do not differ substantially from the definitions
adopted by the UNCAC44 or the Criminal Law Convention.45 However, the international
instruments go much further in defining corruption. While the EU instruments limit the
offence to bribery, the UNCAC obliges state parties to criminalise not just bribery but a
wide range of acts, including embezzlement of public funds by public officials, trading
in influence or abuse of functions.46 In the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention,
most offences are limited to bribery as well, but trading in influence is also covered.47
Before adoption of the EU instruments in this area, criminal laws of Member
States already outlawed the bribery of national public officials.48 However, the criminal
laws of most Member States did not extend to the criminalisation of the corruption of
officials of other Member States 49 In 1998, a study conducted for the EP identified that
no attempt was made in the legislation of any Member State to include specifically
41 Article 5 of the Anti-Corruption Convention.
42 L. Ferola, 'The action of the European Union against corruption' (1999) Legal Issues of European
Integration, Vol. 26 No. 1/2,123-156, at 139.
43 For example: Article 19 of the Criminal Law Convention and Article 12 the UNCAC.
44 Articles 15 and 16 of the UNCAC.
45 Articles 2 and 3 of the Criminal Law Convention. In fact the Council of Europe's convention draw
inspiration from the First Protocol in defining bribery, see: Explanatory Report
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treatv/EN/Reports/HtmF173.htm> accessed 16 December 2007.
46
Chapter III of the UNCAC.
47 Articles 2-12 of the Criminal Law Convention.
48 Commission (n 31), at 2.
49
Explanatory Report (n 36).
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bribery of Community officials, although in many cases the law could be interpreted to
include them.50 Thus the importance of the EU measures stems mainly from the fact that
they obliged the Member States to criminalise passive and active corruption of officials
of the Community and other Member States.
In defining the concept of 'national' official, the national criminal laws of
Member States are given priority.51 Where an official of another Member State is
involved, the definition in the law of that Member State should normally be applied by
the prosecuting Member State. Unlike in the cases of the Council of Europe, the UN and
the OECD conventions, the concept of 'national' official does not automatically include
members of parliament, ministers, members of the highest courts or courts of auditors in
the Member States. These categories of officials may be subject to different anti-
corruption regimes across Member States.52
The 'Community' official refers to any employee within the meaning of the Staff
Regulations, various categories of staff engaged on contract and seconded national
experts to the EC.53 It is worth noticing that members of the Commission, the EP, the
Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors are not covered by this definition. These
categories of Community officials are assimilated to the equivalent category of national
officials, which includes respectively Government Ministers, elected members of its
parliamentary chambers, the members of its highest courts or the members of its court of
auditors.54 The principle of assimilation was introduced due to the high political
sensitivity regarding the liability of the highest officials. It is also worth pointing out that
the EU instruments do not address the corruption of third country officials, even where
such acts adversely affect the EC financial interests.
50
European Parliament (n 4), at 3.
51 Article 1 of the Anti-Corruption Convention.
52
Explanatory Report (n 36).
53 Article 1 of the Anti-Corruption Convention.
54 Article 4 of the Anti-Corruption Convention.
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The growing economic importance of legal persons has raised the question of
their liability for corruption. The scope and character of such liability depends to a large
extent on the legal tradition of the individual Member States. In some Member States, if
a bribe was paid on behalf of a company, then the company itself might have been
criminally liable, while in other Member States the company would have no liability,
only the natural person involved would have committed an offence even if it was for the
benefit of the company.55 This led to a situation where a penalty was imposed on an
individual and a company could simply replace this person with someone else. In light
of the greater complexity of structures within an organisation, it also becomes
increasingly difficult to identify a natural person who may be held responsible for a
bribery offence.56
The First Protocol and the Anti-Corruption Convention do not regulate the
liability of legal persons. As commented in Chapter Two, they only require the Member
States to introduce criminal liability of the heads of business. The Member States agreed
on rules concerning the liability of legal persons in the Second Protocol57 to the PIF
Convention adopted in 1997, which became standard EU rules regulating the liability of
legal persons.58 The Second Protocol defines a legal person as 'any entity having such
status under the applicable national law, except for States or other public bodies in the
exercise of State authority and for public international organizations.'59 Pursuant to its
provisions, Member States are obliged to take the necessary measures to ensure that
legal persons can be held liable for fraud, active corruption and money laundering
committed for their benefit by persons with 'leading positions within the legal persons',
as defined by the Second Protocol, and by a subordinate employee, in a case where the
offence has been made possible by the lack of supervision or control by one of the
55 Commission (n 31), at 3.
56 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Criminal Law Convention, available at:
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Htmiyi73.htm> last accessed 20 October 2007.
37 Second Protocol drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to the
Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests (adopted 19 June 1997, not
entered into force) (the Second Protocol) OJ C 221/22,19.07.1997.
58 S. Peers, EUJustice andHomeAffairs Law (2nd edn OUP, 2006), at 411.
59 Article 1 (d) of the Second Protocol.
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persons in leading position.60 In addition, the liability of a legal person does not exclude
the criminal liability of a natural person involved in the commission of the offences for
which the legal person is liable.61
The Member States are obliged to introduce effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions, which shall include criminal or non criminal fines or other
sanctions.62 The introduction of criminal liability is not required, administrative and civil
law measures are possible as well.63 This provision is a compromise among different
legal systems of Member States. Some jurisdictions do not accept criminal liability of
legal persons, as they recognise that '...corporations ought not to be subject to the
criminal law because they cannot have mental states and so cannot be "guilty."'64
Similar, the OECD, the Council of Europe and the UN initiatives in this area also do not
introduce any obligation to establish criminal law liability of legal persons.65 It is
important to point out that the EU was the first international organisation to address the
liability of legal persons in Europe.
The Second Protocol, however, is limited to acts of corruption affecting the EC
financial interests. The liability of legal persons in a situation where a person within the
company gives a bribe to a national official to obtain a benefit for that company without
affecting the EC financial interests is not regulated by the Second Protocol or any
subsequent EU measure. A second serious limitation is the fact that it foresees the
liability of legal persons for active corruption of public officials only and does not
address the problem of passive corruption of legal persons. This shortcoming was
60 Article 3 (1) and (2) of the Second Protocol.
61 Article 3(3) of the Second Protocol.
62 Article 4 of the Second Protocol.
63
Explanatory Report on the Second Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European
Communities' financial interests, OJ C 91, 31.3.1999.
64 S. Rose-Ackerman, 'Corruption and the criminal law' (2002) Forum on Crime and Society, Vol. 2 No.
1, 3-21, at 12.
65 Article 3(2) of the OECD Convention, Article 19(2) of the Criminal Law Convention and Article 26 of
the UNCAC.
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addressed by the EU legislator later through the adoption of measures against corruption
in the private sector.
The EU measures in the area of public sector corruption have a strong criminal
law character. They do not define any standards for the prevention of corruption within
the public administrations of Member States. Criminal law regulation is important. As it
has been pointed out:
without investigation and prosecution, corruption may not become visible and societies
may perceive themselves to be free of corruption... law enforcement has an important
preventive effect: it may even be considered a prerequisite for prevention, in that it
points at specific corruption problems, thus helping create the necessary awareness.
Successful law enforcement can generate a momentum and mobilise society against
corruption. Without the prosecution of high-level corruption, the chances of success of
specific prevention measures may be fairly slim.66
However, a successful anti-cormption strategy cannot be narrowed down to the criminal
law alone. As Rose-Ackerman has pointed out, corruption cannot be fought solely
through criminal law, which can only '...play a role as a backstop lying behind the
needed structural changes.'67 As already observed in Chapter One, initiatives of the UN
and the Council of Europe increasingly embrace preventive measures against the
corruption of public officials, such as ensuring transparency in financing, prevention of
conflicts of interests or introduction of codes of conduct for public officials.
Although there are no formal EU measures regulating the prevention of
corruption, an important part of EU policy involves supporting various informal
initiatives of Member States aimed at raising integrity in public institutions. An example
of such an initiative is the European Public Administration Network (EUPAN), which is
an informal network of Directors-General responsible for public administrations in the
66 Council of Europe, 'The Prevention of Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe' (2002) Octopus
Activity Report, at 4 <http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/combating_economic_crime/3_technical_cooperation/OCrOPUS/2001/Octopus(20Q2)lE.pdf>
accessed 16 December 2007.
67S. Rose-Ackerman (n 64), at 3.
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Member States.68 EUPAN provides a forum for learning and exchange of best practices
with the goal of raising integrity, accountability and transparency in public
administration among Member States.
1.2.1.2. Private sector
As discussed in Chapter Two, the EU recognised that it had a vital interest in combating
private sector corruption because of its negative impact on competition in relation to the
purchase of goods or services within the internal market. In December 1998 the EU
adopted the Joint Action69 on combating corruption in the private sector, which predated
other international initiatives in this area. The Joint Action called the Member States to
make active and passive corruption in the private sector a criminal offence punishable by
effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.70 In 2003 the Joint Action was replaced
by a Framework Decision on combating corruption in the private sector71 with a more
binding force and a deadline for implementation of 22 July 2005. The Framework
Decision uses similar definitions of active and passive corruption as the Joint Action. It
defined 'active corruption' in the private sector as:
promising, offering or giving, directly or through an intermediary, to a person who in
any capacity directs or works for a private-sector entity an undue advantage of any kind,
for that person or for a third party, in order that that person should perform or refrain
from performing any act, in breach of that person's duties72;
and 'passive corruption', as:
directly or through an intermediary, requesting or receiving an undue advantage of any
kind, or accepting the promise of such an advantage, for oneself or for a third party,
68 For more information, see: <www.eupan.org> accessed 16 December 2007.
69 Council Joint Action 98/742/JHA of 22 December 1998 on corruption in the private sector, OJ L 358/2,
31.12.1998.
70 Article 4 of the Joint Action.
71 Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private
sector, (the Framework Decision), OJ L 192/54, 31.7.2003.
72 Article 2 (a) of the Framework Decision.
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while in any capacity directing or working for a private-sector entity, in order to perform
or refrain from performing any act, in breach of one's duties.73
The Framework Decision does not define the 'breach of duty'. This concept is
understood in accordance with national law, providing that national law covers as a
minimum any disloyal behaviour constituting a breach of a statutory duty or professional
regulations or instructions within the relevant business.74 Apart from the fact that the
above definitions concern private entities, their scope is exactly the same as in case of
public sector definitions introduced by the Anti-Corruption Convention.
The Framework Decision goes further than the Joint Action in several other
areas. First, it applies to business activities within profit and non-profit entities.75
Second, it extends the list of offences to participatory acts, such as instigation, aiding
and abetting76, and encourages Member States to provide for a temporary prohibition of
a person who had a leading position in a company, following their conviction for
corruption, from engaging in a similar business activity or holding such a position.77
Finally, the Framework Decision introduces the liability of legal persons for both active
and passive corruption committed for their benefit.78
The Joint Action allowed Member States to limit the criminalization to a
'conduct which involves, or could involve, the distortion of competition, as a minimum
within the common market, and which results, or might result, in economic damage to
others by the improper award or improper execution of a contract.'79 The Framework
Decision allows for limiting the incrimination only to 'conduct which involves, or could
involve, a distortion of competition in relation to the purchase of goods or commercial
73 Article 2 (b) of the Framework Decision.
74 Article 1 of the Framework Decision.
75 Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision.
76 Article 3 of the Framework Decision.
77 Article 4(3) the Framework Decision.
78 Article 5 of the Framework Decision.
79 Articles 2(2) and 3(2) of the Joint Action.
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services.'80, therefore the scope of the obligatory criminalization is broader. Three
Member States- Germany, Italy and Poland- lodged declarations to limit criminalisation
in such a way.81 The fact that the EU legislator introduced the possibility to limit
criminalisation to conduct distorting competition shows that this anti-corruption measure
serves the broader objective of ensuring fair competition and proper functioning of the
internal market.
Although the EU was the first international organisation to address corruption in
the private sector, its initiatives remain very limited and lag behind the latest
international standards this area. For comparison, the UNCAC not only criminalise
bribery in the private sector but also recommends that state parties prevent corruption in
the private sector, inter alia, by enhancing auditing and accounting standards, promoting
the development of codes of conduct, using good commercial practices and preventing
conflicts of interests by imposing restrictions on the employment of public officials by
the private sector.82 Evidence also suggest that anti-corruption efforts can make a
positive impact, as a 2007 report on economic crime in the private sector found that
companies which had implemented effective anti-corruption controls in conjunction with
strong, clearly understood ethical guidelines said they suffered fewer incidents of
corruption than other companies.83
The EU regulates some areas that contribute to prevention of corruption within
the private sector, including public procurement, liability of heads of business and legal
persons, which may encourage companies to reinforce their internal control systems.
The EU should, however, embrace promotion of integrity and ethical standards into its
80 Article 2(3) of the Framework Decision.
81 Commission (EC), 'Report from the Commission to the Council based on Article 9 of the Council
Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector'
COM(2007) 328 final,18.6.2007, at 7.
82 Article 12 of the UNCAC.
83
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 'Economic Crime: people, culture and controls. The 4th biennial Global
Economic Crime Survey' (2007), at 33
<http://www.pwc.eom/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/l E0890149345149E8525737000705AFl/$file/P
wC_2007GECS.pdf> accessed 16 December 2007.
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strategy against corruption in the private sector. This would not only complement the
activities of national governments in this area, but would also signal the commitment of
the EU to fair competition within the internal market. The only initiative of this type,
which has the support of the Commission, is the Charter of the European Professional
Associations84, whose signatories include notaries, lawyers, accountants, auditors and
tax consultants. This Charter encourages their member associations to adopt standards or
guidelines within existing or future codes of conduct to protect the professionals they
represent from being involved in fraud, corruption and money-laundering or from being
exploited by organised crime.
1.2.2. Cooperation between police and judicial authorities and the
treatment of corruption
The investigation and prosecution of cross-border crime, including cross-border
corruption, is difficult due to differences in laws, practices and procedures among
countries. Therefore, there is a need for a police and judicial cooperation among national
authorities to ensure that cross-border crimes are dealt with more efficiently.
International cooperation in criminal matters is organised by a variety of legal
instruments agreed either on a bilateral basis or within the framework of international
organisations such as the EU, the UN or the Council of Europe.
As observed in Chapter One, traditional judicial cooperation, including
extradition, transfer of proceedings and mutual legal assistance, is conducted in
accordance with the principle of 'double criminality'. A second principle of traditional
judicial cooperation is that the requesting state must comply with the procedural
requirements of the requested state. It requires detailed knowledge of procedures in the
requested state under which legal assistance may be requested.
84 Charter of the European Professional Associations in supporting the fight against organised crime, (27
July 1999)
<http://www.bnotk.de/Berufsrecht/Europ.Charta.gg.org.Kriminalitaet/Europaeische_Charta_OrgKrim(EN
).html> accessed 16 December 2007.
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At the EU level, the need for an effective judicial and police cooperation has
been particularly strong. The progressive elimination of border controls has considerably
facilitated the free movement of persons, but this has also made it easier for criminals to
operate transnationally. Long before the EU gained competence in this area, the
foundations for mutual legal assistance in Europe were laid down by the conventions of
the Council of Europe, which governed the relations among Member States in this
area.85 Two of these conventions were particularly important for combating cross-border
crime: the 1957 European Convention on Extradition86 and the 1959 Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters87, which all Member States have ratified.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the EU gained powers to regulate the field of
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters with the entry into force of the Treaty
of Maastricht in 1993. Since then the Member States have agreed several conventions
with the goal of further developing the Council of Europe's instruments and speeding up
mutual assistance. Examples include two EU conventions on extradition: the Convention
on simplified extradition procedure signed in 199588 and the Convention relating to
extradition between the Member States of the EU signed in 1996.89 These conventions
have the task of supplementing and facilitating the application of the European
Extradition Convention signed in 1957. However, due to the lack of ratifications by
85 For an overview of the Council of Europe conventions in the area of legal cooperation in criminal
matters and chart of ratifications of by Member States, see:
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeParGroupe.asp?GR=l&MA=20&CM=15&CL=ENG>
accessed 16 December 2007.
86 Council of Europe, European Convention on Extradition, ETS No.: 024 (adopted 13 December 1957,
entered into force 18 April 1960) <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/024.htm> accessed
16 December 2007.
87 Council of Europe, European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, ETS No.: 030
(adopted 20 April 1959, entered into force 12 June 1962)
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treatv/en/Treaties/Html/030.htm> accessed 16 December 2007.
88 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on simplified
extradition procedure between the Member States of the European Union, (adopted 10 March 1995, not
entered into force), OJ C 78/2, 30.03.1995.
89 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union relating to
Extradition between the Member States of the European Union, (adopted 27 September 1996, not entered
into force), OJC 313/12,23.10.1996.
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Member States, as of 16 December 2007, none of these conventions has entered into
force.
In 2000, the Council also agreed a Convention on mutual assistance in criminal
matters90, which simplified and modernized traditional mutual assistance. On the basis
of this convention, the Member States requesting mutual assistance no longer need to
satisfy procedural requirements in the requested state. Instead, the priority is given to the
methods and procedure indicated by the Member State that requires the assistance.91 As
of 16 December 2007, this convention has not been ratified by all Member States.92
Due to delays in ratifications, the EU instruments have not been very successful,
and the system of traditional judicial cooperation developed under the framework of the
Treaty of Maastricht with the use of conventions has turned out to be ineffective. The
Commission regarded this system as both too slow and cumbersome for the needs of the
EU.93 There was a need for reinforcement of integration in criminal law matters. In
1998, the UK government, during its presidency in the Council, proposed a new wave of
judicial cooperation based on mutual recognition of pre-trial orders and judgements in
criminal matters, a 'third way' that could be accepted by those Member States who were
enthusiastic about harmonisation of criminal justice systems as well as those protective
of national standards.94 The UK claimed that this approach is based on:
tolerance of diversity on the basis of mutual confidence and trust in each others' legal
systems, as opposed to insistence of uniformity for its own sake.95
90 Convention established by the Council in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union,
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union, (adopted 29
May 2000, not entered into force), (the Mutual Assistance Convention) OJ C 197,12.07.2000.
91 Article 4(1) of the Mutual Assistance Convention.
92
It has not been ratified by Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/agreements> accessed 16 December 2007.
93 Commission (EC), 'Communication from Commission to the Council and the European Parliament.
Mutual Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters' COM(2000)495final, 26.7.2000, at 2.
94 Federal Trust, 'Criminal Law, Procedures and Competences' (2006), at 2
<http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/admin/uploads/FedTrust%20JHA%203.pdf> accessed 16 December 2007.
95
'The mutual recognition of criminal judgements in the EU: will the free movement of prosecutions
create barriers to genuine criminal justice?' Statewatch News Online (2000)
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/jun00/05mutual.htm> accessed 16 December 2007.
124
Mutual recognition was not a new concept. It had already worked in the
operation of the internal market. In 1999 the Tampere European Council agreed that
mutual recognition of judgments and other decisions of judicial authorities should
become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the EU.96 This
was subsequently reiterated in 2004 in a five-year programme for EU action in justice
and home affairs, the so-called Hague Programme,97 and most importantly in the Treaty
of Lisbon.98
The principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters is very different from the
traditional principle of cooperation between states. It is no longer necessary to satisfy the
legal and procedural requirements of other Member States. Mutual recognition means
that' ...once a certain measure, such as a decision taken by a judge in exercising his or
her official powers in one Member State, has been taken, that measure -in so far as it has
extranational implications - would automatically be accepted in all other Member States,
and have the same or at least similar effects there.'99 The core obligation is to recognize
and execute the order or judgment of another Member State, subject only to the reasons
for non-recognition or non-execution or for suspension of execution prescribed by the
EU legislator. Under the rules of mutual recognition, the pre-trial orders and judgments
of one Member State are recognised and accepted by all other Member States, even
though their laws may not regulate a certain matter in the same or even a similar manner.
It also means that each Member State is '... effectively accepting the criminal laws of all
other Member States of the EU without a clear picture of what those laws might be.'100
As the Commission and the Council pointed put:
96
Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, (15 and 16 October 1999), para 33.
97 Council of the European Union, 'The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in
the European Union' 16054/04, 13.12.2004.
98 Article 69A of the Treaty of Lisbon.
99 Commission (n 93).
100 S. Alegre and M. Leaf, 'Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too
Soon? Case Study-the European Arrest Warrant' (2004) European Law Journal, Vol. 10 No. 2, 200-217, at
208.
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implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters
presupposes that Member States have trust in each others' criminal justice systems. That
trust is grounded, in particular, on their shared commitment to the principles of freedom,
democracy and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.101
While a comprehensive analysis of the measures implementing the principle of
mutual recognition in criminal matters lies beyond the scope of this thesis, the
significance of these measures for prosecution of cross-border corruption must be
emphasised. The Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)102, which
entered into force in January 2004, is the first measure in this area. It was adopted in
response to the lack of ratification of the EU conventions on extradition. As Gilmore
observed, it was also a move towards the removal of the three most controversial and
difficult issues in the extradition process: non-extradition of nationals, the political
offence exception and the requirement of double criminality.103
The EAW Framework Decision introduced a new, simplified system of surrender
of sentenced or suspected persons for the purposes of execution or prosecution of
criminal sentences. An arrest warrant issued in one Member State is executed in another
Member State with the minimum of formality and removes the complexity and potential
for delay inherent in the extradition procedures. The EAW is sent directly from one
judicial authority to another without the involvement of any diplomatic channel or other
intermediary. The execution of these warrants is simply a judicial process and the
political stage in current extradition procedures, where a government minister takes the
final decision on whether or not to extradite someone, is abolished. The EAW may be
issued for any act punishable in the Member State issuing the arrest warrant for a
101 'Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal
matters', OJ C 12/10,15.1.2001, at 10.
102 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the
surrender procedures between Member States, (the EAW Framework Decision), OJ L 190/1, 18.7.2002.
103 B. Gilmore, 'The EU Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant: An overview from the
Perspective of International Criminal Law' (2002) ERA Forum 3,144-147, at 145.
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maximum period of at least twelve months or, where a sentence has already been passed,
for at least four months.104
The best-known provision of the Framework Decision on the arrest warrant is the
abolition of the principle of double criminality for certain crimes.105 It is sufficient that
the act is criminal in the state issuing the EAW. There is no need to verify the double
criminality if the EAW has been issued for one of the thirty-two listed offences as
defined by the law of the issuing Member State, where such an offence could be subject
to a sentence of a maximum period of at least three years. Cormption is one of the
offences where the requirement of double criminality is abolished.
The mechanism of the EAW is based on a high level of confidence between
Member States. Traditional legal assistance required a certain extent of harmonization of
substantive law to fulfil the requirement of double criminality. Under the mutual
recognition system, differences in the definition of corruption do not constitute an
obstacle to cooperation. The offence is defined by the law of the issuing state, thus it
embraces, next to cross-border corruption, cases of purely domestic corruption. In
practice, however, the definitions of cormption in public and private sectors are now
approximated by the EU legislator in the Anti-Corruption Convention and the
Framework Decision on cormption in the private sector. Providing that these measures
are effectively implemented by all Member States, there should be no major controversy
in applying the EAW in cormption cases.
As Peers has pointed out, the contours of the agreement on the EAW formed the
template for agreement on other proposals.106 The legal measures based on the mutual
recognition, adopted so far, all abolish the double criminality for exactly the same list of
crimes as that applicable to the EAW. The judicial cooperation in criminal matters at the
104 Article 2(1) of the EAW Framework Decision.
105 Article 2(2) of the EAW Framework Decision.
106 S. Peers, 'Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European Union: has the Council got it wrong?'
(2004) Common Market Law Review, Vol. 41 Issue 1, 5-36, at 12.
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EU level has been intensified in the area of thirty-two crimes, and corruption is one of
them. The new legal instruments based on mutual recognition are all designed to
embrace corruption.107 The measures relating to the execution of freezing and
confiscation orders in relation to the proceeds of corruption are here of particular
importance. Next to traditional prosecution focusing on the treatment of individuals, the
proceed-oriented measures constitute an important element of crime control strategies.108
Corruption is a crime committed for profit and measures focused on the seizure or
confiscation of that profit are an effective deterrent against corruption and reduce the
incentives for offending. Freezing bank accounts and seizure of property prevent
criminals from taking advantage of the proceeds of their illegal activities.
In addition to the above legislative measures, the EU also developed institutions
facilitating judicial and police cooperation in cases of cross-border corruption. Police
cooperation within the EU is reinforced by the European Police Office (Europol), which
was established by a convention signed in 1995.109 Europol is the agency responsible for
improving the effectiveness of cooperation between Member States in combating serious
organised and cross-border crimes, which require a common approach due to their scale,
significance and consequences.110 To this end, Europol's tasks include facilitating the
exchange of information between Member States; obtaining, collating and analysing
information and intelligence; notifying the Member States of any information
107 Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the European Union
of orders freezing property or evidence, OJ L196, 2.8.2003; Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24
February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties, OJ L 76,
22.3.2005; Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the application of the principle of
mutual recognition to confiscation orders, OJ L328, 24.11.2006; Council of the European Union,
'Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the European Evidence Warrant (EEW) for obtaining
objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters' 9913/07, 25.5.2007.
108 M. Kilchling, 'Tracing, Seizing and Confiscating Proceeds from Corruption (and other Illegal Conduct)
Within or Outside the Criminal Justice System' (2001) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and
Criminal Justice, Vol. 9/4, 264-280, at 264.
109 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the
establishment of a European Police Office, (adopted 26 July 1995, entered into force 1 October 1998), (the
Europol Convention), OJ C 316/2, 27.11.1995.
110 Article 2 of the Europol Convention.
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concerning them and of any connections identified between criminal offences; and
maintaining a computerised system of information.111
Over time Europol also gained competence to participate in a support capacity in
• • • • 112
joint investigation teams and ask competent authorities of Member States to conduct
or coordinate investigations.113 Initially, Europol was not competent to deal with the
offence of corruption.114 Europol competences were extended to cover corruption in
2001 by a Council Decision115, and since 2000 they also cover the offence of
money-laundering in general, regardless of the type of offence from which the laundered
proceeds originated, thus including corruption.116 In addition, Europol produces
Organised Crime Threat Assessments reports, which give a future-oriented assessment
of trends in organised crime within the EU.117 In these reports, Europol also examines
links between corruption and organised criminal groups.
One of the bodies with the aim of enhancing judicial cooperation in criminal
matters is the European Judicial Network (EJN) 118, which was set up in 1998. It consists
of contact points within each Member State and the Commission. The EJN helps
national judges and prosecutors to carry out cross-border investigations by enabling
111 Article 3 of the Europol Convention.
112 Article 13 of the Mutual Assistance Convention provides that two or more Member States may set up a
joint investigation team for a specific purpose and a limited period to carry out criminal investigations in
one or more of the Member States setting up the team.
113 Council Act of 28 November 2002 drawing up a Protocol amending the Convention on the
establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) and the Protocol on the privileges and
immunities of Europol, the members of its organs, the deputy directors and the employees of Europol, OJ
C 312/1,16.12.2002.
114 Corruption was one of the offences listed in the Annex to the Europol Convention, which the Council
acting unanimously could assign Europol to deal with it.
115 Council Decision of 6 December 2001 extending Europol's mandate to deal with the serious forms of
international crime listed in the Annex to the Europol Convention, OJ C 362,18.12.2001.
116 Protocol drawn up on the basis of Article 43(1) of the Convention on the establishment of a European
Police Office (Europol Convention) amending Article 2 and the Annex to that Convention, OJ C 358,
13.12.2000.
117 Europol, 'EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2007'
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/European_Organised_Crime_Threat_Assessment_(OCTA)/Q
CTA2007.pdf> accessed 17 December 2007.
"s Joint Action of 29 June 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on
European Union, on the creation of a European Judicial Network, (98/428/JHA), OJ L 191, 7.7.1998
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them to be in direct contact with judicial authorities in other Member States. The EJN
facilitates access to the legal information necessary to prepare effective requests for
judicial cooperation in another Member State.
The main judicial body in this area is, however, Eurojust, a cooperation network
established in 2002 to assist the authorities within Member States and coordinate
investigations and prosecution of serious cross-border and organised crime.119 The
College of Eurojust is composed of twenty-seven national members, one nominated by
each Member State, who may be a judge, prosecutor or police officer.120 Eurojust
competence corresponds to the offences in respect of which Europol is competent, and
thus covers cases of transnational corruption.121 Eurojust activities aim at improving
cooperation among the relevant authorities of Member States, in particular by
facilitating the execution of international mutual legal assistance and the implementation
of extradition requests.122 During 2006, for example, Eurojust asked the authorities in
Portugal to undertake an investigation into money-laundering and corruption, and to
coordinate this investigation with the prosecution authorities in Belgium.123
The Treaty of Lisbon provides for a possibility to increase the powers of
Eurojust. It provides that Eurojust tasks may include the initiation of criminal
investigations, particularly those relating to offences against the financial interests of the
Union.124 This goes further than the decision on setting up Eurojust, which provides that
Eurojust may only ask the national authorities to consider undertaking an
investigation.125 However, as White has noted, it is not clear at this stage how Eurojust
119 Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against
serious crime (2002/187/JHA), (the Eurojust Decision), OJ L 63/1, 6.3.2002.
120 Article 2(1) of the Eurojust Decision.
121 Article 4 of the Eurojust Decision.
122 Article 3 of the Eurojust Decision.
123 Eurojust, 'Annual Report' (2006)
<-}ittp://www.eurojust.europa.eu/press_releases/annual_reports/2006/Annual_Report_2006_EN.pdf>
accessed 16 December 2007.
124 Article 69D of the Treaty of Lisbon.
125 Article 6 (a)(i) of the Eurojust Decision.
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could initiate proceedings in the Member States.126 This could involve either requesting
a Member State to open a case through a non-binding but formal request; or it could be
done by virtue of special powers yet to be determined.127 In 2007 the Commission
recognised that Eurojust should have wider powers, especially in initiating inquiries in a
Member State and criminal inquiries at European level, especially regarding offences
affecting the EC financial interests.128
In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon foresees the creation of a new institution, the
European Public Prosecutor's Office from Eurojust (EPP), in order to combat crimes
affecting the financial interests of the Union.129 The EPP's Office would be responsible
for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment the perpetrators of and
accomplices in offences against the Union's financial interests.130 The European Council
may, however, extend the powers of the EPP's Office to include 'serious crime having a
cross-border dimension.'131 The EPP would exercise the functions of a prosecutor in the
national court in relation to these crimes.
According to the Commission, the creation of the EPP would help to overcome
the fragmentation of the European criminal law area.132 In particular, the centralisation
of the investigation and prosecution functions by the EPP would help to overcome the
difficulty where evidence gathered in one Member State cannot be used in courts in
another Member State.133 In addition, the Commission stressed the added value of
126 S. White, 'European Constitution: what is new in the area of judicial co-operation in criminal matters
and police cooperation' (2004) The Federal Trust Online Paper 07/04, at 4
<■http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/constitution/07_04.pdf> accessed 16 December 2007.
127 Ibid.
128 Commission (EC), 'Communication on the role of Eurojust and European Judicial Network in the fight
against organised crime and terrorism in the European Union' COM(2007) 644 final, 23.10.2007, at 6.
129 Article 69E of the Treaty of Lisbon.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Commission (EC), 'Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the Community
and the establishment of a European Prosecutor' COM(2001) 715 final, 11.12.2001, at 12.
133 Ibid, at 14.
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establishing of the EPP for the investigation of corruption cases within the Community
institutions, where it could supplement the administrative action of OLAF.134
Some authors, however, contest the desirability of the EPP. As Peers has noted,
there is no need for the EPP's Office in light of the intensification of cross- border
judicial cooperation among Member States.135 It has been also pointed out that the EPP
could take advantage of differing standards in the burden of proof, mode of trial,
sentencing and admissibility of evidence across the EU, which in turn could result in
watering down of procedural safeguards, in particular regarding the admissibility of
evidence.136
1.3. The anti-corruption dimension of EU anti-money laundering legislation
The fight against money laundering at the EU level is a cross-pillar matter, meaning that
it is regulated through legislative measures adopted under both the first and third pillars.
Before moving on to discuss the legislative measures in this area, it is important to point
out that the EU money laundering initiatives have developed in parallel with
international developments in the field, in particular initiatives of the FATF.137 While a
more detailed analysis of EU anti-money laundering measures is outside the scope of
this thesis, here the discussion focuses on the provisions with direct relevance for the
prevention of corruption.
134 Ibid, at 15.
135 Peers (n 58), at 491.
136 Justice, 'Justice submission to the House of Commons European Security Committee on the European
Convention on the Future of Europe -draft articles on the area of freedom, security and justice' (2003)
<http://www.justice.org.uk/imapes/pdfs/futureofeurope.pdf> accessed 16 December 2007.
137 For more, see: V. Mitsilegas and B. Gilmore, 'The EU legislative framework against money laundering
and terrorist finance: a critical analysis in the light of evolving global standards' (2007) ICLQ Vol. 56,
119-141.
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The EU adopted its first money laundering countermeasure in 1991 with the
Directive against money laundering (known as the First Directive) 138, which obliged
Member States to prohibit money laundering. Originally, the Commission proposed that
under the First Directive, money laundering should be treated as a criminal offence, but
the Council was opposed, '...taking the view that the Community had no such
competence.'139 Nevertheless, in a statement attached to the First Directive, all Member
States agreed to enact adequate criminal legislation to make money laundering a
criminal offence.140 The definition of money laundering in the First Directive is derived
from the relevant provisions of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which, as already mentioned in Chapter
One, limits criminalisation to laundering of the proceeds of drug related offences.
However, Member States were allowed to extend the provisions of the First Directive to
any other 'criminal activity', including corruption.141 In contrast to UN and Council of
Europe initiatives in this area, the First Directive embraces the preventive approach to
money laundering.142 As Gilmore has pointed out, the content of the First Directive was
heavily influenced by measures elaborated by the FATF.143 The First Directive
expresses the 'know your customer' principle144, recognising a series of obligations for
credit and financial institutions145, including rules on identification and for keeping
records of customers, when opening accounts, and for transactions above a certain
threshold or wherever there is suspicion ofmoney laundering.146 The First Directive also
requires credit and financial institutions to inform authorities 'on their own initiative, of
any fact which might be an indication of money laundering.'147
138 Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991on prevention of the use of the financial system for the
purpose of money laundering, (the First Directive), OJ L 166, 28/06/1991.
139 Mitsilegas and Gilmore (n 137), at 136.
140 W. C. Gilmore, Dirty Money: The evolution of international measures to counter money laundering
and the financing of terrorism (3rd edn, Council of Europe Publishing, 2004), at 196.
441 Article 1 of the First Directive.
443 Gilmore (n 140), at 194.
443 Ibid, at 195.
444 Ibid, at 199.
445 The First Directive also applies to branches, when located in the Community, of credit and financial
jnStitutions whose head offices are inside or outside the Community, see: Article 1 of the First Directive.
146 Articles 3-8 of the First Directive.
447 Article 6 of the First Directive.
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In recognition of the need to comply with evolving international standards, in
2001 the Second Directive was adopted.148 In 1999 the Commission noted that 'since the
Directive was adopted in 1991 both the money laundering threat and the response to that
threat have evolved' and that '...the response of the European Union must also move
forward.'149 The Second Directive also drew to a large extent from the 1996 revision of
FATF standards.150
Two important changes relevant for combating corruption were introduced by
the Second Directive. First, it extended the requirement to identify customers, keep
records and report suspicious transactions for certain non-financial activities and
professions, such as tax advisors, external accountants and auditors, real estate agents,
notaries, lawyers, auctioneers, and casinos.151 Second, it expressly prohibited the
laundering of the proceeds generated from corruption.152
It is important to point out that at the EU level, the laundering of funds derived
from corruption has been criminalised since 1997, when the Second Protocol was
adopted. However, the Second Protocol did not ensure effective criminalisation for a
number of reasons. First, it was limited to corruption damaging the EC financial
interests. Next, the Second Protocol allowed the Member States to limit the
criminalization of money laundering to 'serious cases', as defined by their national law,
of active and passive corruption.153 Moreover, as already commented above, the Second
Protocol has not yet entered into force.
Interestingly enough, the Second Directive does not define corruption by
reference to the relevant UN or EU instrument. The analysis of the subsequent
148 Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2001 amending
Q^uncil Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money
laundering, (the Second Directive), OJ L 344/76, 28.12.2001.
149 Quote taken from Gilmore (n 140), at 201.
150 Directive 2001/97/EC, para 7.
151 Article 2 of the Second Directive.
152 Article 1(E) of the Second Directive.
153 Art. 18 of the Second Protocol.
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amendments to the proposal for the Second Directive shows that the definition of
corruption was subject to debate in the Council and in the EP. In particular, two
possibilities were under consideration: corruption damaging the EC financial interests154
and corruption as defined in the Anti-Corruption Convention and the OECD
Convention.155 In the final text of the Second Directive, 'corruption' is defined by the
law of each Member State.156 In the Council's view such definition covers all forms of
corruption, whether or not it is damaging to the financial interests of the EC, and has
been included in such an explicit manner to underline the seriousness of this offence.157
Allowing national legislators to define what constitutes corruption has a major
advantage, as it ensures the broadest possible scope of the offence, offsetting the fact
that the EU instruments define corruption in a very limited way. In cases where Member
States ratified the relevant anti-corruption instruments of the UN, the Council of Europe
and the OECD, the Second Directive would cover cases of corruption as prescribed by
all these instruments.
The Third Directive158 against money laundering, replacing two previous texts in
this area, was adopted in 2005. As in the case of the Second Directive, the aim was to
bring the Community standards in line with the FATF Forty Recommendations, which
were revised in 2003 to cover terrorist financing. Considering the area of anti-corruption
policy, there is a need to draw attention to important provisions concerning customer
154 Commission (EC), 'Proposal for a European Parliament and the Council Directive amending Council
Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of
money laundering' COM(1999) 352 final, 14.7.1999, at 17.
155 Council of the European Union, 'Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the
financial system for the purpose ofmoney laundering' 7440/00,4.4.2000, at 5.
156 Council of the European Union, 'Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the
financial system for the purpose ofmoney laundering', 8614/00, 19 May 2000, at 5.
157 Council of the European Union, 'Common position with a view to the adoption of a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on the prevention of the
use of the financial system for the purpose ofmoney laundering Draft Statement of the Council's reasons'
12469/00,21.11.2000, at 5.
158 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose ofmoney laundering and terrorist financing,
(the Third Directive), OJ L 309/15, 25.11.2005.
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identification and due diligence. The Third Directive contains an explicit prohibition of
anonymous bank accounts and passbooks.159 Furthermore, in introduces the liability of
legal persons for laundering of the proceeds of corruption160 and also establishes detailed
rules for customer due diligence, including enhanced customer due diligence for
politically exposed persons residing in another Member State or in a third country.
The politically exposed persons, by virtue of their position in public life and
often as a result of protection guaranteed by immunities, are vulnerable to corruption.
According to the Third Directive, '"politically exposed persons" means natural persons
who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions and immediate family
member, or persons known to be close associates, of such persons.'161 This definition
was further elaborated by the Commission in 2006.162 According to the Commission, the
category of 'politically exposed persons' includes heads of State, heads of government,
ministers and deputy or assistant ministers; members of parliaments; members of
supreme courts, of constitutional courts or of other high-level judicial bodies whose
decisions are not subject to further appeal, except in exceptional circumstances;
members of courts of auditors or of the boards of central banks; ambassadors, charges
d'affaires and high-ranking officers in the armed forces; members of the administrative,
management or supervisory bodies of State-owned enterprises.163 The Commission
document also defines 'immediate family members'164 and 'persons known to be close
associates'165 of politically exposed persons.
159 Article 6 of the Third Directive.
160 Article 39 of the Third Directive.
161 Article 3 (8) of the Third Directive.
162 Commission Directive 2006/70/EC of 1 August 2006 laying down implementing measures for
Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition of
'politically exposed person' and the technical criteria for simplified customer due diligence procedures
and for exemption on grounds of a financial activity conducted on an occasional or very limited basis,
OJL 214/29, 4.8.2006.
163 Article 2 of the Directive 2006/70/EC.
164 Article 2(2) of the Directive 2006/70/EC.
165 Article 3(3) of the Directive 2006/70/EC.
136
The institutions and persons covered by the Third Directive166 are required, in
particular, (1) to have appropriate risk-based procedures to determine whether the
customer is a politically exposed person, (2) obtain senior management approval for
establishing business relationship with such customers and (3) take adequate measures to
establish the source of wealth and source of funds that are involved in the business
relationship or transaction.167 In this context, it is important to note that the EU also
takes into account the international standards developed in this area, in particular the
recommendations developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which
give guidance in the area of customer identification and ongoing account monitoring.168
In the Council's view these recommendations should become standard in all credit
institutions in the EU.169
It needs to be concluded that the Third Directive greatly contributes to the
international efforts to combat corruption, as it helps to detect cases of corruption among
individuals holding or having held public positions, particularly those from countries
where corruption is widespread. Although EU anti-corruption instruments do not
directly address passive or active bribery of officials from third countries, EU anti-
money laundering provisions contribute indirectly to the prevention and detection of
such cases. Of special importance here is provision, which provides that 'money
laundering shall be regarded as such even where the activities which generated the
property to be laundered were carried out in the territory of another Member State or in
that of a third country.'170 In other words, the laundering of the proceeds of corruption,
even where the offence of corruption itself took place in a non-Member State, is illegal
within EU territory.
166 Article 3 of the Third Directive.
167 Article 13 of the Third Directive.
168 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Customer due diligence for banks' (2001)
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.htm> accessed 16 December 2007.
169 Council of the European Union, '2376th Council meeting- Ecofin and Justice, Home Affairs and Civil
Protection' 12831/01,16.10.2001.
170 Article 1(3) of the Third Directive.
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Investigations against corruption and the tracing of assets can be seriously
hindered by banking secrecy provisions, so measures have been adopted at EU level to
limit such provisions. The Protocol171 adopted in 2001, aims at improving mutual
assistance in respect of information held by banks and ensures that banking secrecy
provisions are not invoked as a reason to refuse a request for assistance from another
Member State. For the purposes of a criminal investigation, each Member State must,
under the conditions set out in the Protocol, answer to a request sent by another Member
State whether a person subject to investigation holds or controls accounts in any bank
located in its territory and provide details of these accounts.172 Additionally, the Protocol
sets out the rules on assistance for the purpose of getting information on operations
carried out during a certain period on a specified bank account. Such assistance relates to
the monitoring of any operations that may take place in the future on a specified bank
account, and provisions are included to ensure that any assistance given in accordance
with the Protocol is not made known to the holder of the bank account or any third
persons.173 The obligations set out in the Protocol apply to investigations of corruption
cases and regarding the laundering of proceeds generated by corruption.174
More recently, corruption has also found its place in the EU anti-terrorist
financing agenda. In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, terrorist financing
became the object of EU attention. As in the area of anti-money laundering, the strategy
against terrorist financing started as a separate policy, but it has a direct relevance for the
fight against corruption. The legislative measures in this area aim not only at preventing
the misuse of financial systems by terrorists moving their funds, but they increase the
transparency of payment flows and contribute to the detection of abuses of financial
systems by any illegal activity, including the transfer of the proceeds of corruption. In
particular, they establish a system where transfers of funds are accompanied by complete
171 Council Act of 16 October 2001 establishing, in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European
Union, the Protocol to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member
States of the European Union, (adopted 16 October 2001, not entered into force), OJ C 326,21.11.2001.
172 Article 1 of the Protocol.
173 Article 2-4 of the Protocol.
174 Article 1 (3) of the Protocol.
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information on the payer and introduce a duty to declare cash, which includes details of,
inter alia, the owner and the intended recipient of the cash, by natural persons when
entering or leaving the Community.175
1.4. Monitoring mechanisms
An effective monitoring system is important in this policy area because it allows not
only to identify weaknesses and possibilities for improvement, but also to find the best
practices in the area.176 As Chapters Five and Six will discuss in more detail, for the
purposes of its enlargement policy, the EU developed a mechanism specifically to
monitor the general progress of efforts to prevent and combat corruption within the CEE
candidate countries which joined the EU in 2004. As far as policy towards the Member
States is concerned, the EU does not have such an evaluation mechanism. The EU has
only powers to monitor implementation of its anti-corruption instruments, and these
powers differ fundamentally depending on the legal measure employed and, above all,
whether the measure was adopted under the first or third pillar.
Under the first pillar, the Commission has enforcement powers against a Member
State that fails to implement, or implements incorrectly, the Community legislation and
may start an infringement procedure before the Court of Justice to ensure compliance
with Community law.177 In addition, a Member State which considers that another
Member State has failed to comply with obligations under the EC Treaty may bring the
matter before the Court of Justice.178 The duty to comply with the first pillar measure is
175 Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006
on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds, OJ L 345/1, 8.12.2006; Regulation No
1889/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on controls of cash entering
or leaving the Community, OJ L 309, 25.11.2005; Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives
97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC', OJ L 319 /l,
5.12.2007.
176 J. Monar, 'Justice and Home Affairs' (2001) Journal of Common Market Studies, Supplement Vol. 39
No. 3,121-137, at 135.
177 Article 226 EC.
178 Article 227 EC.
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reinforced by the principle of state liability for breach of EC law developed by the Court
of Justice179 and the preliminary ruling procedure, which ensures uniform interpretation
of Community measures within Member States.180 The Commission also reports
annually on the application and enforcement of Community law to the Council and EP181
and maintains the Internal Market Scoreboard, which ranks the Member States
depending on how they performed in implementing internal market acquis into national
law.182 The peer pressure it creates and public exposure is an effective way to push
transposition rates up.183 In addition, the monitoring of implementation may be foreseen
by the individual instruments. For example, the Third Directive against money
laundering provides that by 15 December 2009, and at least at three-yearly intervals
thereafter, the Commission shall draw up a report on the implementation of this
Directive and submit it to the EP and the Council.184
The situation under the third pillar is much more complex and requires careful
consideration. The intergovernmental nature of cooperation in tackling criminal matters
is also reflected in the organisation of the monitoring system. The Commission does not
have enforcement powers similar to those under the first pillar, and the EU Treaty does
not provide for any monitoring mechanisms which would allow for the systematic
evaluation of the implementation of the acquis. The extent ofmonitoring depends on the
type of and provisions of individual legal instruments, and as a consequence every anti-
corruption instrument entails different monitoring procedures.
179 Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich andBonifaci v. Italy [1991] ECR1-5357 and Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93
Brasserie duPecheur SA v. Germany, andR. v. Secretary ofState for Transport, exparte Factortame Ltd
and others [1996] ECR 1-1029.
180 Article 234 EC.
181 For the text of the Annual Reports, see:
<http://ec.europa.eu/communitv_law/infringements/infrinjiements_annual_report_en.htm> accessed 16
December 2007.
182 Internal Market Scoreboard: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/score/index_en.htm> accessed 16
December 2007.
183 Commission (EC), 'Internal Market Scoreboard' (Special edition, 2002), at 6
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/score/docs/scorell/scorell-text_en.pdf> accessed 16 December
2007.
184 Article 42 of the Third Directive.
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There is a separate monitoring framework for implementation of the instruments
aiming to combat corruption that affects the EC financial interests. In particular, the
Member States are required to transmit to the Commission the text of the provisions
transposing the PIF Convention and its two Protocols into their domestic law.185 On that
basis, in 2004 the Commission adopted a report assessing the implementation of these
instruments by the old fifteen Member States.186 It contains a detailed analysis of the
national criminal laws and the chosen method of implementation.187 It is interesting to
follow the Commission's argumentation on how it should evaluate the PIF instruments.
The starting point for the Commission's evaluation is acceptance that the PIF
Convention and its Protocols resemble traditional public international law instruments
and therefore appear to be subject to international law, particularly the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, but this does not contain any rules making it
possible to assess whether a State that has concluded a treaty is actually fulfilling the
obligations imposed by it.188 As a result, the Commission decided to employ the general
evaluation criteria developed by the Court of Justice with respect to Directives and
Framework Decisions (practical effectiveness, clarity and legal certainty, full
application).189
There are four main weaknesses in the monitoring system foreseen by the PIF
instruments. First, there is no deadline for implementation of these instruments. Second,
the PIF Convention does not indicate the deadline for submission of the relevant
information to the Commission. Third, in its assessment the Commission relies only on
the information sent to it by Member States and it does not have the option to conduct
on-the-spot visits in Member States or verify the information in any other way. Fourth
185 Article 10 of the PIF Convention.
186 Commission (EC), 'Report from the Commission: Implementation by Member States of the
Convention on the Protection of the European Communities' financial interests and its protocols. Article
10 of the Convention', COM(2004) 709 final, 25.10.2004.
187 Commission (EC), 'Annex to the Report from the Commission. Implementation of the Convention on
the Protection of the European Communities' financial interests and its protocols. Article 10 of the
Convention' SEC(2004) 1299, 25.10.2004.
188 Ibid, at 9 -10.
is? ibid, at 10-11.
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and finally, the EU has very limited options to respond in cases of inadequate
implementation. In 2004, the Commission concluded that none of the Member States
fully complied with the PIF instruments190, but it could only recommend the Council to
'invite' the Member States to step up their efforts in implementing the PIF
instruments.191
The uniform interpretation of the PIF instruments is ensured by the Protocol192
on the interpretation by way of preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice. In addition,
under Article 35(7) EU, the Commission has the option to bring legal action in the Court
of Justice regarding the interpretation and application of conventions. Furthermore, in
accordance with Article 35(1) EU the Court of Justice has jurisdiction, subject to a
Member State's acceptance, to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the
conventions and on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing them.
Although the Anti-Corruption Convention has the same legal status as the PIF
instruments, it does not provide for a similar monitoring mechanism. The probable
reasons for enhanced monitoring of the PIF instruments is that, although placed in the
third pillar, they pursue an objective and purpose which is also to be achieved under
Article 280 EC Treaty. Apart from the above mentioned option to bring a legal action
under Article 35(7), there is no genuine mechanism which allows evaluating the
implementation and correct application of the Anti-Corruption Convention.
That said, the Council does keep track of the progress made with implementation
of the anti-corruption measures and compliance with the deadlines. For example, in
2001 the Council prepared a questionnaire for Member States to monitor the progress
towards ratification of all EU anti-corruption instruments, the Council of Europe and the
190 Commission (n 186), at 7.
191 Ibid, at 8.
192 Protocol drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the interpretation, by
way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the
protection of the European Communities' financial interests, (adopted 29 November 1996, entered into
force 17 October 2002 among the 15 old Member States), OJ C 151/16, 20.5.1997.
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OECD conventions.193 This has shown little practical value. As commented above, none
of the PIF instruments was speedily ratified by the Member States. The most striking
example is the Second Protocol, which more than ten years after its adoption still has not
entered into force due to the lack of necessary ratifications.
The situation looks slightly different with regard to the Framework Decision on
combating corruption in the private sector. Article 9 of the Framework Decision set the
deadline for its implementation as 22 July 2005. By the same date, the Member States
were also required to submit to the Council and the Commission the text of the
provisions transposing into their national law the obligations imposed on them under this
Framework Decision. Due to delays with submitting the relevant information by the
Member States, the Commission prepared its report on the implementation of the
Framework Decision only in June 2007.194 The report found that the transposition of the
Framework Decision was still at an early stage among Member States. Due to the lack of
enforcement powers, the Commission can only invite Member States to step up their
efforts. The quality of the Commission's reports depends on whether the Member States
forward the information on time. Only two Member States, the Netherlands and Finland,
supplied their legislation to the Commission before the due date and at the time of
preparation of the report, Malta and Cyprus had not submitted any information to the
Commission.195 This evidence shows that the monitoring system provided for under the
Framework Decision does not ensure the timely and effective implementation of EU
anti-corruption measures.
Much more comprehensive monitoring systems, based on peer review, exist in
other areas of cooperation. The monitoring based on peer review does not take the form
of sanctions, but rather depends on mutual encouragement to comply with a given
193 Council of the European Union, 'Implementation of instruments on combating corruption-
Questionnaire' 7945/01,11.4.2001 and 'Implementation of instruments on combating corruption'
10627/01, 6.7.2001.
194 Commission ( n 81).
195 Ibid, at 5.
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measure. One example is the evaluation carried out by the Standing Committee in the
context of the Schengen acquis}96 The evaluation involves the drafting of reports
verifying the progress made in meeting the requirements or implementation of the
Schengen Convention197, on-site visits and the issuance of recommendations to the
countries concerned.198 The reports prepared in the context of the Schengen evaluation
are confidential.199
A second example of a monitoring mechanism based on peer review is that
established pursuant to the Joint Action200 on evaluating the application and
implementation at national level of EU and other international acts and instruments in
the fight against organised crime. For the purposes of evaluation, the Presidency with the
assistance of the General Secretariat of the Council draws up a questionnaire addressed
to all Member States.201 After receiving replies to the questionnaire, evaluation teams,
comprised of experts designated by the Member States, visit the evaluated Member State
and meet its political, administrative, police, customs and judicial authorities.202 On the
basis of the reports prepared by these teams, the Council may address a recommendation
to a Member State and request that the Member State reports back on the progress it has
made.203 The reports drawn on the basis of the Joint Action are confidential, except
when the evaluated Member State publishes the report on its own responsibility.204 The
framework developed by the Joint Action is the most comprehensive monitoring system
196 Executive Committee, 'The Schengen acquis - Decision of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing
Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen (SCH7 Com-ex (98) 26 def.)', OJ L 239,
22.09.2000.
197 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, OJ L 239/19,22.09.2000.
198 See (n 196).
199 Ibid.
200 Joint Action 97/827/JHA of 5 December 1997 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of
the Treaty on European Union, establishing a mechanism for evaluating the application and
implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against organized crime, OJ L
344,15.12.1997.
201 Article 5 of the Joint Action 97/827/JHA.
202 Article 6 of the Joint Action 97/827/JHA.
203 Article 7(3) of the Joint Action 97/827/JHA.
204 Article 9(2) of the Joint Action 97/827/JHA.
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among these developed under the third pillar. According to the Commission, this
mechanism has proved useful and effective, but the drawbacks are: the scope is limited
to only matters related to organised crime and the limited dissemination of the
evaluation results.205 Despite these shortcomings similar mechanism was also developed
in the area of the fight against terrorism.206
In 2003 the Commission expressed an opinion that a separate EU anti-corruption
evaluation and monitoring mechanism is inappropriate, as it would mean duplication of
international activities in this area.207 Such a stance of the Commission met with
criticism of the Transparency International, which has pointed out that the EU should
develop a separate mechanism to monitor the implementation of EU instruments and
initiatives.208 The general need for an evaluation mechanism of the EU policies under
the third pillar was also underlined by the Council in 2004 in the Hague Programme.209
In response, the Commission adopted a Communication setting out a proposal on how to
develop an evaluation mechanism in the area of EU policies on freedom, security and
justice, including anti-corruption instruments.210 The major advantage of the mechanism
proposed by the Commission would be its stress on evaluating the effects of any
measures taken.211 The new evaluation system would bring substantial changes in the
way anti-corruption instruments are monitored. In order to assess the implementation of
EU instruments in this area, the Commission recommends using statistical information,
such as number of prosecutions, number of new crimes that were detected and
205 Commission (EC), 'Evaluation of EU Policies on Freedom, Security and Justice' COM(2006) 332
final, 28.6.2006, at 96.
206 Council of the European Union, 'Council Decision establishing a mechanism for evaluating the legal
systems and their implementation at national level in the fight against terrorism' 12715/02,11.10.2002.
207 Commission (EC), 'Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and
the European Economic and Social Committee on a Comprehensive EU Policy Against Corruption'
COM(2003) 317 final, 28.5.2003, at 9.
208 Transparency International, 'Comments on the European Commission Communication on "A
Comprehensive EU Policy Against Corruption'" (2003), at 4
<-http://www.transparencv.org/content/download/2017/12199/file/tibmssels_on_eu_commission.pdf>
accessed 14 December 2007.
209 Council of the European Union, 'The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in
the European Union' 16054/04,13.12.2004, at 5-6.
210 Commission (n 205).
211 Ibid, at 4.
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successfully prosecuted as a result of EU instruments and surveys of corruption in an
evaluated country.212 The Commission also highlighted the need to engage civil society
in the evaluation of all policies in the area of freedom, security and justice.213 This is
particularly important in the area of anti-corruption, as it ensures a more objective view
of the practical effects of how legislation is functioning in practice.
Changes in the evaluation of the judicial and police cooperation in criminal
matters are also envisaged by the Treaty of Lisbon. Firstly, as Chapter Two discussed,
the Treaty of Lisbon would abolish the pillar structure of the EU and the Commission
would gain enforcement powers over instruments in this area. Secondly, the Treaty of
Lisbon provides for laying down arrangements for the objective and impartial evaluation
of the implementation of Union policies in the area of freedom, security and justice.214
As Monar has pointed out, the model for this provision has been based on the peer
review in the Schengen context, which already led to some positive results and
complements the much harder and more inflexible enforcement proceedings before the
Court of Justice.215
The EU also recognises the value of other international monitoring mechanisms
and takes advantage of them. Member States voluntarily agree to more intrusive
international monitoring systems based on mutual evaluation and peer pressure
established by FATF, MONEYVAL, GRECO and the OECD WG, which were
discussed in Chapter One. All old Member States are members of FATF. In relation to
these countries, FATF also evaluates the compliance with the EC Directives against
money laundering. The evaluations of the remaining 12 new Member States, which are
not themselves members of the FATF, are conducted in co-ordination with the EU. The





214 Article 61C of the Treaty of Lisbon.
215 J. Monar, 'Justice and Home Affairs in the EU Constitutional Treaty. What Added Value for the 'Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice'?'(2005) European Constitutional Law Review 1, 226-246, at 242-243.
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measures against money laundering and terrorist financing. It is important to note,
however, that the Community is not subject to FATF evaluation process, only the
Member States are on their right. Nonetheless, as a result of participation in FATF the
subsequent anti-money laundering Directives were amended in line with revised FATF
Recommendations. In this way, the Community extends application of the FATF
standards to the Member States which are not members of FATF. In addition, these
Member States participate in a monitoring system undertaken by the MONEYVAL,
which evaluates a country's compliance with international standards in this field,
including the FATF Recommendations, the relevant instruments of the Council of
Europe and the UN, and, most importantly, the Directives against money laundering. In
the area of anti-corruption, all Member States participate in the monitoring mechanism
of GRECO and majority of the Member States are also members of the OECDD WG.216
2. Cooperation with international organisations
International initiatives constitute a very important part of the EU strategy against
corruption. In constructing its policy in this area, the EU builds on top of activities of
various international agencies. As already discussed in Chapter Two, in the
Commission's view the EU should limit its own policy to measures which are not
already covered by other international organisations.
The EU takes part in the negotiations to develop international instruments against
corruption at both regional and global level, in particular in the Council of Europe, the
OECD and the UN. In two Common Positions217 on negotiations in the Council of
Europe and OECD, the Member States are asked to coordinate the work on corruption in
216
Except for Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus which did not adopt the OECD Convention.
For chart of ratification, see: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/1898632.pdf> accessed 17 December
2007.
217 Common Position of 6 October 1997 defined by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty
on European Union on negotiations in the Council of Europe and the OECD relating to corruption,
97/661/JHA, OJ L 279/1,13.10.97 and Second Joint Position of 13 November 1997 defined by the
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on negotiations held in the Council
of Europe and the OECD on the fight against corruption, 97/783/JHA, OJ L 320/1, 21.11.97.
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three organisations to ensure that there is no incompatibility and that initiatives of one
organization do not jeopardise or unnecessarily duplicate work carried out in the other
organization. In both documents, the Member States are also asked to coordinate their
positions on all issues which have significant interests of the EU. They outline certain
position concerning, inter alia, the scope of the conventions, definitions and jurisdiction,
which the Member States agreed to uphold during the negotiations on the OECD and the
Council of Europe instruments. Furthermore, the EU was actively involved in the
negotiations on the text of the UNCAC.218 The EU also acknowledged the important role
it could play in ensuring the successful outcome of the future negotiations on the
UNCAC and recognised that it must engage in an open dialogue with countries outside
the EU to ensure accession to the convention by as many states as possible.219
The provisions of the UNCAC provide that regional economic integration
organisations, such as the EU, may become parties to the Convention if at least one of its
Member States has done likewise.220 As of 17 December 2007, all Member States with
the exception of Estonia and Slovenia, have signed the UNCAC.221 The EU as an entity,
however, does not have a legal personality and therefore cannot be a party to
international treaties. It is only the Community that has a competence to accede to the
UNCAC.222 In 2002 the Council authorised the Commission to negotiate the provisions
of the UNCAC that were subject to Community competence. These include the UNCAC
provisions on public procurement, auditing and accounting and the prevention ofmoney
laundering, as well as a series of measures which, as already discussed in Chapter Two,
218 For example: Council of the European Union, 'Initiative of the Kingdom of Denmark concerning the
adoption by the Council of a draft third common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article
34(2)(a) of the Treaty on European Union on negotiations within the United Nations to draw up a United
Nations Convention against Corruption' 12215/2/02, 30.10.2003.
219 Council of the European Union, 'Co-ordinated Position of the European Union on the Preparation for
the future UN Convention on Corruption and the Second Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and
Safeguarding Integrity' 6689/01, 28.2.2001.
220 Article 67 of the UNCAC.
221 For chart of signatories, see: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html> accessed
yj December 2007.
222 Article 281 EC.
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the Community could apply to its own administration.223 The UNCAC was signed on
behalf of the Community on 15 September 2005, subject to a possible conclusion at a
later date.224 In 2004 the Community has already concluded the UNCATOC, which as
observed in Chapter One, includes several anti-corruption provisions.225
The EU also encourages Member States and candidate countries to sign the
relevant international instruments. As Chapter Six will discuss, the international
conventions against corruption are part of the accession acquis, which every candidate
country has to adopt. The Commission and the Council have also repeatedly called on
existing Member States to ratify the relevant conventions of the Council of Europe, the
UN and the OECD, and to join the GRECO.226
Conclusion
The EU legal and institutional framework does not adequately address the problem of
corruption within the Member States. The anti-corruption acquis is very limited and
fragmented. Generally, the legislative action at the EU level is confined to the
approximation of the criminal law definitions of corruption in public and private sectors,
the extension of anti-corruption provisions to officials of Community and other Member
States, the criminalisation of the laundering of the proceeds of corruption and the
introduction of liability regarding heads of businesses and legal persons. The EU accepts
a very narrow definition of corruption as bribery and, in contrast to the Council of
Europe and the UN, does not criminalise other forms of corruption.
223 Commission (EC), 'Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European
Community, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption' COM(2006) 82 final, 2.3.2006, see
Annex II.
224 Council of the European Union, 'Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the
European Community, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption' 11188/1/06,18.7.2006.
225 Council of the European Union, 'Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime' 8763/04, 27.4.2004.
226 Commission (n 207), at 8. Second Communication, at 8 and Council of the European Union, 'The
Prevention and Control of Organised Crime: A European Union Strategy for the Beginning of the New
Millennium' 6611/00, 3.3.2000, recommendation 27.
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Analysis of the EU legislative measures confirms that the assumption behind the
adoption of EU anti-corruption measures is to safeguard the proper functioning of the
internal market. Corruption is treated as a negative externality in the process of building
the internal market, rather than a danger for democracy and the rule of law. This is
proved by the facts that EU measures focus on cross-border corruption and that Member
States are allowed to limit criminalisation of corruption in the private sector to conduct
which involves, or could involve, a distortion of competition. By comparison,
international instruments on corruption in the private sector do not provide for similar
restrictions.
The EU addresses the problem of corruption within Member States mainly
through the use of criminal law measures that focus on repression of the offence. The
prevention of corruption is regulated to a certain degree by the Community through
legislation on public procurement and the obligation for the EU companies to comply
with international accounting and auditing standards. Moreover, measures in the area of
money laundering and terrorist financing increase the transparency of the financial
system and contribute towards the detection of abuses within financial systems involving
any illegal activity, including transferring the proceeds of corruption. Beyond this,
however, the EU has no further strategy to prevent corruption within Member States.
The EU instruments address corruption at a certain minimum level. They do not
address many important aspects that should be considered if corruption within the
Member States is to be effectively tackled, including preventive policies in both the
public and private sectors, the financing of political parties227, the establishment of
independent anti-corruption bodies, the protection of persons reporting corruption or
compensation for damage suffered as a result of a corrupt act. Another serious
shortcoming of the EU framework is the lack of an effective monitoring system. The
evaluation of anti-corruption instruments adopted under the third pillar is patchy and
227 It is important to note that the financing of European political parties is regulated at the EU level by
Regulation No 2004/2003, OJ L 297,15.11.2003, which, however, does not apply to national political
parties.
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highly ineffective. At the same time, Member States are part of a pan-European network
with a more rigorous monitoring in the area of money laundering and corruption with
the full support of the EU. None of these monitoring mechanisms, however, evaluates
the effectiveness of EU anti-corruption initiatives. The added value of the EU
instruments is clearly visible only in the area of judicial and police cooperation in
criminal matters. Here, the burdensome traditional cooperation foreseen by international
instruments is being increasingly replaced by mutual recognition of judgements and pre¬
trial orders.
As has been pointed out, the EU '...lags behind several other international
organisations in terms of the creation of anti-corruption instruments and mechanisms.'228
This is in stark contrast to the area of money-laundering legislation, where policy is
regularly updated in accordance with international standards. While the Commission has
declared that the goal of EU policy is to fight corruption within Member States in a
coherent way229, the EU has not taken the necessary steps to develop such a coherent
strategy. As commented in the OSI Report, ' ...the EU clearly lacks a framework of anti-
corruption standards or a mechanism for monitoring adherence to such a framework.'230
It is, therefore, hard to disagree with Webb, who has pointed out that 'to date, it seems
the EU makes bold statements in non-binding instruments, but drafts narrow and specific
231
legal initiatives.'
The OSI report argues that there are two possible reasons for the lack of a more
coherent framework at the EU level. First, there is a difference in the extent and nature
of corruption across Member States with, for example, deeply embedded bureaucratic
traditions of rectitude and probity characteristic of the northern Member States
228 Open Society Institute, 'Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Corruption and Anti-Corruption
Policy', 2002, at 74 (OSI Report) <http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/corruption> accessed 6 December
2007.
229 Commission (n 207), at 5.
230 OSI Report (n 228).
231 P. Webb, 'The United Nations Convention against Corruption. Global Achievement or Missed
Opportunity' (2005) Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8 No. 1,191-229, at 202.
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contrasting with the more relaxed style of public service characteristic of France.232
Second, corruption, so far, has not undermined the ability to implement the acquis?33
However, as Reed has pointed out, even if corruption significantly undermined
implementation of the acquis, the EU would be unlikely to take the initiative in
confronting corruption.234 This is due to the sensitivity of the issue and the interest of
some political elites in sustaining elements of corruption, as well as national resistance
against external efforts to introduce any legislation or reform, especially as corruption is
often regarded as falling under the purview of sovereign ministers.235
The inadequacy of the EU anti-corruption framework became visible in the
context of the accession of the CEE countries into the EU. The entrenched levels of
corruption in the candidate countries forced the EU to develop a new and more coherent
anti-corruption strategy for the purposes of its enlargement policy. The next chapter
opens the discussion on these developments by explaining how it was possible for the
EU to demand anti-corruption reforms from the candidate countries.
232 OSI Report (n 228), at 34-35.
233 Ibid.
234 Q. Reed, 'Corruption and the EU accession process: who is better prepared?', in Transparency
International, Global Corruption Report 2004, at 124-125
<http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr 2004#download> last




Conditionality in the EU accession process
The 2004 enlargement was the fifth enlargement in the EU history. It was also the
biggest and most challenging of all the EU enlargements. As Cremona observed, it was
perceived as much more than just a 'joining of the club' by a few more countries and has
had an immense political and psychological significance as a 'return to Europe' by the
CEE countries after the end of the divisions of the Cold War.1
One of the most prominent features of the 2004 enlargement process was
conditionality, defined as the linking, by a state or international organization, of
perceived benefits to the fulfilment of certain conditions.2 Setting the legal, political and
economic membership conditions for joining the EU is a form of conditionality. In the
pre-accession process, conditionality followed 'a strategy of reinforcement by reward',
which meant that the EU paid the reward if the government of a candidate country
1 M. Cremona, 'EU enlargement: solidarity and conditionality' (2005) European Law Review 30, 3-22, at
8.
2 K.E. Smith, 'The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How
Effective?'(1998) European Foreign Affairs Review 3, 253-274, at 256.
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complied with the conditions and withheld the reward if it failed to comply.3 As
Cremona noted, the conditionality within the EU's pre-accession process was designed
to ensure that a candidate country's political, economic and regulatory development
converged with the values and norms within the EU.4 Membership conditions were
meant to ensure the proper functioning of the EU after the accession took place and also
to reassure existing Member States that accession would not destabilise the EU. These
concerns led to the establishment of extensive membership requirements and the
application of both economic and political conditionality to encourage the CEE countries
to carry out necessary reforms.
The EU used conditionality as a tool to influence the content of the internal
policies of candidate countries. The CEE countries were expected to meet all the
conditions and were not able to decide on the content of conditions with the exception of
temporary transitional periods. Combating corruption became an important membership
condition for the first time during the 2004 enlargement. It was also one of the most
difficult requirements that the CEE countries had to satisfy before accession.
Two types of conditionality have been distinguished by Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier: democratic conditionality and acquis conditionality.5 While democratic
conditionality concerns the fundamental political principles of the EU, the norms of
human rights and liberal democracy, the acquis conditionality concerns the precise rules
of the acquis.6 As Chapter Two discussed, the EU does not have a general competence
to monitor national anti-corruption policies of Member States. The existing anti-
corruption acquis is too narrow to serve as a model for anti-corruption policies in the
candidate countries. Therefore, the membership condition to prevent and combat
corruption falls into the category of democratic conditionality applied by the EU.
3 F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, 'Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate
countries of Central and Eastern Europe' (2004) Journal of European Public Policy 11:4, 661-679, at 663.
4 Cremona (n 1), at 15.
5
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (n 3), at 669.
6 Ibid.
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The EU was not the only international organisation trying to instil democratic
norms in post-communist societies. After the collapse of communism the CEE countries
also sought membership in the Council of Europe and NATO. Both organisations used
democratisation as a criterion for membership, and the membership in the Council of
Europe was even considered a basic prerequisite for EU entry.7
The Council of Europe also set democratic criteria for membership but was less
strict in applying them than the EU. These criteria included: (1) free and fair elections
based on universal suffrage; (2) freedom of expression and the media; (3) protection of
the rights of national minorities and (4) accession to the European Convention on
Human Rights.8 The approach of the Council of Europe was, however, different from
the one taken by the EU, as it was not based on rigorous conditionality before accession.
Instead, it was based on a vague idea of ' ...post-membership socialization into western
democratic practices.'9
The fight against corruption was also a NATO membership requirement.
Corruption undermines the democratic rule of law, which is considered essential for
NATO membership. Moreover, it facilitates the spread of organised crime and
'
...creates an environment in which NATO members cannot be confident that classified
information will be protected.'10 In order to fulfil the NATO membership requirements,
it was essential for the aspirant countries to show a strong degree of commitment to
7 K.E. Smith, 'The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality' in M. Cremona (ed),
The Enlargement of the European Union (Academy of European Law European University Institute, OUP
2003), 105-140, at 115.
8
K.E. Smith, 'Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy' in J. Zielonka, J. and A. Pravda, A
(eds), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. Volume 2: International and Transnational Factors,
(OUP, 2001), 31-57, at 41.
A. Dimitrova and G. Pridham, 'International Actors and Democracy Promotion in Central and Eastern
Europe: The Integration Model and its Limits' (2004) Democratization, Vol. 11 No. 5, 91-112, at 99.
10 R.A. Bradtke, 'NATO enlargement', Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on Europe (Washington, DC 2002)
<http://www.state.gOv/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/11289.htm> accessed 17 December 2007.
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combating corruption at the highest levels of government.11 Despite the important
benefits of NATO membership for the CEE countries, NATO did not influence the
policy-making in these countries to same degree as the EU. As Dimitrova and Pridham
observed, in case of NATO membership, democratic requirements were traditionally
less important than the security matters.12 It therefore seems that the post-communist
countries were invited to join in, not because they made progress in fulfilling the specific
membership requirements, but because of their geographic position and the
'...widespread perception that they were Eastern Europe's liberal democratic
frontrunners.'13
The EU turned out to be the most successful in fostering the political and
economic changes in the CEE countries. This was due to the extensive and detailed
membership conditions combined with strong conditionality tools. This chapter argues
that the EU had the political capacity and the necessary mechanisms to effect anti-
corruption policy changes in CEE candidate countries. The goal of this chapter is to
examine the potential of the EU to promote anti-corruption reforms in the candidate
countries. The chapter starts by discussing how and why combating corruption became
one of the most important membership conditions. Then the chapter presents the
conditionality tools used by the EU to influence domestic anti-corruption policies.
Finally, the chapter distinguishes two stages in the application of the EU conditionality
and explains the leverage that the accession process provided the EU over the anti-
corruption policies in candidate countries.
1. The general conditions of accession
The basic condition of 'European' identity was the only condition set out in the 1957
Treaty of Rome. As explained by the EP, 'there is no unequivocal interpretation of that
11 Ibid.
12 Dimitrova and Pridham (n 9), at 100.
13 M.A. Vachudova, Europe Undivided - Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism (OUP
2005), at 135.
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criterion. It can be read equally well in geographical, cultural or political terms.'14
Although it was not mentioned explicitly by the Treaty, the candidate countries also had
to fully accept and implement the acquis. The first enlargement of the Communities,
when the UK, Ireland and Denmark were admitted in 1973, did not require fulfilment of
any other explicit membership criteria.15
The membership conditions were further developed for the purposes of the
enlargements of the EU in 1981 and 1986. In its Opinion on the Greek accession, the
Commission indicated that pluralist democracy and respect for human rights were also
conditions of membership, which was later reiterated in the Opinions concerning the
applications of Spain and Portugal.16 However, as Smith has noted, apart from noting
that democracy had been restored in those three countries, the Commission did not
explain what specific criteria it used to reach this conclusion.17 In 1992, in a document
prepared for the European Council, the Commission confirmed that a candidate country
must satisfy the three basic conditions of European identity, democratic status and
respect of human rights.18 In addition, the Commission pointed out that the obligations
of membership presuppose a functioning and competitive market economy as well as
and an adequate legal and administrative framework in the public and private sectors.19
With the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the membership conditions were
reiterated and formalised in Article 49 EU Treaty which stated that any European state
that respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law may apply to become a member of the EU.
14
European Parliament, 'Legal questions of enlargement' (1998), Briefing No 23, PE 167.617, at 5.
15 Smith (n 7), at 109.
16 F. Hoffmeister, 'Changing requirements for membership' in A. Ott and K. Inglis (eds), Handbook on
European Enlargement (T-M-C Asser Press, 2002), 90-102, at 93.
17 Smith (n 7), at 110.
18
'Europe and the challenge of enlargement', EC Bull. Supplement 3/92 (24 June 1992), at 11.
19 Ibid.
157
2. The requirements of the 2004 enlargement
Considering the political and economic situation of the CEE countries, some comparison
can be made to the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s, which were
also undergoing democratic transition after long periods of dictatorship. Unlike the CEE
countries, however, these countries had most of the features of a market economy.20
Moreover, they were allowed '...considerable compromises and adaptations after their
entry to the EU' and 'the consolidation of democracy in these countries was expected to
take place after membership...'21 Greece, however, was allowed to reform its state
administration and implement the acquis after accession so that membership in the EU
could strengthen and protect its new democracy.22 As Vachudova pointed out, the
Commission realised that the accession of ten countries as ill prepared as Greece would
be a 'full-blown disaster' for the EU and therefore insisted that all requirements be met
before the accession.23
For the purposes of the 2004 enlargement, '...the EU developed the most
complex and extensive set of conditions it has ever used towards third countries.'24 The
membership criteria were communicated to the candidate countries through the
European Council conclusions, agreements between the EU and each candidate country
and in various pre-accession documents. The membership conditions covered a wide
range of key public areas, and their aim was to foster and guide the transition to
democracy and a market economy in each of the post-communist countries.
20 N. Nugent, 'Distinctive and Recurring Features of Enlargement Rounds' in N. Nugent (ed), European
Union Enlargement (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 56-69, at 56.
21 A. Albi, EUEnlargement and the Constitutions ofCentral and Eastern Europe (CUP, Cambridge
Studies in European Law and Policy, 2005), at 50.
22 Vachudova (n 13), at 112.
23 Ibid.
24 A. Dimitrova, 'Enlargement, Institution-Building and the EU's Administrative Capacity Requirement'
(2002) West European Politics, Vol. 25 No. 4 (October 2002), 171-190, at 175.
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2.1. The Copenhagen criteria
The EU first outlined the political and economic membership criteria in 1993 at the
Copenhagen European Council in what is known as the 'Copenhagen criteria'. For the
first time, it was formally acknowledged that' ...the associated countries in Central and
Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union.'25
According to the 'Copenhagen criteria', EU membership required that the candidate
country achieve three main goals: (1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy,
the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities (political
criteria); (2) the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope
with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union (economic criteria) and
(3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims
of political, economic and monetary union.26 Whereas the fulfilment of the political
criteria was a condition for the opening of accession negotiations, the economic criteria
and adoption of the acquis were to be achieved before the accession.
The general conditions of democracy, a market economy and the ability to take
on the acquis to large extent resemble the general conditions of accession previously
established by the Member States. The 'Copenhagen criteria' were very general and
vague. They gave little guidance to the CEE countries as to what the EU standards were
or how to achieve them. The EU did not explain how it understood the 'the stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy' and 'the rule of law' or 'a functioning market
economy.' Such a broad formulation, however, allowed the EU to interpret and further
expand on these criteria later in the accession process. As Grabbe has noted, what
constituted the 'Copenhagen criteria' was open to interpretation, 'giving the EU
considerable discretion in deciding what has to be done before compliance is
achieved.'27 The EU was able to use the general 'Copenhagen mandate' to formulate an
25
Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions, (21 and 22 June 1993).
26 Ibid.
27 H. Grabbe, 'How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity'
(2001) Journal of European Public Policy 8:6,1013-1031, at 1015.
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extensive catalogue of membership requirements in its various policy documents, such
as the 1997 Opinions, the annual Regular Reports and the Accession Partnerships.
The third condition formulated by the Copenhagen European Council is
concerned with the obligation to fully adopt and implement the EU acquis, which
comprises:
• the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties;
• the legislation adopted in application of the Treaties and the case law of the
Court of Justice;
• the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union;
• measures relating to the common foreign and security policy;
• measures relating to justice and home affairs;
• international agreements concluded by the Community and those concluded by
the Member States among themselves in the field of the Union's activities.28
For the purpose of accession negotiations, the acquis was divided into chapters. The
content of the acquis was not subject of the accession negotiations, and the candidate
countries could only negotiate the date by when they would adopt the acquis in full.
Grabbe noted that the legislative task which was presented by the EU was largely
administrative rather than political, as candidate countries were not expected to debate
the introduction of the acquis.29 Derogations from the acquis were granted only in
exceptional circumstances. As noted by Mayhew, in previous enlargements, if parts of
the acquis were not implemented or badly implemented after the accession, the country
could be taken to the Court of Justice, but verification before accession did not take
28
Europa Glossary: <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/glossarv/communitv acquis_en.htm> accessed 17
December 2007.
29 Grabbe (n 27), at 1017.
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place.30 Therefore it may be argued that the EU attempted to create 'perfect Member
States', as a higher level of compliance was required from the CEE countries than from
existing Member States.31
As well as adopting the acquis, each CEE candidate country had to ensure its
effective application through appropriate administrative and judicial structures, which in
practice means a well developed civil service and judiciary. At its meeting in Madrid,
the European Council32 in 1995 stressed the need for the candidate countries to adjust
their administrative structures to ensure the harmonious operation of EU policies after
accession. The requirement of adequate administrative capacities to apply acquis, which
ultimately became a fourth condition for accession and not just a supplementary task,
was a new condition and had no precedent in previous enlargements.33
It is important to emphasise that the accession process did not preclude the
development of the EU acquis, which turned it into a 'moving target' for the candidate
countries. In fact, during the pre-accession process, the body of acquis developed to an
unprecedented extent. In previous enlargements the acquis had been far less substantial.
In fact, during the accession of Sweden, Finland and Austria the situation was much
easier, for they had already adopted much of the acquis as participants in the European
Economic Area. But after those three countries joined in 1995, European integration
moved forward in areas of political integration as well as in the traditional areas of
economic integration. One example of this greater integration is the JHA acquis, which
was for the first time an area of great importance during the accession of the CEE
countries.
30 A. Mayhew, 'Enlargement of the European Union: An analysis of the negotiations with the Central and
Eastern European candidate countries' (2000) Sussex European Institute Working Paper No.39, at 10,
<http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/wp39.pdf> accessed 17 December 2007.
31 Ibid.
32 Madrid European Council, Presidency Conclusions, (15 and 16 December 1995)
33 Dimitrova (n 24), at 178.
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Not only was the acquis constantly expanding throughout the accession
negotiations, but the accession acquis also covered elements originating from outside of
the EU framework. This was particularly the case in the field of JHA, where the
accession acquis also contained international conventions against corruption, to which
the candidate countries had to accede independently of the ratification by the Member
States. The adoption of these instruments was scrutinised by the Commission in the
Regular Reports on the progress towards accession. As will be discussed in Chapter Six,
the international conventions constituted an important part of the anti-corruption
accession acquis.
The actual impact of the EU policy recommendations varied from one domain to
another and they worked best when they met with support and a willingness to comply
from national governments. However, that support often depended on the legitimacy of
the EU demands. After the Copenhagen European Council it became clear that the
candidate countries were required to meet higher standards than the old Member States.
None of the established Member States had ever been judged with respect to the quality
of democratic institutions, the effectiveness of their market economy or the standard of
their protection of minorities' rights. This raised a serious problem regarding the
legitimacy of EU demands and concerns of double standards. As will be discussed in
Chapter Six, the double standards were particularly visible in the area of anti-corruption.
The fact that the old Member States were never held to the same anti-corruption
standards seriously hindered the EU policy against corruption within the candidate
countries. The EU could not legitimately demand from them a more rigorous approach
against corruption, while, at the same time, tolerating corruption in its own Member
States.
2.2. Combating corruption as a membership condition
In its strategy towards the CEE countries, the EU moved beyond the formal democracy
criteria formulated initially with Greece, Portugal and Spain in mind (such as a liberal-
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democratic constitution in place with the conventional provisions for accountability, free
elections and a predominance of democratic parties) and ' ...shifted decisively into areas
of substantive democracy'34, including the fight against corruption.
Combating corruption was not mentioned in the 'Copenhagen criteria', but was
explicitly recognised as a membership condition four years later in the Opinions on the
application of the CEE countries for the membership in 1997.35 The Commission
classified corruption as a political requirement for the EU membership and an element of
democracy and the rule of law.36 However, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, the
Opinions of 1997 did not elaborate on the elements of the anti-corruption strategy or
give any other guidance as to the extent of corruption acceptable within the EU. They
only mentioned the problem of corruption in the CEE countries in very diplomatic
terms.
It was a mistake not to include the need to tackle corruption as part of the
'Copenhagen criteria'. The EU should have stressed from the outset in 1993 the
importance of the fight against corruption for the fulfilment of its membership
conditions. This serious omission led to a four-year delay in addressing this problem by
the EU and ultimately impaired the success of the EU strategy against corruption within
the candidate countries.
The discussion about why corruption did not appear earlier on the EU agenda
must be put into a broader international context. As explained in Chapter One, the first
international initiatives against corruption took place in the second half of the 1990s.
Before 1996, the EU itself did not have any legal instrument addressing corruption. Then
in 1997 the OECD Convention was adopted and the Council of Europe defined some
34 Dimitrova and Pridham (n 9), at 97.
35
'Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union', EU Bull. Supplement 5/97 (13 July 1997).
36 For example: Commission (EC), Commission Opinion on Poland's Application for Membership of the
European Union (1997), at 14-18 <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/poland/po-
op_en.pdf> accessed 17 December 2007.
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key anti-corruption standards in its Twenty Guiding Principles. In other words, 1997
was the year when corruption first gained importance at the pan-European level. When
the 'Copenhagen criteria' were formulated in 1993, corruption was just emerging as an
international policy problem.
As Chapters Two and Three argued, the EU does not have powers to assess or
even discuss the extent of domestic corruption within the Member States. Thus,
inclusion of the requirement to fight against corruption did not correspond with any EU
policy towards the Member States in this area. Why then did the Commission decide to
include corruption in its accession policy?
First, corruption could undermine the fulfilment of all three 'Copenhagen
criteria.' The damaging consequences of corruption on democratic and economic
transition in the CEE countries were already discussed in Chapter One. In addition, it is
important to note that corruption could weaken four of the six elements of the
functioning market economy identified by the Commission.37 The OSI report
emphasised three elements in particular that are likely to be undermined by corruption,
including:
• barriers to market entry and exit are absent;
• the legal system, including the regulation of property rights, is in place, laws and
contracts can be enforced;
• the financial sector is sufficiently well developed to channel savings towards
• 38
investment.
37 Commission (EC), 'Composite Paper' (1998), at 6
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/composite_en.pdf> accessed 17
December 2007.
38 Open Society Institute, 'Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy',
2002, at 21 (OSI Report) <http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/corruption> accessed 6 December 2007.
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Corruption, however, has the potential to seriously undermine one other element
identified by the Commission, which provides that:
• the equilibrium between demand and supply is established by the free
interplay of market forces; prices, as well as trade, are liberalised39
The market is not in equilibrium when projects or goods are offered not to someone who
offers the best quality bid, but to someone who offers to pay a bribe. A highly corrupt
market is not as efficient as a legal market because, as Rose-Ackerman argued, the
information about bribe prices will not be widely available and some potential
participants may refuse to enter the market due to moral reasons or fear of punishment
and public officials may limit their dealings to insiders or trusted networks.40
Compounding these problems, the third EU membership condition, the ability to take on
the obligations of membership, would be difficult to fulfil if corrupt practices could
occur in the two institutions responsible for implementation of the acquis: national
courts and public administration.
A second reason for the inclusion of anti-corruption policy in the accession
process was the fact that the 2004 enlargement gave the EU the possibility to explain
how it understood democracy and the rule of law. The Commission also wanted to guide
the CEE countries towards a successful democratic and market economy transition.
Therefore, some membership conditions did not correspond to any specific obligations
required of the Member States, but reflected high standards of public administration.
Combating corruption was seen as an indispensable element of this process. As
Dimitrova noted, the conditionality went far beyond ensuring that the EU's institutional
rules and norms were established, as for this purpose it has been sufficient to ensure the
transposition of the acquis.41 Instead, the EU conditions were 'partially designed to
39 Commission (n 37).
40 S. Rose-Ackerman, Korupcja i rzqdy (Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego i Wydawnictwo Sic!, 2001), at 49
41 Dimitrova (n 24).
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address transformation problems and weaknesses of the candidates.'42 Lastly, as already
discussed Chapter One, the EU pre-accession policy was influenced by the widespread
perception that corruption in the post-communist countries posed a bigger problem than
in the existing Member States.
3. The pre-accession strategy and its instruments
Another new feature of the 2004 enlargement was the importance of the pre-accession
strategy designed to help the candidate countries in their preparations for membership.
The pre-accession strategy for the CEE countries was launched in 1994 by the Essen
European Council43 and subsequently reinforced by the Luxembourg European Council
in 1997 44 As Inglis has noted, in the previous enlargements the word pre-accession was
not applied to the necessary preparations for accession and it was left to the candidate
countries to undertake preparations as they saw fit.45
To prepare for the 2004 enlargement, the EU provided the candidate countries
with technical and financial assistance to help them carry out the reforms required to
meet the membership criteria. The assistance corresponded to the priorities, objectives
and conditions set out within the pre-accession process. Financial aid was provided only
if the countries were committed to political and economic reforms. The main EU
financial instrument was the PHARE programme established in 1989. PHARE was
created to assist Poland and Hungary, but was gradually extended to cover all eight post-
communist countries. At the beginning PHARE assistance was used for the purpose of
promoting market-orientated economic reforms, but after 1994 it was extended to cover
the area of JHA. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, under the PHARE programme the
42 Ibid.
43 Essen European Council, Presidency Conclusions, (9 and 10 December 1994).
44
Luxembourg European Council, Presidency Conclusions, (12 and 13 December 1997).
45 K. Inglis, 'The pre-accession strategy and the accession partnership' in Ott and Inglis (n 16), 103-112, at
103.
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EU provided the CEE countries with considerable technical assistance to support anti-
corruption reforms.
The pre-accession strategy also involved a set of political and legal instruments
through which the EU was able to influence domestic policies in the CEE candidate
countries. These instruments were established to help monitor the candidate countries'
progress in meeting the accession criteria. The most important of these instruments were
the Europe Agreements, the Opinions of July 1997, the Regular Reports and the
Accession Partnerships.
3.1. The Europe Agreements
After initial Trade and Cooperation Agreements signed in 1988 and 1989, the EU
decided to support the reforms undertaken by the CEE countries and develop even closer
cooperation with these countries. Subsequently, the Europe Agreements46 were signed
between the EU and individual CEE countries. Signed between 1991 and 1996, these
were a new type of association agreement that went 'far beyond what is normally
expected of a trade agreement'47 and were 'the most wide-ranging agreements ever
concluded by the EU with third countries.'48 From a legal pint of view they were mixed
agreements, which meant that both the Community and the Member States were
contracting parties. As Muller-Graff has explained, this is due to the fact that, although
the Community had the competence to conclude an association, the political cooperation
under the Europe Agreements fell within the competences of the Member States.49
46
Europe Agreement with Poland, OJ L 348, 31.12.1993; Hungary, OJ L 347, 31.12.1993; the Czech
Republic, OJ L 360, 31.12.1994; Slovakia, OJ L 359, 31.12.1994; Estonia, OJ L 068, 09.03.1998; Latvia
OJ L 026, 02.02.1998; Lithuania OJ L 051, 20.02.1998 and Slovenia, OJ L 051, 26.02.1999.
47 R. Stawarska, 'EU enlargement from the Polish perspective', (1999) Journal of European Public Policy
Vol. 6 No. 5, 822-838, at 825.
48 U. Sedelmeier and H. Wallace, 'Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?' in H. Wallace and
W. Wallace, Policy-Making in the European Union, (4th edn OUP, 2000), 427-460, at 439.
49 P. Ch. Muller-Graff, 'East Central Europe and the European Union: From Europe Agreements to a
Member Status: General Report' in P.Ch. Muller-Graff (ed) East Central Europe and theEuropean
Union: From Europe Agreements to a Member Status (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997),
9-41, at 15.
167
The Europe Agreements were not seen as pre-accession agreements. Their
preambles only mentioned that membership was the final objective of the CEE
countries. Initially, the Commission saw the Europe Agreements as an alternative to
accession and as Sedelmeier and Wallace pointed out, 'this fell short of a firm
commitment and was interpreted quite widely as antipathy to enlargement.'50 The
Commission did not expect that the Europe Agreements would gradually evolve into the
main vehicle to prepare the CEE countries for accession.51 In 1993, however, at the
Copenhagen European Council, the Europe Agreements were recognised to be the basis
of a pre-accession strategy.
The Europe Agreements were the only legally binding agreements signed before
accession, and thus they provided the legal framework for relations between the EU and
the CEE candidate countries. They all followed the same formula with regard to their
content. It is important to emphasise that their main objective was to create a free trade
area, and in this sense the Europe Agreements were trade agreements. They started the
process of introducing the internal market acquis to the candidate countries in the areas
of intellectual and commercial property, public procurement, banking, financial services,
company accounts and taxes, indirect taxation, technical rules and standards, consumer
protection, health and safety, transport, and the environment.52 As will be discussed in
Chapter Six, they also included several provisions relevant to the fight against
corruption.
The Europe Agreements confirmed the use of democratic conditionality in the
EU's relations with the CEE countries. The first indication of the conditionality was
found in the above mentioned Trade and Cooperation agreements with CEE countries,
which included a suspension clause that made the execution of these agreements
50 Sedelmeier and Wallace (n 48), at 438.
51 M. Maresceau and E. Montaguti, 'The Relations between the European Union and Central and Eastern
Europe: a legal appraisal' (1995) Common Market Law Review 32,1327-1367, at 1328.
52 Vachudova (n 13), at 86.
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conditional on respect for human and minorities' rights and democratic principles.53 To
begin with, the eligibility for a Europe Agreement depended on the fulfilment of five
conditions: rule of law, human rights, a multi-party system, free and fair elections, and a
market economy.54 Next, the full implementation of association under the Europe
Agreements depended on the 'actual accomplishment' of country's political, economic,
and legal reforms.55 In this way, in the 1990s the EU had already created incentives for
the CEE countries to pursue democratic and economic reforms. Such democratic
conditionality was visible throughout the entire pre-accession process. The EU wanted
to make sure that the CEE countries continued to reform their systems in accordance
with the rule of law. As will be observed in Chapter Six, the EU's insistence on stability
of institutions guaranteeing democracy in the CEE countries should in the long term
contribute in a very beneficial way to reducing the levels of corruption in the CEE
countries.
3.2. The 1997 Opinions
In 1997 the Commission conducted its first analysis of the situation in the candidate
countries and their progress in fulfilling the political and economic accession criteria.
The Commission's Opinions56 were designed to identify potential problems that might
result from the CEE countries membership and assist the Council in its decision whether
to open accession negotiations with each candidate country. They all purportedly
followed the same general structure and content, as the Commission wanted to show that
it evaluated all ten countries according to the same methods and criteria. As Vachudova
noted, the EU adopted a merit based approach to enlargement, which meant that all the
53 Dimitrova (n 24).
54 H. Grabbe, 'Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality For the Central and
Eastern European Applicants' (1999) EUI Working Paper RSC No. 12, at 10
<http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/grabbe_conditionalitv_99.pdf> accessed 17 December 2007.
35
For example: Preamble to the Europe Agreement with Poland (n 46).
56 1997 Opinions
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/eulO/index_en.htm>
accessed 17 December 2007.
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candidates were subject to the same requirements and evaluated in a manner that has
proved to be more or less based on merit.57
The Commission encountered a number of difficulties while preparing the
Opinions. Due to the simultaneous transformation going on within the CEE countries,
the legal and economic rules were changing rapidly, which made it more difficult to give
an accurate assessment of the situation. It was especially problematic to judge whether
the institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law were stable, as often these
institutions were in the process of forming. In addition, even if the appropriate
institutions were in place, it was hard to foresee whether they would function effectively
in practice.
The assessment of the problem of corruption within the CEE countries contained
in the Opinions will be discussed in Chapter Five, but here it is important to emphasise
that after release of the Opinions it became clear that corruption was not seen as an
obstacle in meeting the political criteria. Starting from 1997, the Commission stated that
all the CEE countries, except for Slovakia58, presented the characteristics of a
democracy with stable institutions that guarantee the rule of law, respect for human
rights and the protection of minorities.59 It is, however, not entirely clear on what criteria
the Commission based its assessments.
57 Vachudova (n 13), at 112.
58 In the Commission's view Slovakia did not fulfil the political criteria due to six main reasons: (1) the
right of parliamentary opposition were not fully respected; (2) respect for the mandates of members of
parliament and the procedures governing the work of Parliament was not always guaranteed; (3) the
government did not respect the role of other democratic institutions; (4) inadequate control of secret
services by parliament; (5) judicial independence was not guaranteed by the legal framework; (6) not fully
respecting the rights of minorities, see: Commission (EC), 'Agenda 2000- Commission Opinion on
Slovakia's Application for Membership in the European Union', 15 July 1997
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/slovakia/sk-op_en.pdf> accessed 17
December 2007.
59 For example: Commission (EC), 'Agenda 2000- Commission Opinion on Poland's Application for
Membership in the European Union', 15 July 1997
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/poland/po-op_en.pdf> accessed 17 December
2007.
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All the Opinions evaluated compliance with the political criteria using the same
language. There were several reasons for the adoption of such a formulaic approach.
Assessing the quality of democracy and the rule of law was a politically sensitive task.
The Commission was aware that any differences across the assessments were scrutinised
by the candidate countries and could cause political problems. Moreover, the use of
identical language signalled to the candidate countries that the standards were the same
for all of them.
3.3. The Regular Reports
The Regular Reports provided a summary of candidate countries' progress in meeting
the 'Copenhagen criteria' and adopting the acquis. They were published from 1998 until
the accession and were the main instrument through which the Commission
communicated the membership conditions.60 Every year, the Regular Reports listed
shortcomings and recommendations for improvement for every candidate country. They
were widely considered a yearly 'judgment' on the state of reforms.61 The EU was also
systematically helping the CEE countries' governments to identify weaknesses, as the
Regular Reports often included specific recommendations for reforms. The EU's support
for particular reforms enhanced the credibility of these reforms within the CEE
countries. This was of particular importance in the area of anti-corruption reforms,
which are difficult to conduct and may be perceived as actions of the government in
power against their political opponents. The governments of the candidate countries had
a strong incentive to act and be praised by the Commission, as on the basis of these
reports, the Council was in a position to decide whether to change the pace of the pre-
accession process. As will be seen in Chapters Five and Six, the Commission developed





accessed 17 December 2007.
61 Vachudova (n 13), at 129.
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3.4. Accession Partnerships and the National Programmes for the
Adoption of the Acquis
The Accession Partnerships guided each individual CEE country on how to meet the
'Copenhagen criteria.'62 They were drafted by the Commission on the basis of the
Regular Reports and then adopted by the Council.63 The first Accession Partnerships
were adopted in March 1998 and then amended on a yearly basis. They set out short-
term and medium-term priorities for each candidate country taking into account
individual needs and shortcomings.
The Accession Partnerships brought together all membership criteria. As Inglis
observed, unlike the Europe Agreements, they were the instruments of the Council and
thus included non-Community areas of competence, including the fight against
corruption.64 Examples of reform priorities emphasised through Accession Partnerships
include the implementation of a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy65, efforts to step
up the fight against corruption66, the completion and implementation of the Code of
Ethics for Civil Servants67 and the completion of the legal framework for the fight
against all types of corruption.68 It is evident that these requirements fall outside the
competence of the EU in relation to the Member States, as discussed in Chapter Two.
62 Accession Partnerships
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/past_enlarpements/eulO/index_en.htm>
accessed 17 December 2007.
63 OJ L85, 20.03.1998, at 1
64
K Inglis, 'The Europe Agreements compared in the light of their pre-accession reorientation' (2000)
Common Market Law Review 37, 1173-1210, at 1175.
65 Council Decision of 28 January 2002 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions
contained in the Accession Partnership with Poland, OJ L 44/71,14.2.2002.
66 Council Decision of 28 January 2002 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions
contained in the Accession Partnership with Slovakia, OJ L44/92,14.2.2002.
67 Council Decision of 28 January 2002 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions
contained in the Accession Partnership with Lithuania, OJ L44/54,14.2.2002.
68 Council Decision of 28 January 2002 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions
contained in the Accession Partnership with Latvia, OJ L44/45, 14.2.2002.
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For most of the CEE countries, the Accession Partnerships played a role as the
'key external driver of reform.'69 Their effectiveness was enhanced by the fact that
financial assistance under the PHARE programme was linked to the degree of
achievement of the priorities established by the Accession Partnerships. Furthermore,
the Accession Partnerships included an explicit conditionality clause, which stipulated
that pre-accession aid depended on compliance with the Europe Agreements and
progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria.70 Hence, the incentive was strong
for the CEE candidate countries to observe the priorities set out by the Commission.
In response to the Accession Partnerships, each of the candidate countries drew
up a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, which set out a timetable and a
national strategy for achieving the relevant priorities and objectives. In addition to
adopting these national strategies, the candidate countries also created institutions to
facilitate their preparation for accession to the EU. For instance, they established inter-
ministerial bodies - a council, commission or committee - to coordinate these
preparations and European integration departments within government ministries or
agencies.71
4. Impact of conditionality on domestic policies of the Central
Eastern European countries
Considering the above conditionality tools, what potential did the EU have to affect the
policy-making in the CEE countries? To separate the kinds of influence that the EU had
on the candidate countries Vachudova distinguished between two types of leverage,
including 'passive leverage' based on the attraction of EU membership and 'active
69 Grabbe (n 54), at 16.
70 Council (n 65), para 3.
71 M. Soveroski, 'Agenda 2000: Paving the Way for Enlargement?' in M. Soveroski (ed) Agenda 2000: an
appraisal of the Commission's Blueprint for Enlargement (EIPA, The Netherlands, 1997), 5-19, at 8.
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leverage' which relied on the deliberate conditionality exercised in the pre-accession
process.72
Initially, EU conditionality was limited and the EU did not play a decisive role in
fostering reforms in the CEE countries. The political and economic 'Copenhagen
criteria' were too general to trigger specific changes in the candidate countries.
Corruption appeared neither in the 'Copenhagen criteria' nor in the Europe Agreements.
Again, as already discussed in Chapter Two, before 1996 the EU also did not have any
acquis directly addressing corruption, which could have been transposed by the
candidate countries. At that time, the EU demands focused on implementation of the
formal internal market acquis. In 1995 the Commission adopted the White Paper on the
preparation of the CEE countries for integration into the internal market73, which
identified the key requirements for the candidate countries in this area. It was the first
document that attempted to clarify the membership requirements.
The character of political change in the CEE countries immediately after 1989
depended mainly on domestic factors.74 Even at that time, long before any formal
application for EU membership, governments of the CEE countries were borrowing the
standards of democracy from individual Western democracies, including in the area of
anti-corruption policy. Thus, the anti-corruption reforms taking place in the CEE
countries were part of a broader democratisation process, which was taking place
independently from the desire to join the EU.
Since the launch of the pre-accession strategy by the Essen European Council in
1994, active leverage was used to reinforce domestic political changes. The EU
constructed deliberate instruments to influence the domestic policies of the candidate
countries. As Vachudova has argued, ' ...Western governments and EU officials started
72 Vachudova (n 13), at 63.
73 Commision (EC), 'White Paper: Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe
for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union', COM (95) 163, 3.5.1995.
74 Vachudova (n 13), at 98.
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to abandon the norm in international politics of not interfering in the domestic affairs of
other states.'75 The conditionality was reinforced with the adoption of the 1997
Opinions, and these policy documents gave the EU the opportunity to define the general
'Copenhagen criteria'. The most powerful conditionality tool was access to different
stages in the accession process and the evaluation of general progress made by the
candidate countries in the Regular Reports. The 1997 Opinions explained what is
expected from the candidate countries under the political criteria, and corruption was
explicitly recognised as an element of democracy and the rule of law. Since then,
democratic conditionality in the area of anti-corruption gathered steam.
The EU started monitoring the adoption and implementation of many policies
over which it had no say in relation to the Member States, including the reform of public
administration, the modernisation and independence of judiciary and the development of
anti-corruption policy. As Grabbe has noted, the scope of the accession agenda went
beyond the influence of the EU in the governance of existing Member States.76 Again,
the accession requirements were non-negotiable for the candidate countries, and they
had no choice but to accept that.
The CEE countries shared the conviction that there was no alternative to EU
membership '...if future stability and prosperity were to be assured...'77 At the same
time, the candidate countries were more receptive to the standards and solutions imposed
by the EU than existing Member States ever were. Because the accession process
coexisted with the political transformation, the CEE countries were seeking new
institutional models and guidance, and the EU was offering that. The desire to join the
EU was such that even where the conditions imposed did nothing to enhance domestic
75 Ibid, at 103.
76 Grabbe (n 27), at 1015.
77 C. Pinelli, 'Conditionality and Enlargement in Light of EU Constitutional Developments' (2004)
European Law Journal, Vol. lONo. 3, 354-362, at 357-358.
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performance, they may have still been accepted simply because they were conditions for
membership.78
An important question to ask is whether preparations to join the EU went
together with the needs of political and economic transition in CEE countries. The EU
policies and acquis were developed for the needs of Member States that were at a more
advanced stage of economic and political development than the candidate countries. The
content of acquis reflected the degree of integration among the Member States and was
not designed for the needs of countries undergoing economic and political transition.
Some authors even argue that due to regulation in a number of public policy areas, EU
membership can have negative consequences on attempts to reduce the size of
government in the CEE countries and therefore increase the risk of corruption.79
As demonstrated in Chapter Three, in the area of anti-corruption, with few
exceptions, there was almost no acquis that could help the CEE countries in constructing
their national anti-corruption programmes. Therefore, as Chapter Six will discuss, the
Commission had to devise a new policy that could assist the candidate countries in their
anti-corruption efforts.
Because the membership conditions were so broad and covered almost every
aspect of public policy, EU pressure during the pre-accession process helped to
strengthen the democratic and economic transition in the CEE countries. The process of
accession to the EU and the pressure to conform with the EU membership conditions led
to the emergence of, as Dimitrova and Pridham called it, a unique model of democracy
promotion through integration.80 Using the Regular Reports and Accession Partnerships,
the EU identified poor performance in the conception and execution of reforms and
78 S. Rose-Ackerman, 'From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable Government in Hungary and
Poland' (CUP 2005), at 38.
79 M.L. Tupy, 'The Rise of Populist Parties in Central Europe. Big Government, Corruption, and the
Threat to Liberalism' (2006) CATO Institute, Centre for Global Liberty & Prosperity Development Policy
Analysis, No. 1, at 18 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/dpa/dpal.pdf> accessed 6 December 2007.
80 Dimitrova and Pridham (n 9), at 94.
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made the environment for abusing or neglecting such reforms less permissive.81 The
desire to join the EU committed the governments of the CEE countries to ongoing
reforms. Vachudova points at judiciary and civil service reforms as the areas where the
pressure from the EU was crucial and forced the governments to conduct the reforms.82
Conclusion
This chapter observed that the EU deliberately developed mechanisms to promote
domestic policy changes in the CEE candidate countries. However, the EU did not use a
chance to emphasise the problem of corruption early in the accession process. It did not
include the fight against corruption in the 'Copenhagen criteria' and link the progress in
combating corruption to the fulfilment of political criteria in the 1997 Opinions. The
need to fight against corruption became an explicit condition of accession only in 1997.
Subsequently, despite of the lack of the relevant competence in relation to Member
States, the EU evaluated the progress in the fight against corruption within the CEE
countries.
Since 1997, the EU used its powerful conditionality tools to promote and
evaluate the anti-corruption efforts in the candidate countries. The Accession
Partnerships and the Regular Report gave the EU the possibility to directly influence and
shape the policy making in the CEE countries. The rule was simple: these instruments
indicated priorities that had to be implemented as part of the preparations for accession
to the EU. The Accession Partnerships gave the EU control on the direction of reforms
and transformation in the CEE countries. On the basis of each Accession Partnership, the
Council had power to sanction a candidate country by reducing or suspending the pre-
accession financial assistance.
81 Vachudova (n 13), at 186.
82 Ibid, at 187.
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The potential of the EU to influence the anti-corruption policies of the CEE
countries was great. The candidate countries were ready to accept the far-reaching
demands of the EU and interference in their internal affairs. It was also in the EU vital
interest to make sure that candidates fully complied with the membership requirements
before accession. At the same time, the benefits of membership were so huge that the
candidate countries were ready to conduct necessary reforms to access the next stage of
the negotiation process.
It has been pointed out that 'the substantial benefits combined with the enormous
requirements of membership have afforded the EU unprecedented leverage on the
domestic politics of candidate countries.'83 This chapter outlined the potential of the EU
and presented the tools available to influence the policies of the candidate countries.
Now the crucial question is whether the EU used conditionality instruments to instigate
the candidate countries to high anti-corruption standards. This will be discussed in
Chapters Five and Six. Chapter Five starts this discussion by explaining how the EU
evaluated the problem of corruption and whether corruption in the CEE countries was
seen as a serious problem from the EU point of view.
83 Ibid, at 108.
178
5
The EU's evaluation of corruption in the Central
and Eastern European candidate countries
The international survey evidence presented in Chapter One suggested that corruption in
the CEE countries constituted a serious problem that required an immediate and decisive
response. This chapter analyses how the EU evaluated the nature and extent of
corruption within the candidate countries. It is important, however, to put this analysis
into a broader context. In particular, as Chapters Two and Three argued, the EU does not
have the competence to monitor the general progress of Member States in their efforts to
prevent and combat corruption, and even the mechanisms for monitoring the
implementation of EU anti-corruption instruments are fragmentary and highly
ineffective. Therefore, for the purposes of enlargement, the EU had to develop new
mechanisms to evaluate the progress of the candidate countries in this area in a broader
and more rigorous way.
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This chapter discusses and assesses these mechanisms. To this end, the chapter is
divided into two main sections. The first section has a largely descriptive character and
analyses and contrasts the evaluations carried out by different bodies within the EU. As
there is little secondary literature in this area, this section builds predominantly on
primary sources of information, including various documents of the Commission and the
Council. Some of the Council's documents were not public documents, but they were
declassified at the request of the author.
The second section focuses on the assessment of the methodology and
mechanisms employed by the EU. It examines the strengths and weaknesses of the EU
instruments. In particular, EU activities are evaluated in the light of international
monitoring mechanisms, which were already discussed in Chapter One.
1. The importance of evaluation
A coherent anti-corruption strategy needs to be based on a thorough analysis of the
causes and patterns of corruption in a given society. In order to bring best results, it
should be tailored to the local circumstances and the specific needs of individual
countries. The anti-corruption strategy should take into account several important
factors, including which sectors are most vulnerable to corruption and why; whether
corruption is induced by public officials or individuals; and officials of what ranks
engage in corrupt practices most often? The more comprehensive and detailed the
evaluation of factors underlying corruption, the more effective and coherent the strategy
against it will be possible. As the World Bank observed:
An effective strategy for anticorruption must be based on an understanding of the root
causes of different forms of corruption and their variation. Without it, policymakers run
the risk of treating the symptoms without remedying the underlying conditions.1
1 The World Bank, 'Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to a Policy Debate' (2000), at xix
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdfcontribution.pdf> accessed 7 December 2007.
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Chapter One observed that the fight against corruption in the CEE countries
posed a particularly difficult challenge. The nature of corruption in these countries
resulted from the communist period and its complex social and political conditions. Any
effective policy against corruption within these countries must take these complexities
into account. For example, as already observed in Chapter One, corrupt practices in the
CEE countries were related to the clientelistic structures within post-communist
societies. Thus, an anti-corruption strategy for these countries cannot be separated from
an understanding of clientelism. This approach has been reflected in the World Bank
studies on the nature of corruption in the post-communist countries, which found that:
Confronting corruption in transition countries requires a more complex approach that
recognizes the diverse factors underlying the persistence of corruption and provides a
foundation for tailoring strategies to the particular contours of the problem in different
countries.2
The OSI report in 2002 also warned about the dangers of the generalizing the treatment
of corruption in the post-communist countries. In particular, it argued that:
While the existence of common factors underlying corruption in post-communist
countries is undeniable, it is important to avoid the assumption that corruption in all
post-communist countries is the same and therefore requires the same solutions. The
major cultural variation among EU member States is not unique. Cultural, historical and
other differences among Central and East European countries are also large, and are
reflected in differences in the extent and nature of corruption. ... These differences
suggest that beyond the establishment of certain basic minimums, there is a need for
solutions specific to individual countries; however, to date very little, if any, research
has been conducted in this area.3
This does not mean that it is not possible to agree certain principles that should
underpin every anti-corruption strategy. At the pan-European level, such a set of
principles exists in the form of the Council of Europe Twenty Guiding Principles against
corruption (See: Appendix 1). These principles, however, are deliberately very general
2 Ibid, at xv.
3 Open Society Institute, 'Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy',
2002, at 45 (OSI Report) <http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/corruption> accessed 7 December 2007.
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so that they can provide an anti-corruption framework for a large number of countries. If
corruption is to be tackled effectively, the policy must move beyond these
generalizations and formulate very specific responses to the individual needs of every
country. Research in this area has confirmed that the so called one-size-fits-all
approaches that apply common policies and tools to countries in which acts of
corruption and the quality of governance vary widely are likely to fail.4 Indeed, anti-
corruption measures that work well in one country might not be good enough for another
country. For example, raising salaries for judges may diminish the problem of corruption
in some countries, but in post-communist countries it would bring limited results if not
accompanied by a comprehensive reform of judicial structures and an increase in
accountability standards.
As argued in Chapter Four, the accession process gave the EU a unique capacity
to influence the domestic policy-making processes across the CEE countries. The EU
did not have to limit its strategy to broad principles, but it could formulate very specific
demands in the area of anti-corruption. The ability to do that depended, however, on the
quality of the EU's evaluation of the causes and nature of corruption within the
candidate countries.
2. The pre-accession institutions and mechanisms of evaluation
There were numerous opportunities within the pre-accession process to collect
information on the extent and treatment of corruption within the CEE countries. The
first such occasion was during the screening process, when the Commission and the
candidate countries were examining the compatibility of national legislation with the
acquis. The screening process was, however, very limited and did not allow the
Commission to see a broader picture of the problem of corruption within the candidate
countries. It focussed narrowly on reviewing the compatibility of the national legislation
4 A. Shah, 'Tailoring the Fight against Corruption to Country Circumstances' in A. Shah (ed) Performance
Accountability and Combating Corruption (Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series, The
World Bank 2007), 233-253, at 236.
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with only the formal EU anti-corruption acquis, which as argued in Chapter Three had a
very narrow scope.
Throughout the pre-accession process, the EU had further opportunities to
receive information in a more systematic way during the regular meeting between JHA
ministers of the Member States and the candidate countries. These meetings provided an
opportunity for an on-going discussion on the progress of the candidate countries in the
implementation and application of the acquis in the area of JHA.5 However, the fact that
only the governments of the candidate countries took part in these meeting impaired the
reliability of information. It was in the best interest of the national governments to
present the situation in their countries in the best possible light so as not to hinder the
pace of the accession process. Therefore, even if corruption within a given candidate
country impaired the proper implementation of the acquis, the national governments
were likely to keep that to themselves.
Most importantly, however, the EU developed new institutions and policy
instruments specifically to monitor the progress of the candidate countries in their anti-
corruption efforts. These assessments were conducted by two groups. Within the
Commission, they were carried out by the Directorate General (DG) Enlargement, which
prepared the 1997 Opinions and the Regular Reports. Within the Council, they were
prepared by a special group of experts, known as the Collective Evaluation Working
Party (CEWP).
5 For example: Presidency Secretariat, Ministry of Justice, 'Informal JHA-Ministerial Meeting,
Copenhagen' Background Papers 13-14 September 2002
<www.statewatch.org/news/2002/sep/JHAbackground5.pdf> accessed 7 December 2007.
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2.1. Evaluation within the Commission
2.1.1. The 1997 Opinions
As discussed in Chapter Four, the Commission recognised the fight against corruption as
a membership condition in the 1997 Opinions, where it also gave its first assessment of
the problem of corruption within the CEE countries. All the Opinions follow the same
structure to ensure the objective and fair assessment of all the candidate countries.6
Corruption was assessed under the section evaluating the standards of democracy and
the rule of law in the candidate countries. All the Opinions drew on the same sources of
information, including data from the countries concerned, which was collected by means
of questionnaires, bilateral follow-up meetings and reports from Member States'
embassies, the Commission's delegations, NGOs and other international organisations
such as the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe.7
The Opinions mentioned the problem of corruption in each of the eight CEE
candidate countries. The general conclusion was that efforts to fight corruption needed
to be intensified, especially in regard to the police, the judiciary and customs officials. In
the Opinions for all countries except for Estonia, the Commission gave its initial
assessment of the extent of corruption, but only did so in very general terms. (See Table
5.1)
6 DOC/97/17 Czech Republic; DOC/97/12 Estonia; DOC/97/13 Hungary; DOC/97/14 Latvia; DOC/97/15
Lithuania; DOC/97/16 Poland; DOC/97/20 Slovakia DOC/97/19 Slovenia
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/eulO/index_en.htm>
accessed 7 December 2007.
7 For example: Commission (EC), 'Agenda 2000- Commission Opinion on Latvia's Application for
Membership in the European Union', 15 July 1997
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/latvia/la-op_en.pdf> accessed 7 December
2007.
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Table 5.1: Evaluation of corruption in the Opinions of July 1997
Candidate Country Evaluation of corruption
Czech Republic present in the system and may be increasing
Estonia
Hungary a number of cases of corruption in the Hungarian police
Latvia significant and widespread problem of corruption in the public
administration
Lithuania severe problems with corruption in the customs administration
Poland corruption remains a source of concern
Slovakia petty corruption is not uncommon
country is experiencing problems with corruption
Slovenia no evidence of significant corruption.
Source: Commission (EC), 'Agenda 2000, Opinions on Application for Membership of the
European Union' (1997)
<htto://ec. europa.eu/enlaraement/archives/enlargement process/past enlargements/eu 10/index
en.htm> accessed 7 December 2007
From the above chart, it is evident that the initial evaluation of the extent of corruption
was scant and fragmentary. The Commission did not follow a consistent approach across
the CEE countries and the Opinions did not contain any further clarification of what
'severe problems', 'source of concern' or 'widespread' meant.
Even more worryingly, some of the assessments suggested that the governments
of the candidate countries influenced the final text of the Opinions. For example, the
Opinion on Latvia concluded that 'the present government has made the fight against
corruption one of its priorities.'8 Similarly, in the Opinion on Lithuania the Commission
emphasised that 'eradicating corruption in the public administration is a high priority of
the present government'9 and the Opinion on Poland stated that 'corruption exists; but
where it occurs it is frequently exposed and attacked'.10 The fact that national
8 Commission (EC), 'Agenda 2000- Commission Opinion on Latvia's Application for Membership in the
European Union', 15 July 1997 <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/latvia/la-
op_en.pdf> accessed 7 December 2007.
Q
Commission (EC), 'Agenda 2000- Commission Opinion on Lithuania's Application for Membership in
the European Union', 15 July 1997
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/lithuania/li-op_en.pdf> accessed 7 December
2007.
10 Commission (EC), 'Agenda 2000- Commission Opinion on Poland's Application for Membership in the
European Union', 15 July 1997
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governments were directly involved in the preparations of the Opinions did not
guarantee a reliable and accurate assessment. As already mentioned above, it was in the
interest of the governments of the CEE countries to present the situation in the best
possible light.
2.1.2. The Regular Reports
As explained in Chapter Four, from 1998 until 2003 the Commission published the
annual Regular Reports, which reviewed the progress made by all the candidate
countries in meeting the membership criteria.11 These Regular Reports were the main
instrument to assess the preparations of candidate countries in advance of EU
membership. They each contained a section specifically evaluating the anti-corruption
measures taken by the individual candidate country. This mainly described which
measures had been taken by the governments to tackle corruption and analysed the
existing anti-corruption legal and institutional framework. An analysis of the Regular
Reports provides insight into how much attention the EU attached to the problem of
corruption over time.
The Regular Reports drew on similar sources of information as the 1997
Opinions. The aim was to use as many sources as possible.12 However, the Commission
relied to a large extent on the assessments by international organisations. Among these,
the GRECO evaluations were the most valuable for the Commission.13 Meanwhile, the
fact that governments of candidate countries remained one of the leading providers of
information undermined their independence and reliability and, as Maresceau observed,





accessed 7 December 2007.
12 N. Kontou, DG Enlargement, Statement at the conference 'The impact of Enlargement on Evolving
Standards for Anti-corruption Policy and Judicial Reform in the EU' (Centre for European Policy Studies,
6 October 2002) <http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=88> accessed 7 December 2007.
13 Interview with Sabine Zwaenepoel, European Commission, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and
Security (Brussels, 29 November 2006).
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the Commission's reporting on particular issues gave the impression of being
'coloured'.14
It is important to note that the Commission did not specify at any point during
the accession process what definition of corruption it adopted for the purposes of
evaluation. As observed in Chapter One, there are two definitions of corruption accepted
at the EU level: a narrow criminal-law definition of corruption as bribery and a broader
concept of corruption as 'an abuse of power for private gain' developed for prevention
policy purposes. From the analysis of recommendations made to the candidate countries,
which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six, it can be deduced that the
Commission's evaluation was not limited to the narrow criminal law definition of
corruption, but rather it measured corruption understood in a broader way.
As already discussed in Chapter Four, the evaluation in the Regular Reports was
conducted in line with the principle that each country should be assessed on the basis of
the same criteria. As the Commission explained, 'this process of regular evaluation
based on unchanging criteria is the only way to make a fair and balanced assessment of
the real capability of each candidate country to meet the Copenhagen criteria'.15 The
adoption of such a fair approach is understandable and should be reflected in every
monitoring system. Most importantly, however, the criteria of assessment must be
communicated in a clear way. As observed in Chapter One, all international monitoring
systems evaluate countries according to specific pre-determined indices in the form of
conventions or a set of recommendations. The Commission's evaluations were
characterised by the lack of a set of clear criteria, which will be discussed in more detail
in Chapter Six.
14 M. Maresceau, 'Pre-Accession' in M. Cremona (ed) The Enlargement of the European Union (OUP
2003), 9-42, at 34.




The Commission evaluated the extent of corruption at both national level and
across the CEE countries. Each year it prepared a composite paper that contained a
synthesis of the analysis in each of the Regular Reports. The first composite paper in
1998 mentioned corruption very briefly:
The fight against corruption needs to be strengthened further. The efforts undertaken by
the candidate countries are not always commensurate with the gravity of the problem.
Although a number of countries are putting in place new programmes on control and
prevention, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of such measures. There is a certain
lack of determination to confront the issue and to root out corruption in most of the
candidate countries.16
In subsequent years, the general assessments of corruption were very similar to the one
above, and the composite reports described corruption across the candidate countries as
a 'matter of serious concern'17 and 'widespread.'18 One report stated that 'the perception
remains that the level of corruption in the acceding countries is still high, and very high
in some cases... '19, without providing any evidence in support of these claims. However,
it is apparent that in the Commission's assessment, corruption in the CEE countries
remained a serious problem from the beginning until the end of the accession process.
While the composite reports were only a synthesis of the problem, the individual
country reports discussed the situation in each of the candidate countries in greater
detail. The first Regular Reports in 1998 did form judgments about the extent of
corruption and highlighted the need to intensify the fight against it. In subsequent
reports, the Commission formulated more detailed assessments of the prevalence of
16 Commission (EC), 'Composite Paper' (1998), at 4
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/composite_en.pdf> accessed 7
December 2007.
17 Commission (EC), 'Enlargement Strategy Paper' (2000), at 16
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/kev_documents/2000/strat_en.pdf> accessed 7 December
2007.
18 Commission (EC), 'Composite Paper' (1999), at 15 and (2001), at 10
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/kev_documents/reports_1999 en.htm#2.%20Composite%20Pa
per> accessed 7 December 2007.
9 Commission (EC), 'Comprehensive Monitoring Report' (2003), at 7
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0675en01.pdf> accessed 7 December
2007.
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corruption, typically focussing on the police, the judiciary, customs officials and public
administration. The Commission repeatedly classified corruption as ranging from
'widespread' through 'cause for concern', 'serious problem' or 'significant problem' to
a 'relatively limited problem'. (See Table 5.2)
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The analysis contained in the Regular Reports represented only a synthesis of all the
information that the Commission had at its disposal. As mentioned earlier, the
Commission based the Regular Reports mainly on secondary sources of information
prepared by other agencies. Although it formulated judgements about the prevalence of
corruption in candidate countries, it did not support it with clear evidence. Therefore,
each assessment appeared to be more intuitive rather than based on facts. The OSI
report, which analysed the sources of information used by the Commission, concluded
that three main criteria were used to assess corruption: criminal statistics, public opinion
surveys and other unspecified evidence such as the 'general perception' or 'persistent
rumours'.20 Moreover, the Commission did not employ a consistent approach across
candidate countries when citing survey data. For example, in some cases it interpreted
high crime statistics as an indication of actual levels of corruption, but in other cases
high crime statistics were presented as proof of the strength of the fight against
corruption.21
The Regular Reports were drafted with the use of careful diplomatic language.
Was the acceptance of such a formulaic and cautious approach appropriate? Due to the
great political importance of the Regular Reports, even small differences in their
wording were broadly analysed and interpreted by the candidate countries. It is also
interesting to note that, as Vachudova observed, while the officials from the candidate
states may have found factual mistakes or may have disagreed with the interpretation of
a particular passage in the Commission's Opinions and Regular Reports, in general they
accepted the logic and the overall fairness of the process.22
The use of more decisive language supported by more precise evidence would,
however, have brought significant advantages. It would have sent a clearer message to
the governments of the candidate countries that they needed to continue with their
20 OSI Report (n 3), at 46- 51.
21 Ibid, at 49.
22 M.A. Vachudova, Europe Undivided - Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism (OUP
2005), at 113.
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efforts to root out corruption. Furthermore, a more careful examination of corruption by
the Commission would have helped to focus the candidate countries better on the
domains which required immediate response. It would also have mobilised the media
and non-govemmental organisations within the country concerned, increasing the
pressure on the national government to act.
Unfortunately, the Commission could not use such decisive language. It was
hamstrung by the lack of similar policy against corruption within the Member States. It
could not strongly criticise the governments of the candidate countries and at the same
time tolerate cases of corruption within its existing members. Therefore, it should not be
too surprising that despite repeated critical assessments, in the Commission's view all
the candidate countries fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria.
It is important to emphasise that the last Regular Reports in 2003, which
identified corruption as a serious problem in all CEE countries except for Estonia and
Slovenia, were published after the Treaty of Accession23 was signed. Therefore, one may
conclude that the criticism of the Commission in this area did not have an impact on the
pace of the accession process, and despite its importance, corruption was not seen as an
obstacle to accession.
2.2. Evaluation within the Council
As observed in Chapter Three, most of the anti-corruption instruments were
adopted under Title VI of EU Treaty and for the purposes of accession negotiations were
part of the acquis in the field of JHA.24 As a result, the progress made by the candidate
countries in their fight against corruption was assessed in the framework of a more
general evaluation in the field of JHA. Alongside the Commission, the Member States
also increased their efforts to monitor the progress made by the candidate countries in
23 OJL 236/17, 23.09.2003.
24 Council of the European Union, 'Enlargement process-Acquis in the field of Justice and Home Affairs
for 2000' 10637/01, 6 July 2001.
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the adoption of the acquis in the area of JHA. As Monar observed, the Member States
became increasingly concerned about the practical implementation of the acquis in the
area of JHA by the candidate countries and even took the view that the Commission was
not paying enough attention to implementation problems in its monitoring work.25 These
concerns over the candidate countries' potential implementation deficits were actually
the main reason for the establishment within the Council of a special mechanism for the
collective evaluation of the acquis in JHA.26
This evaluation took place on the basis of the Joint Action of 29 June 1998.27
Article 2 of the Joint Action provided for the establishment of a group of experts from
the Member States under the supervision of the Council's Committee of Permanent
Representatives of the Member States (COREPER) with the task of preparing and
keeping up-to-date collective evaluations of the situation in the candidate countries on
the enactment, application and effective implementation of the acquis. This group of
experts, known as the Collective Evaluation Working Party (CEWP), enabled the EU
and the Member States to pool their expertise to help evaluate the candidate countries.28
As in the case of the Commission's Regular Report, the aim of the CEWP reports was to
deliver a uniform, fair and accurate assessment of each candidate country. To this end
the CEWP could collect information drawing on relevant reports or, if necessary,
organise ad hoc teams of experts from Member States and the Commission to carry out a
mission on specific aspects, without, however, overburdening the candidate countries.29
25 J. Monar, 'EU Justice and Home Affairs in the Eastward Enlargement: The Challenge ofDiversity and
EU Instruments and Strategies' (2001) ZEI Discussion Paper C 91, at 19
<http://www.zei.de/download/zei dp/dp c91monar.pdf> accessed 8 December 2007
26 Ibid.
27 Joint Action of 29 June 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on
European Union, establishing a mechanisms for collective evaluation of the enactment, application and
effective implementation by the applicant countries of the acquis of the European Union in the field of
Justice and Home Affairs, 98/429/JHA, OJ L191/8, 7.7.1998
28 Council of the European Union, 'Enlargement: Progress reports by the Working Party on Collective
Evaluation and theWorking Party on Enlargement' 12216/00,11 October 2000.
29 Article 3 of the Joint Action 98/429/JHA
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While the Regular Reports were '...limited to the broad lines of progress and
persisting deficits...the reports of the CEWP ' ...reached significantly more systematic
and sophisticated stage'30 The CEWP reports focused on areas where the most serious
shortcomings existed as well as on administrative capacity and implementation of the
acquis in the area of JHA.31 Apart from looking at the formal implementation of the
acquis, a key aim of the CEWP evaluation process was the assessment of actual practice
in the countries concerned, including practical effects on the organisation and resources
of authorities and institutions.32 This approach to evaluation was in line with the
argument made by Tulmets that 'the sector of justice and home affairs requires not so
much legislative measures, but technical investments and training of people, the
efficiency of which is difficult to measure'.33
The evaluations carried out by the CEWP covered 12 candidate countries,
including all eight CEE countries, Malta, Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria. The CEWP
reports are confidential. Access to the individual country reports was refused by the
Council, as 'the unauthorised disclosure could be disadvantageous to the interests of the
EU or one or more of its Member States'.34 As the General Secretariat of the Council
explained, 'any shortcomings in the transposition and application of the acquis were
discussed in an atmosphere of mutual trust and information was often given on a
confidential basis', and the disclosure of this information 'could jeopardise future
evaluation procedures both within the EU and in relation to new candidate countries and
some information could also enable criminals to determine the capacity of the Member
States to combat certain forms of crime'.35 Nevertheless, it is still feasible to outline the
30 J. Monar, 'Justice and Home Affairs' (2001) Journal of Common Market Studies, Supplement Vol. 39
No. 3,121-137, at 136.
31 Council of the European Union, 'Enlargement: statement by the Collective Evaluation Working Party'
14892/03,17 November 2003.
32 Council of the European Union, 10543/99,14 September 1999.
33 E. Tulmets, 'The Management of New Forms of Governance by Former Accession Countries of the
European Union: Institutional Twinning in Estonia and Hungary' (2005) European Law Journal, Vol.11,
No. 5, 657-674, at 669.




general structure of these reports. From the available disclosed documents, it is possible
to reconstruct the methodology followed and sources of information used by the CEWP
in assessing the extent of corruption within the candidate countries.
2.2.1. Methodology
The CEWP adopted two approaches in its evaluation process: a country by country and a
thematic approach. For this purpose, the acquis in the field of JHA was divided into five
areas: asylum, migration, border management, police co-operation and judicial co¬
operation.36 Among the documents available to the public, there are two preliminary
draft reports on the Czech Republic and Hungary37, which suggest that in 2000 the
CEWP reports were divided into three sections: 'border controls, asylum and
immigration', 'police and customs' and 'justice'.
The analysis of the CEWP was organised in accordance with a 'structured
checklist'38, which outlined the key issues addressed in the country reports. It is evident
that corruption was to some extent evaluated from the beginning of the CEWP activities.
The text of the 'structured checklist' from 1999 allows for examination of the contexts
in which corruption appears in these reports. First, the CEWP was asked to establish,
with the use of statistics on the number of proceedings and convictions, whether
corruption constituted a problem in the border security forces.39 Second, the CEWP
focused on the extent of the actual problem of corruption within the police and customs
administration of the candidate countries, which involved collecting information not
only on the number of prosecutions and preventive measures, but also on the salary
levels of the police compared to the general salary level in the society, as well as the
economic ties and second jobs of policemen.40 The CEWP was also given the sensitive
36 Council (n 32).
37 Council of the European Union, 'Collective evaluation: preliminary draft reports on the Czech Republic
and Hungary' 6613/00, 23 March 2000.






task of establishing whether there was any political influence exerted on the police
within the candidate countries.41
After these initial evaluations, corruption received special attention from 2000
onwards. The CEWP perceived corruption as a major problem affecting all the candidate
countries, and in 2000, upon the initiative of the French Presidency, the CEWP decided
to launch a study on corruption in Central and Eastern Europe.42 The aim of the study
was to provide a more comprehensive view of the situation in the candidate countries
with regard to corruption and its impact.43 This initiative did not take the form of a
separate study, but instead, the subject of corruption was dealt with in a separate chapter
in each and every individual country report on the candidate countries.44 The Council
acknowledged that before 2000 the examination of corruption at the EU level was
limited to description of the legislative and administrative stmctures and emphasised that
the task of the CEWP was to deliver a more 'down-to-earth' analysis of the problem.45
With the objective of showing the scale and practical impact of corruption within the
candidate countries, the study began with an analysis of corruption in the public
administration, in particular in the police, customs and judiciary.
The work started with preparation of a situation chart to clarify the anti-
corruption efforts in each candidate country, including: the existence of any anti-
corruption legislation or programme, ratification of the Council of Europe and the
OECD anti-corruption instmments, and membership in the Task-Force on Organised
Crime in the Baltic Sea Region46 and GRECO.47 Additionally, the chart took into
41 Ibid, at 20.
42 Council of the European Union, 'Corruption' 12658/00, 9 November 2000.
43 Ibid.
44 L. Bot, Member in charge of the CEWP, Council of the European Union. Question (Personal email
correspondence 30 March 2006).
45 Council of the European Union, 'Examination of corruption in the applicant countries:-Thoughts on
methods' 10727/00,27 July 2000.
46 The Task-Force was established in 1996 and has the mandate to monitor corruption in the Baltic Sea
Region, including Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The European Commission and Europol have an
observer status. For more, see:
<http://www.balticseataskforce.ee> last accessed 17 December 2007.
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account each country's rank and score in the Transparency International CPI and all the
existing comprehensive reports on the subject prepared by the other agencies.48 At the
same time, however, the CEWP was aware that none of the indicators were capable of
giving a full assessment of corruption in a given country, but it made an assumption that
the legal provisions and organisational structures to fight corruption, combined with
statistics on revealed, investigated and prosecuted cases as well as court convictions
related to corruption behaviour, could indicate the determination of a country's
government and its authorities to fight it successfully.49
The CEWP developed a separate methodology for the evaluation of corruption in
the candidate countries.50 The task was to prepare and keep up-to-date evaluations of the
situation and continuously collect information on corruption in the candidate countries
from all relevant sources, analyse it and establish comprehensive findings. To this end,
the work concentrated on the international dimension of corruption linked to organised
crime and money laundering, the capacity of candidate countries to take effective
measures to fight corruption of all kinds and the evaluation of the extent of 'street level'
corruption.51
It is evident that the work within the Council extended beyond the mere
evaluation of the correct implementation of the anti-corruption acquis. The focus was
also on identifying the causes and extent of corruption within the CEE countries. In its
work, the CEWP aimed to collect and analyse all relevant existing information from
'any available source.'52 This was a similar approach to the one taken during the
preparations of the Regular Reports.53 To begin with, the CEWP was asked to analyse
47 Council of the European Union, 'Inventory of existing material on corruption' 13278/00,15 November
2000, see: Annex.
48 Ibid.
49 Council of the European Union, 'Thematic paper on corruption' 11412/00,15 September 2000.
50 Council (n 42).
51 Ibid.
52 Council (n 32) and Article 3 of the Joint Action 98/429/JHA.
53 As confirmed during the interview with Sabine Zwaenepoel, European Commission, Directorate-
General Justice, Freedom and Security (Brussels 29 November 2006).
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information gathered within the Council's various working parties and data collected
during screenings and negotiations. Most importantly, however, the CEWP developed
questionnaires addressed to agencies that could provide information on cormption from
every possible angle, including the Council of Europe, the OECD, the UN, NGOs, the
Member States' ministries, Europol, Interpol, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, and the relevant Bar Associations and accounting companies.54
As Chapters Two and Three observed, the premise of the EU policy against
corruption is to build on and take advantage of other international developments in this
area. This conviction was also reflected in the works of the CEWP. It was emphasised
that the evaluations carried out by the CEWP should avoid overlaps with and prejudice
to existing international initiatives, thus limiting the scope of work to areas not already
dealt with by other agencies.55 As a result, the CEWP took into account the work carried
out by other agencies, in particular GRECO and the OECD WG. As will be explained in
Chapter Six, the anti-cormption conventions of these organisations were also part of the
accession acquis in JHA that the candidate countries had to adopt before accession.
Therefore, their reports were relevant for an appropriate assessment of the
implementation of the acquis.
The main sources of information used by the CEWP, however, were the Member
States' embassies and the Commission's delegations in the candidate countries. The idea
was that the embassies and the Commission's delegations would work together and use
their personal contacts in order to deliver the most accurate and up-to-date data.
Embassies of the Member States were expected to answer the CEWP questionnaires
collectively along with the other Member States' embassies and the Commission
delegation in the respective country.56 They were asked to provide non-statistical
information about the general crime situation and give their own assessment about the
54 Council (n 49).
55 Council (n 47), at 1.
56 Council of the European Union, 'Collective Evaluation of the implementation of the acquis of EU in the
field of Justice and Home Affairs in Hungary, Poland and Romania' 5430/99, 21 January 1999.
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impact of organised crime on the state and society, including comments about money
laundering.57 In addition, the CEWP expected them to gather information on the public's
feeling about corruption, the citizens' trust to judiciary and deliver the latest texts of
anti-corruption legislation and information about structure, organisation and
competences of the anti-corruption law enforcement agencies.58 It showed the Council's
intention to gather the most accurate data and uncover what was behind the official
statistics.
It is important to emphasise that among the possible addressees of this
questionnaire, there were no governments of candidate countries. This did not mean,
however, that they were not at all involved in the CEWP evaluation process. The CEWP
used all kinds of reports, including those originating from the candidate countries'
government services. In addition, the CEWP visited the candidate countries' missions
and embassies in Brussels to explain what it was doing and asked, or accepted the offer,
to assist in obtaining the relevant documentation.59 As a member of the CEWP
explained, 'we were reticent since we thought it was kind of odd/embarrassing if a
candidate country would be asked to cooperate in an exercise such as this one, aimed at
pinpointing the weak points and shortcomings in its efforts to correctly implement the
acquis, especially since they had no right to see the report after.'60
The text of the first questionnaire used as a basis for the CEWP reports
concentrated only on three areas: border management, police and customs and justice.61
Thus it aimed at getting a detailed picture of each sector's situation using the
questionnaire listed in Table 5.3.
57 Council of the European Union, 'Collective Evaluation of the implementation of the acquis of EU in the
field of Police and Judicial Cooperation in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia-
Questionnaire' 7587/99, 26 April 1999.
58 Ibid.
59 L. Bot, Member in charge of the CEWP, Council of the European Union. Question (Personal email
correspondence 16 June 2006).
60 Ibid.
61 Council (n 49).
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Table 5.3: The CEWP questionnaire on the underlying causes of and measures
against corruption
Police, border guard and customs "culture"
1. Do independent, democratic elected staff associations/unions exist within Police,
Border Guard and Customs?
2. If such associations/unions do not exist, please describe the procedures and activities
to establish good working conditions.
Conditions of employment
1. Are base salaries decent and/or attractive compared to other parts of the public sector,
taking into account risks and responsibilities? Is the graduation of salaries an incentive
for qualified staff to seek promotion? To what extent are salaries and working
conditions at the heart of the problem of corruption (how open /prone do they make
officials to corruption/bribes)?
2. Are promotion based on impartial and fair selection criteria?
Internal audit
1. Has a system of regular and unannounced audits in police units and districts been
created with the aim of controlling for instance the presence of collected fines/costs,
seized drugs, stolen goods and other values?
2. Which kind of control mechanism has been established to monitor/audit officials who
have bureaucratic discretion to impose costs and fines?
3. Do institutions responsible for receiving complaints and enforcing anti-corruption laws
have sufficient resources in terms of staff, training and technical equipment?
4. Which formal measures are established to prevent payoffs related to purchasing
decisions made by officials with discretionary powers to engage in contracts on
equipment and information technology deliveries?
Transparency
1. Can outsiders, such as ordinary citizens, non-governmental organisations or the
media, obtain information (for example by referring to provisions in Freedom of
Information Act) about how Police, Border Guard, Customs and Justice are operating
(administratively and in general terms e.g. access to courts, legal aid, various
procedures, costs involved)?
2. Are statistics of disciplinary cases drawn up frequently and are annual reports
established for internal use? Is this information also publicly available?
3. Are investigations and filed reports on alleged improper behaviour by officials usually
made public? Are prosecutions and court decisions in criminal cases made public?
Source: Council of the European Union, 'Thematic paper on corruption' 11412/00, 15
September 2000, see: Annex 2.
The goal of the second questionnaire was to assess the impact and dimension of
corruption in the candidate countries. To this end, the CEWP made a distinction between
'petty corruption, i.e. bribery' and 'higher, more sophisticated and serious forms of
corruption'.62 Petty corruption was said to be 'a more or less recurrent phenomenon,
endemic to how police, border guard, customs and in some cases the judiciary carry out
62
Ibid, see: Annex 1.
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routine activities related to the general public, such as traffic control, obtaining a
passport, driver's license or visa, border crossing and customs clearance, treatment of
prisoners and registry of companies'.63 High level corruption was defined as involving
officials' complicity with criminals or facilitating their illegal activities, which may
influence the functioning of the judiciary, access to justice and legal aid, and may lead to
the disclosure of operational information and intelligence to un-authorised persons or
criminals.64 The CEWP recognised that both of these forms of corruption seriously
threaten the implementation of the acquis. More specifically, the addressees of the
questionnaire were asked to answer ten questions about the state of corruption in the
candidate countries as in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: The CEWP questionnaire on the impact and dimension of corruption
1. Please give your general impression of the integrity of police, border guard and customs
officials and members of the judiciary.
2. In your opinion, what forms of corruption are most common in the country?
3. What is the public opinion towards police, border guard, customs and judiciary? Are
there improvements?
4. Are Police, Prosecution and Justice considered to work independently from each other?
5. Are there known instances where major law enforcement operations or prosecutions (as
well as technical secrets) have been compromised because of release of operational
information and/or intelligence?
6. Have networks between law enforcement officials and criminals been identified?
7. Have law enforcement officials been identified as major criminals?
8. Are some types of payments considered as acceptable tips or gifts to police and customs
officials and members of the judiciary? If affirmative, are they legalised, publicly known
and subject to reporting requirements?
9. Are there any known instances of low-level officials passing a share of collected bribes
on to higher-level officials?
10. Are there any known instances of selection for "attractive" positions or for promotions
because of an up-front payment?
Source: Council of the European Union, 'Thematic paper on corruption' 11412/00, 15
September 2000, see: Annex 1.
The work of the CEWP should be distinguished from other assessments carried
out by the Commission in close cooperation with the candidate countries. The evaluation




willingness to cooperate fully by giving particular assistance in preparing all the relevant
information based on their direct experience of working with the candidate countries.65
Member States were delivering the information to the CEWP either from internal
sources or through their embassies in the candidate countries. Meanwhile, the lack of
involvement of the governments of the candidate countries contributed to a more reliable
assessment of corruption. It also allowed for questions to be raised about very sensitive
issues, such as 'police brutality'.66 Evaluating the extent of corruption, especially
among public officials in the candidate countries, was a politically sensitive question and
the candidate countries' governments had an interest in hiding or dismissing any corrupt
practices.
It was also important that Member States could be directly involved in this
evaluation. As a result, they had a direct opportunity to assess the preparedness of the
candidate countries. In this way, they also became fully aware of the major weaknesses
and capabilities of the candidate countries.
The results of the CEWP evaluations were reported to the Council and to all
bodies within the Commission involved in the enlargement process, including the
Directorate General Enlargement responsible for preparations of the Regular Reports.
The Commission also took them into account when proposing the adjustment of the
priorities and objectives of the Accession Partnerships and in the selection of financial
assistance programmes. The findings of the CEWP also contributed to the texts of the
EU common negotiating position in the area of JHA.67
In November 2003, just a few months before the accession of the CEE countries
to the EU, the CEWP submitted its final overall assessment on the state of play in the
65 Council of the European Union, 'Report to the Council on the operation and scope of the evaluation
mechanism pursuant to Article 5 of the Joint Action of 29 June 1998' 7695/3/99, 18 May 1999.
66 Council (n 56).
67 For example: Council of the European Union, 'Draft common position on Slovakia' 9372/02, 29 May
2002; 'Revised DCP Estonia' 13080/01, 22 October 2001.
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field of JHA, where it argued that 'corruption is still widespread in acceding countries
and remains a significant concern'.68 In particular, the CEWP pointed out that further
efforts were needed in order to:
• further improve overall anti-corruption strategies
• implement decisive anti-corruption measures
• develop appropriate training for law enforcement officers and prosecutors
• develop a more co-ordinated multi-agency approach and improve investigative
tools
• strengthen co-ordination and co-operation between law enforcement agencies
and prosecution
• increase specialised staff to fight against corruption
• implement awareness-raising campaigns to increase public intolerance to
corruption
• increase integrity, accountability and transparency in public administration69.
In the opinion of the Council, the CEWP evaluations proved to be very valuable for the
EU because they provided timely, balanced and thorough information, as well as a clear
and in-depth picture of issues requiring action.70
Conclusion: Assessment
Combating corruption was one of the greatest challenges that the candidate countries
had to meet. The analysis in this chapter shows that the EU attached great importance to
corruption throughout the pre-accession process and saw corruption as one of 'the most
68 Council of the European Union, 'Enlargement: statement by the Collective Evaluation Working Party'
14264/1/03,17 November 2003.
69 Ibid.
70 Council of the European Union, 'Towards a new program for Schengen evaluation and collective
evaluations in the period 2004-2007' 7162/04, 16 March 2004.
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serious outstanding issues.'71 Contrary to its competence in relation to Member States,
the EU also established appropriate mechanisms with the task of measuring the extent of
corruption within the candidate countries and monitoring the implementation of the EU
anti-corruption acquis. It is also evident that the main institution dealing with corruption
in a more systematic and comprehensive way was the CEWP, a group of experts within
the Council. A complete assessment of its activities is impaired by the fact that the
CEWP reports on each of the candidate countries remain confidential.
The only assessments of corruption within the candidate countries that are open
to the pubic are contained in the Regular Reports. From the beginning to the end of the
accession process, the Regular Reports described corruption as a widespread and a
serious problem across the CEE candidate countries. However, the Commission, neither
examined the roots of corruption nor measured its extent in the region. The Regular
Reports contained only general statements about the prevalence of corruption within the
CEE countries, and due to the political sensitivity of the Regular Reports, the
Commission assessed corruption with the use of formulaic and carefully balanced
language. Moreover, judging from the information sources used for the preparation of
the Regular Reports, it is apparent that the Commission's evaluations were
impressionistic and not conducted in a systematic way.
As will be discussed in Chapter Six, instead of focusing on the incidence of
corruption, the Commission analysed anti-corruption legislation across the candidate
countries.72 This approach appears to have been used broadly in the assessments of the
progress made by the CEE countries. As Monar observed, while the mechanism of the
CEWP allowed the Council to identify problems in the area of implementation and
organisational structures, the Regular Reports focused slightly more on the reduction of
diversity in the legislative area.73
71 Council of the European Union, 'Input Commission monitoring tables (LT, LV, SK, PL)' 10359/2/02
15 January 2003.
72 This is in line with argument presented by the OSI Report (n 3), at
73 J. Monar, (n 25), at 25
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Progress in meeting the political membership criteria, including the existence of
stable institutions to guarantee democracy, the rule of law or the fight against corruption,
was particularly difficult to measure. All these goals were defined in a very vague
manner, and it was hard to evaluate whether they had been achieved. This is contrary to
other areas of acquis where evaluation was more straightforward, and where acquis was
relatively well defined and technical and only very specific laws and decrees needed to
be implemented.74
From the available documents, it is evident that the CEWP made an attempt to
evaluate the extent of corruption within the candidate countries. It was not, however, a
comprehensive evaluation of the causes of corruption specific to every candidate
country. This task of the CEWP was limited to the specific sectors of police, border
guard, customs and judiciary. The focus was on the areas that were directly relevant to
the correct application of the JHA acquis by the candidate countries. The CEWP did not
conduct a comprehensive assessment, which would examine the levels of corruption in
other services, such as the education system, medical services, the registry and permit
services or tax revenue system. Meanwhile, only a comprehensive examination would
allow the construction of an appropriate anti-corruption strategy for each of these
countries.
The evaluation mechanisms developed by the CEWP had four main
shortcomings. First, it started too late. The CEWP began a more focused evaluation of
corruption in 2000, but the accession process was already moving ahead. In October
2002, the Commission recommended to admit the eight CEE countries to the EU. The
negotiations were concluded at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002
and subsequently the Treaties of Accession were signed in 2003. That gave the CEWP
little time to conduct comprehensive evaluations. It is also important to emphasise that
74 Tulmets (n 33), at 669.
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preparations for enlargement covered a great number of policy areas, and anti-corruption
policy was only one of many important issues.
Second, the CEWP evaluations should have been conducted in a transparent way,
because public support for reducing corruption is the best lever for achieving high
standards.75 Public exposure of a government's faults in combating corruption mobilises
the civil society and media, which can play the role of watchdog and put pressure on the
government to act. Unfortunately, the system developed by the CEWP did not ensure
this kind of public support.
Third, the lack of involvement of the national governments ensured greater
objectivity, but at the same time impaired the effectiveness of this evaluation exercise.
The evaluation was conducted by Member States and was therefore limited only to their
knowledge. This reflected the general asymmetry of power and the formal inequality in
favour of the existing Member States during the 2004 enlargement process.76 This
approach to anti-corruption evaluation was inappropriate and resulted in the limited
impact of the CEWP reports. The experience of other international monitoring
mechanisms shows that the major benefit of a mutual evaluation mechanism is that it
can stimulate the governments' action and provide a platform for mutual learning and
the exchange of best practices. Meanwhile, the CEWP reports did not provide any
recommendations to the candidate countries.
Fourth, and finally, the available documents on the work of the CEWP suggest
that its findings in the area of anti-corruption were based predominantly on the results of
questionnaires and other reports. However, research on international evaluation methods
reveals that country visits provide the most effective method for obtaining information
75 F. Heimann and G. Dell, 'Report on Follow-up Process for UN Convention Against Corruption'
(Transparency International 2006), at 3
<http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/international_conventions/projects_conventions/uncac/unc
ac_monitoring_report> accessed 8 December 2007.
7"
N. Walker, 'Constitutionalising Enlargement, Enlarging Constitutionalism' (2003) European Law
Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3, 365-385, at 365-368.
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from multiple sources and for in-depth questioning by reviewers.77 As discussed in
Chapter One, country visits are the main component of the OECD WG, GRECO, FATF
and MONEYVAL monitoring mechanisms.
What then was the primary goal of the CEWP evaluations? It seems that the
purpose was to identify specific weaknesses in the area of JHA and then guide the
candidate countries on how to address these shortcomings. Chapter Six builds on this
discussion and argues that this goal was not achieved in the area of anti-corruption. It
will be observed that the Regular Reports did not contain coherent recommendations for
the candidate countries, but only, as Monar has put it, gave them 'encouraging political
signals to step up preparations in certain broad areas.'78
77 Heimann and Dell (n 75), at 9.
78 J. Monar (n 25), at 25.
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6
The EU anti-corruption strategy towards the
Central and Eastern European candidate
countries: achievement or missed opportunity?
As discussed in Chapter Three, the EU has not developed a coherent policy to assist
Member States in the fight against domestic corruption. However, the enlargement
process and the 'Copenhagen mandate' allowed the EU to impose much broader anti-
corruption demands on the candidate countries. The high levels of corruption within the
CEE countries and the dangers that corruption carried for the success of democratic
transformation forced the EU to develop a new strategy against it. Moreover, the fight
against corruption was crucial for the success of many reforms required by the EU
membership. The outcome of public administration and judiciary reforms depended on
how well the candidate countries addressed the problem of corruption.
It is also important to emphasise that during the pre-accession process, the
Council explicitly recognised that corruption impaired the implementation of the acquis
in many areas and thus combating corruption was 'an important part of the acquis in
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itself'.1 Moreover, the Council noted that corruption has a particularly harmful effect on
the rule of law in the candidate countries, citing five reasons:
• generates a parallel system that operates independently of established
public order
• is a breeding ground for illegal activities
• restricts access to public services for those who cannot or will not be
party to it
• introduces uncertainty into trade
• distorts economic system and deprives the state of revenue.2
In addition, there was a more immediate danger that corruption could undermine the
proper administration of EU aid programmes. For example, the national officials
administrating the SAPARD agricultural aid programme in Poland had to step down
after allegations that they were incompetent and nominated because they were members
of political parties in the ruling coalition.3
For the purposes of enlargement, the EU developed a variety of instruments to
assist the CEE countries with democratic and economic reforms. The simultaneous
political, economic and social transition that the CEE countries were undergoing
constituted an enormous challenge. The new institutions that were meant to support the
democratic process and the rule of law were not established. At the same time, however,
the transition period constituted a great opportunity to influence the pace and content of
anti-corruption reforms within candidate countries. As discussed in Chapter Four, the
pre-accession process gave the EU huge leverage over domestic policy-making in the
CEE countries. The EU was able to influence the content of reforms in many areas of
public policy relevant for preventing and combating corruption, including the reforms of
1 Council of the European Union, 'Examination of corruption in the applicant countries: Thought on
methods' 10727/00, 27 July 2000.
2 Ibid.
3 'Brussels concerned at claims of Polish cronyism' Financial Times (12 September 2002).
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public administration, the civil service, the police and the judiciary, and to monitor the
laws on freedom of the media and the development of civil society.
Before the pre-accession strategy was launched, the EU not only did not have
any policy supporting the anti-corruption efforts of the CEE countries, but also indirectly
contributed to the spread of corruption. Until the adoption of the OECD
Recommendation disallowing the deductibility of bribes to foreign officials in 19964,
companies from some Member States were receiving tax allowances for bribing public
officials of the CEE countries.5 As already discussed in Chapter Four, the EU started to
set anti-corruption standards and was closely monitoring the progress made by the
candidate countries in the fight against corruption only since 1997, when combating
corruption became an explicit membership condition.
Over time, the EU recognised that corruption was one of the greatest challenges
that candidate countries had to face and throughout the whole pre-accession process
devoted considerable attention to the problem. The warnings about the perils of
corruption in the candidate countries were heard from the highest political levels of the
EU. In 2000 the Commissioner responsible for Enlargement, Giinter Verheugen,
described corruption as a 'cancer that spreads unless it is tackled energetically.'6 The
President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, in 2002 referred to corruption in
the CEE countries as 'extremely serious problem'.7
For the EU, an international entity with primarily an economic nature, but
without a comprehensive framework against corruption within its Member States, it was
a challenging task. The EU had to define anti-corruption standards for the candidate
4
OECD, 'Recommendation of the Council on the tax deductibility of bribes to foreign public officials'
(1996) <http://www.oecd.Org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf> accessed 6 December 2007.
Interview with Grazyna Kopinska, Stefan Batory Foundation, Anti-Corruption Programme (16 May
2005 Warsaw).
6 'EU to warn applicants about corruption' BBCNews (8 November, 2000)
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/low/world/europe/1012312.stm> accessed 6 December 2007.
7
R. Prodi, European Parliament, Speech/02/463 (Brussels, 9 October 2002)
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/02/463/0/AGED&format=HTML&a
ged=&language=null&guiLanguage=en> accessed 6 December 2007.
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countries from scratch, as it did not have any legislative or institutional templates in this
area. This task was even harder because there was no universal anti-corruption model
that could be simply transposed to the CEE countries. The EU thus had to decide which
anti-corruption standards it should demand from the candidate countries. In the end, it
partly developed these standards itself and partly borrowed them from other
international bodies, in particular the Council of Europe.
Some areas of the acquis, which had to be adopted by the candidate countries,
were so precise that the EU did not have to supplement them with any other standards.
The single market acquis in areas such as state aid and food safety regulations is good
example. However, in other areas, like combating corruption, judicial independence or
minority protection, the acquis was very limited or non-existent and that left the EU
room for further elaboration of what the standards were. The EU was enabled to do this
by the vagueness of the membership conditions formulated by the Copenhagen
European Council.
As a result, the area of anti-corruption was characterised by the existence of
double standards. The Member States were never judged on the basis of the anti-
corruption criteria set for the candidate countries. This approach weakened the authority
behind the EU demands. As Apap and Carrera observed, attempts to impose higher
standards in the future Member States than those practised by some old Member States
constituted a major cause of tension.8 This problem, however, was not only limited to
the area of anti-corruption but was also present in other policy areas, such as the area of
minority rights. Similar to the fight against corruption, the protection of minorities was
an important component of democratic governance, and on that basis the EU was able to
8 J. Apap, and S. Carrera, 'Progress and Obstacles in the Area of Justice & Home Affairs in an Enlarging
Europe' (2003) CEPS Working Document No. 194, at 7.
<http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1043> accessed 6 December 2007
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impose standards on the candidate countries without having an equivalent policy
towards its own Member States.9
The EU strategy against corruption within the candidate countries was based on
three main elements: the establishment of anti-corruption standards, the evaluation
against those standards and the provision of financial and technical assistance. The main
goal of this chapter is to analyse this strategy and answer whether the EU used the great
potential it had to influence the anti-corruption policies of the candidate countries. To
that end, the chapter begins with a discussion of the anti-corruption standards set by the
EU, making a clear distinction between the requirements of the acquis and the informal
standards developed by the Commission specifically for the CEE countries and
communicated through various policy documents. Next, the chapter discusses the ways
in which the EU encouraged a transfer of know-how and best practice from Member
States to candidate countries. Finally, the chapter assesses the impact of the EU
accession on the anti-corruption policies in the candidate countries and points at its
limits. In particular, the chapter focuses on the example of Poland, the country that faced
the most serious corruption problems among the eight post-communist countries.
1. The EU anti-corruption standards for the candidate countries
The anti-corruption standards set for the candidate countries can be divided into two
categories. The first category comprises the formal acquis, including the EU anti-
corruption instruments applicable to all Member States, as described in Chapter Three.
The second category includes standards developed by the Commission and the Council
under the political criteria in various enlargement policy documents, mainly the Regular
Reports and the Accession Partnerships. These standards were addressed only to the
candidate countries. There is one important difference between these two categories.
Whereas the stress during the negotiations was on meeting the requirements of the
9 M.H. Ram, 'Democratization through European Integration: The Case ofMinority Rights in the Czech
Republic and Romania' (2003) Studies in Comparative International Development Vol. 38, No. 2, 28-56,
at 47-48.
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formal acquis, and the candidate countries had to fully comply with the acquis before
the accession, the compliance with other anti-corruption standards depended to a large
extent on existence of EU pressure and the political will of the candidate countries.
1.1. Formal requirements of the acquis
Before accession, the candidate countries had to align their national legislations with the
anti-corruption acquis, which for the purposes of the enlargement was extended to cover
several international conventions. Therefore, the formal anti-corruption acquis could be
divided into two categories: internal and external. Whereas the internal acquis was
comprised of existing EU instruments, external acquis included the anti-corruption
instruments of other international agencies, in particular the Council of Europe, the
OECD and the UN.
The internal acquis included not only the EU anti-corruption instmments adopted
under the third pillar but also the measures adopted under the first pillar, which do not
directly regulate corruption but nevertheless contribute to the prevention of corruption
within the Member States. In particular this concerns legislation in the area of public
procurement, money laundering, auditing and accounting standards. The candidate
countries were required to conduct exactly the same legislative changes as the Member
States, the extent of which was analysed in detail in Chapter Three.10 These changes
mainly involved the introduction of new offences into their criminal laws. Just as in the
case of the Member States, the laws of the majority of the candidate countries did not
criminalise corruption of foreign officials or Communities' officials and presented a
series of loopholes with regard to corruption in the private sector and the liability of
legal persons for corruption.11 As discussed in Chapter Three, the EU instruments
10 For a comparative analysis of the anti-corruption legislation in the candidate countries (except for
Slovakia) and the Member States see: T. Vander Beken, B. De Ruyver and N. Siron (eds), The
organisation of the fight against corruption in the Member States and candidate countries ofthe EU
(Maklu Antwerpen/Apeldoorn 2001).
11 Ch. van den Wyngaert, 'The Protection of the Financial Interests of the EU in the Candidate States.
Perspectives on the Future of Judicial Integration in Europe-Final Report' in P. Cullen (ed) Enlarging the
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contain a very wide definition of bribery, as they refer to 'advantages of any kind
whatsoever'12, and as a result, in some cases the acquis broadened the definition of
bribery in the national laws of the candidate countries in this respect.13
The application of double standards was visible already at the stage of
formulating the content of the acquis by the Council. In particular, the acquis was
extended to include several international anti-corruption instruments, which the
candidate countries had to adopt despite the lack of ratifications by existing Member
States. The EU used its leverage over the CEE countries and pressured them to adopt
these legal instruments, while being unable to apply such leverage towards its own
Member States. From a legal point of view, it is interesting to consider how the
international conventions became part of the acquis. In 1998, when the Council was
deciding on the scope of the acquis in the area of JHA, there were three categories of
international conventions indicated by the Committee of Permanent Representatives
(COREPER) of the Member States:
1. those ratified by all Member States and therefore constitute the acquis
2. those not ratified by all the Member States, but so important that they should
be part of the acquis, as they express the values of the EU
3. those not falling within first or second category, but thought very important
with a view to creating the area of freedom, security and justice.14
Fight against Fraud in the European Union: Penal and Administrative Sanctions, Settlement,
Whistleblowing and Corpus Juris in the Candidate Countries (Academy of European Law Trier Vol. 36
Koln: Bundesanzeiger 2004), 299-394, at 309 and 317.
12 Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention drawn up on the basis ofArticle K.3 (2) of the Treaty on European
Union on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of
Member States of the European Union (adopted 26 May 1997, entered into force 28 September 2005), OJ
C 195, 25.06.1997.
13 For example: the Lithuanian and Bulgarian laws limited the object of the offence to property
advantages, see: Wyngaert (n 11), at 309.
14 H. Nilsson, Head of Unit, Council of the European Union: General Secretariat, Directorate-General H II
Lecture (Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, 15 July 2005).
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On the basis of the above criteria, the Council decided on the content of the JHA acquis.
Subsequently, the Commission closely monitored the adoption of these instruments in
the Regular Reports. Some conventions were obligatory for the candidate countries to
accede. These included the Council of Europe Convention of 8 November 1990 on
Money Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and
the UNCATOC.15 Both of these conventions were signed by old Member States before
2003. Other conventions to which accession was 'desirable' included the Council of
Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption and the OECD
Convention.16 In practice, however, the Commission closely monitored the ratifications
of all these instruments in the Regular Reports. As far as the OECD Convention is
concerned, the pressure form the Commission brought limited results as four of the post-
2004 Member States still have not adopted it.17 A much speedier ratifications of the
international instruments by the candidate countries were visible in case of the Council
of Europe instruments. The ratifications, as of 30 November 2007 looked as follows:
15





Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus, see: Chart of Ratifications of the OECD Convention
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/1898632.pdf> accessed 7 December 2007.
215
Table 6.1: Ratification of the Council of Europe instruments by the Member
States and the CEE countries
Member State: Criminal Law Civil Law

























Source: <httD://www.coe.int/t/da1/areco/documents/instruments en.aso accessed 6 December
2007
From the above, it is evident that the CEE countries (in bold) ratified the Council of
Europe conventions despite the lack of such ratifications by old Member States. This not
only illustrates the effectiveness of the pressure coming from the EU, but also the
continuing inability of the EU to speed up ratifications by old Member States.
Moreover, in its Regular Reports, the Commission acknowledged the accession of the
18 Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No.: 173 (adopted 27 January 1999,
entered into force 1 July 2002)
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=173&CM=l&DF=7/ll/2007&CL=
ENG> accessed 6 December 2007
19 Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No.: 174 (adopted 4 November 1999,
entered into force 1 November 2003)
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=174&CM=l&DF=7/ll/2007&CL=
ENG> accessed 6 December 2007
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candidate countries to GRECO20, commented on its evaluation missions and encouraged
the candidate countries to follow the resulting recommendations.21 This shows that the
EU relies on the anti-corruption mechanisms of the Council of Europe.
1.2. Anti-corruption standards beyond the acquis
The formal anti-corruption acquis focused on the criminalisation of bribery and did not
allow for the exertion of much influence on the candidate countries' general strategies
against corruption. Compliance with the acquis meant that the candidate countries had
achieved the same anti-corruption standards as required under EU law for old Member
States and had ratified major international instruments in this area. The EU, however,
was aware that this was not enough to address the problem of corruption within the CEE
countries and decided to reinforce its strategy.
Setting broader anti-corruption standards for countries was unprecedented at the
EU level. As concluded by Chapter Four, the fact that the accession was the main goal
of foreign policy for the CEE countries gave the EU great potential to influence their
anti-corruption policies. There was a major difference in the way the EU addressed the
problem of corruption within Member States and candidate countries. In its policy
towards Member States, EU action depends on the limited competence in this area and,
t
most of all, the political will of the Member States. The distinction between EU and
national competences in the area of anti-corruption was not upheld in the policy towards
the CEE countries. As Grabbe has argued, the membership conditions covered several
areas where Member States have long been very resistant to extending EU
competence.22 The 'Copenhagen mandate' gave the EU an unlimited option to demand
20 The CEE countries acceded to GRECO in the following years: in 1999 Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, in 2000 Latvia and in 2002 the Czech Republic.
21
For example: Commission (EC) 'Comprehensive monitoring report on Poland's preparations for
membership' (2003), at 17
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/kev_documents/2003/cmr_pl_final_en.pdf> last accessed 6
December 2007.
22 H. Grabbe, 'Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process' in K.
Featherstone and C.M. Radaelli (eds), The Politics ofEuropeanization (OUP 2003), 303-327, at 308.
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reforms in areas such as anti-corruption policy, as well as judicial and civil service
reform. It also gave the EU great flexibility in defining the policy goals for the CEE
countries in accordance with the EU's perceived needs and allowed the EU to adjust
demands for reform on an ad hoc basis.
Before discussing the particular standards developed by the Commission in this
area, it is worth emphasising that, as argued in Chapter Five, the EU did not evaluate the
extent or causes of corruption in a comprehensive way. These finding are in line with
Reed, who criticised the Commission for the lack of a clear approach to corruption in
candidate countries and for not formulating a set of assumptions about the roots of
corruption or the policies needed to deal with it.23 The fact that the EU did not decide to
conduct a more comprehensive study suggested that it did not decide to devise anti-
corruption strategies tailored to the needs of individual candidate countries and instead
opted for a 'one-size-fits-all' approach in defining anti-corruption standards.
Over time, corruption became one of the most serious problems and a potential
obstacle to enlargement, but as observed by Chapter Four, until the start of the accession
negotiation in 1998 and 1999, the issue of corruption was neglected. The Europe
Agreements regulated corruption in a very limited way. All of them, with the exception
of the agreement with Poland24, contained provisions on cooperation with the aim of
developing audit and financial control standards in national administrations.25 The goal
of such cooperation was to ensure the proper management of the pre-accession financial
assistance, which contributed to enhancing standards and preventing corruption in the
public administrations of the candidate countries.
23 Q. Reed, 'Corruption and the EU accession process: who is better prepared?', in Transparency
International, Global Corruption Report 2004, at 122
<http://www.transparencv.Org/publications/ecr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2004#download> last
accessed 6 December 2007.
24
Europe Agreement with Poland, OJ L 348,31.12.1993.
25 For example: Article 85 of the Europe Agreement with Hungary, OJ L 347, 31.12.1993.
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The Europe Agreements signed with Poland, Hungary26, Slovakia27 and the
Czech Republic28 did not refer to corruption in an explicit way. The agreements signed
with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia came after 1997, when combating
corruption was recognised as an explicit membership condition, and did mention this
issue.29 They contained a special clause on cooperation in the prevention of corruption.
The Member States agreed to cooperate with the candidate countries and provide
technical and administrative assistance in the prevention of corruption. The cooperation
included the drafting of national legislation, the establishment of information centres and
databases, measures to enhance the efficiency of the institutions charged to prevent
corruption, staff training, the development of investigative facilities and the formulation
of mutually acceptable measures to prevent corruption.30 Moreover, all the Europe
Agreements provided for administrative and technical assistance with the aim of helping
the candidate countries to establish standards in the area ofmoney laundering equivalent
to those adopted by the Community and international agencies, in particular the FATF.31
It was later in the pre-accession process that the Commission started to guide the
candidate countries in their efforts to fight corruption. The first anti-corruption
obligations resulted from the signing of the Pre-Accession Pact on Organised Crime (the
Pre-Accession Pact)32 in 1998 by the EU and the CEE countries. The primary goal of the
Pact was to help the candidate countries to implement the EU acquis in the area of JHA
before entering the EU. It also contained a list of international instruments that would
serve as a basis for intensified cooperation.33 The preamble to the Pre-Accession Pact
emphasized the commitment of the signatory countries to democracy, human rights and
26
Europe Agreement with Hungary, OJ L 347, 31.12.1993.
27
Europe Agreement with Slovakia, OJ L 359,31.12.1994.
28
Europe Agreement with the Czech Republic, OJ L 360, 31.12.1994.
29
Europe Agreement with Estonia, OJ L 068, 09.03.1998; Europe Agreement with Latvia OJ L 026,
02.02.1998; Europe Agreement with Lithuania OJ L 051, 20.02.1998; Europe Agreement with Slovenia,
OJL 051, 26.02.1999.
30 For example: Article 100 of the Europe Agreements with Estonia (n 29).
31 For example: Article 89 of the Europe Agreements with Estonia (n 29).
32 Pre-Accession Pact on Organised Crime Between the Member Sates of the European Union and the
applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Cyprus (the Pre-Accession Pact) OJ C 220,
15.07.1998.
33
Principle 2 of the Pre-Accession Pact.
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the rule of law and expressed their determination to work together closely to combat
organised crime and other forms of serious crime. Most importantly, in the preamble all
the countries acknowledged that 'satisfactory legal bases for combating corruption and a
consistent application thereof' are necessary for effective law enforcement cooperation
and judicial cooperation at both national and international level.
The signatories agreed on fifteen principles, which encompassed the essential
elements of cooperation between the EU and the candidate countries in the area of
organised crime. The countries recognised that 'corruption is one of the major threats to
our societies, defrauding citizens and private and public institutions alike.'34 They
underlined the need to develop a comprehensive policy against corruption in all its forms
following consultations with the Council and the Commission, as well as the need to
associate the CEE countries with this endeavour. Assisting the candidate countries in
preventing and combating corruption was one of the main goals of the Pre-Accession
Pact.35 This Pact obliged the signatories to develop their own national programmes for
the fight against corruption. In response to this duty, the government of the Czech
Republic, for example, developed its first national anti-corruption strategy.36
The responsibility for the implementation of the Pact was entrusted to a pre-
accession pact expert group (PAPEG) comprised of experts from the participant states.37
Its main tasks were to identify and counteract threats connected with international
organised crime, monitor and evaluate action to counteract such crime in each of the
participant countries and plan specific projects in to combat organised crime in order to
prepare the applicant countries for accession.38 In the area of anti-corruption, the work of
PAPEG was complementary to the work done by the CEWP, as discussed in Chapter
34
Principle 12 of the Pre-Accession Pact.
35 Council of the European Union, 'Swedish intentions regarding the pre-accession pact on organised
crime' 5175/01,10 January 2001, at 3.
36
J. Fenyk and S. Klouckova, 'Topical tasks in combating corruption in the Czech Republic' (2001)
AGON No. 31, 5-7, at 5-6 <http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/publications/agon/agon_31.pdf> accessed 6
December 2007.
37
Principe 15 of the Pre-Accession Pact.
38 Ibid.
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Five. It was agreed that PAPEG and the CEWP would report to one another on
developments in the field of corruption.39 In 2000 PAPEG was asked to concentrate on
three of the principles in the Pre-Accession Pact: the establishment of central
coordinating units for combating organised crime, combating corruption and the
establishment of money-laundering and financial crime units in the candidate countries.
As far as combating corruption was concerned, PAPEG was collecting information from
the candidate countries on practical measures planned or being taken to tackle
40
corruption.
The EU started to evaluate anti-corruption policies across the CEE countries in a
more regular way after 1998 through the annual Regular Reports. From the analysis of
all these documents, it is possible to list the legislative and institutional arrangements
that the Commission considered important for a national policy against corruption.
These included:
• the existence of political commitment to fight corruption
• the strengthening of the legal and institutional framework in the fight against
corruption
• the adoption of an anti-corruption strategy, involving the development of a clear
and comprehensive government programme against corruption
• the strengthening of anti-corruption preventive measures in order to strike a good
balance between preventive and repressive measures
• the existence of anti-corruption bodies in the public administration
• the development of mechanisms for closer co-operation and co-ordination among
different institutions concerned with the fight against corruption
• the creation of codes of conduct/ethics for public officials and practitioners in the
liberal professions
39 Council (n 35).
40 Council of the European Union, 13985/00, 18 December 2000, at 2.
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• the provision of specialised education and training programmes for police
officers, prosecutors and judges
• the provision of appropriate resources, equipment and trained personnel to
combat corruption and money laundering
• the efficiency of the police and the judiciary in the fight against corruption
• the provision of sufficient manpower, equipment and pay for public officials
• the regulation of lobbying
• addressing political party financing
• the regulation of conflict of interest
• the financial screening of politicians
• providing for the independence of internal controllers within all state bodies
• launching a public awareness raising campaign as to the dangers of corruption
• establishing closer cooperation with the general public and NGOs
Taken together, the above anti-corruption indicators constitute a good basis for a
comprehensive national anti-corruption strategy. It is evident that the Commission
moved beyond simply the criminalisation of corruption and focused also on prevention
policies within the candidate countries. However, it is important to emphasize that none
of the candidate countries was regularly assessed on the basis of all of these criteria nor
asked to fully comply with them.
The strategy of the EU suffered from two major weaknesses. First, the
Commission merely acknowledged the progress made by the candidate countries across
the indicators above without any further elaboration of what precisely good standards
were. For example, although the EU did pressure all the governments to adopt national
anti-corruption strategies, it did not advise them on the specific content of these
strategies. The Commission's assessments focused on the anti-corruption legislation and
institutional arrangements in the CEE countries. They often merely acknowledged in
which of the listed domains new regulations had been adopted. The Regular Reports
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contained rather ad hoc evaluations of the anti-corruption policies of these countries
without a clear strategy behind these evaluations. As OSI report argued, there was ' ...no
indication of either the benchmarks employed to assess corruption levels or the level of
progress that would be considered sufficient by the Commission, either in terms of
formal anti-corruption policy or in terms of reducing levels of corruption.'41
A second weakness of the EU strategy was that the standards were not presented
in any systematic way or clearly communicated in a single document to the candidate
countries. Instead, they were communicated through various pre-accession instruments.
Moreover, the above anti-corruption criteria were not applied in any consistent way
across the candidate countries. Different criteria were applied to different countries. For
example, the importance of the involvement of civil society in the anti-corruption
campaigns was emphasized only in the 2001 Regular Report on Lithuania42, the 2002
Regular Report on Latvia43, the 2002 Regular Report on Lithuania44 and the 2003
Regular Report on Lithuania.45 Spotlighting the issue only in these two countries was
not justified, as in all candidate countries efforts to bring civil society into the anti-
corruption project was of utmost importance.46 One of the legacies of the communist
system was the lack of developed civil society organizations, which play an important
role in raising the public awareness of the dangers of corruption and, along with the
media, can publicise corrupt practices within local and central government. Another
example of inconsistency is the fact that the need to regulate lobbying was mentioned
41 Open Society Institute, 'Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy',
2002, at 22 (OSI Report) <http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/corruption> accessed 6 December 2007.
42 Commission (EC), '2001 Regular Report on Lithuania's Progress Towards Accession' SEC(2001)
1750,13.11.2001, at 21.
43 Commission (EC), '2002 Regular Report on Latvia's Progress Towards Accession' SEC(2002) 1405,
9.10.2002, at 24.
44 Commission (EC), '2002 Regular Report on Lithuania's Progress Towards Accession' SEC(2002)
1406, 9.10.2002, at 26.
45 Commission (EC), 'Comprehensive monitoring report on Lithuania's preparations for membership'
(2003), at 14. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/cmr_lt_final_en.pdf>
accessed 6 December 2007.
46 OSI Report (n 41), at 29.
223
only in the assessments of Latvia47, Slovakia48, Lithuania49 and Hungary.50 The OSI
report criticised this approach and argued that uncontrolled lobbying was a major source
of corruption in all CEE countries.51 Similar inconsistency was also visible in the areas
of the financing of political parties and the regulation of conflict of interests.52
It is, therefore, not the scope of the ELI policy recommendations that deserves
criticism. The Regular Reports provided for a reasonably comprehensive set of anti-
corruption standards. It is rather the inconsistency in applying and evaluating the
compliance with these standards that impaired the success of EU policy. The candidate
countries should have been presented with a comprehensive set of criteria at the
beginning of the accession process and then systematically assessed on their progress
against those criteria. The EU strategy would bring better results if the candidate
countries knew what exactly was expected of them in this area.
In May 2003, only a year before the accession took place, the Commission
presented the candidate countries with the most comprehensive set of anti-corruption
criteria, entitled the 'Ten Principles for Improving the Fight against Corruption in
Acceding, Candidate and other Third Countries.'53 These principles not only
recommended full compliance with the EU acquis and international conventions in this
area, but also pointed to the need to include preventive measures in the national anti-
47 Commission (EC), 'Comprehensive monitoring report on Latvia's preparations for membership' (2003),
at 15. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/kev_documents/2003/cmr_lv_final_en.pdf>
accessed 6 December 2007.
48 Commission (EC), 'Comprehensive monitoring report on Slovakia's preparations for membership'
(2003), at 13 and 52.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/kev_documents/2003/cmr_sk_final_en.pdf> accessed 6
December 2007.
49 Commission (EC), '2000 Regular Report on Lithuania's Progress Towards Accession', at 18 and 83
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/kev_documents/2000/lt_en.pdf> accessed 6 December
2007.
50 Commission of the European Communities, '2001 Regular Report on Hungary's Progress Towards
Accession', at 18 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/kev_documents/2001/hu_en.pdf> accessed
6 December 2007.
51 OSI Report (n 41), at 56.
52 Ibid.
53 Commission (EC), 'Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and
the European Economic and Social Committee on a Comprehensive EU Policy Against Corruption',
COM(2003) 317 final, 28.5.2003, see: Annex.
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corruption strategies, such as codes of conduct in the public and private sectors, merit-
based recruitment and promotion policies in the public administration, disclosure of
assets by private servants, rules on whistleblowing and transparent rules on party
financing (See: Appendix 2).
The Ten Principles developed by the Commission overlap to a large extent with
the Council of Europe's Twenty Guiding Principles (See: Appendix 1). At first sight, the
Council of Europe's principles appear much broader. However, some areas covered by
the Twenty Guiding Principles are already covered by provisions of the EU acquis, thus
the Commission did not have to repeat them separately. This applies, in particular, to the
criminalisation of national and international corruption, the seizure and deprivation of
the proceeds of corruption offences, the liability of legal persons and transparent public
procurement procedures.
The practical effect of the EU's Ten Principles was very limited. Rather than
having any bite, countries were only invited to take the principles into account when
devising their national strategies against corruption. Unlike in the case of the Council of
Europe's GRECO, there was no follow-up mechanism to assess whether the principles
were successfully implemented at the national level.
The EU also used the 'Copenhagen mandate' to insist on reforms in three areas
of public policy that are highly relevant for the fight against corruption: public
administration, the judiciary and financial control. As discussed in Chapter Four, the
2004 enlargement was the first in which candidate countries were asked to demonstrate
that their national public administrations and judiciary had the capacity to take on the
obligations of membership and properly implement the acquis.
After 1989, all the post-communist countries had to develop an effective and
independent judiciary and civil service, both of which used to be subordinated to the
communist party. The Commission consistently urged each candidate country to reform
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its public administration and create an independent and professional civil service.54
There was no formal acquis setting standards for public administrations. Over time,
however, a general agreement on key components of good governance emerged among
the Member States, including not only the rule of law and principles of reliability,
predictability, accountability and transparency, but also technical and managerial
competence, organisational capacity and citizens' participation.55 Candidate countries
were asked to take these principles into account and adhere to standards promoted by the
Member States in reforming their public administrations.
Judicial independence was also a membership condition in its own right and
throughout the pre-accession process, the Commission consistently pushed for reforms
to establish and ensure judicial independence and the efficiency of the court system.56 In
particular, the EU insisted on the adoption of measures that prevent and reduce
corruption in the judiciary, including procedures for the appointment, promotion,
disciplinary procedures and remuneration of judges.57 According to the World Bank's
report in 2006, however, corruption within the judiciary still constituted a problem, as
the reforms of the judiciary in the candidate countries tended to focus on ensuring its
independence rather than its accountability or capacity, and establishing independence
without ensuring accountability creates opportunities for corruption.58
54 For example: Commission (EC), '1999 Regular Report on Poland's Progress Towards Accession', at
59-60 <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdEkev_documents/1999/poland_en.pdf> accessed 6




SIGMA, 'European Principles For Public Administration' (1999) SIGMA Papers No. 27, at 5
<http://www.sigmaweb.org/> accessed 6 December 2007.
56
Open Society Institute, 'Judicial Independence in the EU Accession Process' (2001)
<http://www.eumap.org/reports/2001/judicial> accessed 6 December 2007.
~7
For example: Commission (EC), '2002 Regular Report on Estonia's Progress Towards Accession'
SEC(2002) 1402, 9.10.2002, at 23; '2002 Regular Report on Poland's Progress Towards Accession'
SEC(2002) 1408, 9.10.2002, at 24-26; '2002 Regular Report on Hungary's Progress Towards Accession',
at 15-16, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/kev_documents/2000/hu_en.pdf>
accessed 6 December 2007.
58 The World Bank, J.H. Anderson and Ch.W. Gray, 'AntiCorruption in Transition 3. Who is Succeeding
and Why?' (2006), at xvi
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECA/Resources/ACT3.pdf> accessed 6 December 2007.
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Another area relevant for the fight against corruption was financial control. The
EU required candidate countries the set up an effective system for the protection of the
financial interests of the Communities. The candidate countries had to comply with the
requirements of Article 280(2) EC and protect the financial interests of the Communities
as they would protect national financial interests. Considering that about 80% of the
Community budget is administrated by national authorities59, it was a priority for the EU
to ensure that the national financial control systems of the candidate countries met the
standards of sound financial management. As no distinction was to be made in terms of
control of the national budget and of EU resources, the Commission was assessing the
candidate countries' public financial control systems in general. It was concerned, in
particular, with the existence of effective and transparent financial management, a clear
demarcation between financial management and internal audit, and the independence of
external audit.60 As Maniokas observed, in the negotiations in the area of financial
control, '...the Commission went as far as to prescribe the rules of functioning of the
whole national system of internal and external audit and financial control, which was
and remains a national competence'.61
In this context it is important to note the role of OLAF in contributing to the
creation of independent anti-fraud structures in the candidate countries. The most
important example in this area is a PHARE project called 'OLAF Poland' established in
2001with the aim of establishing a special anti-fraud unit within the Polish
administration to increase its capacity to combat fraud affecting the Community budget
in relation to pre-accession funds.62 In addition, all the candidate countries were required
59 Commission (EC), 'Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council.
Protection of the financial interests of the Communities - Fight Against Fraud - Annual report 2006'
COM(2007)390, 6.7.2007, at 5.
60 For example: Commission (EC), '2000 Regular Report on Poland's Progress Towards Accession, at 82-
83 <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/kev_documents/2000/pl_en.pdf> accessed 6 December
2007.
61 K. Maniokas, 'The method of the European Union's enlargement to the east: a critical appraisal' in A.L.
Dimitrova (ed), Driven to Change: The European Union's Enlargement Viewed from From The East,
(Manchester University Press 2004), 17-37, at 22.
2 Commission (EC), 'Report from the Commission. Protection of the Financial Interests of the
Communities and Fight Against Fraud-Annual Report 2001' COM(2002) 348 final/3, 6.8.2002, at 16.
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to set up anti-fraud services (AFCOS) to coordinate the legislative, administrative and
operational activities linked with the protection of the Communities' financial
interests.63 Although the above reforms in the area of financial control were initiated
with the primary aim of protecting the Community budget, they allowed national
authorities to leam from Western models in this area and later transfer standards to the
national level.
2. Technical and financial assistance as a policy transfer instrument
2.1. The EU programmes
This section discusses the extension of acquis to the candidate countries within the EU
pre-accession process as a type of policy transfer, defined as a process by which
knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one
political system is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements,
institutions and ideas in other political systems.64 In the area of anti-corruption, the EU
was supporting policy transfer among individual Member States and candidate countries
also within the framework of EU technical and financial assistance for the CEE
countries. As a result, the limited anti-corruption acquis was to a large extent
accomplished by a transfer of best practices and know-how from individual Member
States. This took place mainly through twinning projects financed under the PHARE
programme. As already discussed in Chapter Four, the PUARE programme was the
main financial instrument used in the accession of the CEE countries. Since, 1996
financial assistance under PHARE supported developments in the area of JHA.
However, as Monar observed, the EU 'did little to bring the accession preparations in
63 Commission (EC), 'Commission Report. Protection of the Financial Interests of the Communities and
Fight Against Fraud-Annual Report 2002' COM(2003) 445 final/2, 4.12.2003, at 11-13.
64
D.P. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, 'Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary
Policy-Making' (2000) Governance, Vol. 13, No 1,5-24, at 5.
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the area of JHA to an earlier and more effective start.'65 The principal PHARE
instruments in the field of JHA were horizontal programmes established only in 1996
and 1999 to assist the CEE countries in transposing of the acquis in this area.66
It is important to point out that PHARE-funded reform projects were not dictated
by the EU. Instead, the Commission responded to proposals from recipient countries in
its selection of which sector to assist.67 Most importantly, the EU could not do much
when the government concerned was reluctant to accept programmes that supported the
rule of law or the fight against corruption in particular.68 The EU could not support such
initiatives against the will of candidate countries' governments.
The anti-corruption reforms of the candidate countries were reinforced mainly
through the twinning projects, which were EU policy instruments developed for the
needs of the 2004 enlargement. Under twinning, an expert from a Member State was
seconded to a candidate country to assist in the development of the modern and efficient
administration needed to implement the acquis.69 Each candidate country was free to
select the twinning partner that best suited its own culture, organization and national
interest. Twinning provided an excellent platform for sharing and learning best practices.
It allowed Member States to export legislative and institutional models to the candidate
countries, which had the chance to use the standards that worked well in Member States
and use them as a template for anti-corruption reforms.
65 J. Monar, 'EU Justice and Home Affairs in the Eastward Enlargement: The Challenge ofDiversity and
EU Instruments and Strategies' (2001) ZEI Discussion Paper C 91, at 6.
<http://www.zei.de/download/zei_dp/dp_c91_monar.pdf> accessed 6 December 2007
b0 Commission (EC), 'Decision of 1999 Establishing a Phare horizontal programme on Justice and Home
Affairs' <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/ZZ9910%20-
%201999%20%20Justice%20and%20Home%20Affairs.pdf> accessed 6 December 2007.
"7
European Parliament, 'The PHARE programme and the enlargement of the European Union' (1998)
Briefing No 33, PE 167.944, 4.12.1998, at 12.
68 Interview with Mieneke de Ruiter, General Secretariat DG H 2 B - Judicial Cooperation, Council of the
European Union (5 December 2005 Brussels).
69 Commission (EC), 'Twinning: Building Europe Together' (2006), at 8
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/twinning_brochure_2005_en.pdf> accessed 6 December 2007.
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In 2002, the OSI report concluded that PHARE projects related to anti-corruption
policy were created on an ad hoc basis with no centralised pool of resources or official
EU expertise, or any system of twinning or secondment organised on a systematic and
planned basis.70 Indeed, before 2003 only two twinning projects designed specifically to
support anti-corruption efforts were launched, including in 2000 in Slovakia71 and in
2001 by the Czech Republic.72 However, in 2003 all the remaining countries, except for
Slovenia, participated in such projects.73 As Chapter Five observed, the levels of
corruption in Slovenia were not perceived as a serious problem by the EU at any point
during the accession process.74
Twinning gave the EU the ability to influence the fulfilment by candidate
countries of the accession criteria, especially in the field of institutional capacities,
where the acquis was non-existent.75 According to Tulmtes, it produced elements of soft
law in sectors that had little Community involvement.76 The main advantage of twinning
projects was that they were set to deliver specific and mandatory results agreed between
the parties in advance. As discussed earlier, the lack of such an approach is the main
criticism of the EU strategy against corruption in the CEE countries. Unlike the Regular
Reports, every twinning project set out and aimed at the achievement of specific project
benchmarks, which often went beyond the scope of the acquis. As a result, the twinning
70 OSI Report (n 41), at 72.
71
Project Fiche, 'Support to the Implementation of the National Programme of Fight Against Corruption',
SK0008.01 <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/sk0008.01_anti-corruptionrev.pdf>
accessed 6 December 2007.
72
Project Fiche, 'Improving the Fight against Corruption and Economic Crime', CZ01-07-06
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/cz01_0706_improving_the_fight_against_.pdf>
accessed 6 December 2007.
73 Estonia: 'Reducing corruption' 2003/005-850.01.01; Hungary: 'Support to the Police investigation
capacity in the areas of organized crime, financial crime and corruption' 2003/004-347-03-03; Latvia:
'Development and Strengthening of the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau' 2003/004-979-
01.03; Lithuania: 'Strengthening of Administrative Capacities in the Fight against Corruption', 2003.004-
341.05.03; Poland: 'Strengthening of the Implementation of the Anti-corruption Strategy', 2003/005-
710.01.03' <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/index.cfm> ' accessed 6 December 2007.
74 See: Table 5.2.
75 E. Tulmets, 'The Management ofNew Forms of Governance by Former Accession Countries of the
European Union: Institutional Twinning in Estonia and Hungary' (2005) European Law Journal, Vol.11,
No. 5, pp. 657-674, at 673.
76 Ibid, at 658.
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projects partially offset the vagueness of the Regular Reports. Their success depended
on the quality of the twinning adviser and the will of the candidate country to use the
potential they offered. As Grabbe observed, the advice on how to reform institutions
depended on the experience and assumptions of the individual pre-accession advisor,
which were in turn influenced by his or her nationality and background.77 The EU
continued to provide twinning assistance to the CEE countries between the date of
accession and the end of 2006 in the framework of the PHARE Transition Facility.78
Twinning support in the area of anti-corruption was received in 2005 and 2006 by
Poland79, the Czech Republic80 and Slovakia.81
During the pre-accession process, all the twinning programmes were providing
assistance to the governments of the candidate countries. There was no separate EU
assistance programme that aimed at providing financial and technical support to NGOs
active in the area of anti-corruption. It was only after the accession of the CEE countries
that the EU launched a programme of grants for NGOs from post-2004 Member States
working in the area of anti-corruption.82 The lack of broader strategy and support for
NGOs within the pre-accession process was also confirmed in the findings of the OSI
report, which argued that the approach of the Commission in the area of anti-corruption
policy was focused on '...elites, top-down anti-corruption strategies.'83 As already
77 Grabbe (n 22), at 315.
78Article 34(2) of the Act of Accession provided for a Transition Facility with the aim to provide
continued support for the reinforcement of administrative and judicial capacity, including anti-corruption
strategies, in the post-2004 Member States during the period of 2004-2006, OJ L 236, 23.09.2003
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/financial_assistance/transition_facilitv_en.htm> accessed 6 December
2007.
19 See 3.1. below.
80
Project Fiche, 'Reinforcement of the Czech Police Capacity in Combating Corruption and Economic
Crime', 2005/017/518.04.02 <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fichejproiet/document/2005-017-518-
04.02%20-%20Corruption.pdf> accessed 5 December 2007.
81
Project Fiche, 'Continued Support to the Fight against Corruption', 2005/017-464.03.03
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/2005-017-464.03.03%20-
%20Fight%20against%20Corruption.pdf> accessed 5 December 2007.
82
For more information, see:
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/2004_2007/support_ngo/funding_support_en.htm> accessed 5
December 2007.
83 OSI Report (n 41), at 32.
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noted, the Commission evaluated and encouraged a greater role for civil society in anti-
corruption efforts only in the Regular Report on Latvia and Lithuania.
In addition to PHARE, several specific programmes in the area of JHA supported
initiatives of the CEE countries in their strategies against corruption and organised
crime. It concerns, in particular, four programmes: FALCONE84, GROTIUS85, OISIN86
and HIPPOKRATES87, which were replaced in 2003 by a single framework programme
called AGIS.88 The goal of the AGIS programme, which ran from 2003 until 2006, was
to help legal practitioners and law enforcement officials from the Member States and
candidate countries to set up Europe-wide networks, as well as to exchange information
and best practices. Similar to the four mentioned programmes it replaces, AGIS
supported projects such as training, conferences, conducting research and dissemination
of the results.89 Examples of activities undertaken in the area of anti-corruption included:
• seminars and conferences for officers from law enforcement and other
administrative areas within all Member States and candidate countries to
analyse the situation of corruption within the EU and candidate countries,
• a conference on corruption in healthcare,
• a comparative study of the anti-corruption systems within the
competencies of the Supreme Audit Institutions of Europe and
• a study on Corruption within the Public Sector.90
84 FALCONE is a programme for exchanges, training and cooperation for persons responsible for action to
combat organised crime; Joint Action 98/245/JHA, OJ L 99, 31.3.1998.
85 GROTIUS is a programme of incentives and exchanges for legal practitioners; Joint Action
96/636/JHA, OJ L287, 8.11.1996.
86 OISIN is a programme for the exchange and training of, and cooperation between, law enforcement
authorities; Joint Action 97/12/JHA, OJ L7,10.1.1997.
87 HIPPOKRATES is a programme of incentives and exchanges, training and cooperation for the
prevention of crime; Council Decision 2001/515/JHA, OJ L 186, 7.7.2001.
88 Council Decision 2002/630/JHA of 22 July establishing a framework programme on police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters (the AGIS Decision), OJ L203,1.8. 2002.
89 Article 4 of the AGIS Decision.
90 AGIS Implementation Reports for Years 2003, 2004 and 2005 at:
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/2004_2007/agis/funding_agis_en.htm#> accessed 6 December
2007.
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All of these programmes in the area of JHA offered many advantages to the
beneficiary countries. Most importantly, they contributed to the exchange of know-how
and experience in the area of preventing and combating corruption in Europe. The CEE
countries usually had very limited funds for such activities within their national budgets.
Programmes like AGIS provided an excellent opportunity for candidate countries' police
officers, judges and prosecutors to participate in an evolving European network for
judicial and police co-operation.
2.2. Joint programmes with the OECD and the Council of Europe
The EU cooperated closely with other international organisations in providing financial
and technical assistance to the post-communist countries. In the area of anti-corruption,
two joint programmes deserve a special mention. These were the Sigma programme in
cooperation with the OECD and the Octopus programme in cooperation with the
Council of Europe.
One of the priorities of the PHARE programme was to help the CEE countries to
build sound, efficient and effective public institutions, which would enable them to
satisfy the "Copenhagen criteria". This was also the main goal of the Sigma programme
(Support for Improvement in Governance and Management), which was launched in
1992 as a common initiative of the OECD and the EU and principally financed by
PHARE.91 The annual Sigma assessments of the progress made by the CEE countries
have served as an input to the Commission's Regular Reports since 1999. Sigma's
assessments covered six sectors: civil service and administrative legal framework, policy
capacities, public expenditure management, public procurement, public internal financial
control, and external audit.92 The major advantage of the Sigma programme was that it
not only assessed the progress of reform, but also assisted the CEE countries in
modernising their public administrations. Sigma's detailed recommendations constituted
91 For more information, see: <http://www.sigmaweb.org> accessed 5 December 2007.
92
Sigma assessments reports are available at:
<http://www.sigmaweb.Org/document/37/0.3343.en_33638100_34612958_35550053_l_l_l_l.00.html>
accessed 6 December 2007.
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an important blueprint for reforms conducted by the CEE countries. Furthermore, the
Sigma programme also investigated progress in the fight against corruption within
public administration, which was necessary for the existence of high quality public
policy and regulation.93
The EU also cooperated with the Council of Europe to support the economic and
democratic changes taking place within the post-communist countries. In 1996 the
Commission and the Council of Europe launched the Octopus programme with the
principal goal of promoting higher standards within the CEE countries in their fight
against corruption, money laundering and organised crime.94 The Octopus programme
contributed to the exchange of best practice in terms of the legislation, enforcement and
prevention of corruption. The practitioners from the CEE countries and other members
of the Council of Europe were able to participate in a variety of conferences, workshops
and training sessions organised within the framework of the programme and to agree on
recommendations regarding measures to be taken in their respective countries.95 In
addition, experts from the CEE countries had an opportunity to participate in study visits
and discuss with their counterparts from host countries how the instruments of the EU
and the Council of Europe should be implemented. The Octopus programme provided a
useful platform for discussion, learning and training for civil servants, judges,
prosecutors and police officers involved in the fight against corruption and organised
crime.
All of these initiatives should be assessed very positively, as they served as a
catalyst for the elaboration of European anti-corruption standards. While the EU was
93 Commission (EC), 'Commission Decision of 1998 Establishing the third tranche for the third support
programme for improvement in government and management SIGMA III'
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_proiet/document/ZZ9808%20-%201998%20SIGMA%20III.pdf>
accessed 6 December 2007.
94 For more, see: <http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/combating_econoroic_crime/3_technical_cooperation/OCrOPUS/> accessed 5 December 2007.
93
For example: 'The Prevention of Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe' 2002 'Anti-Corruption
services- Good practice in Europe' (2004) <http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/combatine economic_crime/3_technical_cooperation/octopus/> accessed 6 December 2007.
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trying to define such standards in its accession policy documents, the development was
to some extent taking place spontaneously as a result of projects and research financed
by these programmes. The number of initiatives in the area of anti-corruption was
relatively high in comparison to other JHA areas.96 This suggests that there was a
political will within the EU to fund projects and there was willingness on the side of
CEE countries to provide project proposals. However, often these projects were only
based on ad hoc perceptions of needs, rather than on strategic planning by the EU.
Although twinning projects introduced an element of strategic planning to reforms, it
started very late, as it was only in 2003 when all the candidate countries received this
type of support through PHARE.97
3. The impact of the EU accession on the anti-corruption policies
The enlargement of May 2004 forced the EU to go beyond the single market objectives
and focus on the promotion of democracy and the rule of law. Unlike in the case of the
Council of Europe, however, the primary goal of the EU is to create a single market and
not to promote or enhance the quality of democracy within the Member States. The EU
consequently had a much more limited area for manoeuvre. This policy mandate limited
the initiatives of the EU not only internally, but also within its enlargement policy. The
fight against corruption was an important objective, but less urgent than economic and
administrative adjustments that guaranteed the proper functioning the single market after
the accession of the CEE countries to the EU.
96
ECOTEC, 'Support to the Justice and Home Affairs Acquis. Thematic Evaluation of the European
Union Phare Programme', (2006), at 16
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/phare/22_iha_0533_final_version_160306_en.p
df> accessed 6 December 2007.
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Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania, together with Bulgaria and Romania received support in the area of anti-
corruption under PHRE earlier than the rest of the countries. In 1998 the Catch-Up Facility was set up to
accelerate their preparations for membership, including, financing of the anti-corruption projects. See:




However, as discussed in Chapter Four, the desire to join the EU acted as an
important catalyst for reform in the CEE countries. The impact of the accession process
on anti-corruption policy in a given candidate country depended on many factors. One of
the most crucial was the existence of the political will of the national government to
reform. Strong and committed political leadership was important to push and shape anti-
corruption reforms.98 Another important factor was the openness of the political system
with an active civil society and freedom of the media, which could focus attention on the
problem of corruption.
While it is not difficult to trace the limited legislative changes required by the
formal anti-corruption acquis, it is not entirely possible to separate the EU influence on
the anti-corruption policies in the candidate countries from other domestic and external
factors. Since the mid-1990s, there was an increase in the amount of attention
international organisations, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,
the OECD, Transparency International and in particular the Council of Europe, paid to
corruption in the post-communist countries. Nonetheless, as already observed in Chapter
Four, among other international organisations the EU had the greatest potential to
influence domestic policies across the CEE countries. Findings of the World Bank from
2006 confirmed that the accession process was a major incentive for the CEE countries
to address corruption, as they found a strong correlation between EU conditionality and
the intensity of anti-corruption legislative activities in the CEE countries.99 (See Figure
6.1)
Figure 6.1: Anti-corruption intensity and the pull of the European Union
98 The World Bank (n 58), at xviii and 82






Source: The World Bank, J. H. Anderson, J.H. and Ch.W. Gray,
AntiCorruption in Transition 3.Who is Succeeding and Why?' (2006), at 81
<http://siteresources. worldbank. org/1NTECA/Resources/ACT3.pdf> accessed 9 December 2007
The World Bank's findings confirmed that for the so-called 'first wave of accession
countries' (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia), the intensity of
anti-corruption efforts and the pull of the EU were the strongest from 1995 to 2002, and
for Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia this pull was even stronger during these years due to
greater uncertainty regarding their potential membership. Chapter Four argued that it
was a mistake on the side of the EU not to address the problem of corruption at the
earliest stages of the accession process. The findings of the World Bank seem to confirm
this view, showing that in the area of anti-corruption, EU conditionality worked best
when accession was still not certain, particularly before the accession negotiations were
concluded in 2002.
3.1. Case study: Poland
At the beginning of the 1990s, soon after democratic changes had begun, the problem of
corruption in Poland was still neglected. Only by the second half of the 1990s was there
a general recognition of the dangers of corruption for the success of the economic and
political transformation. The change in attitudes occurred from bottom-up and originated
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from civic activities and investigative journalism, which played an important role in
exposing cases of corruption.
The first anti-corruption initiatives in Poland took place independently from the
accession process and were not the outcome of EU pressure in this area. Since 1997,
several anti-corruption legislative measures have been introduced, but they were all
proposed by Members of Parliament and not the government.100 At the same time, the
fight against corruption began to appear on the agenda of political parties during election
campaigns, as it was considered to be a good catch phrase that could help to win
elections. In the late 1990s, however, the government at last acknowledged the need to
address the problem of corruption in a more coherent way.
In 1999, in response to a request from the Polish government, the World Bank
prepared a report that was the first thorough analysis of the problem of corruption in
Poland.101 The World Bank's report identified 'high level' corruption as one of the most
serious problem in the country and stated, 'All those interviewed identified high level
corruption as the most serious corruption problem that Poland faces, and considered that
it was growing'.102 It further highlighted the need to address corruption in areas such as
lobbying, conflict of interests, political party finance, judicial and prosecution bodies,
subnational government, public procurement, privatisation, customs and tax
administration, concessions and licences, and healthcare.103 One other important factor
that helped to uncover the scale of corruption in Poland was the activity of the Supreme
Chamber of Control, which since 2000 has been producing special reports about
corruption in Poland and has accepted the rule that every control would investigate the
100 Open Society Institute, 'Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy in Poland' (2002), at 405
<http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/corruption> accessed 6 December 2007.
101 The World Bank, 'Corruption in Poland: Review of Priority Areas and Proposals for Action' (1999)
<http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/PolandREPORT.pdf> accessed 6 December 2007.
102 Ibid, at 7.
103 Ibid, at 6-24.
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areas and sources of corruption as well as the procedures and mechanisms encouraging
According to the Transparency International CPI, Poland has been and continues
to be the most corrupt country among the eight post-communist states that joined the EU
in May 2004.105 Due to its size, Poland was also the greatest beneficiary of EU financial
assistance programmes, even though the levels of corruption carried a danger of
misappropriation of the EU pre-accession funds. As a result, the EU had a particularly
strong interest in reinforcing anti-corruption reforms in Poland.
Although it is not entirely possible to isolate the impact of the EU accession on
anti-corruption changes, there are several policy areas where the attention paid by the
Commission acted as a catalyst for change. More precisely, one can see the amendments
introduced to national laws as a result of the duty to comply with the formal acquis in
the area of anti-corruption. For instance, in order to comply with the acquis, Poland had
to introduce a number of amendments to its criminal law. It extended its application to
foreign officials and officials of international organisations, introduced the criminal
liability of legal persons in 2002 and criminalised corruption in the private sector in
2003.106 In order to comply with the requirements of the acquis, Poland had to pass laws
including amendments to the Penal Code, Penal Procedure Law, the law relating to the
fight against unfair competition, the law on public procurement and the law on banking
activities.107 Moreover, Poland signed several international conventions that were part of
the EU acquis108 and which significantly extended the scope of national law.109 It also
104 Interview with Grazyna Kopinska (n 5).
105 For more information, see: Table 7.1 below and
<http://www.transparencv.org/policv_researcli/surveys_indices/qji> accessed 6 December 2007.
106 C. Nowak, Dostosowanie prawa polskiego do intrumentow miqdzynarodowych dotyczqcyh korupcji
(Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, Program Przeciw Korupcji, Warszawa 2004), at 35-78
<http://www.batorv.org.pl/doc/kor_instr.pdf> accessed 6 December 2007.
107 A. Grzelak, 'Poland' in A. Moore (ed) and M. Chiavario, Police andJudicial Co-operation in the
European Union FIDE 2004 National Reports (CUP 2004), 251-270, at 253.
108 Council of Europe Convention on Money Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the
Proceeds from Crime (1998); Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (1999); OECD Convention (2000);
UNCATOC (2000) and Civil Law Convention on Corruption (2001).
109 Nowak (n 106).
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became a member of GRECO in 1999 and participated in the works of the OECD WG.
This kind of intense legislative activity was characteristic of all the CEE countries. As
has been pointed out, ' ...the main outstanding legal and institutional issues for meeting
the European Union's acquis communautaire were better addressed through specific
anti-corruption legislative measures than through high profile anti-corruption
campaigns'.110
In Poland, the desire to join the EU acted as the most important motor of anti-
corruption policy in the period between 2001 and 2004 under the government of Leszek
Miller. The pressure coming from the Commission was a direct reason behind the
adoption of the governments' anti-corruption strategy in September 2002.111 All the
Regular Reports until 2001 repeatedly criticised the Polish government for the lack of a
central and integrated strategy. The 2001 Regular Report on Poland underlined that:
...while efforts were being made to fight against corruption, there appeared to be a lack
of a clear overall strategy. A recently constituted government task force on corruption is
a first step in drawing together the various stands of policy and the actors involved in the
fight against corruption.112
Not only was the strategy adopted as a result of EU pressure, but also the Commission
was the main addressee of it. This was evident from the fact that although the strategy
called for the production of periodical reports on the state of implementation, the
government prepared such a report in 2003 in the English language specifically for the
Commission and without presenting it to the public.113 The impact of the accession
process on the adoption of national anti-corruption strategies was also visible in other
candidate countries. As Steves and Rousso observed, '...the concerns of the European
110 F. Steves and A. Rousso, 'Anti-Corruption programmes in post-communist transition countries and
changes in the business environment, 1999-2002' (2003) EBRD Working Paper No. 85, at 10-11.
111 Interview with Grazyna Kopinska (n 5).
112 Commission (EC), '2001 Regular Report on Poland's Progress Towards Accession', at 21
<rhttp://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/kev_documents/2001/pl en.pdf> accessed 6 December
2007.
113 Interview with Grazyna Kopinska (n 5).
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Commission have been paramount in the crafting of anticorruption policies, and the
Commission has provided extensive assistance for the development of anti-corruption
policy, in particular in the formulation of national anticorruption strategies and action
plans'.114 The assistance in this area was given mainly through the twinning projects.
For Poland, the pressure to reform was also visible in other policy areas, such as
public procurement legislation, judicial and public administration reform, and the fight
against corruption within the police and customs service. The laws on public
procurement, for example, were changed several times to make them compatible with
the acquis in this area. However, as already discussed in Chapter Three, the primary goal
of EU public procurement rules is to ensure equal access for the EU companies to public
contracts in other Member States. Therefore, the insistence of the Commission to
conduct reforms in the area of public procurement was primarily dictated by the need to
ensure fair competition and the proper functioning of the single market rather than
combating corruption as such. The pressure for changes was also strong in regard to the
civil service, police, customs and judiciary.115 Initially, Poland tried to oppose the
inclusion of judicial reform in the accession negotiations, claiming that the EU had
never before judged the functioning of the judicial system in candidate countries.116 The
functioning of the judicial system was, however, always present in the negotiations. The
EU insisted on conducting specific reform in the area of public administration, regarding
topics such as increase in salaries, computerisation and the length of judicial
proceedings.117
114 Steves and Rousso (n 110), at 15.
115 Interview with Grazyna Kopinska (n 5).
116 Interview with Jacek Garstka, Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to the European
Union (1 December 2005, Brussels).
117 For example: Commission of the European Communities , '1998 Regular Report on Poland's Progress
Towards Accession', at 44,
^Kttp://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/kev_documents/1998/poland_en.pdf> accessed 6 December
2q07; Commission (EC), '2001 Regular Report on Poland's Progress Towards Accession', at 87 and 20
^uttp://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/pl_en.pdf> accessed 6 December
2007.
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The EU supported the anti-corruption reforms with significant financial and
training assistance provided under the PHARE programme. Since 1998, anti-corruption
issues were dealt with in twinning programmes carried out by the Police and Border
Guard, but up until 2003 there had been no PHARE programme to assist the
development of general anti-corruption policy in Poland. However, between 2003 and
2006 Poland received four twinning projects in the area of anti-corruption. The first one
was launched in 2003 and aimed at strengthening the implementation of the anti-
corruption strategy.118 The 2003 Regular Report underlined the deficiencies of the
strategy:
The strategy does, in itself, not really deal with high-level corruption, with the exception
of those issues related to the civil service and financial disclosure by public
functionaries. An official implementation report of July 2003 indicates that while
progress in implementing the strategy has been made in a number of areas, the actual
impact has been rather limited. One explanation is that the strategy has been overseen by
an interministerial team without sufficient administrative and political back-up. Another
is the failure to secure broad support for the strategy, which was one of the major
assumptions for ensuring its effectiveness.119
Therefore, the overall objective of the first twinning project was to assist the Polish
government and especially the Ministry of Interior and Administration with the
strengthening of activities undertaken during the implementation of the anti-corruption
strategy. The Polish government was supported by, inter alia, assistance in conducting
legislative changes, the establishment of a monitoring system for the implementation of
the anti-corruption strategy, the training of officials and central administration
responsible for implementation of anti-corruption strategy, and the elaboration of ethical
standards for public administration.120
A second project in this area was launched in 2004 and aimed at further
strengthening the institutional and administrative capacity to prevent and combat
118 Project Fiche, 'Strengthening of the implementation of the Anti-corruption Strategy' 2003/005-
710.01.03 <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_proiet/> accessed 6 December 2007.
119 Commission (n 21), at 16.
120 Project Fiche (n 118).
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corruption.121 The objectives of the project included the evaluation of the legal
regulations and mechanisms favouring corruption, the continuation of works related to
enhancing public awareness, and promoting ethical standards of conduct in the areas of
public life most exposed to corruption, as well as among high-level public officials. Two
more twinning projects have taken place since the accession of Poland to the EU under
the PHARE Transition Facility. The first one was launched in 2005, and in general was a
continuation of two previous projects aimed at combating and preventing corruption in
the public administration.122 The last project was received in 2006 with the primary
purpose of creating the Central Anticorruption Bureau in Poland.123
The influence of the accession process on Polish anti-corruption policy was
important, but limited. The accession process accelerated many important reforms,
especially regarding the civil service, the judiciary and public procurement. Without
accession, the changes would have probably had a slower pace, but nevertheless they
would have occurred.124 The areas of reform indicated by the Commission in the
Regular Reports were high on the government's agenda. The importance of the Regular
Reports is proven by the fact that sometimes experts representing the Polish government
during the negotiations purposefully drew the attention of the EU to a particular problem
so that it could be highlighted in the Regular Reports and trigger a positive reaction from
the Polish government.125
At the same time, however, the Polish experience showed that the Commission
put too little stress on the effective implementation of reforms undertaken by the
governments of the CEE countries. In fact, Pitera argued that the anti-corruption reforms
121 Project Fiche, 'Strengthening of the process of implementation of the anticorruption activities in
Poland' 2004/016-829.05.02 <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_proiet/> accessed 6 December 2007.
122 project Fiche, 'Enhancing anticorruption activities in Poland' 2005/017-488.05.01
<rhttp://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_proiet/document/2005-017-488.05.01%20anti-corruption.pdf>
accessed 6 December 2007.
123 Project Fiche, 'Improvement of the anticorruption activities in Poland' 2006/018-180.05-01
«rhttp://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/2006_018-180%20Anticorruption.pdf> accessed
6 December 2007.
124 Interview with Grazyna Kopinska (n 5).
125 Interview with Jacek Garstka (n 116).
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conducted in Poland on the eve of accession often had merely declaratory character.126
Rose-Ackerman also observed that the EU frequently accepted formal compliance rather
than active implementation.127 For example, even though the Commission knew about
the problems with the actual implementation of the anti-corruption reforms from the
leading NGOs in the Poland, it intentionally did not see the lack of progress and it
tended to focus only on what had been accomplished.128 The political decision to accept
the CEE countries was made. The EU had to allow the CEE to join the EU, as it was
afraid to loose political credibility. Therefore, the Commission could not severely
criticise Poland and then allow it to accede. The case of Poland confirmed that although
the EU was consulting NGOs on the developments of anti-corruption policy in Poland, it
did not recognize their crucial importance or the success of anti-corruption reforms.
Moreover, the Polish government did not treat the involvement of civil society as a
priority area in applying for the EU financial assistance, and there was no separate EU
initiative to support it.129
Shortly before accession, the EU perceived corruption as a serious problem in
Poland. In the last Regular Report the Commission concluded that:
Corruption is perceived to be increasing from an already relatively high level in Poland.
It is considered to affect all spheres of public life. There has been very little progress in
combating corruption, and the existing perception has been borne out in various high
profile corruption cases recently.130
After the accession, EU leverage over anti-corruption reforms came to an end. This area
of policy is now considered to fall entirely under the competence of the Polish
government. The approach of the Commission to the problem of corruption within
Poland after the accession was best illustrated by the fact that when the leading anti-
corruption NGOs in Poland organised a conference on progress in the fight against
126 Interview with Julia Pitera, Transparency International Poland (17 May 2005 Warsaw).
127 S. Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable Government in Hungary and
Poland (CUP 2005) at 46.
128 Interview with Grazyna Kopinska (n 5).
129 Ibid.
130 Commission (n 21), at 16.
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corruption. With the presence of representatives of the World Bank, Transparency
International and GRECO, the Commission's officials refused to come and comment on
the situation in Poland, claiming that, since the accession, this was a purely domestic
matter on which the Commission had no competence to comment.131
Conclusion
The EU policy against corruption developed furthest for the needs of the 2004
enlargement. The candidate countries were under strong political pressure to comply
with the Commission's recommendations set out in the Regular Reports. Because of the
priority accorded to accession by their governments, the EU was able to push anti-
corruption reforms faster than they would otherwise occur. The impact of the accession
process was most visible in the great intensity of legislative changes conducted by the
CEE countries in order to comply with the acquis. In addition, the progress achieved by
the candidate countries in increasing the effectiveness of public administration and the
courts in tackling corruption was to a large extent made possible thanks to EU technical
and financial assistance.
In the long run, the spread of democracy and market-oriented reforms, which
were encouraged by the EU, should reduce corruption.132 One of the most important
factors limiting corruption over time is the existence of a functioning democratic
political order. The democratic form of government, the rule of law, freedom of speech,
a free media and civil society allow the exposure of corruption and create an
environment in which corrupt practices can no longer be tolerated. As observed in
Chapter Four, the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law
was an important condition for EU membership. The prospect of accession was a major
drive behind democratic reforms in the CEE countries, and the fight against corruption
was recognised as one of the most important components of these reforms. If one
131 Interview with Grazyna Kopinska (n 5).
132 K. A. Elliott, 'Corruption as an International Policy Problem' in A.J. Heidenheimer and M. Johnston
(eds), Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts (3rd edn Transaction Publishers New Brunswick 2005),
925-941, at 925.
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accepts that democracy reduces corruption in the long term, then the EU's insistence on
democratic reforms in the pre-accession process and membership in the EU itself both
contributed in a beneficial way to a reduction of corruption in the CEE countries.
As Kaufmann has pointed out, poorly designed and inadequately implemented
market reforms may boost corruption, but well-designed and properly executed market
reforms do not.133 Treisman, in his cross-national study on corruption, concluded that
'democratization has to be radical and long-lived and trade liberalization has to be
extensive to decrease corruption much'.134 The empirical evidence showed that
'countries with the highest degree of economic freedom experienced the lowest levels of
corruption, whereas countries with the least economic freedom experienced the highest
levels of corruption'.135
Although there were clearly many benefits to the fight against corruption as a
result of the accession process, could the EU have done more to stem the tide of
corruption in the CEE countries? The EU policy was characterised by fragmentation and
the lack of a strategic vision on how to fight corruption within the candidate countries.
Although the Regular Reports delivered a comprehensive set of anti-corruption
standards, the EU failed to apply them consistently. According to the OSI report:
The anti-corruption policy measures that the European Commission has tended to
recommend to candidate States have been generally oriented towards a control
paradigm, with a strong emphasis on ensuring that criminal anti-corruption law is
optimal and fully enforced.136
This was due to the fact that the stress during the accession negotiations was on adoption
and implementation of the acquis, which has a strong criminal law character.
133 D. Kaufmann, 'Corruption: The Facts' (1997) Foreign Policy Issue 107, 114-131, at 122.
134 D. Treisman, 'The causes of corruption: a cross-national study' (2000) Journal of Public Economics 76,
399-457, at 401.
135 M.L. Tupy, 'The Rise of Populist Parties in Central Europe. Big Government, Corruption, and the
Threat to Liberalism' (2006) CATO Institute, Centre for Global Liberty & Prosperity Development Policy
Analysis, No. 1, at 15 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/dpa/dpal.pdf> accessed 6 December 2007
136 OSI Report (n 41), at 31.
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Although the EU formulated a fairly comprehensive set of criteria, it was
reluctant systematically to judge the candidate countries on these bases. The important
question is why the EU did not develop a more effective policy in this area? The primary
explanation is the lack of a genuine framework against corruption within the Member
States. The fact that the EU does not have such a policy towards existing Member States,
as well as the fact that none of its Member States has ever been judged on the basis of
similar requirements, seriously undermined the legitimacy of EU anti-corruption
demands, especially those which reached beyond the formal acquis.
The EU did not use its full potential to influence anti-corruption changes in the
CEE countries. It should have used the leverage it had before the accession and
formulated a more coherent and clear anti-corruption framework for the candidate
countries. As already argued in Chapter Five, the EU strategy also lacked a thorough
analysis of the causes of corruption within the CEE countries. In a broad assessment,
the EU approach to the problem of corruption in the CEE countries can be described as
too little and too late. Policy makers in the candidate countries waited for the Regular
Reports to guide them on reforms, but the guidance given in the Regular Reports did not
clearly indicate the substance of reforms or their desirable sequencing.
This approach by the EU was, however, not entirely deliberate. Instead, it seems
that, at the beginning, the EU did not have a clear idea about how to deal with corruption
within the candidate countries. It was a learning process for the EU itself, and the
requirements in this area became gradually more refined as the EU gained more
experience. For example, over time, the Regular Reports contained ever more detailed
descriptions of the existing loopholes in the candidate countries' legislation.
The biggest weakness of the EU strategy was the fact that it ended on the day of
accession of the CEE countries to the EU in May 2004. Although the problems with
corruption remained serious, the EU lost its influence to drive reforms in the CEE
countries, and as in the case of all Member States, now it can only monitor the proper
administration of EU funds. The shortcomings of this EU strategy became particularly
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visible during the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. The next chapter discusses how




The impact of 2004 enlargement on
the EU anti-corruption policy
The accession of the CEE countries to the EU took place despite their continuing
problems with corruption. In the last assessment of the progress made by the CEE
countries in 2003, the Commission concluded that:
With a few notable exceptions, the perception remains that the level of corruption in the
acceding countries is still high, and very high in some cases, and can affect confidence
in the public administration and the judiciary, thereby affecting also the proper
implementation of the acquis. The fight against corruption must therefore remain a
policy priority in the coming years.1
1 Commission (EC), 'Comprehensive Monitoring Report of the European Commission on the state of
preparedness for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia' COM(2003) 675 final, 5.11.2003, at 7-8.
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In addition, in its final report in 2003 the CEWP concluded that corruption was still
widespread in the CEE countries and remained a significant concern.2
Significantly high levels of corruption were confirmed in 2007 by a study
entitled 'Nations in Transit' conducted by the NGO Freedom House Europe3, which
each year assesses the democratic development of twenty nine countries, including all
new Member States. The outcome of the last eight assessments can be seen in Figure
7.1.
Figure 7.1: Corruption in the new Member States
1999-




Bulgaria 4.75 4.75 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.00 3.75 3.75
Czech Rep 3.25 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50
Estonia 3.25 2.75 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2,50 2.50
Hungary 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.00 3.00
Latvia 3.50 3.50 3.75 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.25 3.00
Lithuania 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.50 3.75 4.00 4.00
Poland 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.50 3.00 3.25 3.00
Romania 4.25 4.50 4.75 4.50 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.00
Slovakia 3.75 3.75 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.00 3.00 3.25
Slovenia 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.25 2.25
Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2007
<httD://www.freedomhouse.hu//imaaes/fdh aalleries/NIT2007/corruDtion%20-%20reaional2.Ddf>
accessed 10 December 2007.
The ratings are based on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the
lowest level of democratic progress.4 Freedom House looks at perceptions of corruption,
the business interests of top policy makers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of
interests, and the efficacy of anti-corruption initiatives. From the above ratings, it is
evident that corruption in the CEE countries represents an ongoing challenge. In fact,
2 Council of the European Union, 'Enlargement: statement by the Collective Evaluation Working Party',
14264/1/03,18.11.2003, at 13.
3 For information on Freedom House, see: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/> accessed 10 December 2007.
4 The 2007 ratings reflect the period 1st January through 31st December 2006.
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between the accession to the EU in 2004 and 2007, levels of corruption actually
increased in Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia while they diminished only in
Latvia.
Whereas Chapter Six analysed the response of the EU to the problem of
corruption within the pre-accession process, this chapter focuses on EU initiatives taken
after the 2004 enlargement. Chapter Two and Three both demonstrated that the EU
policy against corruption within existing Member States is very limited and restrained
by a number of legal and political factors. Thus, paradoxically, anti-corruption standards
actually diminished once the CEE countries acceded to the EU. Unlike within the pre-
accession policy, there is no room for practicing double standards towards the CEE
countries now inside the EU, as any new policy developments to address corruption
must apply equally to all Member States. Although the pre-accession process allowed
the EU to identify and address problems in the area of anti-corruption, after accession
the EU lost its leverage over national anti-corruption policies in the CEE countries, and
it can no longer demand reforms in this area. Therefore the EU policy faces an important
challenge: how best to secure the continuity of the anti-corruption reforms and ensure
that the momentum generated by the accession process is not lost. The accession of
Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007 completed enlargement that began in 2004, but it
also made the issue of policy change in this area even more urgent, as both of these two
new Member States possess significantly high levels of corruption.
This chapter argues that the 2004 enlargement, followed by the accession of
Romania and Bulgaria, constitutes an opportunity for the EU to develop a more coherent
policy against corruption. As Chapter Six illustrated, during the 2004 enlargement the
EU was systematically assessing the progress made by candidate countries and
formulating recommendations in case of identified shortcomings. As a result, it gained
valuable experience that should now be used in formulating policy towards all Member
States. In addition, high levels of corruption in some new Member States, which
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endanger the proper functioning of the EU legal system, should motivate the political
will to establish a more comprehensive anti-corruption framework.
The goal of this chapter is to analyse the changes that took place in EU anti-
corruption policy as a result of the 2004 enlargement and elaborate on possible future
developments of this policy. To this end the chapter starts with an analysis of the impact
of the 2004 enlargement on the external policy of the EU. First, it explains how the
experience of the 2004 enlargement strengthened the EU anti-corruption strategy
towards Romania and Bulgaria. Secondly, it shows that the EU decided to change its
strategy towards the existing candidate countries in order to promote anti-corruption
reforms at a very early stage of the accession process. Furthermore, the chapter
illustrates that corruption has also found its place in the external policy of the EU
towards potential candidate countries and within the framework of the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Next, the Chapter moves on to discuss the impact of 2004
enlargement on the internal policy of the EU. It analyses the EU anti-corruption
initiatives after 2004 and points out that the Commission is moving towards developing
a more coherent strategy against corruption within the Member States. Finally, the
chapter examines the arguments for and against a separate EU anti-corruption
framework and argues that the best option is a new anti-corruption policy at the EU level
which could draw from the 'Open Method of Coordination' (OMC).
1. The reinforcement of the EU strategy towards Bulgaria and Romania
The EU did not introduce any mechanism to monitor progress in combating corruption
within the CEE countries after their accession in May 2004. The EU position here
differed from its position towards the old Member States only with regard to continuing
financial support for national anti-corruption projects under the PHARE Transition
Facility, which, as discussed in Chapter Six, expired in 2006. Upon accession the
Commission could, as in relation to any Member State, monitor the implementation of
the acquis with the use of tools available on the basis of the EC and the EU Treaties as
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already discussed in Chapter Three. The detection of corrupt practices in the use of the
EU agricultural or structural funds could also lead to delay in the disbursement of these
funds, financial corrections and recovery of payments by the Commission.5
In addition to the above standard mechanisms, the Treaty of Accession6 with
CEE countries introduced three specific safeguard clauses in matters of the economy, the
internal market and the area of JHA, which could have been applied for three years after
accession and expired in 2007. Any new or old Member State was allowed to invoke an
economic clause in case of serious economic difficulties resulting from accession.7 The
internal market clause could have been invoked when a new Member State caused, or
risked causing, a serious breach of the functioning of the internal market8. The
Commission could then have taken appropriate measures such as excluding this state
from the benefits of certain internal market legislation.9 Finally, the JHA safeguard
measure enabled old Member States to refuse automatic recognition and enforcement of
judgements and arrest warrants from the CEE countries in case of 'serious' or 'imminent
risks' of shortcomings in the transposition, implementation or the application of the
acquis relating to mutual recognition in criminal and civil matters.10
Corrupt practices can undermine the correct implementation of the acquis. They
can also impair the independence and impartiality of the justice system, which is a
necessary prerequisite for implementation of the principle of mutual recognition among
Member States. It would therefore seem that evidence of high levels of corruption was
likely to trigger the application of the JHA clause. However, this was not the case and
this safeguard clause was unlikely to be used to discipline the CEE countries with regard
to their anti-corruption policies. As has been pointed out, the safeguard clauses were
5 Commission (EC), 'Communication from the Commission. Monitoring report on the state of
preparedness for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania' COM(2006) 549 final, 26.9.2006, at 7.
6 OJ L 236, 23.09.2003.
7 Article 37 of the Treaty of Accession.
8 Article 38 of the Accession Treaty.
9 Commission (n 5), at 8.
10 Article 39 of the Treaty of Accession.
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rather an emergency window, and the possibility for invoking them has never been
seriously discussed.11
The situation changed with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in January
2007. Both countries applied for EU membership in 1995 and until 2005 were subject to
the same EU accession policy as the CEE countries that joined in 2004. However, since
2005, when the Treaty of Accession12 with two countries was signed, one could see a
change in the Commission's strategy. Corruption emerged as one of the most serious
issues and a possible obstacle to the accession of both countries. The Commission
started to monitor Romania and Bulgaria more intensely than the 2004 entrants. There
were two very practical reasons for this change: it was easier to monitor only two
countries and the problems of corruption were much more serious.13
However, another contributing factor that led to a more rigorous approach by the
Commission was the change of political climate within the EU. The rejection of the
Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch referendums signalled public disapproval
of many aspects of EU policy, including enlargement.14 In this more difficult political
environment, the Commission was under pressure to provide hard evidence that there
was a commitment to fight corruption in Bulgaria and Romania. It had also learned the
main lesson from the previous enlargement: the need for more intense monitoring to
guarantee that the implementation of anti-corruption measures is effective and brings the
intended results. As a result, the strategy towards Bulgaria and Romania was reinforced
in two ways: by introducing the formal possibility of postponing of accession and by
introducing a verification mechanism to monitor progress in the area of anti-corruption
after the accession process was finished.
11 G. Noutcheva, 'Bulgaria and Romania's Accession to the EU: Postponement, Safeguards and the Rule
of Law' (2006) CEPS Policy Brief No. 102, at 2 <http://shop.ceps.eu/downfree.php?item_id=1329>
accessed 11 December 2007 and K. Inglis, 'The Union's Fifth Accession Treaty: New means to make
enlargement possible' (2004) Common Market Law Review 41, 937-973, at 972.
12 OJ L 157, 21.6.2005.
13 Interview with Sabine Zwaenepoel, European Commission, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and
Security (Brussels, 29 November 2006).
14 'Nervousness about EU enlargement' Financial Times (30 June 2005).
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The accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania were concluded in
December 2004. The Treaty of Accession stated that both countries would join in
January 2007, but it also gave the EU the option to postpone the accession of either
country until January 2008. In particular, the Treaty provided that the Council could,
acting unanimously on the basis of a Commission recommendation, decide to postpone
either country's accession, ' ...if there is clear evidence that the state of preparations for
adoption and implementation of the acquis in Bulgaria or Romania is such that there is a
serious risk of either of those States being manifestly unprepared to meet the
requirements of membership...'15 In addition, the Treaty of Accession expressly
provided for the possibility to postpone of Romania's accession to the EU if the country
failed to meet special anti-corruption commitments.16 Romania was obliged to
considerably step up the fight against corruption, in particular against high-level
corruption, and conduct an independent audit of the results and impact of the national
anti-corruption strategy.17 Article 39(2) of the Accession Treaty provided for the
possibility of postponing the accession of Romania until January 2008, by the Council
acting by qualified majority, if serious shortcomings were observed in the fulfilment of
the above commitments. The difference in treatment between Romania and Bulgaria was
not so much a result of differences in their governance standards, but rather a matter of
perceived political will of their respective governments to tackle problems indicated by
the EU.18 As Lazowski has argued, the postponement clause 'served as a stick to
discipline the forthcoming members in their last minute pre-accession efforts.'19
In addition to the postponement clause, Romania and Bulgaria were also
presented with a list of special anti-corruption commitments to be adhered to after the
15 Article 39(1) of the Treaty of Accession
16 Article 39(2) of the Treaty of Accession
17 Annex IX of the Protocol concerning the conditions and arrangements for admission of the Republic of
Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, OJ L 157/201, 21.6.2005
18 Noutcheva (n 11).
19 A. Lazowski, 'And Then They Were Twenty-Seven... .A Legal Appraisal of the Sixth Accession
Treaty' (2007) Common Market Law Review 44, 401-430, at 416.
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accession negotiations were closed.20 In the previous round of enlargement, only Poland
was presented with one special recommendation concerning the introduction of liability
of legal persons for corruption.21 The list presented to Romania and Bulgaria clearly
indicates that the Commission took a much stronger stance on corruption in this round of
enlargement.
Following the conclusion of the accession negotiations, the EU decided to
monitor closely the state of preparations of Romania and Bulgaria. The Commission was
asked to continue to submit annual reports on Bulgaria's and Romania's progress
towards accession, together with recommendations. The annual reports in 2005 and 2006
highlighted that corruption remained a serious problem in both countries. For example,
in 2005 the Commission noted that in Bulgaria:
...widespread corruption remains a cause for concern and affects many aspects of
society. There is a positive downward trend as far as administrative corruption is
concerned, but the overall enforcement record in the field of corruption remains very
weak.22
With regard to progress made by Romania, the 2005 report observed that:
...corruption remains a serious and widespread problem that affects many aspects of
society. The impact to date of Romania's fight against corruption has been limited, there
has been no significant reduction in perceived levels of corruption and the number of
successful prosecutions remains low, particularly for high-level political corruption.23
In its final report on both countries, adopted in September 2006, the Commission
observed that further progress was still necessary in the area of judicial reform and the
fight against organised crime and corruption.24 In 2006 Commission officials said, for
20 Interview with Sabine Zwaenepoel (n 13).
21 Ibid.
22 Commission (EC), 'Bulgaria 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report', SEC(2005) 1352, 25.10.2005,
at 11.
23 Commission (EC), 'Romania 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report', SEC (2005) 1354, 25.10.2005,
at 13.
24 Commission (n 5), at 4-5.
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example, that '...Bulgaria has not managed to successfully prosecute any of the
estimated 173 contract killings or assassination attempts since 1992.'25 One of the
experts sent by the EU to assess Bulgaria's progress in its fight against organised crime
and corruption, Klaus Jansen, observed that 'the country's efforts to tackle organised
crime were "a total mess", and criminal bosses and people traffickers were going
unpunished.'26 Moreover, he added that his attempts to uncover the truth about the crime
in Bulgaria were frustrated as 'they believed they would get into the EU anyway, and I
encountered a "kiss my ass' attitude" and 'whenever I tried to go into details they said
disclosure was against the national interest. '27A second expert, Susette Schuster, in a
report to the Commission noted that in Bulgaria 'there was "open nepotism" in the
appointment of judges, and that judicial reforms were "chaotic".'28 In comparison to
these alarming unofficial assessments, the Commission reports from 2005 and 2006
appeared to be very carefully worded, as their focus was presumably on preparing public
opinion within the EU for the accession of these two countries.
Despite continuing problems with corruption and the lack of progress noted in
the Commission's reports, to postpone the accession of Bulgaria and Romania until 2008
would have carried considerable political risks. Bulgarian Prime Minister Sergei
Stanishev said that 'a possible postponement will discourage the people who bear the
burden of changes; it will undermine public confidence. This will send a wrong sign to
the western Balkan countries.'29 He further added that 'a postponement would be
perceived as a rejection', and 'it would be a mistake. We are not second-class European
citizens. Do not try to humiliate us.'30 One of the Members of the EP noted that 'the
consequence of postponement would be entirely negative - a slap in the face rather than
25
'Bulgaria: Don't humiliate us' EuroActiv.com (11 May 2006)
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/bulgaria-humiliate-us/article-155156> accessed 11 December
2007.
26




'Bulgarian PM steps up EU pressure' TheParliament.com (15 May 2006)
<http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200605/a33f953a-c9ac-4fb8-8ce6-8bd4a3e2Q99f.htm> accessed 11
December 2007.
30 EuroActiv.com (n 25).
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motivation. A bad signal to the Bulgarian people, it would encourage extremist forces
and shake business confidence.'31 The Guardian observed that delaying membership
might' ...make no difference and might even set back the reform program.'32
The EU acknowledged all these risks and decide not to postpone the accession of
Romania and Bulgaria. Although the two countries did not fulfil the membership
criteria, the EU, as Noutcheva has described it, fell into 'its own "rhetorical trap" from
which there was no easy way out.'33 On one hand, it could not postpone the accession
without losing its credibility, and on the other, the accession of two countries with high
levels of corruption and insufficient frameworks against organised crime could
undermine the functioning of the EU. In addition, as the Economist has noted, one
important argument for allowing Romania and Bulgaria to join was the stability and
prosperity in the eight post-communist countries.34
Ultimately the EU opted for a 'third scenario'. It decided to establish a regime of
post-accession monitoring which no new Member State had ever faced before. Romania
and Bulgaria were allowed to enter the EU under the condition that they would meet
certain anti-corruption 'benchmarks' after the accession35. Benchmarking is defined as
'a system that aims at comparing in a systematic manner organisational processes
and/or performances with the objective of improving these processes and thus creating
new (and higher) standards.'36 (emphasis in original) It was used in the pre-accession
process, but as discussed in Chapter Four, the anti-corruption benchmarks were often
vague and not systematically applied across all candidate countries. The new monitoring
mechanism allows the EU to retain leverage in the area of anti-corruption until three
years after the accession. It has been pointed out that EU acted on an assumption that 'on
31 TheParliament.com (n 29).
32
'Bulgaria and Romania to join EU in 2007 despite corruption fears' The Guardian (4 April 2006).
33 Noutcheva (n 11).
34 'We're off on a European odyssey' The Economist (28 September 2006).
35 Commission (n 5), at 9-11.
36 R.A. Del Sarto, T. Schumacher and E. Lannon, 'Benchmarking Democratic Development in the Euro-
Mediterranean Area: Conceptualising Ends, Means and Strategies' (2007) EuroMeSCo Annual Report
2006, at 16 <http://83.138.170.194/images/04.pdf> last accessed 12 November 2007.
258
balance it may be preferable to work with them when they are inside than to try to push
for reforms from the outside.'37
To push for reforms, the EU not only extended the application of pre-accession
monitoring in time, but also improved it. As observed in Chapter Six, a major weakness
of the EU strategy towards the CEE countries was the lack of clear anti-corruption
benchmarks. On 13 December 2006, the Commission adopted a decision on the basis of
Articles 37 and 38 of the Treaty of Accession, establishing a cooperation and
verification mechanism to review the progress in meeting specific benchmarks in the
area of judicial reform and the fight against corruption in Romania38 and Bulgaria39.
Articles 37 and 38 of the Treaty of Accession contain the same internal market and JHA
safeguard measures as the ones foreseen for the 2004 entrants. If Bulgaria or Romania
failed to address the benchmarks adequately, the Commission may apply these safeguard
measures. Thus, the major difference with the previous enlargement is that insufficient
efforts in combating corruption may lead to the suspension of other Member States'
obligation to recognise judgements and execute warrants issued by either country's
courts or prosecutors falling under the principle of mutual recognition. The safeguard
measure may be invoked up to three years after accession, but it may also be applied
beyond that date until the situation is remedied.40 It has been pointed out that there is
also a possibility to apply more symbolic sanctions, as '...the two countries might be
denied access to some common initiatives and future policies in the area of police and
judicial cooperation... .'41
37 Editorial comments, 'The Sixth Enlargement' (2006) Common Market Law Review 43,1497-1501, at
1499.
38 Commission Decision (2006/928/EC) establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of
progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against
corruption, OJ L 354/56, 14.12.2006.
39 Commission Decision (2006/929/EC) establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of
progress in Bulgaria to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against
corruption and organised crime, OJ L 354/58,14.12.2006.
40 Commission (EC), 'Memo/07/260' (2007)
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/260&format=HTML&aged=Q&lan
guage=EN> accessed 11 December 2007.
' Noutcheva (n 11).
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The benchmarks to be addressed by Romania, as of December 2006, were:
1. Ensure a more transparent, and efficient judicial process notably by enhancing the
capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Report and monitor
the impact of the new civil and penal procedures codes.
2. Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying assets,
incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for issuing mandatory decisions
on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken.
3. Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non-partisan
investigations into allegations of high- level corruption.
4. Take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in particular within the
local government.42
The benchmarks to be addressed by Bulgaria, as of December 2006, were:
1. Adopt constitutional amendments removing any ambiguity regarding the independence
and accountability of the judicial system.
2. Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process by adopting and implementing a
new judicial system act and the new civil procedure code. Report on the impact of these
new laws and of the penal and administrative procedure codes, notably on the pre-trial
phase.
3. Continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance professionalism, accountability
and efficiency. Evaluate the impact of this reform and publish the results annually.
4. Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of high-
level corruption. Report on internal inspections of public institutions and on the
publication of assets of high- level officials.
5. Take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at the borders and
within local government.
6. Implement a strategy to fight organised crime, focussing on serious crime, money
laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on
new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas.43
The above benchmarks call for fundamental reforms. They suggest that neither of the
two countries fulfils the principal membership condition of having an effective and
independent judicial system, which is necessary for implementation of the acquis.
Moreover, in Bulgaria the independence of judiciary was not ensured by the country's
constitutional system.
42 Commission Decision 2006/928/EC.
43 Commission Decision 2006/929/EC.
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Bulgaria and Romania are required to submit reports on their progress in meeting
the benchmarks by the end of March of each year. The Commission can also organise
expert missions to both countries to make its own assessments on the ground and seek
information from other sources, including NGOs.44 On the basis of the national reports
and its own findings, the Commission prepares its own report at least every six months,
which is subsequently communicated to the EP and the Council.45
The Commission received the first reports from Bulgaria and Romania by March
2007 and it subsequently undertook expert missions to both countries in April 2007 to
conduct independent assessments of progress. In June 2007, the Commission delivered
two reports on the progress made by Romania46 and Bulgaria47 on judicial reform,
corruption and, for Bulgaria, also in the area of the fight against organised crime since
their accession in January 2007. The reports were based on a variety of information
sources. The Bulgarian and Romanian governments were a primary source of
information, but the Commission also analysed information received from the EC
Representation Office, Member State diplomatic missions in Bulgaria and Romania,
civil society organisations and expert reports. The reports were subsequently transmitted
to the two governments for the correction of any factual inaccuracies.
The findings made by the Commission with respect to the situation in Romania
and Bulgaria were to a large extent critical and did not support the conclusion that these
countries fulfil the political conditions for membership. While some progress has been
made in adopting legislative measures, the Commission often stressed the need to wait
and see how the implementation of the relevant measures work in practice. For example,
in the report on Romania, the Commission noted that:
44 Commission (EC), 'Questions and Answers' (2007)
<http://ec.europa.eu/dffs/secretariat general/cvm/docs/speaking_notes general 20070706_en.pdf>
accessed 11 December 2007.
45 Article 2 of the Commission Decision 2006/929/EC and 2006/928/EC.
46 Commission (EC), 'Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
Romania's progress on accompanying measures following Accession', COM(2007) 378 final, 27.6.2007.
47 Commission (EC), 'Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
Bulgaria's progress on accompanying measures following Accession', COM(2007) 377 final, 27.6.2007.
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The Romanian Government is committed to judicial reform and cleansing the system of
corruption. In all areas, the Romanian authorities demonstrate good will and
determination. They have prepared the necessary draft laws, action plans and
programmes. However, the real test can only be met through determined implementation
of these actions on the ground every day. There is still a clear weakness in translating
these intentions into results.48
As the Financial Times has observed, after the Romania's accession in January
2007 'reforms aren't on the public agenda any more', and according to business people,
corruption has surged.49
Bulgaria, meanwhile, was seen as meeting only one benchmark. It passed a
constitutional amendment to establish an independent and accountable judiciary. It also
made some progress towards transparency of the judicial process, improving the
professionalism of judges and combating corruption at the border and with local
government. At the same time, however, the Commission pointed out that:
"Contract killings" continue to be of great concern, and in particular most recent killings
of local politicians since January. To date, no prosecution and conviction has taken
place.50
In both countries, the judicial treatment of high-level corruption continued to be a
source ofmajor concern and the progress achieved in the judicial treatment of high-level
corruption was insufficient. The Commission concluded that '...a lot of additional
efforts would be necessary to control corruption and organised crime.'51 Romania and
Bulgaria were also asked to prepare the national action plans by October 2007 showing
how they intended to meet the benchmarks.52
48 Commission (n 46), at 5.
49 G. Parker, K. Hope and Ch. Condon, 'Analysis: Europe's errant entrants' Financial Times (12 June
2007).
50 Commission (n 47), at 20.
51 Commission (n 44).
52 Action Plans <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/cvm/index_en.htm> accessed 11 December
2007.
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The above monitoring exercise is unprecedented at the EU level. It is important
to note that in the last monitoring report in 2006, the Commission specifically mentioned
that food safety, aviation safety and EU agricultural funds also required verification after
accession.53 However, only in the area of judicial reform and the fight against corruption
did the Commission decide to develop a specific verification mechanism.
The post-accession monitoring system differs substantially from the pre-
accession strategy. It involves defining precise policy goals for the new Member States
and monitoring to what extent these goals have been met. The premise of the current
system is simple: setting specific anti-corruption benchmarks, periodical monitoring of
compliance with the benchmarks using independent sources of information and on-the-
spot visits to the country concerned, and, finally providing the financial and technical
assistance to support the necessary reforms.
The Commission's system of benchmarking resembles the Council of Europe's
GRECO evaluations of the Twenty Guiding Principles against Corruption. The
Commission's reports contain much more detailed assessments than any other
documents in the pre-accession process. It appears that the EU realised that the anti-
corruption strategy developed for the purpose of 2004 enlargement policy was
insufficient.
The EU clearly responded to the problem of corruption in Romania and Bulgaria
more seriously than in the previous round of enlargement. The EU policy has become
notably more systematic. Not only did candidate countries have to fulfil more strict
criteria, but also the EU developed clearer guidelines. It has been pointed out that 'the
imposition of this monitoring regime could be interpreted as an admission that the
accession process has failed to ensure that candidate countries meet EU standards.'54
53 Commission (n 5), at 11-12.
54 A. Brown and M. Attenborough, 'EU enlargement: the Western Balkans' (2007) Research Paper 07/27,
House of Commons Library, at 17
<http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2007/rp07-027.pdf> accessed 11 December 2007.
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The former Romanian justice minister, Monica Macovei, who was responsible for the
main anti-corruption reforms in Romania before the accession, admitted that although
the basis was there, the reforms of the judiciary and the fight against corruption must
continue after accession to the EU and that the post-accession monitoring process was
needed.55
To date, the cooperation and verification system has turned out to be ineffective.
As the Economist has noted, there is now a belief that 'Romania and Bulgaria came in
too soon' and have been sliding away from reforms ever since accession.56 The
monitoring process was criticised by the UK, France, the Netherlands and Sweden,
which all claimed that the Commission was not taking the work seriously57.
Commissioner Frattini, who is in charge of reviewing the progress made by the two
countries, was accused of 'growing too close to the governments he was supposed to be
scrutinising', including going on a skiing trip with the Bulgarian interior minister.58
Despite the fact that post-accession monitoring is much more coherent and
potentially could bring more effective results than pre-accession policy, its effectiveness
ultimately depends on the application of sanctions, which is limited for political reasons.
Although in general assessment the efforts undertaken by Romania and Bulgaria since
the accession have been insufficient, the Commission has not recommended invoking
the safeguard clauses foreseen in the Treaty of Accession. The Commission has
observed that sanctions are '...neither necessary nor appropriate at this stage' and
stressed that 'safeguards are not punitive measures to take in case of non-delivery but
are measures of last resort in order to protect the interests of the EU.'59
55 'Interview with Ms Monica Macovei' EUobserver.com (08 January 2007).
56
'Charlemagne: Post-enlargement stress' The Economist (10 November 2007).
57
Parker, Hope and Condon (n 49).
58 Ibid.
59 Commission (n 44).
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The text of the reports was subject to political tension within the Commission.
The Commissioner responsible for JHA, Mr Frattini, suggested introducing changes to
the texts of the reports, admitting that 'the critical remarks are too strong and should be
toned down.'60 Under pressure from Romanian and Bulgarian Commissioners, the words
'no room for complacency' in pursuing reform and fighting corruption were replaced by
a more diplomatic phrase 'there is need to step up efforts.'61 Mr Frattini defended such
moves by saying that it was necessary to choose 'proper language.'62
It therefore seems that the monitoring mechanism relies more on peer pressure,
than on any believable threat of using the safeguard clauses. One could argue that any
pressure for reform would have been more effective if it was used before accession,
when the EU leverage over the domestic policies of Romania and Bulgaria was much
stronger. Although the system was designed to keep the political pressure up, it seems
unlikely, if not impossible, that the Commission will decide to use sanctions now that
these countries have gained the status of Member States.
Above all, this mechanism offers only a temporary push and does not solve the
problem in the long term. It is not realistic to expect that the problems of corruption will
be cured within three years of the accession, before the safeguard mechanism expires.
Moreover, even if the sanctions are applied, they would affect innocent people and
companies, as the court judgments affecting their legal position will not be recognised
elsewhere in Europe.63
The EU decided to create this mechanism in recognition that its framework was
not able to offer a viable solution to the problem of corruption in the Member States. A
60
'Bulgaria and Romania escape sanctions, but not criticism' EUobserver.com (27 June 2007).
61 'Maintain standards' Financial Times (29 June 2007); The Commission however, declared that
'contrary to rumours spread, the reports have not been toned down by the Commission. In fact, the
methodology and political line set by the President of the Commission was clear from the beginning: firm
but fair, a comprehensive approach on the overall reform process without adding any new requirements.'
see: Commission (n 44).
62 'Frattini defends mild stance on Bulgaria and Romania' EUobserver.com (27 June 2007).
63
Parker, Hope and Condon (n 49).
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much better solution would be to develop an anti-corruption framework that evaluates
all Member States on an equal basis, which would remove the controversy of applying
double standards within the EU.
The 2004 and 2007 enlargements provided a number of lessons which are now
being incorporated into the pre-accession strategy towards the candidate countries:
Croatia, Turkey and Macedonia. Although the formal accession negotiations were
launched in October 2005 with Turkey and Croatia, no target dates have been yet set for
their accession. As demonstrated by the World Bank study discussed in Chapter Six
(See: Figure 6.1), the pull of the EU was the strongest when the candidate countries were
still uncertain as to their accession. Therefore, by not setting accession dates, EU
leverage over anti-corruption reforms in these countries remains very strong.
The fight against corruption has already emerged as one of the most important
issues within pre-accession policy. In 2006, the Commission adopted a Communication
in which it advocated more rigorous enlargement strategy.64 In November 2007, the
Commission confirmed that the quality of the enlargement process was improved by
tackling public administration and judicial reform and the fight against corruption at an
early stage of the pre-accession process.65 The Commission recognised the fight against
corruption within the candidate countries as one of the 'top priorities.'66 One of the new
tools introduced in the new enlargement strategy is benchmarking, whereby candidate
countries are expected to demonstrate success in meeting precise benchmarks before the
negotiation chapter can be opened or closed. Another important change is insertion into
the accession negotiations of the new Chapter 23 'Judiciary and Fundamental Rights',
under which the Commission has been monitoring specifically the independence of the
judiciary.67
64 Commission (EC), 'Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007. Including annexed special
report on the EU's capacity to integrate new members' COM(2006) 649 final, 8.11.2006.




67 For example: Commission (EC), 'Croatia Progress Report 2005' SEC(2005) 1424, 9.11.2005, at 83.
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The Commission decided to adopt this more rigorous approach in order to avoid
the lack of progress that the EU experienced in the late stages of Bulgaria's and
Romania's accession negotiations.68 In future, the timetable for accession is likely to
slow down. The EU wants to make sure that all necessary reforms are carried out before
the accession and that unprepared countries will not be allowed to accede. This trend
within accession policy is likely to continue during any future rounds of enlargement
and has important implications for EU policy towards the potential candidate countries
from the Western Balkans.
2. The extension of anti-corruption policy to external relations of the EU
The promotion of the fight against corruption as part of the external policy of the EU is
not a new theme. For example, anti-corruption clauses, which foresee cancellation of
financing in cases of corruption, have been an important element of the EU cooperation
agreements with developing countries. The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000 between
the EU and 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific jurisdictions, states that both parties
undertake to work together to fight against corruption and bribery.69 In particular, the
Cotonou Agreement provides that serious cases of corruption can give rise to a
consultation procedure with the ultimate possibility of suspending assistance.70 As the
Commission has explained, 'the consultation procedure does not apply exclusively when
EC funds are involved but more generally when corruption constitutes an obstacle to the
country's development.'71
68 Commission (n 64), at 5.
69 Article 33(2) of the Cotonou Agreement
<http://ec.europa.eu/development/ICenter/Pdl7agr01_en.pdf> accessed 11 December 2007.
70 Article 97 of the Cotonou Agreement.
71 Commission (EC), 'Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and
the European Economic and Social Committee on a Comprehensive EU Policy Against Corruption',
COM(2003) 317 final, 28.5.2003, at 22.
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Accession policy, however, pushed corruption higher up than ever before on the
EU external policy agenda. Enlargement has been one of the EU's most powerful policy
tools to promote democratic reforms in candidate countries. As a result, the EU is using
mechanisms that worked well within enlargement policy to promote democracy and the
fight against corruption in third countries. This is particularly visible in relations with
potential candidate countries from the Western Balkans and within the framework of the
ENP.
2.1. Potential candidate countries
The inclusion of anti-corruption policy in the pre-accession process has already had one
important practical impact. The EU is using its newly gained experience in the policy
towards potential candidate countries. The Feira European Council in 2000 recognised
that the countries of Western Balkans, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Montenegro and Serbia, are potential candidates for EU membership.72 As a
consequence, the EU has been using the incentive of membership to exert influence on
the domestic policies of these countries.
The strategy towards the Western Balkan countries is known as the Stabilisation
and Association Process and is modelled on the policy tools used during the 2004
enlargement, which were discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. It combines
conditionality, which is necessary for the access to different stages of the Stabilisation
and Association Agreements, and the assistance programmes73, which help each country
to progress towards the requirements of EU membership.74 The Stabilisation and
Association Agreements are seen as 'the most important cornerstone for achieving a
72 Santa Maria Da Feira European Council, Presidency Conclusions, (19 and 20 June 2000), para 67.
73 Financial Assistance for 2000-2006 was offered under the Community Assistance for Reconstruction
Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme and for the period 2007-2013 through Instrument for
Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), based on Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006, OJ L210, 31.7.2006.
74 Commission (EC), 'Report from the Commission. The Stabilisation and Association process for South
East Europe. First Annual Report' COM(2002) 163 final, 3.4.2002, at 4.
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candidate status', and the EU sees them as a chief instrument to ensure reforms.75 The
example for the region has been set by the two Western Balkan countries, Croatia and
Macedonia, which have already gained status as candidate countries.
Another important conditionality instrument is the European Partnership.76 It was
adopted by the Council with the aim of assisting the Western Balkan countries in
preparing for membership by identifying priorities and timetables for reform.77 The
European Partnerships have the same structure and objectives as the Accession
Partnerships used in the accession of the CEE countries. The European Partnership with
Albania, for example, contains a separate section devoted to anti-corruption policy that
includes specific priorities, such as aligning national law to Council of Europe and UN
conventions against corruption, strengthening the institutional capacity to investigate
and prosecute corruption, and enforcing the law on the declaration of assets.78 The
European Partnerships with the remaining Western Balkan countries contain similar
provisions relevant to the needs of a particular country. Unlike the Accession
Partnerships for the CEE countries and Bulgaria and Romania, which were concluded
around the time when the accession negotiations were opened, the European
Partnerships prioritise anti-corruption reforms much earlier, even before a country gains
a candidate status. The EU is also using twinning, another instrument developed for the
needs of 2004 enlargement, to strengthen the Western Balkan countries' administrative
and judicial capacity.
75 F. Trauner, 'EU Justice and Home Affairs Strategy in the Western Balkans. Conflicting Objectives in
the Pre-Accession Strategy' (2007) CEPS Working Document No. 259, at 7
<http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1469> accessed 11 December 2007.
76
European Partnerships <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/reports_nov_2007_en.htm>
accessed 11 December 2007.
77 Council Regulation (EC) No 533/2004 of 22 March 2004 on the establishment of European partnerships
in the framework of the stabilisation and association process, OJ L 86/1, 24.3. 2004.
78 Council Decision of 30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the
European Partnership with Albania and repealing Decision 2004/519/EC, OJ L35/1, 7.2.2006.
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Moreover, since 2002, the Commission has been assessing the performance of
these countries in annual progress reports.79 Similar to the Regular Reports, each of the
progress reports contains a section evaluating anti-corruption policy. In its first progress
report on the situation in the Western Balkan countries, the Commission noted that:
Corruption is a severe problem throughout the region and a basic feature of the political
landscape. Its sheer scale and links with organised crime undermine basic public
confidence in political and constitutional order in a region where these are already
fragile for other reasons. It also deters foreign investment. Efforts are being made to
address this in some countries; but these efforts have not yet generated the momentum
needed to persuade politicians that this is a serious obstacle to moving closer to the
EU.80
The fight against organised crime and corruption in the Western Balkans countries is one
of the priorities of EU external policy in the area of JHA.81 In 2006 the Council adopted
the Action Plan, which invited the Western Balkan countries to develop and implement
national anti-corruption action plans and create independent bodies for the prevention,
investigation and prosecution of corruption.82 The fight against corruption is also one of
the areas of action under the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe initiated by the EU
in 1999.83 As Trauner has put it, the Stability Pact is 'a framework agreement to
streamline the existing efforts in the region and to develop a shared strategy among all
actors for stability and growth in south-eastern Europe.'84
The EU policy towards the countries of the Western Balkans and the prospects it
offers are serving as catalyst for reform in the same way the accession process did in the
CEE countries. However, the application of the EU pre-accession framework to this
79
Progress Reports <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/kev_documents/reports_nov_2007_en.htm>
accessed 11 December 2007.
80 Commission (n 74), at 10.
81 Council of European Union, 'A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security
and Justice', 15446/05, 6.12.2005.
82 Council of the European Union, 'Action Oriented Paper on Improving Cooperation, on Organised
Crime, Corruption, Illegal Immigration and Counter-terrorism, between the EU, Western Balkans and
relevant ENP countries', 9272/06,12.5.2006, at 9.
83 For more information on the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative, see:
<http://www.stabilitvDact.org/anticorruDtion/default.asp> accessed 11 December 2007.
84
Trauner (n 75), at 9.
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regional setting suffers from two major shortcomings, namely the EU 'commitment
deficit', which generates doubts about the credibility of the EU membership promise,
and the uncertain timeframe within which compliance with EU rules will be rewarded.85
It has been pointed out that' ...without the ultimate prospect of full membership, or even
the prospect that this may be significantly delayed or reduced to some form of privileged
partnership, there is a danger that internal reforms in the Western Balkans could slow
down, stall, or even regress.'86 As the Economist has observed, the security and stability
of the Western Balkans depends on holding out the promise of joining the EU one day.87
The political context was different for Bulgaria and Romania, whose accession
was seen as a completion of the 2004 enlargement. As has been observed, the EU set a
date for their accession for 2007 ' ...partly to console them over the fact that they were
not included in the first wave of enlargement in 2004....'88 However, as some authors
noted, 'Bulgarian and Romanian accession is seen by some as a lesson in how not to
enlarge the EU.'89 This may undermine the prospects for accession of the Western
Balkans countries and the EU may not be willing to give them sufficient incentives to
ensure the continuity of reforms in the region.
2.2. European Neighbourhood Policy
The ENP was developed in 2004 to provide a framework for the development of a
relationship with third countries which would not include the prospect of membership. It
governs the EU relations with Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia90,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria,
85
Ibid, at 12.
86 Brown and Attenborough (n 54), at 24.
87 'In praise of enlargement' The Economist (28 September 2006).
88 House of Lords, 'The Further Enlargement of the EU: threat or opportunity?' (2006), 53rd Report of
Session 2005-06, at 36.
89
Parker, Hope and Condon (n 49).
90 The EU also supports the anti-corruption reforms in Georgia within the framework of EU Rule of Law
Mission, Eujust Themis on the basis of Council Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP, OJ L 228, 29.6.2004. For
the assessment, see: Council of the European Union, 13751/1/04,10.09.2007.
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Tunisia and Ukraine.91 On one hand, this policy is intended to reassure current Member
States that the EU will not continue enlarging indefinitely; on the other, it offers the
ENP countries a process of integration that does not prejudge which of them might
someday join the EU.92
The EU has modelled the ENP on the enlargement process.93 It is using
conditionality to strengthen the ENP countries' commitment to democratic reforms. The
EU offers to step up cooperation and to allow progressive integration into certain
policies and programmes, depending on the fulfilment of these commitments. The
countries that promote more shared values get priority in financial support, as well as
greater and speedier access to the internal market.94 The participation in the internal
market depends on meeting agreed targets for reform.
The use of enlargement templates is especially visible in the Action Plans and
progress reports that were drawn up. The Action Plans have been adopted since 2004,
and they establish key priorities to be addressed in the years ahead by the ENP
countries.95 Priorities for action focus on political reforms similar to those aimed at
candidate countries. They intend to strengthen the commitment to democracy and the
rule of law, including the reform of the judiciary, the fight against corruption and the
development of civil society. Unlike during the accession process, however, the EU
develops the policy targets in close cooperation with the partner countries themselves.
As has been discussed in Chapter Four, the EU defined membership conditions in a
unilateral way and they were not subject to negotiations with the candidate countries.
Within the ENP policy, however, the EU is not only consulting the countries involved,
but also asks international organisations, such as the Organization for Security and
91
More information available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm> accessed 12 November
2007.
92 H. Grabbe, 'How the EU should help its neighbours' (2004) CER Policy Brief, at 1
<http://www.cer.org.uk/pdl/policvbrief_eu_neighbours.pdf> accessed 11 December 2007.
9j
J. Kelley, 'New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European
Neighbourhood Policy' (2006) Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44 No. 1, 29-55.
94
Ibid, at 36-37.
95 Action Plans <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#2> accessed 11 December 2007.
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Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, and the International Labour
Organisation for assistance with establishing benchmarks.96 As the Commission has
admitted, the EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners and
there is no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities.97 The
involvement of national governments in setting the reform agenda ensures greater
commitment to the reforms and more effective implementation of these priorities.
The Action Plans contain specific sections devoted to the area of anti-corruption
and list many specific recommendations in this area.98 The most consistently applied
indices include: the alignment of the national law in accordance with the relevant
international instruments in this area, development of codes of ethics for public officials,
regulation of conflict of interests, implementation of the recommendations of GRECO,
effective implementation of the anti-corruption strategy and an increase the public
awareness in the area of anti-corruption. The ENP progress reports evaluate annually the
progress in implementing the Action Plans in the same way as were the Regular Reports
used in the 2004 enlargement99. They briefly describe the progress made by each
country in the fight against corruption and identify the remaining areas where
improvement is necessary.
The EU also provides the ENP countries with technical and financial assistance
to support reforms indicated by the Action Plans. The main financial instrument is the
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, which aims at supporting
initiatives promoting the rule of law and good governance, including the fight against
96 Commission (EC), 'Wider Europe- Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern
and Southern Neighbours' COM(2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003, at 16.
97 Commission (EC), 'European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper' COM(2004) 373 final, 12.5.2004,
at 8.
98
For example: EU/Armenia Action Plan, at 13-14
<http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf> accessed 11 December
2007.
99
Progress Reports <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#2> accessed 11 December 2007.
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corruption.100 The EU is also promoting institutional models in the ENP countries
through twinning.101
The EU thus has a great political capacity to influence the development of anti-
corruption policies far beyond its borders. It remains to be seen, however, whether the
ENP will be able to produce similarly positive effects to those achieved within the pre-
accession policy. There is a risk that without the incentive of membership, the countries
may not be motivated enough to undertake difficult domestic reforms. This in particular
applies to anti-corruption reforms, which are often politically sensitive and require long-
term commitment on the side of governments. An additional problem is that compared
to the EU candidate countries,' ...the ENP countries are starting out with lower points of
democracy, human rights, labour rights and law and order.'102 As Grabbe has pointed
out, to achieve success without offering the prospect of accession, the EU must give
'specific rewards in return for specific improvements, with clear conditions and
benchmarks to measure progress, rather than vague promises of "launching a dialogue"
on various issues.'103
The consistent inclusion of anti-corruption policy in the EU programme for third
countries once again confirms that the EU sees the fight against corruption as an
indispensable element of a functioning democratic system. The accession policy has had
a great impact on advancing the issue of corruption in the external policy. The next
section discusses whether similar developments are taking place in the EU policy
towards the Member States.
100 Article 2(d) of the Regulation (EC) of 24 October 2006 laying down general provisions establishing a
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument No 1638/2006, OJ L 310/1, 9.11.2006.
101 N. Wichmann, 'The Intersection between Justice and Home Affairs and the European Neighbourhood
Policy: Taking Stock of the Logic, Objectives and Practices' (2007) CEPS Working Document No. 275, at
10 <http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_1546.pdf> accessed 11 December 2007.
102
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3. The anti-corruption policy after the 2004 enlargement
Without a specific mechanism allowing the EU to discipline post-2004 Member States
to continue their anti-corruption reforms, the only option left was to introduce a new
framework that would allow for the evaluation of the anti-corruption policies of all
Member States. The 2004 enlargement, however, did not bring about any immediate
changes in the EU policy against corruption within the Member States. Nevertheless,
subsequent policy developments in this area suggest that the EU may be moving towards
a much more comprehensive policy.
The importance of the prevention of, and fight against, corruption was underlined
in 2004. That year, a five-year programme for EU action in the area of JHA, the so-
called Hague Programme was launched.104 One of the initiatives foreseen by the Hague
Programme was the development of a strategic concept on tackling organised crime and
an examination of the links between corruption and organised crime.
In 2005, the Commission presented the Communication on developing a strategic
concept on tackling organised crime105, which provided for some important
developments in the area of anti-corruption. The Commission recognised that corruption
is the key tool by which organised crime infiltrates the legal markets and recommended
'...further development and implementation of a comprehensive EU anti-corruption
policy including criminal law measures, the promotion of ethics and integrity in public
administration and improved monitoring of national anti-corruption policies in the
context of EU and international obligations and other standards...'106
104 Council of the European Union, 'The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in
the European Union' 16054/04,13.12.2004.
105 Commission (EC), 'Developing a strategic concept on tackling organized crime' COM(2005) 232 final,
2.6.2005.
106 Ibid, at 4.
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Additionally, in order to improve knowledge of the links between corruption and
organised crime, in 2006 the Commission recommended the development of crime
statistics, including on corruption, in collaboration with Member States, using the
Community Statistical Programme as needed.107 Development of common statistics on
corruption would enable the Commission and the Member States to gain a clearer
understanding of the corruption phenomenon. As already discussed in Chapter One,
there is no single universally agreed definition of corruption. As a result, the Member
States may differ not only in defining corruption, but they might also have a variety of
statistical collection procedures to measure the extent of corruption in their countries.
Colleting evidence on the scale of corruption is problematic. In its policy towards the
candidate countries, the EU often relied on the indexes produced by TI, which do not
measure the actual extent of corruption, but only the perception of the problem. In
relation to the Member States, the EU must justify every new initiative in the light of the
principle of subsidiarity, and it would be difficult to propose new anti-corruption
measures at the EU level based exclusively on the perception of the problem.
Developing comparable statistical information on the trends and levels of corruption
would help to assess whether corruption constitutes a problem across the EU, and
reliable evidence may convince the Member States that more coordinated action against
corruption is needed.108
In response to the Hague Programme, the Commission also presented the Action
Plan, which listed the main actions and measures to be taken over the years 2005-2009,
including specific deadlines for their presentation to the Council and the EP.109 In the
area of anti-corruption, two specific measures are proposed by the Commission: the
107 Commission (EC), 'Developing a comprehensive and coherent EU strategy to measure crime and
criminal justice: An EU Action Plan 2006 - 2010' COM(2006) 437 final, 7.8.2006.
108 The Commission already sponsored a study in December 2005/April 2006 on five types of crime,
including corruption. It was conducted by Transcrime, the Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime.
The aim of the study was to collect data on corruption and highlight similarities and differences in the way
the Member States have defined and collected the statistics and propose harmonised definitions and
collection procedures, see: <http://www.transcrime.unitn.it/tc/507.php> accessed 11 December 2007.
109 Commission (EC), 'The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years. The Partnership for
European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice' COM(2005) 184 final, 10.5.2005.
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examination of the need for codes of conduct on ethics and integrity for public officials
and consideration of whether to introduce obligations on certain categories of officials
with regard to reporting bribery as well as disclosure of assets and business interests.110
More importantly, the Commission also plans to evaluate Member States' anti-
corruption policies in 2009.111 It remains to be seen what the practical impact of the
above instruments will be, but they need to be assessed very positively. They all would
take EU policy beyond regulation of cross-border corruption and aim at influencing the
content of national anti-corruption strategies.
One of the most important initiatives under consideration within the Council is
setting-up a network among anti-corruption authorities (including police, judicial,
prosecutorial and customs authorities) at EU level with a target date of 2008.112 In 2005
a proposal was made by Austria, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg and
Slovakia for a Council Decision to establish the European Anti-Corruption Network
(EACN).113 It was proposed that the EACN would be composed of contact points
designated by each Member State and OLAF with the main task being to 'contribute to
developing the various aspects of the fight against corruption at Union level' and to
'support anti-corruption activities at national level.'114 The EACN would facilitate co¬
operation, contacts and exchanges of experience among Member States, national
organisations, OLAF, the Commission, Council, and other groups of experts and
networks specialising in anti-corruption matters.115 It would also enhance international
cooperation which may include holding conferences, organising exchange of staff
between the relevant organisations in the Member States, developing common training
programmes and establishing of minimum standards for codes of ethics.116
""
Ibid, at 22.
111 Ibid, at 24.
112 Ibid, at 25.
113 Council of the European Union, DRAFT 'Council Decision on the setting up of a European Anti-
Corruption Network' 15629/05,14.12.2005 (DRAFT EACN Decision).
114 Article 3(1) of the Draft EACN Decision
115 Articles 2 and 3(2)(a) of the Draft EACN Decision
116 Article 3 (2)(b) of the Draft EACN Decision
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The above initiative did not ultimately succeed as some Member States felt it was
too formalised.117 Since then, the need for a network of contact points has been
expressed repeatedly, in particular by OLAF.118 In 2007 Germany presented an amended
proposal for a contact-point network against corruption, which has a much more limited
scope and is less ambitious than the proposal for the EACN.119 Although the original
proposal clearly stated that the activities of the EACN would not affect the national
competences in the area of anti-corruption, as the network would operate on voluntary
basis and be subject to national legislation120, there was potential for it to play a greater
role. The EACN was required to submit a report to the Council on its activities each
year, indicate the areas for priority action, and ask the Council to take note of the report
and forward it to the EP.121 Furthermore, it was proposed that the EACN would collect
information on anti-corruption activities, evaluate it to determine the best practices and
provide expertise to the Council and to the Commission in all matters concerning
corruption.122 There was therefore a chance that the reports and evaluations of the
EACN would act as a catalyst for a change in EU policy. The EACN could report to the
Council on any shortcoming in the national policies and lobby for coordinated EU action
in this area.
The new proposal from 2007 abandons these potentially far-reaching provisions.
Instead, it provides for the creation of a less formal contact-point network against
corruption, which would consist of national authorities and agencies charged with
preventing and combating corruption. It is proposed that the new network should have
two main tasks: it should constitute a forum for the exchange of information on effective
measures against corruption, and it should facilitate the establishment of contacts among
117 Council of the European Union, 'Draft Council Decision on a contact-point network against corruption'
6589/3/07,13.6.2007.
118 Ibid.
119 Council of the European Union, 'Initiative of the Republic of Germany with a view to the adoption of a
Council Decision on a contact-point network against corruption' 11202/07, 25.6.2007 (the New Proposal).
120 Article 3(2) of the Draft EACN Decision.
121 Article 3(2)(e) of the Draft EACN Decision.
122 Article 3 (2)(d) of the Draft EACN Decision.
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its members.123 The changes introduced to the proposal show the reluctance of Member
States to reinforce substantially cooperation in this area.
The contact-point network against corruption is not a new concept at the EU
level. An informal network already exists in the form of the European Partners Against
Corruption (EPAC).124 The general objectives of EPAC include the exchange of
experiences and best practices among agencies combating corruption in Member States.
The new network would build on the existing informal structure of EPAC.125 Among the
most important benefits of the formalisation of such cooperation is that it would bring
increased commitment from Member States towards the network's programme, and thus
lead to more efficient fulfilment of policy objectives.
The proposal also provides that the network would operate without prejudice to
the European Police College126, which already provides training of police in the area of
corruption and financial crime. A question arises as to the possible overlap in the work
of the new contact-point network with other similar initiatives at the pan-European level.
This particularly applies to the Council of Europe's GRECO, the OECD WG and the
Working Group on the Review of Implementation of the UNCAC. All these initiatives
cover geographical areas that are larger than the EU. A separate network at the EU level
needs to avoid overlapping with these initiatives, but it can also deliver an added value,
as it would provide a more accurate and comparable EU-wide view of the situation. The
anti-corruption network would be in better position to reflect the political priorities of
the EU.
123 Article 3 of the New Proposal.
124 For more, see: <http://www.epac.at> accessed 11 December 2007. The exchange of knowledge and
best practice is also taking place within the European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption Network
(EHFCN), which includes some of the Member States, regions and candidate countries; see:
<http://www.ehfcn.org/index.asp> accessed 11 December 2007.
125 The original proposal for the EACN was based on the recommendation of the 4th EPAC-Conference in
2004, see <http://www.epac.at/download/vienna_declaration.pdf> accessed 11 December 2007.
126 For more information see: <http://www.cepol.europa.eu/> accessed 11 December 2007.
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If the current proposal is accepted by the Council, it will mean that the Member
States chose a less ambitious option, as the network's role will be restricted to the
collection of information as well as the monitoring and comparison of developments in
the area of anti-corruption. The network will not be well placed to contribute to the
developments of EU policy. In contrast, the original proposal implied a more permanent
structure and offered a better chance for the network's view to be taken into
consideration by the EU.
Nonetheless, this initiative, however limited, is a very positive development. It
would contribute to the exchange of best practices and information on the ways in which
Member States respond to corruption, and it would also support the efforts of domestic
officials vis-a-vis their own governments. The network may also be a pilot project for
more enhanced cooperation in this area. A comparison can be drawn to other policy
areas, such as migration, where cooperation among the Member States started in 2002
through an informal contact-points network and in 2007 the Commission proposed the
creation of a more ambitious European Migration Network.127
4. Possible developments
Survey evidence in 2007 (See: Table 7.1) showed that corruption remains an ongoing
challenge within the EU. It is seen to be a problem in most of the new Member States,
but is generally no worse than in some longer established Member States, in particular
Greece, Italy and Portugal128. Moreover, corruption is perceived to be widespread in the
three candidate countries: Turkey, Croatia and Macedonia.
127 Commission (EC), 'Proposal for a Council Decision Establishing a European Migration Network, Ex
Ante Evaluation of the Feasibility of a European Migration Network' COM(2007) 466 final, 10.8.2007.
128 It is worthy of note that in 2007 Transparency International emphasised the 'significant improvement'
made by the Czech Republic, Italy and Romania which were ranked at 46, 45 and 84 respectively in
Transparency International CPI 2006, see: Transparency International CPI 2007 Regional Highlights
<www.transparencv.org> accessed 11 December 2007.
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Table 7.1: Member States and candidate countries in the Transparency
International CPI 2007





































Source: TI survey of 179 countries
<http://www.transparency.Org/policy_research/surveys__indices/cpi/2007:s-last accessed 8 November 2007
As a result of accession, the EU lost its leverage over the national anti-corruption
policies of new Member States. As has been pointed out, 'it's a cruel irony that the EU
has maximum leverage in questions of corruption performance before accession, but
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once countries are in the Union, where money, goods, people - and problems - can move
freely, the influence drops to almost zero. This has to change.'129
As observed in Chapter Three, the EU does not have a framework to discipline
the Member States with regard to corruption. The monitoring of democracy and the rule
of law among the Member States is prescribed by Article 7 EU Treaty, which provides a
legal basis for sanctioning Member States that are found to be in breach of the rule of
law. On the basis of this Article, in the case of a serious and persistent breach of the rule
of law, the Council may decide to suspend certain rights of a Member State, including
voting rights in the Council. The procedure, however, is not likely to be used even in
cases of widespread corruption occurring within the political or economic system of a
Member State. Sanctioning a Member State is a highly politicised process. As indicated
in Table 7.1, many Member States are perceived to face similar corruption problems,
and it would be politically implausible to single out and sanction only one of them.
Although the problems of corruption are not confined to the new Member States,
it is particularly important to maintain high anti-corruption standards in these countries
after their accession. Central and Eastern Europe have been through a successful
democratic transition, but the consolidation of democracy has not yet been fully
achieved and will take a few more decades. The fight against corruption constitutes a
crucial element of this process. If the irreversibility of anti-corruption reforms is not
ensured, there is a danger of seriously undermining the quality of democratic changes in
these countries. Successful anti-corruption reforms require years of commitment and
monitoring. Lack of an anti-corruption strategy within the EU endangers the success of
anti-corruption reforms promoted by the EU during the enlargement.
EU initiatives, such as the development of a post-accession evaluation
mechanism for Romania and Bulgaria, the insertion of the safeguard clauses into the
129 Transparency International, Press Release, (27 June 2007)
<http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2007/2007_Q6_27_bulgaria_romani
a accession eu> accessed 11 December 2007.
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Treaty of Accession and the provision of financial support for anti-corruption efforts
after accession, suggest that the EU was aware that problems of corruption would persist
and did not consider its role in this area as finished. Combating corruption must be an
ongoing priority. The levels of corruption in some Member States may constitute an
obstacle to the effective implementation of the acquis. The high-level corruption carries
the risks that police information shared among the authorities of Member States may be
communicated to organised groups. Also, corruption is likely to endanger the proper use
of EU funds. In fact, if appropriate preventive measures are not taken, the EU financial
assistance could reinforce corruption and deprive societies of the benefits of accession.
Corruption in the public procurement process has the potential to undermine fair
competition within the internal market.
The current EU policy framework cannot meet the above challenges. There are
basically two ways in which the EU can address the current problems. It can either
cooperate more closely with the Council of Europe or develop its own framework that
would allow supervision of the Member States' anti-corruption strategies. The following
sections explore these two alternatives.
4.1. Arguments for a closer cooperation with the Council of Europe
Closer cooperation with the Council of Europe in the area of anti-corruption should be
considered in the broader context of networking between the EU and the Council of
Europe. One of the most important examples of such networking is the issue of the
Community's accession to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).130 In the
event of accession, the European Court of Human Rights would carry out judicial
control regarding the respect for fundamental rights by the EU institutions, taking
precedence over the ECJ in this area.131
130 Council of Europe, 'Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' ETS
No. 005 (adopted 1 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953).
131 In the Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR 1-1759, the ECJ concluded that under the current Treaties, the
Community had no competence to accede to the ECHR. An explicit authorization enabling the Union to
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Similar to its role in the area of human rights, the Council of Europe has
developed the most comprehensive anti-corruption framework at the pan-European
level. Therefore, instead of developing a separate framework in this area, the EU could
cooperate more closely with the Council of Europe and its monitoring mechanism
GRECO. That would also be in line with the premise of the EU policy against
corruption, which is to build upon other international initiatives and avoid unnecessary
duplication. Relying on the Council of Europe's mechanism may also be the only viable
option if there is no political will to set up a separate anti-corruption framework at the
EU level.
As discussed in Chapter One, GRECO evaluates its member countries'
compliance with the Council of Europe anti-corruption instruments, including the
Twenty Guiding Principles for the fight against corruption. It is the most comprehensive
monitoring mechanism in Europe, and as of 30 November 2007 providing evaluations
for 46 member countries. Accession to GRECO was one of the conditions of EU
membership, and all the Member States are parties to it. GRECO operates on an
intergovernmental basis, and closer cooperation between the EU and GRECO could
possibly increase the influence of the GRECO monitoring mechanism across the
Member States. A closer cooperation with the EU would allow for identifying problems
common to all Member States and this in turn may encourage Member States to address
these problems at the EU level.
One of the options considered at the EU level is the accession of the Community
to the Council of Europe anti-corruption conventions and GRECO, which was proposed
by the Commission in 2003.132 The statute of GRECO provides for the possibility of
accede to the ECHR is introduced in the Article 6 (2) of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, (2007) CIG 14/07
<http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf> accessed 11 December 2007.
132 Commission (n 71), at 9.
284
Community participation in its work.133 Also, the Council of Europe's Civil Law
Convention134 in Article 18 and Criminal Law Convention135 in Article 33 provide for
specific accession clauses for the Community. Membership in GRECO follows
automatically from accession to both conventions.136 Under the current Treaties, only the
Community has a competence to become a party to the Council of Europe
instruments.137 However, it is important to note that the Treaty of Lisbon changes this
situation, as the Union as a whole is given a single legal personality to take on
• • 138
international obligations.
The terms and modalities of the Community's membership in GRECO are not
prescribed in advance and are subject to negotiations between the EU and the Council of
Europe.139 One may, however, speculate about the political and legal implications of an
eventual accession to GRECO. The central question is whether the Community's
accession to GRECO would reinforce the monitoring of Member States' anti-corruption
policies. Considering the very limited competence of the Community in the area of anti-
corruption, as discussed in Chapter Two, such a development is unlikely. A comparison
can be drawn to the participation of the Commission in FATF, which, as observed in
Chapter One, monitors members' progress in implementing anti-money laundering
measures. As a result of this participation, as explained in Chapter Three, the
Community has brought anti-money laundering Directives in line with the latest FATF
standards. However, in the area of anti-corruption, the Community has much more
133 Article 5 of the Statute of GRECO, Council of Europe, Appendix to Resolution (99) 6
<http://www.coe.int/t/dgl/greco/documents/statute_en.asp> accessed 10 December 2007.
134 Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No.: 174 (adopted 4 November 1999,
entered into force 1 November 2003) (the Civil Law Convention)
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=174&CM=l&DF=7/ll/2007&CL=
ENG> accessed 6 December 2007.
135 Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No.: 173 (adopted 27 January 1999,
entered into force 1 July 2002) (the Criminal Law Convention)
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=173&CM=:l&DF=7/ll/2007&CL=
ENG> accessed 9 December 2007.
136 Article 32 of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and Article 15 of the Civil Law Convention.
137 Article 281 EC Treaty.
138 Article 46A of the Treaty of Lisbon.
139 Article 5 of the Statute of GRECO.
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limited competence. Therefore, the reinforcement of GRECO evaluations with the use of
Community sanctions under the current Treaties is not legally feasible.
The Community can accede to the Council of Europe Conventions and GRECO
only within the limits of its competence. The external competence of the Community is
limited by the principle of attributed powers (Article 5 EC) and by the competence
which it may exercise in accordance with the objectives set by the EC Treaty.140 The
Commission outlined the Community's competences in the area of anti-corruption in
2006 on the occasion of accession to UNCAC.141 On that basis it is possible to assess to
what extent the Community would be able to apply the provisions of the Council of
Europe instruments.
As in the case of accession to UNCAC, the Community could apply the relevant
provisions of the Council of Europe instruments to its own administration. For example,
as far as Twenty Guiding Principles are concerned, Principle No 7 relates to the
specialisation of bodies in charge of fighting corruption and providing them with
appropriate means and training to perform their tasks. If the Community were to become
a member of GRECO, its anti-corruption body OLAF should become subject to an
evaluation process. In addition, the Twenty Guiding Principles contain recommendations
on public procurement and audit which could be applied to the Community.
Apart from the above, the majority of areas covered by the Council of Europe's
instruments fall under the competence of the Union142 or the Member States.143 In
140 I. Govaere, J. Capiau and A. Vermeersch, 'In-Between Seats: The Participation of the European Union
in International Organizations' (2004) European Foreign Affairs Review 9:155-187, at 158.
141 Commission (EC), 'Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European
Community, of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption' COM(2006) 82 final, 2.3.2006,
Annex II.
142 For example: Principle 2 on criminalisation of international corruption or Principle 4, which requires
adoption of measures for the seizure and depravation of the proceeds of corruption offences. These matters
are regulated by the third pillar instruments, as already discussed in Chapter Three. In addition provisions
of the Criminal Law Convention including criminalisation of bribery and laundering of proceeds from
corruption, corporate liability and international cooperation are also addressed under the third pillar
instruments.
286
recognition of that, the Community's accession to the Council of Europe Conventions
and resulting membership in GRECO has not been further pursued by the Commission,
and it was recognised that the necessary legal basis does not exist to support such an
application at this point.144
Given the very limited competence of the Community, one can conclude that
accession to the Council of Europe instruments would not result in a significant change
in the EU policy towards Member States. Such accession should, however, be strongly
advocated for other reasons. It would certainly enhance the legitimacy of the EU
framework against corruption within its institutions. The quality of the Community's
staff regulations, codes of conduct, public procurement and audit regulations would be
subject to the detailed and impartial control of GRECO. It would also send an important
signal to the Member States and possibly increase their cooperation with GRECO.
Furthermore, a long term benefit could come from the Community's participation in the
future development of the Twenty Guiding Principles.
Cooperation with GRECO should be reconsidered by the Commission if the
Treaty of Lisbon is ratified and the Union is given a single legal personality. The
accession of the Union to GRECO would bring more significant results. This potential
gain derives from the fact that, as already discussed in Chapter Two, the Union has
much broader competence in this area.
4.2. The case for a separate EU anti-corruption framework
Given the extensive activity of the Council of Europe, why should the EU develop a
separate anti-corruption framework at all? In the area of JHA, the Council of Europe has
143 The good example of that is Principle 6 on limiting immunity from investigation and prosecution of
corruption or Principle 15 on regulation of political party financing.
144 Statement by Lucinda Mac Mahon, European Commission Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and
Security (Personal email correspondence 5 September 2007).
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been an important 'laboratory of cooperation'.145 As already noted in Chapter Three, the
EU often built upon the instruments of the Council of Europe and made them more
binding among Member States. As Monar has observed, the Member States often
realised that '...some of the interests they had in common could not be adequately
pursued within the larger framework of the Council of Europe with its great diversity of
interests and heavy and lengthy negotiation procedures', and therefore, they moved
beyond these limitations by setting up their own framework of cooperation.146
The EU could therefore use the experience of GRECO as a point of departure for
its own anti-corruption framework. The main advantage of a separate framework is the
fact that, due to a degree of integration among Member States within the EU, it could
have a more binding nature. Moreover, since 1997 the EU has been gradually gaining
experience in the evaluation of national anti-corruption policies in the candidate
countries, and this experience has contributed to the emergence of new EU standards in
this area.
The accession of the candidate countries to GRECO was not considered enough
to guarantee progress in combating corruption, and the EU decided to develop its own
policy to monitor progress in this area. The intergovernmental mechanisms of the
Council of Europe were not sufficient to address the needs of accession policy in this
area, and this was particularly evident in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania. Despite the
fact that both countries joined GRECO in 1999, the EU has remained concerned about
their problems with corruption. As has been observed, by defining the list of
benchmarks, the Commission signalled '...the need of a much more sophisticated tool
for evaluating governance reform and progress...'147
145 For more, see: J. Monar, 'The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Factors
and Costs' (2001) Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 39 No. 4,747-764, at 748-750.
146 Ibid, at 750.
147 Center for the Study of Democracy, 'The Future of Corruption Benchmarking in the EU' (2007) Brief
No 11, at 2 <http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=2117> accessed 12 December 2007.
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The possible anti-corruption framework could essentially be developed in two
ways, by using either a hard or a soft law approach. A 'hard law' option is to elaborate
an EU system for the fight against corruption that would contain a catalogue of the anti-
corruption benchmarks combined with an effective mechanism for its enforcement.
Chapter Two concluded that the EU has the legal capacity to develop a more
comprehensive anti-corruption framework under the third pillar, but progress in this area
depends on the political will of Member States. The development of a binding
framework is likely to meet strong Member State's resistance, as it would involve EU
interference in many areas of public policy within Member States, such as the
functioning of their public administration, the assessment of the independence of their
judicial systems and the freedom of media.
The second option, which has more chances to succeed, is to develop a soft anti-
corruption acquis based on benchmarking and the sharing of best practice. The term
'soft law' refers to rules that are not binding and there are no sanctions to enforce
compliance.148 One of the main advantages of this option is that Member States may be
more willing to agree on higher standards if they know that non-compliance will not be
sanctioned.
The EU has a suitable mechanism developed in other policy areas that could be
successfully applied in the area of anti-corruption. The new anti-corruption framework
could be based on the OMC initiated by the Lisbon European Council in 2000.149 The
OMC was first applied in the area of employment and gradually extended to other
148 A. Schafer, 'Resolving Deadlock: Why International Organisations Introduce Soft Law' (2006)
European Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2,194-208, at 195.
149 Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclusions (23 and 24 March 2000), para 37.
policies, such as social protection, social inclusion, education, youth and training150, it
has been adapted to the specific needs of each of these policies, but it generally involves:
• agreeing guidelines for the Union
• establishing indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored
to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means of comparing best
practice
• translating guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific
targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional
differences (preparing National Action Plans)
• periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning
processes.151
The OMC is designed to help Member States progressively to develop their own policies
towards certain common objectives. Most importantly, the OMC allows for cooperation
without interfering with the national autonomy of Member States. It draws on
benchmarking, mutual learning, the exchange of best practice and peer pressure to attain
its objectives. For the area of anti-corruption, it is of great importance that in drawing up
their national policies, Member States are asked to ensure active involvement of
NGOs.152 As Caviedes has observed, being forced to compare and evaluate national
policies in an open forum with the participation of the civil society and international
actors ' ...involves a risk of losing control over the agenda-setting process.'153 This may
150 Europa Glossary <http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossarv/open_method_coordination_en.htm> accessed 12
December 2007.
151 Lisbon European Council (n 149).
152 Commission (EC), 'Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
on the open method of coordination for the Community immigration policy' COM(2001) 387 final,
H.7.2001, at 14.
153 A. Caviedes, 'The open method of co-ordination in immigration policy: a tool for prying open Fortress
Europe?' (2004) Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 11 No. 2, 289-310, at 306.
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broaden the scope and increase the quality of anti-corruption reforms undertaken by
individual countries.154
In the area of anti-corruption, there is no need for a significant degree of
approximation of laws. The action rather requires compliance with a set of policy
principles that should be monitored in the Member States. Only certain areas are suitable
for legislative approximation. It particularly applies to the penalisation of various types
of corruption and the laundering of the proceeds of corruption, the liability of legal
persons or transparent public procurement procedures. As discussed in Chapter Three,
these areas are regulated by the EU legislator and the necessary minimum level of
approximation has already been achieved.
However, each national anti-corruption strategy, however, including preventive
polices, must be tailored to the specific need of a country. As already noted in Chapter
Five, the causes of corruption are country specific. It would not therefore be possible to
devise an optimal anti-corruption policy for a group of countries. Solutions that may
work in one country may not be beneficial in others. Although Member States face
similar challenges with respect to corruption, the optimal course of action is at the
national level. Devising an anti-corruption policy at the international level is rather about
setting a number of policy goals that all countries should comply with.
The OMC allows for policy formation best suited to national needs.155 The goals
are set at the EU level, but the responses are formulated at the national level. Member
States can leam about solutions found in other Member States and may apply them in
154 This is in line with Duina and Raunio who note that the experience to date shows that national
legislators used the OMC to develop more successful domestic laws and argue that' ...the OMC generates
insights and guidance into legislative best practices which can, in principle at least, be leveraged by
national legislators to produce more successful domestic legislation', see: F. Duina and T. Raunio, 'The
open method of co-ordination and national parliaments: further marginalization or new opportunities?'
(2007) Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 14 No. 4, 485-506, at 494 and 499-501.
155 D. Hodson and I. Maher, 'The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft
Economic Policy Co-ordination' (2001) Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 39 No. 4, 719-746, at
741.
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their own countries. As has been observed, the OMC could make it easier for Member
States to accept common targets '...as those would be combined with a longer time
horizon and a certain margin of national flexibility for the implementation of these
targets...'156
The demands of European integration require coordination in the area of anti-
corruption, but the EU competence in this field is weak. In the case of the OMC, the
existence of an explicit legal basis for EU action is not required, as each decision to
apply the OMC is taken on 'a case-by-case basis by the Council acting on a proposal
from the Commission or on its own initiative.'157 At the EU level, there is a need for a
framework that could influence the domestic policies and harness national authorities to
fight corruption. It is not about creating an EU anti-corruption model, but rather making
sure that Member States are part of a framework that ensures the continuity and
irreversibility of their anti-corruption efforts. All these factors make the model of the
OMC suitable for the needs of anti-corruption policy.
The first application of the OMC in the area of anti-corruption took place within
the accession process. As Tulmets has pointed out, the methods used for the preparation,
implementation and evaluation of twinning projects relied mainly on the OMC, in
particular given the fact that projects needed to indicate benchmarks to be achieved.158
As observed by Chapter Six, there were numerous twinning projects in the area of anti-
corruption through which the EU tried to compensate for the poor acquis in this area.
It should also be noted that the OMC has been used to achieve progress in
politically sensitive areas in the context of JHA. The Commission advocated using the
156 J. Monar, 'Maintaining the Justice and Home Affairs Acquis in an Enlarge Europe' in J. Apap (ed),
Justice and Home Affairs in the EU: Liberty Security Issues after Enlargement (Edward Elgar Publishing,
2004), 37-54, at 46.
157 European Parliament, 'Analysis of the open coordination procedure in employment and social affairs'
P5_TA(2003)0267, 5.6.2003.
158 E. Tulmets, 'The Introduction of the Open Method of Coordination in the European Enlargement
Policy: Analysing the Impact of the New PHARE/Twinning Instrument' (2005) European Political
Economy Review, Vol.3 No.l, 54-90, at 63.
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OMC for immigration and asylum policy, proposing the adoption of guidelines to be
implemented through national action plans and monitored by the Commission, which
would also make new legislative proposals wherever needed.159 In the area of
immigration, the OMC is meant to support and complement EC legislation.160
The intergovernmental nature of the OMC, however, carries some risks. The
guidelines are open to different interpretations, non-compliance is not subject to any
legal sanction, and 'peer pressure' may not ensure respect for deadlines.161 However, as
Pieth has argued, '..."soft law" is not a "soft option"', and the impact of politically
binding recommendations should not be underestimated.162 At the international level,
monitoring procedures and the risk of public exposure by peers have proved to be highly
effective in the area of money laundering.163 As observed in Chapter One, in the area of
anti-corruption, the OECD WG and GRECO peer pressure mechanisms have also
proved to bring results.
Moreover, the OMC could 'serve to reconfigure the boundaries of competence
between the Member States and the Union.'164 As Schafer has observed, in the longer
term, 'soft law' may turn into 'a more solid form of cooperation and foster its own
unanticipated dynamic, but during negotiations its main virtue is to avoid deadlock.'165
An anti-corruption framework based on the OMC can help to identify common problems
and this in turn may lead to recognition that a European response is necessary. The
159 Commission (n 152) and Commission (EC), 'Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament on the common asylum policy, introducing an open coordination method'
COM(2001) 710 final, 28.11.2001.
160 Caviedes (n 153), at 299.
161 J. Monar, 'Justice and Home Affairs after the 2004 enlargement' (2003) The International Spectator
1/2003,1-18, at 10
162 jyj pieth, 'The Harmonization of Law Against Economic Crime' (1999) European Journal of Law
Reform, Vol. 1 No. 4, 527-545, at 536.
163 Ibid.
164 Hodson and Maher (n 155), at 722-723.
165 Schafer (n 148), at 198.
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resulting EU measure could then be based on best practices rather than on a
compromise.166
Conclusion
The policy towards candidate countries should act as a laboratory for the further
development of EU policy towards Member States. The current EU anti-corruption
framework does not secure the achievements made by the CEE countries, and the
reforms in this area take a long time to deliver results. Consequently, there is a need for
constant pressure on new Member States to continue with domestic reforms.
This need was expressly recognised by the EU in its policy towards Romania and
Bulgaria. However, the verification mechanism designed to safeguard reforms in both
countries after the accession is only temporary and its application raises serious political
problems. Instead of taking a decision to single out Romania and Bulgaria, the EU
should have developed a framework which could have been equally applied to all
Member States.
The 2004 enlargement acted as a catalyst for change only to a limited extent.
More radical changes occurred in the external policy of the EU. The experience gained
by the EU in dealing with the problem of corruption in the CEE countries was utilised
and reinforced in the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. The Commission has also
decided to change its enlargement strategy for candidate countries and set precise anti-
corruption benchmarks at an earlier stage of the accession process. Another important
impact of the experience gained in the 2004 enlargement is the inclusion of prevention
and combating corruption into the policy towards the Western Balkans and within the
ENP. As a result, the EU is applying enlargement instruments to promote anti-corruption
reforms in the third countries.
166 Monar (n 161), at 14.
294
The 2004 enlargement did not have any immediate impact on EU policy against
corruption within existing Member States. Nonetheless, the subsequent policy
developments suggest that this EU policy may change. This in particular applies to
developing common statistics on corruption, the planned evaluation of national anti-
corruption policies in the context of organised crime, and the setting up of an anti-
corruption network. These initiatives may contribute to exposing the scale of corruption,
which in turn could prompt the Member States to delegate more powers in this area to
the EU. The initiatives of Member States are often reactive to the political situation, and
if corruption is found to endanger the effective implementation of the acquis, then the
Member States may be willing to give the EU powers to define standards and evaluate
their anti-corruption efforts.
The last two enlargements, however, have profoundly transformed the EU. The
accession of the CEE countries gave the EU the opportunity to define the values on
which its membership is based. Within the pre-accession process, the EU emphasised
that it was ' ...more than an economic partnership of convenience, but a true community
of values shared across Europe... '167 Now there is a need to uphold these values inside
the EU as well. The EU should not only promote democracy outside its borders, but it
should also foster democracy within its Member States. In the EU external policy,
combating corruption has been consistently recognised as an important element of the
EU model of democracy. However, the EU has not yet developed a coherent policy to
address the problem of corruption within its Member States.
As an important international policy player, the EU should use its political
capacity and institutional framework to promote uniformly high anti-corruption
standards across its Member States. It is proposed that the EU should develop a soft anti-
corruption acquis, composed of non-binding guidelines and indicators. The effectiveness
of such an anti-corruption framework would rely on a form of peer pressure as well as
167 Open Society Institute, 'Judicial Independence in the EU Accession Process' (2001), at 26
<http://www.eumap.org/topics/judicial/reports/judicial01/sections/overview/iudicial_accession.pdf>
accessed 12 December 2007.
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naming and shaming, as no Member State wants to be seen as the worst in this policy
area. Sound anti-corruption reforms would enhance the credibility of the European
integration project and would send the right message to external countries where the EU
seeks to promote democracy and the rule of law.
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Conclusion
The EU successfully supported and reinforced political and economic reforms in the
accession states in Central and Eastern Europe. The incentive of membership benefits
combined with strong conditionality gave the EU the necessary leverage to promote
anti-corruption reforms in candidate countries. The post-communist countries had to
meet vast anti-corruption requirements and were subject to an intrusive evaluation
mechanism. Significant improvements were made, but it was far from a complete
process. Corruption is an ongoing challenge and combating it requires a long term and
consistent commitment. The EU has been able to use the accession process to commit
the CEE countries' national governments to anti-corruption reforms, but this ability
ceased to exist on the day of accession. If the irreversibility of anti-corruption reforms is
not ensured, there is a danger that the quality of democratic changes in these countries
could be seriously undermined.
The need for a more coherent anti-corruption policy became particularly urgent
with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. The recourse to a post-accession
verification mechanism only demonstrated that the EU was unable to respond to the
problem of corruption within the countries once they gained a Member State status. It
also showed that the EU recognises that current pre-accession policy is not robust
enough to cure problems with corruption in the candidate countries.
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As a result of the 2004 enlargement, corruption became one of the priorities in
EU external policy. The EU reinforced its anti-corruption strategy towards the candidate
and potential candidate countries. While improvements in the external policy need to be
assessed positively, they do not change the fact that the EU must also address the
problem of corruption within existing Member States, as the disparity between the
standards imposed on candidate countries and those inside the EU is substantial.
The continuing problem of corruption in the new Member States and the lack of
an effective mechanism to address it may undermine the commitment of the EU to
future enlargements. It comes at a time when the countries of the Western Balkans need
reassurance that they have a clear prospect of EU membership. As in the case of the
CEE countries, such a prospect is the strongest incentive to promote reform in the
Western Balkans. A coherent framework against corruption within the Member States is,
therefore, indispensable if the EU wants to continue to promote democracy and stability
in its external policy.
This thesis has demonstrated that the EU has not developed a coherent policy
against corruption across the Member States and therefore is not able to safeguard the
achievements made by the candidate countries during the accession process. The limited
response of the EU to the problem of corruption can be explained by the lack of a
broader competence in this area. While it is important to emphasise that the EU took
initiatives in the areas where the competence is clear, such as cross-border corruption,
more needs to be done.
The EU has the necessary tools that could be used to instigate Member States
towards developing common anti-corruption standards. However, any progress in this
area depends on the political will of the Member States. This is best illustrated in the
context of the proposal to establish an anti-corruption network. Discussion on the role of
this network and the subsequent amendments to the proposal show the reluctance of
Member States to establish more ambitious cooperation in this area.
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Up until now, the EU has not addressed corruption as a general threat to
democracy and the rule of law across the Member States. Instead, corruption has been
targeted by the EU legislation only as an unwanted side-effect in the creation of the
internal market. Although the EU was the first organisation at the pan-European level to
criminalise cross-border bribery, address corruption in the private sector and introduce
the liability of legal persons, its initiatives remain narrow and now lag behind
international developments in this area. It can be said that the EU initiatives stopped
'half way through' in comparison with evolving international standards.
While the Council of Europe, the OECD and the UN instruments increasingly
embrace efforts to prevent corruption, EU action remains focused on the repression of
the offence of bribery. In addition, other international organisations increasingly
recognise the fundamental importance of ensuring appropriate monitoring mechanisms
for the success of any anti-corruption initiative. Meanwhile, the EU monitoring
framework remains ineffective and highly fragmented.
The internal market is based on the mutual confidence that the administrative and
judicial systems across the Member States fully respect the rule of law. Moreover,
unprecedented integration in the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters has
been increasingly based on mutual recognition and the Member States' trust in each
others systems. The new measures rest on the assumption that respect for the rule of law
exists uniformly throughout all Member States. In practice, however, some new and old
Member States score poorly in the international anti-corruption rankings. If the EU
stands for democracy and the rule of law, it should develop its own framework to ensure
uniformly high anti-corruption standards throughout the Member States. Cormption
undermines the rule of law and corrodes tmst. It is therefore of fundamental importance
that all the Member States have in place an effective system to fight cormption. For all
these reasons, the EU should not leave the regulation of cormption only to
intergovernmental cooperation at the international level.
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Although the Member States agree on much more far reaching anti-corruption
instruments at the international level, they have been unwilling to create a more
ambitious system at the EU level. Other international instruments are much more
comprehensive but have a less binding nature. Meanwhile, the EU has been unable to
develop more robust instruments due to the constant struggle between the Member
States and the Community institutions over the division of powers. This struggle is not
confined to the area of anti-corruption, but also taking place in other internal market
matters. In the third pillar, this struggle is particularly visible because cooperation is
needed in very sensitive areas that traditionally fell within the realm of national
competence. Gradually, as a result of the Court of Justice case law, EU powers are
progressing independently from the will of the Member States. As a result, the Member
States prefer to leave the regulation of such sensitive policy matters as anti-corruption to
intergovernmental organisations.
At the same time, however, it is the unique and highly advanced integration
system of the EU that could bring the most effective results in the fight against
corruption across the Member States. EU action in this area does not have to involve any
transfer of sovereign powers from the Member States. In the area of anti-corruption,
there is a special need for mutual learning and exchange of best practices across
countries. The Member States should use the procedures and institutions developed
within the EU to agree on higher common anti-corruption standards. Such a framework
would not rely on legal sanctions, but rather on persuasion to comply with these
standards.
The argument for a separate EU framework is not, however, based on the claim
that other monitoring mechanisms at the pan-European level are not effective. Quite to
the contrary, the EU system would build on these initiatives and not undermine them. It
should be developed in close cooperation with other monitoring mechanisms. There is a
need to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts, especially considering that all these
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mechanisms have limited resources and different priorities. The EU mechanism could
focus on the implementation of the relevant EU instruments. In addition, the limited
membership would be an advantage, as it would allow for identifying and addressing
problems common to the Member States.
There is also no need for reinventing a new system. The EU could draw on
existing monitoring mechanisms, such as the ones developed by GRECO, the OECD or
FATF. The EU also could use the experience it gained within its own mutual evaluation
system in the area of organised crime. One important lesson from the 2004 enlargement
is that in order to increase the effectiveness of evaluations and dissemination of best
practice in this area, the review process must be transparent and present opportunities for
participation by civil society. A process whereby governments are assessing
governments behind closed doors is not appropriate in the area of anti-corruption.
An improved EU framework alone would not guarantee success in the fight
against corruption. Every international initiative in this area must be accompanied by
political will coming from within countries. Efforts to fight corruption require strong
local leadership and ownership. The EU would help to create additional incentives and
provide a forum for the exchange of best practices among Member States.
The question of whether the EU should address corruption within the Member
States is in reality part of a more fundamental question about the objectives and the role
of the EU. Is its aim primarily economic integration or a union of values? The European
Community had economic origins but has been gradually embracing other fields of
policy. Since the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, the creation of the single
market has been recognised as the principal objective of integration. The goal of EU
policy in the area of justice and home affairs was subordinated to this goal and served to
compensate for the abolition of internal border controls. A good example of this is the
EU policy against corruption, where the EU focused on regulating cross-border
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corruption because of an obvious need for EU action as a consequence of the open
border between Member States.
The EU moved beyond the single market agenda in its policy towards the CEE
candidate countries, where it focused more than ever on the promotion of democracy
and the rule of law. The question is whether the EU should do the same in its policy
towards all Member States. The answer must be yes. This thesis has demonstrated that
the EU has the capacity and 'know-how' to develop common anti-corruption standards.
The question remains whether there is a political will to take action.
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List of interviews and consultations
The title or affiliation listed is accurate at the time of the interview
Interviews
Peter Jozsef Csonka, Head of Unit, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and
Security, European Commission (Brussels, 2 December 2005)
Jacek Garstka, Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to the
European Union in Brussels (Brussels, 1 December 2005)
Grazyna Kopiriska, Stefan Batory Foundation, Anti-Corruption Programme,
Poland (Warsaw, 16 May 2005)
Lucinda Mac Mahon, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security,
European Commission (Brussels, 29 November 2005)
Julia Pitera, Transparency International Poland (Warsaw, 17 May 2005)
Mieneke de Ruiter, General Secretariat DG H 2 B - Judicial Cooperation
(Brussels, 5 December 2005)
Sabine Zwaenepoel, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security,
European Commission (Brussels, 29 November 2005)
Consultations
Laetitia Bot, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (Personal
email correspondence 30 March 2006 and 16 June 2006)
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (Personal email
correspondence 22 May 2006).
Hans Nilsson, Head of Unit, General Secretariat of the Council of the European





On The Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight Against Corruption
(adopted on 6 November 1997)
1. to take effective measures for the prevention of corruption and, in this
connection, to raise public awareness and promoting ethical behaviour;
2. to ensure co-ordinated criminalisation of national and international corruption;
3. to ensure that those in charge of the prevention, investigation, prosecution
and adjudication of corruption offences enjoy the independence and autonomy
appropriate to their functions, are free from improper influence and have
effective means for gathering evidence, protecting the persons who help the
authorities in combating corruption and preserving the confidentiality of
investigations;
4. to provide appropriate measures for the seizure and deprivation of the
proceeds of corruption offences;
5. to provide appropriate measures to prevent legal persons being used to shield
corruption offences;
6. to limit immunity from investigation, prosecution or adjudication of corruption
offences to the degree necessary in a democratic society;
7. to promote the specialisation of persons or bodies in charge of fighting
corruption and to provide them with appropriate means and training to perform
their tasks;
8. to ensure that the fiscal legislation and the authorities in charge of
implementing it contribute to combating corruption in an effective and co¬
ordinated manner, in particular by denying tax deductibility, under the law or in
practice, for bribes or other expenses linked to corruption offences;
9. to ensure that the organisation, functioning and decision-making processes of
public administrations take into account the need to combat corruption, in
particular by ensuring as much transparency as is consistent with the need to
achieve effectiveness;
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10. to ensure that the rules relating to the rights and duties of public officials take
into account the requirements of the fight against corruption and provide for
appropriate and effective disciplinary measures; promote further specification of
the behaviour expected from public officials by appropriate means, such as
codes of conduct;
11. to ensure that appropriate auditing procedures apply to the activities of
public administration and the public sector;
12. to endorse the role that audit procedures can play in preventing and
detecting corruption outside public administrations;
13. to ensure that the system of public liability or accountability takes account of
the consequences of corrupt behaviour of public officials;
14. to adopt appropriately transparent procedures for public procurement that
promote fair competition and deter corruptors;
15. to encourage the adoption, by elected representatives, of codes of conduct
and promote rules for the financing of political parties and election campaigns
which deter corruption;
16. to ensure that the media have freedom to receive and impart information on
corruption matters, subject only to limitations or restrictions which are necessary
in a democratic society;
17. to ensure that civil law takes into account the need to fight corruption and in
particular provides for effective remedies for those whose rights and interests
are affected by corruption;
18. to encourage research on corruption;
19. to ensure that in every aspect of the fight against corruption, the possible
connections with organised crime and money laundering are taken into account;
20. to develop to the widest extent possible international co-operation in all
areas of the fight against corruption.
305
Appendix 2
Ten Principles for Improving the Fight Against Corruption in Acceding,
Candidate and Other Third Countries
Commission (EC), 'Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee on a Comprehensive EU Policy
Against Corruption' COM(2003) 317 final, 28.5.2003, Annex
1. To ensure credibility, a clear stance against corruption is essential from
leaders and decision-makers. Bearing in mind that no universally applicable
recipes exist, national anti-corruption strategies or programmes, covering both
preventive and repressive measures, should be drawn up and implemented.
These strategies should be subject to broad consultation at all levels.
2 Current and future EU Members shall fully align with the EU acquis and ratify
and implement all main international anti-corruption instruments they are party to
(UN, Council of Europe and OECD Conventions). Third countries should sign
and ratify as well as implement relevant international anti-corruption instruments.
3. Anti-corruption laws are important, but more important is their implementation
by competent and visible anti-corruption bodies (i.e. well trained and specialised
services such as anti-corruption prosecutors). Targeted investigative techniques,
statistics and indicators should be developed. The role of law enforcement
bodies should be strengthened concerning not only corruption but also fraud, tax
offences and money laundering.
4. Access to public office must be open to every citizen. Recruitment and
promotion should be regulated by objective and merit-based criteria. Salaries
and social rights must be adequate. Civil servants should be required to disclose
their assets. Sensitive posts should be subject to rotation.
5. Integrity, accountability and transparency in public administration (judiciary,
police, customs, tax administration, health sector, public procurement) should be
raised through employing quality management tools and auditing and monitoring
standards, such as the Common Assessment Framework of EU Heads of Public
Administrations and the Strasbourg Resolution. Increased transparency is
important in view of developing confidence between the citizens and public
administration.
6. Codes of conduct in the public sector should be established and monitored.
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7. Clear rules should be established in both the public and private sector on
whistle blowing (given that corruption is an offence without direct victims who
could witness and report it) and reporting.
8. Public intolerance of corruption should be increased, through awareness
raising campaigns in the media and training. The central message must be that
corruption is not a tolerable phenomenon, but a criminal offence. Civil society
has an important role to play in preventing and fighting the problem.
9. Clear and transparent rules on party financing, and external financial control
of political parties, should be introduced to avoid covert links between politicians
and (illicit) business interests. Political parties evidently have strong influence on
decision-makers, but are often immune to anti-bribery laws.
10. Incentives should be developed for the private sector to refrain from corrupt
practices such as codes of conduct or "white lists" for integer companies.
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